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Labour's  election  victory  in  1997  was  heralded  as  a  new  era,  the  dawn  of  a 
Third  Way,  a  novel  attempt  to  chart  a  unique  political  course  overcoming  the 
perceived  limitations  of  both  New  Right  and  Old  Labour.  In  this  thesis  I  explore  the 
era  of  New  Labour  generally  and,  in  particular,  the  impact  of  the  Third  Way  on 
working  lives.  Key  to  my  analysis  is  New  Labour's  attempt  to  synthesise 
oppositional  interests,  in  particular  those  of  capital  and  labour.  This  involves  a  crucial 
rhetoric  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership.  My  research  explores  the 
rhetoric  of  New  Labour  in  relation  to  the  reality  of  this  new  force  in  power.  It  does 
this  by: 
"  drawing  out  key  features  in  the  development  of  New  Labour,  especially  its 
relation  to  Old  Labour; 
"  examining  central  elements  of  New  Labour  ideology; 
"  arguing  that  Scotland  should  be  seen  as  central  to  the  transition  from  Old  to 
New  : Labour; 
"  utilising  a  case  study  of  industrial  relations  developments  in  a  major 
electronics  factory  in  the  West  of  Scotland  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  key 
developments  in  public  sector  employment. 
My  main  finding  is  that  where  New  Labour's  ideology  promises  positive  benefits, 
the  form  of  its  implementation  has  negative  impacts  for  workers.  Since  I  take  New 
Labour  as  a  process,  my  thesis  concludes  with  a  more  speculative  exploration  of 
possible  future  developments,  both  in  relations  to  New  Labour's  role  in  them,  and 
their  possible  impact  on  the  New  Labour  project. 
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The  Return  to  Work 
This  is  fundamentally  a  thesis  about  work.  Writing  in  the  year  of  New 
Labour's  `historic'  election  victory,  Richard  Brown  was  able  to  note  two  important 
points  in  relation  to  the  motivation  behind  my  conducting  this  research.  The  first  is 
that,  saving  a  few  notable  exceptions: 
Among  sociologists  the  study  of  work  and  employment  has  become 
much  less  fashionable  than  it  was  twenty  to  thirty  years  ago  (Brown 
1997:  1). 
The  research  is  also  based  on  my  understanding  of,  and  support  for,  Brown's  further 
claim  that: 
The  availability  of  opportunities  for  employment  and  the  conditions 
under  which  they  are  employed,  still  have  more  impact  on  most 
individual's  life  chances  than  many  other  more  fashionable  concerns. 
Work  and  employment  structure  our  lives  and  shape  inequalities  of 
condition  and  opportunity  to  a  greater  extent  than  most  if  not  all  other 
areas  of  social  life  (ibid). 
So,  what  follows  is  intended  as  a  contribution  to  the  study  of  work  and  employment, 
and  the  contours  of  the  relationships,  and  the  ideologies,  that  help  shape  the 
contemporary  experiences  of  workers.  In  recognition  of  the  importance  of  work  and 
employment  for  Sociology,  I  seek  to  confirm  the  necessity  of  a  `turn'  to  work,  linked 
specifically  to  the  relationship  between  it  and  the  contemporary  period.  Hence,  both 
work  and  the  dominant  ideological  current,  embodied  in  New  Labour  and  the  Third 
Way,  are  given  equal  weight,  and  I  analyse  their  interconnectedness.  Sociological 
writings  on  work  when  it  was  more  `fashionable',  for  example  Beynon  (1973/1984), 
Nichols  and  Armstrong  (1976),  Nichols  and  Beynon  (1977),  Poliert  (1981)  and  more 
recent  contributions  from,  for  example,  Darlington,  have  clearly  demonstrated  the 
need  for  the  study  of  work  to  be  underpinned  by  a  concern  to  analyse  it  in  relation  to 
politics  and  political  developments.  Work,  employment  and  `industry'  cannot  be 
separated  from  questions  of  power,  ideology  and  prevailing  political  trends,  and  it  is 2 
an  appreciation  of  this,  gleaned  from  the  studies  of  work  noted  above,  that  underpins 
this  thesis. 
In  addition,  it  is  underpinned  by  a  motivation  to  develop  an  analysis  of  key 
political  developments  of,  in  particular,  the  last  decade  and  the  specific  context  these 
have  created  for  workers.  Thus,  in  coming  to  try  to  understand  New  Labour,  it 
became  clear  that  New  Labour,  in  itself,  further  necessitates  a  `return'  to  the  study  of 
work.  Firstly,  it  is  important  to  recognise  the  absolute  centrality  of  work  to  New 
Labour.  Work  is,  for  New  Labour,  both  the  best  form  of  welfare  and,  in  turn,  the 
central  mechanism  to  facilitate  delivery  of  its  apparently  key  social  justice  aims. 
Gradually,  a  central  objective  of  the  research  became  to  explore  New  Labour's 
commitments  to  social  justice,  the  salience  of  its  claims  regarding  its  delivery,  and 
whether,  in  any  sense,  its  programme  of  reform  in  employment  relations  and  in  the 
public  sector  would  result  in  the  delivery  of  social  justice  `at  work'.  In  undertaking 
the  empirical  work  described  below,  I  sought  to  ensure  that  such  considerations  were 
not  explored  in  a  `top  down'  manner  and  that  the  experiences  of  workers  remained 
central. 
Secondly,  there  are  specific  and  crucial  elements  of  New  Labour  ideology 
operating  to  fundamentally  shape  the  experiences  of  workers.  Much  time,  journalistic, 
and  academic  effort  has  gone  into  `mapping'  New  Labour,  its  ideology  and 
trajectories.  This  thesis  is,  therefore,  intended  as  a  contribution  to  the  discussion  and 
understanding  of  New  Labour.  However,  in  this  study  I  also  seek  to  relate  key 
ideological  tenets  to  the  contemporary  experience  of  work.  I  seek  to  outline  and 
examine  the  `real'  impact  of  New  Labour  on  real  people's  lives.  It  could  be  argued 
that  there  is  a  welter  of  knowledge  about,  for  example,  three  of  the  fundamental  tenets 
of  New  Labour  ideology  -  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership  -  but  there  is 
little  concern,  especially,  though  not  exclusively,  from  within  New  Labour,  about  how 
their  contradictory  features  negatively  affect  workers  and  communities.  My 
contribution  is  intended  to  demonstrate  that  this  represents  a  gap  in  our  understanding 
that  needs  to  be  addressed,  and  is  offered  as  a  tentative  step  towards  redressing  the 
balance. 
A  further,  central,  concern  of  New  Labour  is  linked  to  its  endeavour  to  put  an 
ideological  proclivity  to  synthesise  oppositional  interests  into  practice.  The  most 3 
significant  manifestation  of  this,  in  terms  of  this  thesis,  is  that  to  synthesise  the 
interests  of  capital  and  labour.  This  is  clearly  embodied  in  New  Labour's  'partnership' 
agenda  and  the  proposed  development  of  a  new  workplace  culture  of  mutual  gains. 
This  necessitates  an  understanding  of  contemporary  developments  within  trade  unions 
as  they  remain  "the  only  organisations  in  Britain  which  can  claim  a  truly  mass 
membership  of  working  people"  (Spencer  1989:  13).  As  the  most  obvious  expression 
of  labour  collectively  represented,  it  is  important  to  analyse  how  they  have  responded 
to  political  developments,  particularly  those  linked  with  the  New  Labour  government 
they  played  a  crucial  role  in  returning  to  power  after  decades  in  the  wilderness.  New 
Labour's  courtship  of  business  and  its  pursuit  of  the  interests  of  capital,  discussed 
throughout,  mean  that  the  historic  relationship  between  trade  unions  and  the  Labour 
Party  also  requires  scrutiny.  First,  in  the  context  of  a  decade  of  `modernisation',  then 
in  a  era  of  a  New  Labour  government,  unions  have  changed.  This  has  resulted  in  an 
institutionally  consensual  approach  where  a  formerly  independent,  conflictual, 
orientation  has  been  marginalised  (Darlington  1994a),  and  the  extent  to  which  unions 
continue  "to  provide  an  experience  outside  the  dominant  ideology"  (Spencer  1989: 
16)  needs  further  exploration.  I  consider  this  below,  with  reference  also  to  how  the 
dominant  approach  of  trade  unions  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  has  helped  to  mould  New 
Labour's  ideological  premises.  An  infamous  and  defining  feature  of  the  development 
of  New  Labour,  and  the  transition  from  Old  to  New  Labour,  has  been  a  fierce  rebuttal 
of  perceived  independent  trade  union  power  in  the  1970s  and  its  preclusion  of  the 
return  of  those  times.  What  I  seek  to  demonstrate  below  is  the  structural  expression  of 
this  ideological  premise,  alongside  the  consideration  of  continuities  between  what  is 
understood  as  Old  Labour  and  New  Labour. 
However,  it  has  also  been  necessary  to  unpack  the  layers  of  the  context  that 
New  Labour  is  both  relating  to  and  seeking  to  shape.  In  this  respect,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  this  research,  a  further  important  element  concerns  New  Labour's  claims  of 
`decentralised'  decision  making  and  the  `new'  political  circumstances  created  by 
devolution.  This  is  connected  to  the  need  to  outline  fully  the  circumstances  in  which 
capital  and  labour  act.  But  it  is  also  connected  to  a  developing  understanding  of 
Scotland  as  a  special  critical  case  in  terms  of  the  wider  themes  explored  here.  Thus, 
the  election  for  the  first  Scottish  Parliament  in  1999  and  the  issues  that  emerged 4 
around  it  are  analysed  as  a  key,  defining,  moment  both  in  Scottish  politics  and  in  the 
development  of  New  Labour. 
Thus,  although  initially  I  was  intending  to  utilise  the  coming  of  New  Labour 
as  a  framing  devise,  it  quickly  became  clear  that  it  was  much  more  than  this.  What  I 
was  dealing  with  was  not  just  twenty  years  of  union  decline,  twenty  years  of 
Thatcherism,  and  the  anti-trade  union  laws  that  helped  define  its  epoch.  I  was  also 
dealing  with  twenty  years  of  development  within  Labour,  and,  more  specifically, 
almost  a  decade  of  its  modernisation  from  which  what  we  now  know  as  New  Labour 
emerged.  My  realisation  necessitated  a  shift  in  focus  that  required  a  fuller 
understanding  of  New  Labour's  development  and  its  ideological  premises.  It  also 
meant  that  an  analysis  of  this  would  need  to  be  offered  as  a  sound  foundation  for  the 
empirical  material.  The  Third  Way  that  New  Labour  supports  is  fundamentally 
premised  on  the  acceptance  of  the  central  Thatcherite  tenet  `there  is  no  alternative':  to 
market  forces,  to  globalisation,  to  neo-liberal  solutions.  In  particular,  from  within  this 
perspective,  there  is  neither  the  scope  nor  the  will  for  collective  resistance.  A 
fundamental  question  that  I  set  out  to  explore  was  whether  having  a  Labour 
government  after  two  decades  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  working  lives,  on 
militancy,  and  on  union  growth.  It  also  aimed  to  assess  the  type  of  trade  unionism  that 
developed  as  a  result.  Further,  in  terms  of  employment  relations,  New  Labour's 
approach  is  framed  in  and  through  its  ideology  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and 
partnership  and  the  concern  to  synthesise  interests,  central  to  Third  Way  thinking. 
This  is  further  confirmed  once  New  Labour's  and  the  Third  Way's  central  justification 
for  its  analyses  are  explored,  the  demands  of  globalisation  and  how  those  in  power 
seek  to  operate  in  the  context  of  its  apparent  trajectories.  Globalisation  is  granted  an 
ethereal  quality  in  New  Labour  analyses.  Yet,  as  Brown  (1997:  11)  argues,  it  is 
important  to  recognise  that: 
It  would  be  wrong  [however]  to  see  `globalisation'  as  some  sort  of 
inevitable  process  arising  from  the  working  out  of  immutable 
economic  laws.  The  liberalisation  of  trade  and  the  deregulation  of 
financial  markets  are  the  result,  at  least  in  part,  of  political  decisions, 
and  their  effects  can  be  modified  by  political  choices  on  the  part  of 
individual  governments. 5 
It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  explore  and  analyse  the  New  Labour  response  to 
`globalisation'  and  its  perceptions  of  social  change,  and  to  outline  its  overall  effects 
on  workers.  Insight  in  this  respect  is  achieved,  in  no  small  measure,  by  my  empirical 
focus  on  an  industry  and  a  company  seemingly  seeking  to  respond  to  the  phenomenon 
of  globalisation,  and  my  own  exploration  of  its  'fit'  with  New  Labour's  construction  of 
a  `new'  world  of  work.  I  have  also  explored  how  this  'globalisation'  phenomenon 
impacted  at  local  level,  and  whether  there  was  evidence  that  New  Labour's 
ideological  premises  offered  anything  to  mitigate  its  worst  effects. 
Thus  far,  little  has  been  said  in  terms  of  workers  themselves.  One  of  the  most 
significant  conclusions  to  emerge  from  this  research,  as  alluded  to  above,  is  the 
importance  of  context.  `The  times'  in  which  contemporary  workers'  experiences  are 
shaped  play  a  crucial  role  in  their  development,  and  redevelopment,  as  workers  and  as 
trade  unionists.  It  is  worth  restating  the  materialist  conception  of  history  here  by  way 
of  demonstrating  my  support  for  this  analysis: 
Men  make  their  own  history,  but  they  do  not  make  it  just  as  they 
please;  they  do  not  make  it  under  circumstances  chosen  by  themselves, 
but  under  circumstances  directly  found,  given  and  transmitted  from  the 
past  (Marx  1852/1926:  1). 
What  I  set  out  to  do  was  to  illustrate  and  analyse  the  New  Labour  era  as  set  of 
circumstances  not  of  workers'  own  choosing.  This  resulted  in,  perhaps,  a  greater 
focus  on  structural  constraints  over  human  agency.  To  the  extent  this  is  the  case,  it  has 
occurred  as  `product'  of  the  research  process  itself.  I  believe  that,  to  an  extent,  this  is 
linked  the  nature  of  the  ideological  premises  focused  on  here.  Flexibility, 
competitiveness  and  partnership,  essentially  combine  to  marginalise  collective  agency 
`from  below'  as  a  force  for  meaningful  change.  They  re-affirm,  in  a  `new'  context  and 
in  a  `new'  way,  ideological  support  for  the  notion  that  workers  need  `look  upwards' 
rather  than  `across'.  At  the  same  time,  and  connected  to  this,  the  reproduction  of 
labour  and  of  trade  unionists  has  changed  in  many  respects.  The  de-industrialisation 
of  the  1980s,  especially,  and  an  acceptance  by  New  Labour  of  key  tenets  of  the  New 
Right  that  ignores  how,  despite  its  own  rhetoric,  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  even 
partnership  have  marginalisation  and  polarisation  `built  in',  continue  to  make  a 
significant  mark.  Moreover,  key  changes,  discussed  below,  suggest  that  some  of  the 6 
concepts  developed  to  deal  with  even  relatively  recent  phenomena  like  labour  market 
segmentation  already  need  modification.  This  again  draws  attention  to  structure  and 
the  need  to  fully  relate  to  this  has  shaped  what  is  presented  in  this  thesis. 
In  addition,  developing  a  comprehensive  and  coherent  account  of  the  New 
Labour  era  and  its  ideological  premises,  has  brought  with  it  difficulties  and 
constraints  in  terms  of  applying,  in  a  direct  way,  earlier  accounts  in  the  sociology  of 
work  and  trade  unionism.  `Importing'  the  experiences  of  workers  across  decades  of 
political  transformation  and  industrial  upheaval  proved  difficult.  The  conclusions  of 
many  of  these  earlier  accounts  remain  salient,  and  central  elements  of  the 
contradictions  they  exposed  evidently  remain.  I  hope  my  understanding  of,  and 
support  for,  such  conclusions  is  clear,  though  I  hope  it  is  also  clear  that  my  objective 
was  not  to  re-visit  and  revise  in  the  light  of  `new  developments'.  A  new  context  has 
emerged,  worthy  of  study,  critically  important  to  study  `in  its  own  right'. 
Such  accounts  have,  however,  crucially  informed  my  approach  and  I  would 
locate  myself  in  the  tradition  that  places  work,  and  the  perceptions  of  workers,  at  the 
centre  of  the  study  of  contemporary  capitalism.  Of  particular  importance  are  the 
works  of  Beynon  (1973/1984),  Nichols  and  Beynon  (1977)  and  Nichols  and 
Armstrong  (1976)  since  they  have,  above  all,  demonstrated  how  academic  rigour  does 
not  preclude  identification  with,  and  a  celebration  of,  workers'  militancy,  however 
that  is  manifest.  Consideration  of  Darlington's  work  (1993,1994a,  1994b,  1995, 
1996)  was  also  vital  in  this  respect,  and  with  reference  to  the  contours  of  workplace 
relations,  their  connections  to  wider  political  developments  and  the  impact  of  crucial 
developments  in  trade  union  orientation.  My  understanding  of  what  `we'  were  left 
with  by  the  mid  1990s,  as  a  sound  foundation  from  which  to  begin  my  own  analysis, 
comes  from  his  highly  effective  typology  of  the  bureaucratic,  consensual,  turn  away 
from  the  militancy  that  culminated  in  the  "Glorious  Summer"  of  1972  (Darlington 
1994a;  Darlington  and  Lyddon  2001).  Darlington's  conclusions  (2002)  on  the 
significance  of  the  role  of  left  wing  trade  unionists  in  the  development  of  sustainable, 
oppositional  trade  unionism,  were  also  influential,  though  the  `turn'  that  the  research 
took,  and  external  developments,  outlined  below,  limited  my  opportunity  to  fully 
apply  them  in  the  context  of  this  research.  Hyman's  work  (1975,1989)  provided  a 
useful  introduction  to  the  industrial  relations  arena  and  this  helped  me  to  develop  an 7 
understanding  of  the  interconnectedness  of  politics/power  and  industry/economics. 
Kelly's  arguments  (1996)  in  support  of  militancy  over  co-operation  and  partnership 
acted  as  a  basis  from  which  to  develop  my  own  critique  of  partnership,  and 
importantly,  allowed  me  to  relate  the  dangers  of  a  reliance  on  employer  goodwill  to 
real  experiences. 
The  role  of  the  literature  noted  above  in  relation  to  the  thesis  has  been  to 
underpin,  to  inform,  to  influence,  and,  fundamentally,  to  facilitate  the  development  of 
critical,  analytical  skills.  Thus,  it  is  not  synthesised  and  analysed  in  order  to  create  an 
explicit  theoretical  framework.  In  a  sense,  the  decision  not  to  begin  the  research 
process  with  the  development  of  a  theoretical  framework  can  be  justified,  firstly,  in 
relation  to  the  tradition  that  I  have  sought  to  lay  claim  to: 
Most  academic  sociologists  will  probably  be  critical  of  Working  for 
Ford  because  it  is  not  explicitly  'theoretical'...  Mr  Beynon  formulates 
no  initial  hypotheses  and  spends  little  time  discussing  the  theoretical 
contributions  made  by  previous  writers  as  a  prelude  to  demolishing  or 
revising  them.  But  the  book  is  not  the  less  theoretical  in  the  best 
sense...  (The  Times  Literary  Supplement  7th  August  1973  cited  in 
Beynon  1984:  22). 
Secondly,  this  approach  is  justifiable  with  reference  to  its  results.  Despite  the 
apparent  lack  of  academic  sociological  convention,  this  thesis  is  no  less  scholarly  or 
comprehensive.  Indeed,  I  would  argue  that,  it  is  all  the  more  comprehensive  for  the 
lack  of  a  strict  framework  since  this  has  facilitated  the  development  of  a  multi-faceted 
analysis.  What  is  presented  here  broadly  encapsulates  key  historical  and 
contemporary  developments  in  politics  and  power  relations,  in  employment  and 
industry,  and  draws  out  critical  links  between  them.  Moreover,  these  are  considered, 
discussed  and  analysed  in  relation  to  significant,  distinct,  yet  interconnected  sites. 
Overall,  in  bringing  all  these  elements  together,  I  seek  to  elucidate  key  features  of 
work  under  New  Labour  and,  in  doing  so,  to  demonstrate  the  central  contradictions  of 
New  Labour.  Whilst  not  suggesting  that  the  material  presented  represents  an  all 
embracing  account  of  work  in  the  New  Labour  era,  this  study  does  nevertheless 
represent  a  broad  challenge  to  its  ideological  premises.  It  is  a  snapshot  of  the  realities 
of  the  New/'new'  world  of  work  and  the  real  impacts  of  `working  the  Third  Way'. 8 
The  Research 
West  Coast  Computer  Industries' 
Noon  and  Blyton  (1997:  1)  have  pointed  out  that  the  mythology  of  the  `new' 
world  of  work  is  "profoundly  misleading".  Despite  the  New  Labour  ideal  of  a  new 
culture  at  work,  embraced  by  all  sides,  there  remains  an  asymmetry  of  power  and: 
Two  groups  engaged  in  a  structural  conflict...  each  of  the  parties 
maintain  their  own  distinct  agendas  (Noon  and  Blyton  1997:  7). 
In  1998,  I  believed  an  important  exemplar  of  this  crucial  distinction  was  developing 
`on  my  doorstep'.  A  militant  manifestation  of  this  structural  conflict  was  occurring 
just  as  the  New  Labour  notion,  embodied  in  the  Fairness  at  Work  White  Paper 
(Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  1998a),  rejecting  the  `old  battles  and  old  weapons' 
of  a  previous  industrial  era,  was  becoming  embedded.  Important  also  was  that  this 
was  occurring  in  an  electronics  factory,  West  Coast  Computer  Industries  (WCCI)  in 
Gourock,  Inverclyde.  In  this  so-called  `sunrise'  industry,  and  formerly  unfettered  by 
such  `traditional'  concerns,  a  group  of  workers  were  demonstrating  their  opposition  to 
management  using  `old  weapons',  including  seeking  out  collective  representation  by 
joining  a  trade  union,  the  Iron  and  Steel  Trade  Confederation  (ISTC)  in  significant 
numbers. 
In  terms  of  a  continuity  of  tradition  where  New  Labour  seeks  to  promote  a 
notion  of  transformation,  I  was  also  drawn  to  how  this  industry  was  shaping 
experience  in  a  geographical  area  for  those  who  work  in  it  and  the  wider  community. 
As  the  research  progressed,  it  became  increasingly  clear  that  the  move  in  this  area 
from  `ships  to  chips'  has  seen  electronics  permeate  the  very  sinew  of  a  locale,  in  the 
ways  traditional  industries  did  in  the  past.  This  helps  challenges  the  mythology  of  the 
`new'  world  of  work  and,  I  believe,  re-affirms,  in  a  new  context,  the  sentiment  behind 
a  famous  speech  by  the  Upper  Clyde  Shipbuilders  (UCS)  militant,  Jimmy  Reid,  made 
in  1971  during  their  historic  fight  for  `the  right  to  work':  "we  don't  just  make  ships  on 
the  Clyde,  we  make  men"  (quoted  in  Foster  and  Woolfson  1986:  193).  The 
dominance  of  electronics  giants  like  IBM  and  National  Semiconductor,  and  the 
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increasing  reliance  of  the  area's  labour  market  on  the  supply  network  of  the  former, 
which  WCCI  formed  a  significant  element  of,  made  it  increasingly  clear  that  in 
Inverclyde:  `we  don't  just  make  computers,  we  make  people'.  What  was  also 
happening  in  1998  at  WCCI  was  that  trade  unionists  were  being  `made'  and  `remade'. 
This  group  were  relatively  isolated,  in  terms  of  their  militancy,  if  not  in  terms 
of  the  production  network  that  their  employer  was  part  of,  but  there  was  possibility 
that  their  fight  for  an  independent  voice  in  the  workplace  could  act  as  a  catalyst  to 
others  in  the  industry  to  follow  suit.  I  sought  to  explore  how  their  struggle  to  join  a 
union  and,  subsequently,  to  have  `their'  union  recognised,  developed  in  the  light  of  a 
new  and  emerging  context.  It  was  also  important  to  link  the  contours  of  workers' 
battles  with  management,  and  their  outcomes,  to  New  Labour  and  its  trajectories,  and 
to  assess  the  success  of  New  Labour's  promises  in  relation  to  the  experience  of  these 
workers.  Given  the  traditional  approach  by  these  workers  to  employer  offensive  in 
terms  of  wildcat  action,  I  was  keen  to  develop  an  understanding  of  the  sort  of  trade 
unionism  that  would  emerge  in  this  context  and  in  the  New  Labour  era.  Crucially,  not 
only  did  WCCI  seemingly  represent  the  possibility  of  acting  as  a  spark  to  other 
workers  locally,  it  also  represented  a  key  site  through  which  to  analyse  embryonic  and 
developing  trade  union  activism  under  all  that  is  New  Labour.  WCCI  was  at  the  most 
hostile  end  of  the  employer  spectrum  in  terms  of  trade  union  activity.  It  was  therefore 
important  to  explore  this  situation  in  the  context  of  the  New  Labour  `dream'  of  the 
mutual  gains  workplace  and  the  partnership  ideal,  central  to  its  creation  of  a  `new' 
culture  at  work.  Essentially,  what  began  as  a  concern  to  chart  militancy  in  a  particular 
location  and  the  impact  of  a  `positive'  legislative  programme  for  employment 
relations,  developed  into  an  analysis  of  New  Labour  generally,  with  specific  reference 
to  one  workplace  in  a  key  industry  in  Scotland.  Thus  WCCI  was  studied  through  the 
prism  of  the  structural  context  progressively  being  developed  in,  and  through,  the 
totality  of  New  Labour. 
The  majority  of  the  empirical  material  presented  here  relates  to  this  group  of 
workers.  This  was  a  study  that  sought  to  explore  workplace  experience,  largely  from 
the  perspectives  of  key  activists  and  through  an  analysis  of  secondary  sources.  I  have 
had  no  formal  access  to  the  company  or  its  employment  relations  policies.  When  I 
made  initial  contact  with  the  company  in  1998,  a  conversation  with  the  Human 10 
Resources  Manager  indicated  that  the  company  might  be  willing  to  participate  in  a 
minimal  way,  but  this  seemed  contingent  on  any  `findings'  being  made  available  to 
the  company  in  order  for  managers  to  gauge  the  strength  of  a  "pro-union  feeling"  in 
this  factory  and  a  "mood  of  collectivism".  But  I  wanted  to  study  WCCI  from  a  critical 
perspective  and  was  therefore  conscious  that  an  element  of  subterfuge  would  be 
necessary,  that  open  access  to  the  company  might  not  allow.  Fundamentally,  as  a 
political  activist  and  trade  unionist,  I  identified  closely  with  the  interests  of  the 
workers  and  their  struggle  to  gain  an  independent  voice  in  the  workplace.  I  had  no 
desire  to  `collaborate'  with  a  company  whose  harsh  management  techniques  were 
becoming  increasingly  notorious.  I  also  understood  that  any  `application'  of  social 
research  by  a  company  like  WCCI  was  unlikely  to  serve  benevolent  ends.  Moreover, 
as  Beynon  has  argued: 
Historically,  the  rich  and  powerful  have  encouraged  hagiography,  not 
critical  investigation  (Beynon  1988:  23). 
Thus,  I  was  concerned  that  the  granting  of  access  to  management  views  directly 
would  be  contingent  on  my  casting  the  company  in  a  positive  light,  at  a  time  when 
reports  of  harsh  management  and  poor  industrial  relations  had  begun  to  filter  out  of 
the  factory.  In  addition,  further  correspondence  with  the  Human  Resources  Manager 
revealed  that,  since  I  had  already  directly  approached  the  ISTC  and  secured  the 
participation  of  a  key  full-time  official  from  the  union,  this  precluded  the  co-operation 
of  the  company.  I  was  also  aware  that  the  research  process  was  going  to  be  a  `long- 
haul'  and,  increasingly,  that  this  would  take  place  during  a  period  of  upheaval  and 
turmoil  for  the  industry.  It  would  also  occur  in  a  period  political  change  that 
necessitated  the  intensification  of  my  own  political  activity.  Maintaining  distance 
from  the  company,  and  researching  it  whilst  remaining  fully  separate  from  it,  allowed 
me  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  the  company  initiating  the  "discrediting  process"  which 
Beynon  has  explicitly  referred  to  (1988:  23)  and  described  in  operation  in  detail 
(1984).  Thus  far,  therefore,  the  company  remains  unaware  of  my  scrutiny  of  its 
practices  and  the  participation  of  its  former  workers  in  it. 
A  central  aim  of  this  research  was  to  elicit  the  views  of  worker-activists  and 
union  protagonists  and  this  meant  the  lack  of  explicit  involvement  of  WCCI 
management  was  not  an  obstacle.  The  research  is  a  case  study  of  working  life  in  the 11 
era  of  New  Labour,  and,  an  examination  of  trade  unionism  within  one  workplace,  as 
organisation  developed  within  the  context  of  the  legislation  that  it  brought  forward.  In 
studying  this  one  workplace,  however,  I  am  conscious  of  Noon  and  Blyton's  caveat 
that  the  essence  and  diversity  of  work  cannot  be  "distilled  into  a  single  thesis  or 
argument"  (1997:  4).  Clearly  the  experience  for  one  group  of  workers  cannot  be 
assumed  to  be  representative  of  all  workers.  What  studying  WCCI  demonstrated  was 
both  the  similarities  with  other  workers  in  the  electronics  industry  and  elsewhere,  and 
differences  between  different  groups  of  workers,  including  the  different  types  of 
workers  employed  at  the  Gourock  site.  However,  it  does  represent  one  example  that 
throws  into  question  New  Labour  analyses  of  the  contemporary  period  particularly, 
though  not  exclusively,  in  relation  to  the  world  of  work. 
Through  attendance  at  mass  meetings  in  1998,  it  was  decided  to  focus  on  key 
activists  during  an  intense  period  of  union  recruitment  at  the  factory.  Some  of  the 
evidence  that  informs  the  following  chapters  was  produced  through  unstructured 
interviews  in  1998  with  five  of  these  activists,  three  of  whom  were  on  the  first  elected 
trade  union  committee.  This  group  had  all  worked  at  the  plant  for  a  previous  regime 
and  were  core  production  workers  until  2000-2001.  These  activists  were  interviewed 
again  towards  the  `end'  of  the  field-work  between  2000  and  2001.  Between  1998  and 
2003,  regular  informal  contact  has  been  kept  with  this  group.  This  contact  been  both 
`research  specific'  and,  increasingly,  of  a  personal  nature.  As  Buchanan  et  al.  (1988: 
61)  have  pointed  out: 
Rich  information  is  a  product  of  close  relationships  of  mutual  trust  and 
respect. 
Talking  to  these  workers'  separately,  and  as  a  group,  in  informal  settings 
allowed  me  to  develop  this  type  of  relationship,  especially  with  one  activist  in 
particular  whose  participation  in  the  research  was  vital.  He  was  often  disparaged  as  a 
`hot-head'  and  he  increasingly  openly  criticised  the  union  though  he  had  been 
instrumental  in  its  early  successes.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  possible  to  dismiss  this 
activist: 
One  politically  active  branch  leader  who  played  a  leading  role  in 
recruitment  was  eventually  removed  as  his  constant  calls  for  stoppages 12 
made  his  position  as  a  union  officer  untenable  (Findlay  and  McKinlay 
2000:  25). 
Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  necessary  to  recognise  the  level  of  commitment  to 
workers'  struggle  often  masked  by  striving  to  `get  the  job'  done  in  a  more 
bureaucratised  context.  I  was  able  to  observe  first  hand  the  level  of  personal 
frustration  and  sacrifices  of  this  worker  in  the  cause  of  fighting  for  union  recruitment 
and  recognition.  This  provided  an  invaluable  insight  into  personal  pressures  and 
consequences,  not  amply  represented  in  accounts  of  union  `successes'  and  `failures' 
in  the  `new'  context.  Behind  each  of  the  developments  outlined  in  the  empirical 
chapters  in  relation  to  both  the  ISTC  and  the  orientation  of  the  management  regime, 
there  lies  the  `hidden'  story  of  workers  like  this  one,  struggling  in  the  middle  of  the 
night,  trying  to  figure  out  how  best  to  respond  to  them.  Away  from  the  factory,  I 
accompanied  him  as  he  worked  at  raising  the  profile  of  the  WCCI  workers  to  a  wider 
political  audience  at  rallies  and  demonstrations.  Thus: 
Besides  insight  into  personal  relationships,  the  researcher  must  know 
something  about  the  position  of  people  in  the  community  and  in  the 
factory,  the  role  they  play,  and  the  reactions  of  other  people  to  them. 
Only  a  careful  evaluation  of  information  in  the  light  of  these  factors 
can  indicate  their  real  meaning  and  significance  as  research  data  (Blum 
1957,  cited  in  Buchanan  et  al.  1988:  61). 
More  sporadic  contact  was  maintained  with  others  and  with  some  ordinary 
members  who  had  been  interviewed  in  1998.  Many  of  the  initial  respondents  left 
WCCI  early  on  in  the  research,  but  others  continued  to  pass  on  information  to  me 
directly  or  through  third  parties.  More  formal  `access'  to  a  larger  group  of  worker  was 
difficult.  Workers  at  WCCI  worked  long  hours,  often  at  weekends,  and  what  free  time 
they  had  was  precious.  Whilst  they  were  openly  critical  of  the  WCCI  regime  and 
clearly  acknowledged  that  I  was  gathering  evidence  from  them  for  research,  they 
preferred  to  participate  in  an  informal  way  rather  than  through  what  they  perceived  as 
the  formality  of  interviews.  However,  one  activist  whose  input  had  previously  been 
informal,  took  part  in  a  more  formal,  though  still  largely  unstructured,  interview  in 
2000,  though  by  this  stage  his  own  union  activity  had  become  more  bureaucratised. 
The  benefits  of  this  level  of  informality  were  that  the  workers  were  more  comfortable 
with  this  and  it  allowed  for  a  more  opportunistic  approach  than  that  associated  with  a 13 
fully  structured  framework  (Buchanan  et  al  1998;  Bryman  1989).  It  did,  however, 
lead  to  assumptions,  on  the  part  of  the  workers,  about  my  own  knowledge  of  the 
terminology,  the  sub-cultural  elements  of  everyday  factory  life  and  the  labour  process 
they  experienced  in  contemporary  electronics.  This  was  demonstrated  in  the 
`peppering'  of  conversations  with  comments  such  as  "I  don't  need  to  tell  you...  you 
know  what  it's  like".  Yet  the  flexibility  of  this  approach  and  its  apparent  drawbacks 
actually  helped  strengthen  other  central  elements  of  the  thesis,  as  the  research 
progressed.  In  these  unstructured  discussions,  the  workers  always  returned  to  the 
nature  of  the  WCCI  regime  and  its  key  exemplars.  This,  in  turn,  resulted  in 
sharpening  my  focus  around  the  `fit'  of  companies  like  WCCI  with  the  New  Labour 
vision  and  hence  honed  my  concern  to  explore  its  own  underpinning  values  and 
motivation,  alongside  its  employment  relations  settlement. 
Attendance  at  members'  meetings  between  1998  and  2003,  largely 
anonymously,  was  a  critical  part  of  evidence  gathering  and  this  forms  a  central 
element  of  the  empirical  material  presented  in  relation  to  the  WCCI  case.  Initially, 
this  helped  identify  the  most  active  union  members  that  could  be  interviewed  in 
greater  depth,  and  allowed  for  an  assessment  of  the  rate  of  development  of  workplace 
organisation  and  progress.  This  also  helped  me  to  gauge  the  continuing  level  of 
militancy  at  the  factory  and,  importantly,  to  further  develop  my  understanding  of 
working  conditions  there.  I  also  gained  a  further  invaluable  insight  into  workplace 
relationships  and  senior  management  ethos  through  an  interview  in  early  2001  with  a 
former  WCCI  Human  Resources  Officer  who  came  to  the  factory  in  2000,  admittedly 
wary  of  the  problematic  management-worker  relations  reported  with  regularity  in  the 
local  press. 
In  1998  and  in  2001,  I  also  interviewed  the  full-time  officer  of  the  ISTC  who 
played  a  pivotal  role  in  the  organisation,  recruitment  and  development  of  workplace 
unionism  at  WCCI.  I  also  keep  informal  contact  with  him  over  the  period  of  the 
research  and  his  participation  was  invaluable  in  terms  of  both  an  understanding  of 
developments  in  the  factory,  and  of  the  contradictory  nature  of  trade  unionism  in  the 
UK. 
Comments  from  electronics  workers  from  other  companies  about  WCCI,  and 
about  their  own  working  lives  in  the  sector  have  helped  inform  this  study. 14 
Knowledge,  experience  and  opinions  concerning  electronics  and  its  employers  are 
crucial  element  of  a  localised  cultural  capital  that  has  developed  over  decades  in 
Inverclyde,  and  as  such,  local  perceptions  are  a  thoroughly  legitimate  source  of 
information.  As  noted  above,  electronics  has  become  woven  into  the  fabric  of  the 
Inverclyde  area.  During  the  period  of  this  research,  this  process  intensified  due  to, 
firstly,  the  expansion  of  the  network  of  labour  suppliers  around  a  key  local  player  - 
IBM  -  and,  secondly,  the  subsequent  contraction  of  employment  in  the  industry.  This 
cultural  capital  has  clearly  been  drawn  on  this  during  the  research. 
With  the  withdrawal  and  subsequent  redundancy  of  the  majority  of  the 
militants  and  with  the  sacking,  in  2001,  of  one  of  the  few  remaining  original  activists 
at  the  factory,  the  major  focus  of  this  research  became  secondary  source  material.  I 
have  made  some  use  of  documentary  evidence  on  the  company,  including  `official' 
information  regarding  its  performance  and  development.  A  key  element  of  the 
empirical  strategy  has  been  "tracking"  developments  at  the  factory  (Bryman  1989: 
150),  utilising  the  local  media  in  particular.  There  was  clear  evidence  from  this  of  the 
atrophy  of  the  militancy  that  shaped  the  first  year  or  so  of  union  activity  and 
especially  after  2001.  The  notoriety  of  the  company,  its  employment  practices,  and  its 
responses  to  trade  union  activity  meant  that  WCCI  was  featured  heavily  in  local  and 
(sometimes)  national  press  and  this  coverage  proved  an  invaluable  source  of 
information  especially  before  and  after  the  period  of  the  field-work.  The  struggle  for 
union  recognition  at  WCCI,  and  the  subsequent  development  of  workplace  trade 
unionism  also  attracted  academic  attention.  Consideration  of  research  on  WCCI  by 
others  (Gall  1999;  Findlay  and  McKinlay  2000)  has  supplemented  my  own.  Yet,  what 
had  been  a  steady  current  of  stories  over  my  period  of  `active'  research,  relating  to 
management  intransigence,  worker-management  antagonism  and  trade  union  `fire- 
fighting',  more  or  less  petered  out  until  a  strike  in  late  2002  and  the  factory's  closure 
in  early  2003. 
Although  I  was  heavily  influenced  by  accounts  of  workplace  `from  the  inside', 
from  both  a  worker's  (Cavendish  1982;  Westwood  1984)  and  a  researcher's 
perspective  (Poliert  1981),  I  have  never  been  inside  this,  or  any  other,  electronics 
factory.  Whilst  an  account  from  the  shop-floor  would  have  provided  rich  empirical 
material,  a  growing  awareness  of  conditions  inside  the  factory  ruled  this  out,  to  an 15 
extent.  The  punishing  shift  patterns  at  WCCI,  the  lack  of  breaks,  and,  crucially,  the 
prohibition  of  newspapers  (and  therefore  writing  material)  on  the  line,  and  my  own 
domestic/academic  responsibilities  created  clear  difficulties  for  this  type  of  covert, 
participant  research.  As  a  result,  what  is  presented  in  relation  to  WCCI  is,  in  the  main, 
an  account  `from  the  outside'.  As  Buchanan  et  al.  have  pointed  out  (1988:  53): 
In  the  conflict  between  the  desirable  and  the  possible,  the  possible 
always  wins.  So  whatever  carefully  constructed  views  the  researcher 
has  of  the  nature  of  social  science...  those  views  are  constantly 
compromised  by  [the]  practical  realities... 
However,  the  methods  of  data  collection,  described  above,  the  close  and  continuing 
contact  maintained  with  key  activists,  and  living  in  the  geographical  area,  preoccupied 
with  how  the  key  players  in  its  dominant  industry  operate,  particularly  WCCI  at  the 
time  of  this  research,  facilitated  the  development  of  an  effective  `relationship'  with 
this  company.  My  experiences  over  the  years  of  this  research  have  confirmed  the 
salience  of  an  important  conclusion  reached  by  Beynon  (1988:  33): 
It  is  critical  for  the  research  process  to  be  understood  not  as  a  highly 
formalised  piece  of  rote  learning,  but  rather  as  a  creative  act,  an  act 
which  links  the  sociologist  to  the  organisation  being  studied. 
In  terms  of  the  `representativeness'  of  WCCI,  this  can  only  be  understood  in 
relation  to  the  context  of  New  Labour's  wider  ideology  which,  as  I  shall  demonstrate 
below,  grants  external  validity  to  how  the  company  operated  between  1998  and  2003. 
Initially,  I  sought  to  construct  an  account  of  WCCI,  focused  on  the  interaction  of 
material/objective  conditions  and  the  subjective  experiences  of  workers,  which 
explicitly  identified  with  self  activity  and  the  cause  of  workers'  struggle.  What 
developed  was  a  critique  of  how  the  company  operated,  but  it  is  also  a  critique  of  both 
the  tacit  and  open  support  of  companies  like  WCCI  by  New  Labour  and  a  Third  Way, 
that  dismisses  the  possibility  of  any  collective  counterweight  developing  to  bring 
about  their  radical  transformation.  I  have  sought  here  to  develop  an  understanding  of 
the  actual  experience  of  New  Labour  by  workers,  and  what  its  ideology  and  actions 
mean  for  them  in  practice.  The  New  Labour  milieu  is  central  to  the  material  and 
objective  conditions  that  workers  are  forced  to  relate  to.  A  thorough  grasp  of  its 
nature  and  contours  as  a  structural  constraint  is  a  necessary  foundation  from  which  to 16 
explore  subjective  experiences  and  the  possibilities  for,  and  limitations  on,  the 
responses  of  human  agents. 
The  Glasgow  Social  Work  Strike  and  the  Public  Sector 
At  the  same  time  as  the  research  into  WCCI  began,  further  evidence  of  a 
return  to  the  `old'  battles,  New  Labour  and  the  Third  Way  denounced  as  outmoded 
and  irrelevant,  began  to  emerge  in  the  public  sector.  One  clear  and  important 
manifestation  of  this  was  in  August  1998,  in  the  Social  Work  Department  of  Glasgow 
City  Council.  The  `unofficial'  strike  by  more  than  fifteen  hundred  members  of  the 
UK's  biggest  union,  UNISON,  in  one  of  its  biggest  branches,  was  significant  in  that  it 
was  fuelled  by  a  deepening  sense  of  antagonism  becoming  manifest  in  other  council 
departments  in  Glasgow  and  elsewhere.  This  antagonism  and  the  issues  that  created 
the  conditions  for  this  militant  `episode',  were  centrally  linked  to  the  New  Labour 
project,  and,  in  particular,  its  programme  for  `reform'  and  `modernisation'  in  the 
public  sector.  Research  into,  and  analysis  of,  this  strike  and  the  contours  of 
employment  relations  in  the  public  sector  that  developed  since  New  Labour's 
election,  helped  to  elucidate  a  central  and  underpinning  concern  of  its  ideology.  New 
Labour's  clear  aim  to  `reform'  the  public  sector,  unfettered  by  what  it  believes  to  be 
the  vested,  producer,  interests  of  public  sector  workers  is  fully  demonstrated  in  its 
political  will  to  fight  opposition  to  its  `modernisation'.  The  Glasgow  Social  Workers 
strike  in  1998  and  the  issues  that  have  emerged  in  local  government  since, 
demonstrate  the  impact  of  this. 
The  nature  of  workplace  trade  unionism  was  also  important  here  and  the 
contours  of  its  development  in  Glasgow  at  the  time  of  the  strike,  and  later,  raised 
important  questions  about  the  role  of  a  powerful,  Labour-supporting,  trade  union 
bureaucracy,  facing  militancy  from  a  well-established,  well-organised,  membership. 
Research  into  the  features  of  this  strike  and  its  outcomes  resulted  in  the  need  to 
further  develop  my  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  New  Labour  and 
the  unions.  Much  of  the  material  presented  regarding  this  relationship  was  generated 
through  examining  the  case  of  the  Glasgow  Social  Workers  and  the  complex 
hierarchy  of  officialdom  in  UNISON,  and  the  spontaneous  responses  to  it,  between 
the  time  of  the  1998  strike  and  a  further  official  strike  in  local  government  across 
Scotland  in  2001.  A  number  of  strikers  and  activists  were  interviewed  in  2000  in 17 
respect  of  their  memories  of  the  strike,  the  issues  that  brought  it  about,  and  its 
connections  to  workplace  employment  relations  in  subsequent  years.  The  strike 
brought  together  those  already  politically  active  and  politicised  a  wider  layer  of 
members.  Workers'  perceptions  of  a  Labour-controlled  Council's  going  on  the 
offensive  were  confirmed  by  the  actions  of  Glasgow  City  Council  during  the  strike 
and  subsequently.  A  court  injunction  was  taken  out  against  eight  of  the  leading 
strikers  and  all  strikers  were  sent  letters  threatening  them  with  the  sack,  a  fate  faced 
subsequently  by  striking  library  workers  a  short  time  later.  The  Social  Workers  strike 
demonstrated,  albeit  briefly,  a  `return'  to  rank  and  file  union  politics  with  mass 
meetings,  strong  picket  lines,  flying  pickets  and  debate,  particularly  within  an 
`unconstitutional'  (in  UNISON  terms)  strike  committee,  made  up  of  as  many  as 
ninety  ordinary  activists.  Many  believed  that  the  Council  were  striving  hard  to  sap 
potential  militancy  over  New  Labour's  local  governments  `reforms'  and  to  ensure  the 
delivery  of  a  cowed  and  acquiescent  workforce  in  advance  of  implementation. 
I  also  interviewed  a  local  lay  official  who  was  a  member  of  the  UNISON 
national  executive  committee  and  the  union's  leader  in  Scotland.  Both  voiced  concern 
over  militant  activity  outside  official  UNISON  structure  and  questioned  the  political 
motivation  of  those  involved,  particularly  in  relation  to  their  open  critique  of  the 
Labour  government.  Examination  of  official  documentation  of  three  years  of  active 
trade  unionism,  as  well  as  that  concerning  wider  policy  affecting  local  government 
generally,  and  media  accounts  of  the  issues  that  the  strike  brought  to  the  fore,  allowed 
me  to  track  developments.  `Unofficial'  strike  material  was  also  studied  with  material 
in  relation  to  the  `cases'  of  activists  censured,  demonised,  expelled  from  UNISON, 
and  even  sacked  by  the  Council  for  their  roles  in  militant  workplace  trade  unionism.  I 
used  official  union  and  Scottish  Executive  material  regarding  key  developments  in  the 
progress  of  New  Labour's  `flagship'  local  government  policies,  like  the 
implementation  of  the  Best  Value  regime  and  the  proliferation  of  Public  Private 
Partnerships  (PPPs)  in  the  provision  of  front-line  services.  In  doing  so,  I  was  also  able 
to  build  up  a  picture  of  both  official  and  unofficial  opposition  to  them,  and  of  a 
growing  tension  between  a  trade  union  and  its  members  over  the  tacit  support  for  a 
government,  whose  key  policies  were  seemingly  at  odds  with  the  union's. 18 
Therefore,  the  Glasgow  Social  Workers  strike  in  1998  and  opposition  to  the 
policy  thrust  of  New  Labour  in  local  government,  in  the  West  of  Scotland  in 
particular,  represents  a  further  `case  study'  of  this  research.  Yet  it  is  not  presented 
here  as  a  fully  developed  empirical  element  of  the  thesis.  There  are  important  reasons 
for,  firstly,  pursuing  the  Glasgow  Social  Work  strike  and  the  issues  around  it  as  an 
element  of  this  research  and,  secondly,  not  for  reporting  it  but  synthesising  my 
findings  in  this  respect  with  the  wider  outcomes  that  are  presented.  Like  the  WCCI 
workers,  the  Social  Workers  represented  a  group  taking  both  tentative  steps  and  bold 
strides  in  the  opposite  direction  of  New  Labour,  early  in  its  first  term.  At  the  very 
least,  it  was  important  in  relation  to  recording  and  exploring  militancy,  any  militancy 
under  a  New  Labour  government.  However  as  the  research  developed,  it  became  clear 
that  although  this  strike  was  "small,  short  and  sectoral"  (Mcllroy  2000:  32),  it  raised 
crucial  questions  about  the  impact  of  `thinking  the  unthinkable'  in  the  public  sector 
and  was  thus  intrinsically  linked  to  the  New  Labour  project.  Although  this,  in  turn, 
cannot  be  separated  from  a  wider  analysis  of  New  Labour,  its  trajectory  in  the  context 
of  the  public  sector  is  nonetheless  distinct  from  the  ideology  of  flexibility, 
competitiveness  and  partnership  that  was  so  fundamental  in  shaping  experiences  at 
WCCI.  My  research  into  this  case  study  has  helped  determine  and  underpin  the 
analysis  of  New  Labour  presented,  particularly,  though  not  exclusively,  in  relation  to 
the  public  sector  and  Labour's  link  with  the  trade  unions.  It  also  acted  as  a  sound 
basis  to  develop  my  understanding  of  key  contradictions  and  tensions  within  this 
relationship.  My  subsequent  examination  of  Public  Private  Partnerships,  and  the 
nature  of  their  centrality  for  New  Labour,  the  developing  role  of  business  in  the 
delivery  of  social  justice,  and  my  understanding  of  New  Labour  as  a  `partner'  in  the 
employment  relationship,  all  have  their  foundation  therein.  But  the  Social  Workers 
strike,  and  the  welter  of  issues  that  it  acted  as  a  catalyst  in  bringing  to  the  fore,  have 
not  been  fully  developed  analytically  in  what  is  presented  in  this  thesis. 
Further  developments  mitigated  against  my  inclusion  of  the  Social  Workers  as 
a  separate  case.  The  first  is  conceptual  and  linked  to  the  point  made  above  regarding 
New  Labour's  ideological  thrust.  Synthesis  is  central  to  New  Labour  and  the  Third 
Way.  Indeed,  as  I  shall  demonstrate,  both  are  fundamentally  premised  on  striving  to 
synthesise  the  Old  Left  and  the  New  Right.  The  objective  to  synthesise  the  interests  of 
capital  and  labour  is  the  essence  of  New  Labour.  Clearly,  as  the  discussions  of  Public 19 
Private  Partnership  presented  later  demonstrate,  this  moulds  New  Labour's  approach 
in  terms  of  public  sector  `reform'.  This,  in  turn,  serves  to  mould  public  sector 
employment  relations  as  it  does  in  the  private  sector.  But  the  contexts  are  distinct  and 
the  contours  of  these  two  sets  of  relationships  are  different.  One  crucial  element  of 
this  was  that,  essentially,  the  WCCI  workers,  at  face  value  at  least,  appeared  as  the 
potential  beneficiaries  of  the  New  Labour  employment  relations  settlement. 
Conversely,  New  Labour's  public  sector  `reforms'  and  its  `modernisation'  programme 
are  resulting  in  considerable  costs  to  public  sector  workers.  This  is  important.  It 
became  increasingly  clear  as  the  research  developed  that  to  explore  and  analyse  this 
effectively,  and  to  present  detailed  full  findings  were  out-with  the  scope  of  the 
objectives  that  initially  framed  this  thesis.  Moreover,  the  negative  impact  of  the 
ideology  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership  was  increasingly  being 
demonstrated  in  sharp  relief  at  WCCI  and  this  necessitated  a  sharp  focus  on  New 
Labour  doctrine  in  this  respect.  Other,  equally  important,  New  Labour  principles 
frame  its  approach  to  the  public  sector  and  experiences  of  `working  for'  New  Labour, 
but  it  was  not  practical  to  develop  these  as  an  analytical  framework  through  which  to 
fully  examine  empirical  evidence  gathered  in  relation  to  local  government  in  Scotland 
and  the  Social  Workers  strike. 
The  second  reason,  also  conceptual  to  an  extent,  concerns  the  value  of 
comparing  the  development  of  trade  unionism  in  private  sector  manufacturing  in  an 
overtly  anti-union  industry,  with  a  group  of  well-organised  public  sector  workers.  The 
differences  between  the  political  consciousness  of  both  groups,  even  the  activists, 
were  at  times  stark.  I  thought  it  possible,  initially,  that  comparing  both  groups  could 
facilitate  more  meaningful  generalisations.  Yet,  as  the  research  progressed,  it  became 
clear  that  this  was  more  difficult  than  I  first  assumed.  This  conclusion  was  reached  in 
relation  to  a  deepening  understanding  of  New  Labour.  A  previously  less  obvious 
distinction  between  the  two  groups,  linked  to  how  New  Labour  both  related  to,  and 
sought  to  shape,  the  impact  of  the  wider  developments  of  earlier  decades,  emerged  as 
important.  In  terms  of  both  media  representation  and,  it  should  be  noted,  political 
responses,  these  groups  of  workers  were  handled  differently.  This  hinted  at  a  more 
general  conclusion  regarding  New  Labour's  assessment  of  the  contemporary  balance 
of  class  forces,  of  power  in  the  workplace,  and,  crucially  its  assessment  of  the 
effectiveness  of  possible  opposition  to  its  thrust.  Despite  a  clear  lack  of  practical, 20 
political  support  for  the  workers  at  WCCI,  there  was  both  tacit  and  rhetorical  support 
for  their  fight  from  politicians,  the  media,  and  the  labour  movement  bureaucracy.  The 
striking  Social  Workers,  and  militancy  within  local  government  generally,  were 
vilified,  particularly  by  the  media  and  politicians.  Two  interconnected  conclusions 
emerged  from  this.  The  first  is  that  the  balance  of  class  forces  at  the  end  of  the 
twentieth  century,  demonstrated  in  essence  in  production  relations,  gave  New  Labour 
a  solid  foundation  from  which  to  construct  its  employment  relations  settlement.  In  a 
factory  like  WCCI,  its  `new'  culture  could  seemingly  address  problematic  worker- 
management  relations  with  little  overall  cost  to  `the  project'.  At  face  value  and  in  the 
short  term  at  least,  a  fight  for  rights  and  representation  like  that  at  WCCI  did  not  pose 
a  threat  to  New  Labour.  Yet,  secondly,  New  Labour's  understanding  of  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  public  sector  in  the  context  of  its  plans  for  `modernisation'  meant  it 
perceived  a  greater  threat.  Opposition  to  policy  changes  in  relation  to  both  services 
and  working  conditions  meant  opposition  to  New  Labour's  fundamental  orientation. 
Moreover,  any  militancy  in  the  public  sector  risked  comparisons  with  Old  Labour 
`failures'  in  the  past  and,  importantly,  the  `Winter  of  Discontent'.  The  political 
motivations  of  WCCI  activists  were  largely  never  questioned  openly,  whereas  the 
Social  Work  strike  and  workplace  unionism  within  Glasgow  City  Council  were 
argued  to  have  been  `hijacked  by  left  wing  activists'.  This  led  me  to  conclude  that  key 
issues  merited  a  greater  attention  than  the  scope  of  this  thesis  would  allow  for. 
Three  `empirical'  developments,  linked  to  the  further  contraction  of 
electronics  generally,  supported  my  decision  to  `exclude'  the  majority  of  evidence 
gathered  in  respect  of  the  Social  Workers.  The  impact  of  mass  redundancies  at  WCCI, 
its  subsequent  closure,  and  the  negative  effects  of  the  flexibility  that  characterised 
relations  in  the  supply  chain  it  was  part  of,  necessitated  a  fuller  consideration  of  the 
effects  on  the  community  and  the  responses  of  politicians,  particularly  in  relation  to 
New  Labour's  rhetoric  of  the  `new'  Scotland.  Alongside  this,  came  a  crisis  in  Social 
Work,  largely  due  to  increasing  case-loads,  and  pressure  on  existing  staff,  resulting  in 
recruitment  and  retention  problems  in  the  profession.  In  addition,  the  impact  of  the 
proliferation  of  New  Labour's  flagship  Public  Private  Partnership  policy,  being 
pursued  with  some  alacrity,  was  increasingly  being  felt  in  local  government  in 
Scotland.  These  developments  in  local  government  needed  to  be  considered  carefully 
and  fully,  in  the  context  of  what  occurred  at  the  time  of  the  Social  Workers  strike  in 21 
1998  and  of  the  issues  that  emerged  from  it.  Hence,  a  large  amount  of  material 
collated  for  this  research  has  been  omitted,  though  it  has  fully  informed  my  analysis 
of  New  Labour  and  the  public  sector.  Moreover,  it  represents  a  useful  starting  point 
for  addressing  a  distinct  yet  interconnected  set  of  questions  regarding  the  impact  of 
New  Labour  as  a  basis  for  further  research.  In  this  respect,  the  material  collated  from 
both  groups  of  workers  could  usefully  facilitate  a  comparative  study  of  public  sector 
workers  at  the  `frontline'  of  delivering  New  Labour's  weakly  pursued  social  justice 
aims  and  those  workers  most  dependent  on  their  success:  `victims',  to  an  extent,  of  its 
`partner'  -  the  pursuit  of  economic  efficiency.  Both  groups  were  researched  on  the 
basis  of  the  further  structural  constraints  on  workers  being  constructed  by  New 
Labour.  However  the  process  of  research  helped  elucidate  the  distinguishing  factors 
of  these  constraints  for  different  groups  of  workers. 
The  `New'  Scotland 
Significant  developments,  worthy  of  further  investigation  at  both  WCCI  and 
within  local  government,  coincided  with  a  crucial  period  in  Scotland.  As  noted  earlier, 
central  to  an  understanding  of  work  is  an  analysis  of  the  context  in  which  capital  and 
labour  `act'.  In  this  respect,  an  exploration  of  the  `new'  and  emerging  Scottish  context 
was  critical.  Thus,  further  empirical  material  was  collated  through  extensive  research 
into  the  first  Scottish  parliamentary  elections  in  1999  and  into  Scottish  politics  more 
generally  around  this  period.  Again,  Scotland  is  not  presented  here  in  a  `case  study' 
format,  though  it  informs  a  single  chapter  on  the  Third  Way  and  New  Labour  in 
Scotland.  In  addition,  the  process  of  research  in  this  area,  and  its  outcomes,  has  helped 
shape  the  thesis  throughout. 
The  decision  to  study  Scotland  was  initially  based  on  both  the  rhetoric  and  the 
reality  of  the  `new'  political  circumstances  seemingly  developing  around  the  creation 
of  the  Scottish  Parliament.  The  reservation  of  work  and  employment,  however,  at  first 
posed  a  barrier  to  analysis,  in  the  sense  that  the  New  Labour  employment  relations 
settlement  was  the  same  in  Scotland  as  it  was  in  the  rest  of  the  UK.  Yet,  as  the 
research  into  New  Labour's  ideology  progressed,  it  became  clear  that  it  could  be 
further  analysed  in  some  depth  in  relation  to  the  Scottish  `case'.  Scotland's  traditions, 
mythologies,  and  its  future,  resulted  in  a  distinct,  if  not  completely  separate,  set  of 
issues  for  New  Labour  to  relate  to.  In  order  to  explore  this,  its  outcomes,  and  electoral 22 
developments  in  Scotland  in  detail,  data  was  collected  from  the  often  daily  digest  of 
media  output  on  the  Scottish  election  through  which  the  key  issues  were  identified. 
Two  key  elements  of  the  thesis  were  developed  further,  in  and  through,  this.  The  first 
was  the  centrality  of  the  public  sector  in  the  context  of  the  creation  of  a  Scottish 
Parliament.  The  devolution  settlement  further  reinforced  the  importance  of  the  public 
sector  and  is  thus  of  crucial  significance  in  relation  to  New  Labour's  wider  aims. 
Indeed,  exploration  of  Scotland  at  this  time  helped  illuminate  New  Labour's  overall 
approach.  The  second  element  was  the  New  Labour  rhetoric  of  `decentralised' 
solutions  and  its  claim  that  `Scottish  solutions  for  Scottish  problems'  would  develop 
as  a  result  of  devolution.  The  New  Labour  aim  to  synthesise  the  interests  of  capital 
and  labour,  and  to  `marry'  social  justice  and  economic  efficiency,  have  been  fully 
demonstrated  in  its  approach  to  Scottish  devolution.  The  mobilisation  of 
entrepreneurial  discourse  as  a  key  historical  reference  point  for  Scotland,  and  the  tacit 
rejection  of  a  workers'  perspective,  evidently  underpin  this.  The  Scottish 
parliamentary  elections  also  presented  New  Labour  with  an  important  opportunity  to 
re-state  and  reinforce  its  commitment  to  business  interests.  The  study  of  Scottish 
devolution  offered  the  opportunity  to  explore  the  contradictions  inherent  in  the  New 
Labour  approach  and  to  assess  how,  apparently  de-centralised,  solutions  would  impact 
on  workers,  like  those  employed  by  WCCI. 
Central  to  gathering  evidence  on  Scottish  politics  was  my  active  involvement 
in  political  activity.  I  was  immersed  `on  the  ground'  in  weeks  of  campaigning  and 
canvassing  in  1999,  and  whilst  fully  participating  in  the  process,  I  also  gathered 
further  evidence  in  respect  of  the  key  issues.  Two  separate  comments  made  during 
and  at  the  end  of  the  1999  campaign,  fundamentally  shaped  the  examination  of  New 
Labour  in  Scotland  that  resulted  my  reaching  an  important  conclusion.  Significantly, 
the  study  of  Old  Labour  `becoming'  New  Labour,  that  is  a  central  element  of  the 
thesis  overall,  is  rooted  in  an  understanding  of  this  transition  as  a  process.  The 
Scottish  Parliament  and  devolution  is  representative  of  a  key  `moment'  in  this 
transition.  What  became  an  increasingly  apparent  need  to  develop  this  idea,  and 
research  Scotland  from  this  perspective,  was  motivated  by,  firstly,  a  comment  from  a 
lifelong  Labour  supporter  criticising  the  party  to  anyone  who  would  listen  that  she 
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Sick  of  them  not  standing  up  for  the  people  that  got  them  in  and 
forgetting  that  people  like  my  father  who  helped  create  that  party  to 
stand  up  for  the  poor.  I  didn't  leave  the  Labour  Party  -  it  left  me  and 
thousands  like  me. 
I  was  also  struck  by  another  comment,  directed  at  Socialist  Workers  Party  activists  the 
day  after  Labour  had  won  most  seats  in  the  Scottish  parliamentary  elections: 
See,  the  worker's  party  won  so  you  can  pack  up.  It's  the  worker's 
party  in  charge  in  Scotland  now. 
The  impact  of  these  comments  on  the  development  of  the  research  and  its 
trajectories  helps  to  confirm  a  clear  benefit  of  a  qualitative  approach,  noted  by 
Bryman  (1989:  138): 
The  relative  absence  of  structure  in  much  qualitative  research  implies  a 
further  noteworthy  feature:  flexibility.  The  researcher  is  able  to 
capitalise  on  chance  remarks  or  unexpected  events  that  propel  a  new 
line  of  investigation. 
The  contradiction  between  the  comments  of  two  people  of  similar  age  and 
background,  is  illustrative  of  the  contradiction  at  the  heart  of  the  Labour  Party  that 
needed  to  be  explored.  From  this  developed  my  understanding  of  1999,  not  only  as  a 
watershed  year  for  Scottish  politics,  but  also  for  New  Labour  and  how  it  related  to 
Old  Labour  consciousness. 
Part  of  the  political  research  in  Scotland  involved  interviewing  several 
members  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  (MSPs),  though,  again,  what  was  garnered  from 
their  responses  underpins  a  general  `sense'  of  Scottish  politics  rather  than  a  survey  of 
official  political  opinion.  I  link  this,  firstly,  to  the  fact  that  the  parliament  was  in  its 
infancy  and  their  roles,  and  that  of  the  parliament  generally,  were  also  in  the  very 
early  stages  of  development.  Secondly,  the  focus  of  the  research  had  sharpened 
around  the  central  New  Labour  tenets  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership 
after  the  interviews  took  place,  thus  they  were  of  limited  value  in  this  respect.  That 
said,  some  interviews  did  provide  interesting  insights.  The  Labour  MSP  for  the 
Glasgow  constituency  of  Shettleston,  Frank  McAveety,  was  interviewed  and  this  was 
informative  in  respect  of  the  Social  Work  strike  since  he  was  the  leader  of  Glasgow 
City  Council  leader  at  the  time  of  the  dispute.  This  interview  helped  to  underpin  and 24 
to  consolidate  a  greater  understanding  of  New  Labour  in  practice,  particularly  in  local 
government.  It  also  helped  to  illuminate  the  tension  between  public  sector  `reforms', 
the  role  and  impact  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  the  New  Labour  perception  of  the 
barrier  that  public  sector  trade  unionism  represents. 
Participation  in  the  research  by  Duncan  McNeil,  the  Labour  MSP  for 
Greenock  and  Inverclyde,  was  also  significant.  The  first  short  interview  took  place  not 
long  after  the  1999  STUC  Congress  and  the  time  of  his  second,  longer  interview 
coincided  with  the  WCCI  announcement  of  mass  redundancies  in  November  2000. 
His  particular  insight  on  both  events  was  useful.  It  informed  my  understanding  of  both 
responses  to  how  companies  were  operating  in  respect  of  the  flexibility, 
competitiveness  and  partnership  agenda,  and  the  impact  of  `new'  methods  for  dealing 
with  `old'  problems.  Before  becoming  an  MSP,  he  was  well  known  as  the  former 
shop  stewards'  convenor  in  the  local  shipyards  and,  latterly,  as  a  full-time  official  of 
the  GMB  union.  Part  of  the  analysis  of  political  responses  in  the  WCCI  locale  is  also 
based  on  media  coverage,  specifically  comments  by  McNeil  and  his  Westminster 
colleague,  David  Cairns.  Examining  the  approaches  and  rhetoric  of  both  politicians 
has  been  a  vital  component  of  my  brief  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  devolved 
settlement,  in  one  particular  location. 
John  McAllion,  the  Labour  MSP  for  Dundee  East  between  1999  and  2003, 
was  also  an  exception,  partly  because  he  was  the  embodiment  of  an  Old  Labour 
`residue'  in  Scotland.  He  was  heavily  featured  in  media  at  the  time  of  the  elections  in 
1999  due  to  his  `off  message'  approach  and  expectations  that  he  would  be  a  maverick 
-a  `thorn  in  the  side'  of  New  Labour  in  the  Scottish  Parliament  -  who  could  lead  a 
left-wing  cabal  that  threatened  the  project  to  develop  New  Labour  solutions.  The 
interview  illuminated  his  own  analysis  of  the  issues  he  expected  to  dominate  Scottish 
parliamentary  business.  This  helped  to  further  draw  out  the  weaknesses  of  the 
devolved  settlement  and  the  persistence  of  the  `democratic  deficit'  the  Parliament  was 
supposed  to  address.  Indeed,  the  responses  of  all  three  MSPs  helped  demonstrate  this 
in  sharp  relief,  in  their  different  ways.  Importantly,  from  both  McAveety  and  McNeil, 
I  had  expected  to  find  evidence  of  both  a  Third  Way  `with  a  heavy  heart'  approach 
and  Old  Labour  resilience  in  a  New  Labour  guise.  I  did  not.  Not  only  has  the  New 
Labour  project  been  fully  embraced,  but  their  responses  helped  me  reach  the 25 
important  conclusion  that  it  could  not  have  been  fully  developed  without  the  active 
engagement  of  politicians  like  McNeil  and  McAveety. 
Political  activism  on  my  part  has  been  a  central  element  in  imbuing  the  study 
of  the  `new'  Scotland  with  a  `sense'  and  `feel'  for  the  Scottish  political  `scene'.  I 
believe  this  represents  a  strength  in  terms  of  analysing  official  accounts  and  of 
understanding  the  impact  of  important  developments.  Often  this  impact,  and  the 
possible  significance  of  it,  is  not  covered  in  detail  by  `mainstream'  accounts.  This  is 
especially  the  case  around  an  election  period,  when  the  focus  is  on  psephology  and 
party  spin.  Thus  sociological  research  can  benefit  from  those  undertaking  it  being 
actively  engaged  in  important  processes,  not  adequately  analysed  by  surveys  of  voting 
behaviour  or  election  results,  since  key  issues  are  often  `hidden'  in  such  analyses.  In 
this  respect,  support  for,  and,  indeed,  critique  of,  specific  approaches  and  policies  are 
not  often  translated  into  votes,  especially  when  voter  turnout  at  elections  is  as  low  as 
it  is  in  the  UK  currently.  Thus,  `being  involved'  has  added  something  to  this  research 
that  might  not  have  been  otherwise  available.  Beynon  has  argued  that  researching 
organisations  is  "political  process;  it  involves  the  researcher  mediating  power 
relationships"  (1988:  21).  I  consider  this  research  to  be  a  political  endeavour,  as  is  all 
critical  research  in  one  way  or  another,  and  whilst,  as  a  political  activist,  my  role  in 
the  `mediation  of  power  relations'  is  stated  in  an  explicit  way  here,  my  conclusions 
are  no  less  salient. 
In  the  contemporary  period,  the  politics  of  the  left  are  attracting  greater 
attention  than  they  have  for  almost  two  decades,  and  this  is  a  process  that  is  further 
advanced  in  Scotland  than  it  is  in  the  rest  of  the  UK,  largely,  though  not  exclusively, 
as  a  result  of  the  growth  of  the  party  of  which  I  am  a  member.  In  1999,  I  attended  the 
inaugural  conference  of  a  new  political  force  in  Scotland,  the  Scottish  Socialist  Party 
(SSP),  as  a  sociological  researcher  gathering  evidence  of  its  motivations  and 
ideological  premises.  Three  years  later  I  attended  as  a  delegate.  Significant 
developments  that  occurred  in  that  interim  period,  not  least  the  merger  of  the  SSP  and 
the  Socialist  Workers  Party  in  Scotland,  are  not  discussed  in  detail  in  this  thesis, 
though  these,  and  my  involvement  in  them  have  informed  this  research.  As  a 
parliamentary  candidate  in  the  2003  elections,  after  four  years  of  devolution,  I 
observed  that  voter  comments  critiquing  New  Labour  were  much  more  prevalent  than 26 
they  had  been  in  1999.  Comments  on  the  paucity  of  positive  benefits  from  devolution 
were  also  an  important  feature.  This  active  research  allowed  for  the  development  of 
an  understanding  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  devolved  settlement  and  the  exploration  of 
how  these  linked  to  the  overall  New  Labour  project. 
I  intend  this  open  and  explicit  reference  to  my  own  left  wing  political 
allegiances  as  a  welcome  relief  from  research  and  literature  that  claims  detachment 
despite  implicit  orientation.  Such  admission  does  not  automatically,  or  necessarily, 
result  in  error,  misrepresentation,  or  unwarranted  justification  of  a  particular  political 
tradition.  Moreover,  as  Darlington  has  argued: 
No  intellectual  pursuit  within  capitalist  society  can  stand  above  the 
fundamental  social  division  between  exploiters  and  exploited  (1994a: 
viii). 
The  Outline  of  the  Chapters 
As  emphatically  expressed  above,  an  understanding  of  the  political  must 
inform  the  study  of  work.  In  addition,  the  overall  aims  of  this  thesis,  and  the 
development  of  the  research  as  a  process,  necessitated  a  thorough  analysis  of  New 
Labour.  This  is  developed  throughout,  but  Chapter  One,  The  Political  Economy  of 
New  Labour,  lays  the  foundation  for  this  analysis.  Here,  central  features  of  New 
Labour's  ideology  are  outlined.  The  chapter  also  explores  continuities  and  changes  in 
relation  to  the  transition  from  Old  to  New  Labour,  and  introduces  key  contradictions 
that  are  a  central  feature  of  New  Labour.  These  are,  in  part,  linked  to  the 
contradictions  of  the  Labour  Party  itself,  through  an  exploration  of  important  elements 
of  the  processes  and  outcomes  of  its  modernisation.  New  Labour  is  connected 
fundamentally  to  Third  Way  analyses  of  social  change,  especially  its  claims  regarding 
the  most  appropriate  methods  of  relating  to  globalisation  and  shaping  responses  to  it. 
The  impact  of  this,  particularly  in  respect  of  New  Labour's  relationship  to  business 
and  the  ideological  underpinning  of  `reform'  and  `modernisation',  is  considered. 
Overall,  this  chapter  seeks  to  characterise  the  New  Labour  milieu  and,  importantly, 
the  contours  of  the  relationships  which  are*central  to  it.  The  nature  of  the  struggle  by 
New  Labour  to  synthesise  antagonistic  interests  is  also  introduced  here. 27 
The  continuing  importance  of  the  relationship  between  New  Labour  and  the 
trade  unions  is  explored  in  Chapter  Two,  New  Labour  and  the  Unions:  Continuity  and 
Change.  Here  the  `fit'  between  New  Labour  rhetoric  in  terms  of  this  relationship  and 
its  contemporary  realities  are  discussed,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  public  sector 
and  the  ideology  of  flexibility  competitiveness  and  partnership.  The  New  Labour 
employment  relations  settlement,  the  ideologies  and  values  that  underpin  it,  are  also 
discussed  alongside  `official'  and  `unofficial'  trade  union  responses  to  it.  New 
Labour's  ideological  development  is  intrinsically  linked  to  key  developments  in  trade 
union  orientation  over  the  last  two  decades  and  the  connections  between  them  are 
considered.  What  is  demonstrated  in  this  chapter  is  New  Labour's  continuing  reliance 
on  the  unions  for  financial,  practical,  and  ideological  support,  despite  claims  to  the 
contrary.  Moreover,  the  chapter  looks  beyond  the  rhetoric  in  order  to  explore  the 
nature  of  this  continuing  dependence,  and  discusses  the  contradictions  that  result  in 
the  trade  union  bureaucracy  essentially  placing  the  interests  of  the  Labour  Party  above 
those  of  their  members.  The  alliance  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions  is  both 
persistent  and  characterised  by  an  inherent  tension,  and  the  contemporary  period 
involves  its  restructuring.  Fundamentally,  however,  these  are  tensions  and 
contradictions  that  have  helped  define  this  relationship  across  most  of  the  twentieth 
century.  A  central  question  addressed  here  is  the  extent  to  which  trade  unions  and 
their  members  reap  benefits  from  a  continuing,  if  fraught,  allegiance  to  New  Labour, 
at  a  time  when  both  its  policies  and  ideological  thrust  are  seemingly  so  adrift  from 
those  of  the  trade  union  movement.  Recent  developments  that  have  seen  this  alliance 
called  into  question  are  briefly  alluded  to  in  this  chapter.  Significantly,  New  Labour's 
ideological  thrust  is  considered  in  relation  to  its  impact  on  the  maintenance  of  the 
`false  dichotomy'  of  the  separation  of  politics  and  economics,  which  has  sustained  the 
relationship  between  Labour  and  the  unions  since  party's  creation  over  a  century  ago. 
Chapter  Three,  A  `Tartan'  Third  Way?:  New  Labour  and  Scottish  Devolution, 
explores  some  of  the  issues  discussed  in  earlier  chapters  in  relation  to  a  `new'  and 
emerging  Scottish  context.  In  this  chapter,  I  have  outlined  both  the  proliferation  of 
New  Labour  solutions  that  underpins  the  devolved  settlement  and  the  nature  of  key 
distinctions  in  relation  to  Scotland.  The  significance  of  Scottish  devolution  for  the 
process  of  transition  from  Old  to  New  Labour  is  also  stressed  and  thus  its  significance 
in  respect  of  the  wider  aims  of  this  thesis.  Essentially,  this  chapter  explores  New 28 
Labour  and  the  Third  Way  through  the  prism  of  Scotland  and  the  specifics  of  the 
Scottish  polity.  I  also  examine  how  the  synthesis  of  antagonisms  by  New  Labour  is 
imbued  with  specifically  Scottish  `twists'  in  ways  that  seeks  to  grant  it  greater 
salience  in  Scotland.  Moreover,  I  also  discuss  the  critical  role  played  by  the  trade 
unions  in  Scotland  in  the  delivery  of  election  victory  for  New  Labour  and  their 
responses  to  its  ideological  development  in  the  Scottish  context.  Questions  regarding 
Scotland's  continuing  dependence  on  the  public  sector  are  explored  and  how  New 
Labour's  endeavour  to  `modernise'  Scotland  is  linked  to  the  drive  to  rid  the  public 
sector  of  apparent  `vested  interest'  and  `producer  consciousness'.  In  common  with  the 
previous  two  chapters,  I  consider  the  impact  of  New  Labour's  overall  orientation  on 
its  apparent  aims  regarding  the  delivery  of  social  justice. 
The  next  three  chapters  introduce  the  core  empirical  material  and  narrate  the 
processes  that  have  shaped  the  developments  at  the  West  Coast  Computer  Industries 
factory  in  Gourock.  The  relationship  between  New  Labour's  ideology,  and  its 
contradictions,  and  the  real  experiences  of  workers  is  discussed  in  detail  in  these 
chapters.  They  explore  how  contemporary  experiences  of  work  are  shaped  in  the 
context  of  the  New  Labour  era,  and  the  impact  of  key  ideological  premises  on  a 
particular  group  of  workers  is  discussed  in  detail.  In  Working  the  Third  Way:  West 
Coast  Computer  Industries  the  significance  of  the  company  for  the  local  economy  and 
labour  market  are  outlined.  Key  features  of  living  and  working  in  Inverclyde,  an  area 
that  has  borne  the  worst  effects  of  the  de-industrialisation  of  more  than  two  decades, 
are  described  in  some  detail  and  this  serves  to  define  the  context  central  to  the  `story' 
of  West  Coast  Computer  Industries.  A  key  element  of  this  context  is  the  relationship 
between  the  area  and  the  electronics  industry  which  increasingly  dominates  it,  and 
how  over-reliance  on  its  key  players'  production  networks,  help  to  mould  the  area 
both  in  relation  to  work  and  beyond.  The  responses  of  politicians,  in  an  area 
dominated  locally  and  nationally  by  Labour,  are  also  central.  Essentially  this 
dependence  serves  to  shape  such  responses  and  renders  politicians  apparently 
powerless  in  the  face  of  multinational  responses  to  `globalisation'  -  the  trajectories  of 
which  New  Labour  and  the  Third  Way  claim  to  be  adept  at  relating  to.  Moreover, 
these  responses,  in  the  name  of  the  competitiveness  and  flexibility  that  New  Labour 
readily  support,  increasingly  impact  negatively  on  working  lives  which  poses 29 
questions  regarding  its  `fairness'  agenda.  These  are  explored  throughout,  in  relation  to 
events  and  activity  motivated  `from  below'  and  `from  above'  at  WCCI. 
A  central  element  of  this  agenda  -  the  provision  of  statutory  recognition  - 
represented  the  potential  for  the  growth  of  trade  unionism  in  largely  uncharted  areas 
like  electronics.  At  face  value,  this  also  represented  the  promise  of  effective 
representation  for  workers  as  a  counterweight  to  management  offensives.  At  WCCI 
the  process  to  seek  out  such  representation  was  set  in  train  in  advance  of  the 
legislation,  in  the  face  of  a  harshening  management  activity,  and  an  organising  and 
recruitment  drive  by  the  ISTC.  The  contours  of  the  relationships  that  developed,  the 
implicit  and  explicit  impact  of  New  Labour  employment  relations  settlement,  and  its 
ideological  underpinning  are  considered  in  detail  in  Chapter  Five,  Forward  Together 
which  covers  the  period  from  the  successful  struggle  to  gain  recognition  for  the  ISTC 
and  the  closure  of  the  factory  in  January  2003. 
Reflections  on  the  `New'  World  of  Work  is  the  final  substantive  chapter.  This 
draws  together  the  central  themes  of  the  thesis  in  relation  to  the  WCCI  findings.  Here, 
questions  regarding  the  real  impact  of  New  Labour  are  raised  and  explored. 
Significantly,  it  relates  New  Labour  rhetoric  and  analytical  accounts  of  its  ideological 
premises,  and  its  trajectories,  to  the  lives  of  real  people.  The  costs  and  benefits  of 
New  Labour  are  also  discussed  in  relation  to  the  `devolved  centralism'  that  arguably 
characterises  the  `new'  Scotland.  In  addition,  this  chapter  discusses  how  we  can  relate 
earlier  analyses  of  competitiveness  and  flexibility,  and  of  the  key  contours  of 
workplace  trade  unionism,  to  the  new  context.  The  negative  impact  of  New  Labour  is 
a  critical  feature  of  the  thesis,  and  this  is discussed  in  relation  to  the  development  of  a 
vibrant  `unionism'  as  opposed  to  state-employer  sanctioned,  and  fundamentally 
weaker,  `union  membership'.  The  problematic  nature  of  conceptual  distinctions  that 
inform  both  the  study  of  work  and  New  Labour  perspectives  is  also  alluded  to  in  this 
chapter,  particularly  in  respect  of  the  continuing  salience  of  dominant  notions  of 
labour  market  segregation  demonstrated  in  ideas  like  `core'/`periphery', 
'temporary'/`permanent'. 
Overall,  all  three  chapters  are  intended  as  an  exploration  of  the  New  Labour 
era  as  experienced  in  a  particular  locale,  and,  importantly,  as  a  general  challenge  to 
the  perceptions  that  inform  it  and  the  ideology  that  underpins  it.  The  centrality  of 30 
work  for  New  Labour  provides  something  of  an  ironic,  though  no  less  serious, 
backdrop  to  these  chapters  and  the  thesis  overall.  The  `story'  of  WCCI  facilitates  a 
necessary  shift  from  the  abstract,  the  theoretical  and  the  speculative,  to  the  material, 
the  concrete. 
The  concluding  chapter  of  the  thesis  draws  out  the  key  issues  that  have 
developed  out  of  the  research  and  re-states  its  findings  in  relation  to  its  central 
questions.  It  also  re-visits  more  recent  developments  like  the  contemporary  endeavour 
by  some  on  the  left  within  the  Labour  Party  to  `reclaim'  it  and  wrestle  it  from  its 
Blairite/New  Labour/Third  Way  orientation.  Similarly,  indications  that  the  tension 
inherent  in  the  Labour-union  relationship  is  becoming  more  manifest,  and  the 
implications  of  this,  are  discussed.  This  final  chapter  also  alludes  to  questions  that 
have  emerged,  particularly  in  relation  to  elements  of  the  research  that  can  act  as  a 
foundation  for  further  analysis.  Central  to  this  is  the  development  of  a  comparative 
study  of  public  sector  workers  and  those  in  the  private  sector,  and  analyses  of  distinct, 
yet  intrinsically  linked,  elements  of  New  Labour  and  their  contrasting  impact  on  a 
variety  of  workers.  In  addition,  the  difference  between  `having  a  union'  and  `being 
unionised'  in  the  New  Labour  era  requires  further  exploration,  alongside  a 
consideration  of  effective  `routes  through'  New  Labour.  Of  particular  importance 
here,  is  effective  collective  resistance  to  New  Labour  and  its  Third  Way  concerns, 
both  as  a  governing  party  and  as  a  party  with  the  unions  as  its  key  ally.  The  chapter 
casts  a  speculative  eye  over  current  developments  and  outlines  some  possible  effects 
on  `future  Labour'.  Questions  remain  regarding  what  New  Labour  has  done  for  `us' 
and  over  how  workers  in  reality  benefit  from  their  unions  support  of  New  Labour.  I 
hope  that  the  issues  raised  here  and  the  analytical  strands  outlined  in  this  thesis 
represent  something  of  a  platform  from  which  to  develop  our  understanding.  Beynon 
(1988:  29)  has  argued  that: 
Sociological  research  [is]  a  means  of  building  a  dialogue  between  the 
sociologist  and  the  public. 
From  my  perspective,  an  absolutely  crucial  element  of  this  must  be  not  simply  to 
relate  to  `the  public'  how  `the  world  is',  but  also  to  address  their  questions  regarding 
`a  world  of  whose  making?  '.  This  thesis  is  intended  as  a  critical  contribution  to  such  a 
dialogue. 31 
CHAPTER  ONE:  THE  POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF  NEW 
LABOUR 
1.1:  Introduction 
The  objective  of  this  chapter  is  to  define  New  Labour  and  to  outline 
my  understanding  of  what  New  Labour  stands  for.  The  intention  here  is  to  explore  the 
notion  of  reform  in  the  context  of  the  conditions  that  New  Labour  both  seeks  to  relate 
to  and  to  shape.  The  issue  of  modernisation  is  fundamental  to  our  understanding  of 
New  Labour  and  an  underpinning  aim  here  is  to  problematise  New  Labour's 
conceptualisation  of  modernisation  with  reference  to  Old  Labour,  to  the  state,  and  to 
the  public  sector.  It  is  important  to  try  to  characterise  what  New  Labour  is  in  relation 
to  Old  Labour  and  to  draw  out  crucial  similarities  and  continuities  between  Old  and 
New  Labour,  and  to  outline  key  distinctions.  From  this,  it  is  hoped  a  greater 
understanding  of  Labour  in  both  `guises'  can  be  gleaned. 
Also  important  to  our  understanding  of  New  Labour,  is  a  consideration  of  key 
premises  of  Third  Way  thinking  as,  despite  some  differences  of  emphasis  between 
key  Third  Way  thinkers  like  Giddens  (Driver  and  Martell  2001:  43-44),  the  Third 
Way  gives  intellectual  life  to  New  Labour  and  New  Labour  gives  the  Third  Way  its 
clearest  and  most  persistent  political  expression.  The  intention  here  is  to  introduce  the 
Third  Way,  though  not  to  offer  a  comprehensive  or  exhaustive  analysis,  since  that 
could  be  a  thesis  in  its  own  right.  The  aim  is  to  use  the  Third  Way  to  explore  New 
Labour  through  focusing  on  elements  of  Third  Way  thinking  particularly  pertinent  in 
relation  to  the  overall  aims  of  the  thesis. 
Fundamental  to  New  Labour,  and  to  the  wider  aims  of  this  thesis,  is  the 
relationship  that  New  Labour  has  with  business.  This,  as  will  be  discussed  fully  in  the 
following  chapters,  has  helped  facilitate  key  policy  developments  and  has  helped 
shape,  and  are  shaped  by,  essential  New  Labour  ideological  premises,  especially  in 
terms  of  flexibility  competitiveness  and  partnership.  Moreover,  New  Labour's 
relationship  with  business  is  intrinsically  connected  to  the  contemporary 
modernisation  of  the  public  sector  and  to  the  reformulation  of  the  state.  Such  links, 
and  their  impacts,  will  be  explored  here,  and  throughout  the  remainder  of  the  thesis. 32 
Before  fully  examining  the  changes  and  continuities  between  Old  Labour  and 
New  Labour  in  greater  detail,  it  is  important  both  to  note,  and  to  challenge,  two 
important  myths  connected  to  the  Labour  Party  and  to  Labour  governments.  The  first 
is  that  Labour  was  always,  and  ultimately  is,  a  working  class  party  whose  interests  lie 
with  representing  and  pursuing  the  interests  of  that  class.  Even  what  has  come  to  be 
characterised  as  Old  Labour  has  always  been  a  capitalist  workers'  party  (Lenin, 
1920/1993).  Labour  continues  to  have  organic  links  with  workers,  however  fractious, 
through  the  trade  union  movement.  The  working  class  still  look  to  Labour  to  effect 
change  and  as  a  countervailing  force  to  ruling  class  ideology.  More  recently,  the 
persistence  of  faith  in  Labour's  ability  and  willingness  to  take  action  contra  to  the 
neo-liberal  hegemony  of  the  last  two  decades,  culminated  in  a  landslide  victory  for 
Labour  in  1997.  Yet,  such  links,  and  the  continuing  commitment  to  Labour  as  the 
party  that  can  fundamentally  reform  capitalism  in  a  sustained  and  persistent  way,  does 
not  mean  that  Labour  is  anything  other  than  a  capitalist  party.  A  clear  understanding 
of  this  is  important,  since  a  central  premise  of  this  chapter  is  that,  in  this  fundamental 
respect,  New  Labour  is  no  different  from  Old  Labour.  This  unequivocal  similarity  can 
be  summed  up  thus: 
They  are  bourgeois  politicians  with,  at  best,  a  certain  bias  towards 
social  reform.  They  have  no  intention  whatsoever  of  adopting  let  alone 
carrying  out,  policies  which  would  begin  in  earnest  the  process  of 
socialist  transformation  in  Britain.  On  the  contrary,  they  must  be 
expected  to  resist  with  the  utmost  determination  all  attempts  to  foist 
such  policies  upon  them  (Miliband  1972:  373). 
The  second  myth  is  that  created  by  the  Thatcherite  Right,  though  given 
legitimacy  and  fully  reinforced  by  New  Labour,  that  the  Labour  governments  of  the 
1960s  and  1970s  were  too  left  wing,  too  pro-worker,  and,  ultimately,  too  pro-public 
sector  at  any  cost,  including  electoral  oblivion.  For  New  Labour,  these  governments 
represent  not  only  the  squandering  of  political  power  through  the  retention  of  a 
producer  consciousness  that  had  long-since  been  rejected  by  the  electorate,  but  also 
the  squandering  of  the  legacy  of  Labour  pioneers  through  their  inability  to  manage  the 
economy  efficiently,  because  of  a  commitment  to  policies  of  tax  and  spend.  New 
Labour  have  thus  reinvented  the  history  of  the  party,  both  in  terms  of  its  connection  to 
(its  version  of)  Old  Labour  and  in  terms  of  popular  perceptions  of  Thatcherism  and 
the  New  Right. 33 
Hence,  it  will  be  argued  that,  in  some  key  ways,  New  Labour  are  the  same  as 
Old  Labour,  and  in  the  very  areas  where  New  Labour  suggest  sharp  transformation 
there  is  considerable  continuity.  However,  even  where  there  is  continuity  of  outcome, 
for  example  in  the  acquiescence  of  the  trade  union  leadership,  the  processes  that  lead 
to  such  outcomes  have  often  changed.  There  have  been  alterations  linked  to  ideology 
and  orientation  and  these  will  be  explored.  For  New  Labour  these  represent  the 
reflection  of  the  need  to  relate  to  the  circumstances  of  'an  ever-changing  world', 
largely  brought  about  by  what  are  perceived  and  constructed  as  the  contemporary 
demands  of  globalisation.  I  will  demonstrate  how  this  is  fundamentally  linked  to  a 
concern  to  appease  capital  in  a  way  both  different  from  Old  Labour  and  yet  does  not 
represent  an  essential  fissure  in  Labour's  historical  rationale.  Nevertheless,  it  is  also 
the  case  that  the  very  existence  of  New  Labour,  and  its  accommodation  and 
celebration  of  the  contemporary  neo-liberal  agenda,  are  facilitating  a  more  general 
recognition  of  the  limitations  of  the  Labour  project  as  a  whole.  An  analysis  of  the 
exultation  of  neo-liberalism,  alongside  the  apparently  continued  and  renewed 
commitment  to  Labour's  traditional  values  by  New  Labour,  exposes  the  central 
contradiction  at  the  heart  of  Labour.  The  reformist,  social  democratic,  tradition  is 
fundamentally  based  upon  separation  of  the  political  and  the  economic  spheres. 
What  I  am  arguing  is  that  in  New  Labour's  explicit  endeavours  to  synthesise 
neo-liberalism  and  reformist  social  democracy,  and  the  resultant  effort  to  conjoin 
oppositional  categories  detailed  below,  including  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour,  is 
symbolic  of  a  crisis  of  reformism,  however  embryonic.  Whilst  it  can  be  argued  that 
the  demise  of  Labour  as  a  reformist  party  is  much  older  than  the  emergence  of  New 
Labour,  or  even  Old  Labour  as  we  are  encouraged  to  perceive  it  (Miliband  1972: 
372),  the  `marriage'  of  neo-liberalism  and  social  democracy  that  New  Labour  seeks  to 
embody,  not  only  represents  part  of  a  process  in  the  development  of  reformism,  but 
also  a  crucial  `moment'  in  the  history  of  social  democracy.  It  is  important  to  note  that, 
thus  far,  New  Labour  retains  its  electoral  appeal.  The  reasons  for  this  are  complex  and 
are  connected,  in  a  sense,  to  the  current  configuration  of  other  parties  and  their 
weaknesses.  The  main  point  of  my  argument  is  that  New  Labour  demonstrates  also 
how  reformism  can  be  reinvented  and  still  maintain  its  support.  In  this  sense,  it  is 
seemingly  very  different  from  Old  Labour.  However,  whether,  under  New  Labour,  the 
crisis  of  reformism  is  being  progressed  or  halted  is  contingent  upon  many  factors, 34 
including  ultimately  the  opposition  New  Labour  faces  both  electorally  and  more 
generally.  I  will  suggest  here,  and  in  later  chapters,  the  impact  of  Labour  in  its 
contemporary  form  on  the  contours  of  reformism  as  a  whole. 
It  is  necessary  to  characterise  what  Old  Labour  actually  stood  for,  and,  in  this 
chapter,  that  will  be  done  through  the  prism  of  New  Labour's  claims  about  the  past, 
present  and  future  of  the  party,  and  government  policy.  Therefore,  it  is  not  intended  to 
base  the  discussion  on  a  protracted  consideration  of  Old  Labour,  or  to  offer  an 
extensive  historical  analysis  of  the  Labour  Party'.  My  objective  is  to  illustrate  the 
distinction  that  New  Labour  makes  between  different  Labour  governments  of  the  past, 
and  how  New  Labour  seeks  to  lay  claim  to  the  `best'  elements  of  the  social 
democratic  tradition.  Thus  the  government  of  the  immediate  post  war  period  is 
lauded,  alongside  the  Thatcher  governments,  as  having  "a  coherent  vision  that  drives 
a  government  forward"  (Mandelson  1997:  2).  However,  the  later  Labour  governments 
"made  promises  they  could  not  keep"  (Blair  2002a)  as  their  commitments  were 
"unsustainable  and  expensive"  (Mandelson  1997:  3).  Whilst  this  assessment  may,  or 
may  not,  be  accurate,  it  is  still  important  to  highlight  the  extent  to  which  the  history  of 
Old  Labour  has  been  re-written.  Since  Blair's  election  as  party  leader,  placing 
intellectual  and  ideological  distance  between  New  Labour  and  'second  wave'  Old 
Labour  has  been  a  paramount  concern.  In  one  sense  this  can  be  assumed  to  reflect  the 
electoral  pragmatism  before  1997  and  a  concern  to  secure  the  unprecedented  and,  thus 
far,  elusive  second  term  in  office,  until  2001  that  is.  The  poor  electoral  record  of  New 
Labour's  predecessors,  especially  in  the  1980s,  is  often  held  up  to  justify  the 
modernisation  of  the  party.  However,  this  must  also  be  linked  to  an  ideological  shift 
that  sees  New  Labour  not  simply  accommodate,  but  wholeheartedly  embrace,  the  neo- 
liberal  economic  paradigm. 
It  is  important  to  explore  this  process  in  the  context  of  two  particular  versions 
of  Old  Labour,  though  it  is  not  necessary  to  accept  the  New  Labour  conceptualisation. 
A  distinction  needs  to  be  made  between  the  versions  of  the  Old  that  New  Labour 
foregrounds.  For,  in  the  New  Labour  perspective,  there  are  (at  least)  two  Old  Labours. 
Both  the  post-war  government  and  the  post-IMF  government  are  Old  Labour.  The 
former,  for  New  Labour,  embodying  the  traditions  of  social  democracy  in  the  political 
1  There  is  a  plethora  of  literature  on  this  subject.  For  example  Cliff  and  Gluckstein  (1988),  Panitch 35 
and  economic  climate  where  it  was  most  appropriate  to  do  so,  and  the  latter  clinging 
onto  a  settlement  whose  time  was  passing.  However  the  post-IMF  Callaghan 
government  foreshadowed  both  Thatcherism  and  New  Labour,  and  this  is  not  openly 
recognised  by  the  New  Labour,  as  it  struggles  to  achieve  distance  from  this  period.  It 
is  intended  to  illustrate  here  the  transformation  of  Labour  in  terms  of  its  distance  from 
the  Wilson  and  Callaghan  governments,  but  also  to  stress  what  is  retained.  Further 
complexity  and  ambiguity  is  revealed  when  the  Labour  Party  of  the  1980s  and  1990s 
is  explored.  For  example,  from  a  New  Labour  perspective,  the  1980s  is  considered  as 
a  period  of  division,  especially  after  the  break  with  the  right  of  the  party  that 
culminated  in  the  creation  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party  in  1981,  and  electoral 
defeats  in  1983,1987  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  1992.  But  this  time  of  apparent 
extremism  was  also  the  period  during  which  the  `modernising  project'  was  born. 
Also,  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  is  characterised  as  a  period  of  left-wing 
ascendancy.  However,  when  it  is  critical  of  Old  Labour,  New  Labour  is  not 
unambiguously  referring  to  the  whole  period  of  New  Right  Conservative  government 
as  one  of  division,  extremism  and  the  dominance  of  militants.  The  fact  that  former 
leaders,  Neil  Kinnock  and  John  Smith,  are  held  up  as  beacons  of  modernisation  and 
renewal  (Blair  1994),  makes  it  difficult  to  determine  effectively  what  New  Labour 
defines  itself  against.  So,  New  Labour  is  both  Old  and  New,  and  is best  viewed  as  a 
product  of  all  that  we  understand  as  Labour,  since  at  key  junctures  in  post-war  history 
the  roots  of  New  Labour  are  apparent.  For  example,  in  the  1950s  consensus  Labour 
did  not  mark  itself  out  as  distinct  from  the  Conservative  governments  and  the  period 
of  `Butskillism'  is  arguably  an  embryonic  Third  Way.  Similarly,  the  `revisionism'  in 
the  late  1950s  represented  a  period  of  focus  on  the  `true'  meaning  of  Labour's 
`socialist'  ideology  and  a  struggle  to  effectively  relate  to  the  relative  affluence  of  the 
long  boom  and  the  impact  of  the  welfare  state  on  the  working  class.  This  perception, 
that  changes  to  the  nature  of  capitalism  were  working  against  Labour  (Jones  1996), 
has  clear  resonance  with  more  contemporary  concerns  about  modernisation. 
In  a  similar  vein,  in  the  early  1960s  Wilson  sought  to  appeal  to  the  middle 
class  vote  and  to  relate  to  the  `new  times'  being  constructed  by  the  "white  heat  of  the 
scientific  revolution"  (The  Guardian  2"d  October  1963),  in  a  way  that  seemingly 
parallels  Blair's  embrace  of  the  rhetoric  of  the  `new'  economy  and  the  `knowledge' 
and  Leys  (2001)  and  Miliband  (1972),  whose  work  is  drawn  upon  in  this  chapter,  are  especially  useful. 36 
society.  The  proposed  industrial  relations  reforms  and  the  curbs  on  militancy  towards 
the  end  of  the  1960s,  belie  the  notion  of  a  radical  left-wing  legacy  from  which  New 
Labour  needed  to  escape,  especially  since  these  are  credited  as  the  parent  of  the 
industrial  relations  reform  over  three  decades  (Rees  2001),  including,  ironically, 
Heath's  much  opposed  Industrial  Relations  Act  of  1971  and  the  Thatcherite  reforms 
of  the  1980s  and  1990s. 
The  neo-liberal  turn  of  the  Labour  government  after  the  IMF  crisis  of  1976 
and  the  embryonic  `partnership'  culture  that  the  `Social  Contract'  years  represent,  do 
seem  more  characteristically  Blairite  in  design  than  New  Labour's  re-invention  of 
Labour's  history  alludes  to.  Radical  rhetoric,  in  the  run-up  to  the  1974  election, 
involved  Labour  opportunistically  trying  to  relate  to  contemporary  militancy  and  the 
necessity  to  exploit  opposition  to  the  Heath  government,  rather  than  an  actual  active 
shift  leftwards.  The  period  of  `radical'  Labour  was  also  very  short-lived.  Yet,  none  of 
these  currents  within  Labour  are  adequately  represented  nor  differentiated  by  New 
Labour,  as  Labour's  `failed  past'  is  simplistically  reconstructed. 
The  creation  of  New  Labour  must  be  viewed,  therefore,  as  a  process,  and  party 
history  holds  the  key  to  the  creation  of  New  Labour  as  much  as  the  defeat  in  four 
general  elections  acted  as  the  "great  legitimising  back-cloth  for  the  whole  Blairite 
project"  (Coates  1999:  350).  It  is  also  an  evolving  and  developing  process  -a  project: 
Our  approach  is  `permanent  revisionism',  a  continual  search  for  better 
means  to  meet  our  goals,  based  on  a  clear  view  of  the  changes  taking 
place  in  advanced  industrial  societies  (Blair  1998a:  4). 
New  Labour  is  new  in  many  ways  but,  in  others,  its  project  is  a  struggle  to  put  right 
the  wrongs  of  Old  Labour  and  take  up  the  unfinished  business  of  Thatcherism,  whilst 
laying  claim  to  the  `true'  values  of  the  social  democratic  tradition.  What  I  seek  to  do 
in  this  chapter  is  to  draw  together  the  strands  of  the  dual  purpose  of  the  New  Labour 
project  as  a  foundation  upon  which  an  analysis  of  New  Labour's  employment 
relations  settlement,  its  relationship  with  its  traditional  trade  union  allies,  the 
devolution  settlement,  and  the  realities  of  working  life  under  New  Labour,  can  be 
built. 
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As  noted  earlier,  in  different  ways  Labour  governments  have  always  sought  to 
manage  capitalism.  Thus  Labour,  even  the  most  left  wing  elements  of  Old  Labour, 
was  never  actively  engaged  in  a  struggle  to  overthrow  capitalism.  In  this  sense  New 
and  Old  Labour  are  not  different.  The  difference  between  them  is  manifest  in  New 
Labour's  disdain  for  key  structures  of  the  post  war  settlement,  not  only  as  having 
outlived  their  time  in  policy  terms  but  also  because  of  the  effect  that  they  had  on  the 
Labour  Party: 
An  integral  part  of  the  crisis  for  the  left  during  the  Thatcher  years  was 
that  we  were  transformed  into  the  political  force  that  defended  the 
post-war  settlement.  As  a  result,  we  became  trapped  into  a  political 
culture  that  was  defensive  -  even,  ironically,  conservative  (Robin  Cook 
cited  in  Lavalette  and  Mooney  1999:  36). 
Panitch  and  Leys  (2001)  have  used  the  example  of  the  New  Left,  both  inside 
and  out  of  the  Labour  Party,  to  illustrate  the  difficulty  of  seeing  Old  Labour  as  a 
homogeneous  bloc.  They  argue  that  strife  over  party  democracy,  the  influence  of  the 
right,  and  even  what  appears  as  contemporary  `control  freakery',  are  not  necessarily 
new  phenomena.  They  also  assert  that  the  very  grounding  of  the  necessity  to 
modernise  can  be  challenged,  since  New  Labour  gloss  over  the  significance  of  the 
New  Left  to  facilitate  a  greater  accommodation  with  the  Thatcherite  legacy.  In  their 
view,  that  places  the  objectives  of  the  New  Left  at  the  possible  centre  of  the  `real' 
modernisation  of  the  Labour  Party,  the  eschewal  of  activism  and  `socialist'  education, 
in  return  for  moderate  electoral  success,  limited  any  notion  of  a  meaningful 
transformation  of  society  for  Old  Labour.  Once  in  government,  Old  Labour  imitated 
its  opposition.  Then,  as  now,  this  illustrates  how: 
The  working  class  has  access  to  the  state  (elections  and  parliament)  but 
does  not  exercise  it  to  achieve  socialism  because  of  its  indoctrination 
by  the  means  of  communication.  In  fact  it  might  be  said  that  the  truth 
is  if  anything  the  inverse:  the  general  form  of  the  representative  state  - 
bourgeois  democracy  -  is  itself  the  principle  linchpin  of  Western 
capitalism,  whose  very  existence  deprives  the  working  class  of  the  idea 
that  socialism  as  a  different  type  of  State  and  the  means  of 
communication  and  other  mechanisms  of  cultural  control  thereafter 
clinch  this  ideological  `effect'  (Anderson  quoted  in  Panitch  and  Leys 
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From  this  perspective,  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  when  New  Labour  began  to 
emerge  as  a  distinct  strand  of  party  and  political  thought.  The  removal  of  the  totemic 
Clause  Four  of  the  Labour  Party's  constitution  is  taken  as  a  watershed  and,  above  all, 
is  perceived  as  marking  the  consolidation  of  the  birth  of  New  Labour.  There  are  key 
differences  between  old  and  new  Clause  Four,  though  it  is  problematic  to  assume  that 
the  meaning  of  both  is  simple  and  straightforward.  There  is,  in  both,  characteristic 
Labour  ambiguity  and  availability  of  competing  interpretations: 
1918-1995 
To  secure  for  the  workers  by  hand  or  by  brain  the  full  fruits  of  their  industry 
and  the  most  equitable  distribution  thereof  that  may  be  possible,  upon  the 
basis  of  common  ownership  of  the  means  of  production,  distribution,  and 
exchange,  and  the  best  obtainable  system  of  popular  administration  and 
control  of  each  industry  and  service. 
1995- 
1.  The  Labour  Party  is  a  democratic  socialist  party.  It  believes  that  by  the 
strength  of  our  common  endeavour,  we  achieve  more  than  we  achieve  alone  so 
as  to  create  for  each  of  us  the  means  to  realise  our  full  potential  and  for  all  of 
us  a  community  in  which  power,  wealth  and  opportunity  are  in  the  hands  of 
the  many  and  not  the  few,  where  the  rights  we  enjoy  reflect  the  duties  we  owe, 
and  where  we  live  together,  freely,  in  a  spirit  of  solidarity,  tolerance  and 
respect. 
2.  To  these  ends  we  work  for: 
A  dynamic  market  economy,  serving  the  public  interest,  in  which  the 
enterprise  of  the  market  and  the  rigour  of  competition  are  joined  with  the 
forces  of  partnership  and  co-operation  to  produce  the  wealth  the  nation  needs 
and  the  opportunity  for  all  to  prosper,  with  a  thriving  private  sector  and  high 
quality  public  services,  where  those  undertakings  essential  to  the  common 
good  are  either  owned  by  the  public  or  accountable  to  them...  2 
Whilst  the  new  Clause  Four  clearly  embodies  New  Labour's  effort  to  intrinsically  link 
neo-liberal  priorities  to  Labour  values,  it  does  not  transform  the  nature  of  Labour's 
historic  accommodation  with  capital.  It  simply  declares  a  long  held  position  openly. 
This  represents  the  culmination  of  a  process  that  began  with  Labour's  first  majority 
government  in  1945  as  Labour,  from  then  on,  sought  to  reassure  private  capital  that 
their  interests  were  in  safe  hands: 
2  Adapted  from  full  citations  in  Coates  (2000). 39 
For  all  that  the  Fabians  represented  a  ruling  class  current,  their  `state 
socialism'  had  never  intended  to  leave  80%  of  the  economy  in  the 
hands  of  private  profit  makers.  Clause  four's  `social  ownership'  was 
clearly  understood  to  apply  to  as  much  of  industry  as  administratively 
possible.  Of  course  the  two  previous  minority  Labour  Governments 
could  do  little  to  carry  it  out.  In  1945  no  such  excuse  existed,  so  the 
Labour  leadership  simply  re-wrote  the  political  textbook  (Cliff  and 
Gluckstein  1988:  222). 
This  has  resonance  with  New  Labour's  orientation  and  suggests  the  New 
Labour  position  on  Clause  Four  was  far  from  distinctive.  However  a  change  has 
occurred  in  that,  having  shifted  the  focus  from  public  ownership  and  concretised  this 
position,  the  question  of  the  relevance  of  public  provision  is  pursued  with  some 
vigour.  Although,  as  Thompson  (1996)  notes,  this  shift  in  emphasis  was  evident  from 
1992,  the  real  impact  of  this  only  began  to  emerge  after  the  1997  general  election.  The 
effects  intensified  in  the  period  after  the  2001  election,  in  particular,  with  the 
proliferation  of  the  Public  Private  Partnerships,  especially  in  health,  education  and 
housing.  Moreover,  the  extract  of  the  new  Clause  Four  cited  above  is  also  intended  to 
demonstrate  clear  a  distinction  between  Old  and  New  Labour,  in  the  sense  that  for  the 
former,  from  at  least  1945,  Clause  Four  was  a  key  element  of  the  socialist  myth  that 
the  party  never  acted  upon  (Jones  1996).  For  the  latter,  although  in  parts  the  revised 
Clause  Four  is  characteristically  vague,  the  experience  of  New  Labour  in  power  has 
revealed  that  objectives  regarding  the  dynamic  market  economy  and  thriving  private 
sector  are  being  put  into  practice  with  alacrity.  Importantly,  the  concern  noted  here  is 
for  high  quality  public  services  rather  than  public  sector  and  the  either/or  of 
public/private  ownership  is  absolutely  central  in  terms  of  impact  on  forming  policy. 
Moreover,  as  I  demonstrate  below,  the  state  is  in  the  process  of  being  `remade'  under 
New  Labour  and  the  `public'  of  being  re-conceptualised  in  neo-liberal  terms. 
As  noted  in  the  introduction  to  this  chapter,  the  Blairite  concern  to 
`modernise'  and  relate  to  the  demands  of  `the  modern  world'  mirror  Wilson's  in  the 
early  1960s.  This  resulted  for  Wilson,  as  for  Blair,  in  appeals  to  the  middle  class,  and 
attention  was  turned  from  Labour's  traditional  support  and,  indeed,  on  it,  as  concern 
grew  over  union  militancy  and  the  `need'  for  wage  restraint: 
Modernising 
...  was  in  part  to  be  achieved  by  addressing  the  issue  of 
working  class  militancy,  through  pay  freezes  and  incomes  policies 40 
culminating  in  1969  with  the  publication  of  In  Place  of 
Strife 
... 
(Ferguson  et  al.  2002:  158). 
As  Panitch  and  Leys  (2001)  argue,  not  only  did  this  allow  real  earnings  to  fall,  it 
paved  the  way,  to  an  extent,  for  Thatcherism  and  the  rise  of  the  New  Right.  By  the 
time  of  Labour's  second  post  war  term  in  office,  the  working  class  were  already  being 
perceived  as  problematic.  Although  Wilson  did  seek  to  appeal  to  the  left  and  appeared 
radical  in  opposition  before  1964,  the  Labour  government  was  much  less  so  in  power. 
Thus,  whilst  there  was  some  expansion  of  public  ownership,  wider  reforms  and 
political  orientation,  especially  in  terms  of  industrial  relations,  meant  cuts  in  wages 
and  conditions  which  helped  set  in  train  the  wider  radicalisation  of  the  rank  and  file  of 
the  Labour  Movement  that  characterised  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s. 
Consequently,  New  Labour's  analysis  of  the  period  is  problematic  since  a  central 
focus  is  on  the  apparently  close  relationship  between  the  Wilson  government  and  the 
trade  unions.  Yet,  close  examination  of  Old  Labour  challenges  any  notion  that  Labour 
was  in  the  grip  of  the  unions.  In  fact,  open  challenges  from  rank  and  file  union 
members  to  their  leadership's  acquiescence  and  deference  to  Labour,  and  militancy 
over  threats  to  union  rights  during  this  period,  suggest,  rather,  the  union  bureaucracy 
was,  to  a  large  extent,  in  the  grip  of  parliamentary  Labour.  There  are  difficulties 
therefore  in  determining  how  effectively  New  Labour  is  able  to  define  itself  in 
relation  to  Old  Labour,  especially  given  the  history  of  rightward  shifts  at  key 
moments  in  Labour's  history. 
Coates  (1999)  suggests  that  there  are  two  historical  reference  points  against 
which  New  Labour  defines  itself  in  order  to  characterise  the  party  as  a  new  force  and 
differentiate  itself  from  Old  Labour.  The  first  is  the  period  when  the  Bennite  left  were 
perceived  to  be  in  the  ascendancy  in  the  Party  between  1979  and  1983,  which  Coates 
suggests  was  central  to  creating  the  impetus  for  the  rise  of  New  Labour.  There  is 
some  salience  in  this  framework,  especially  when  the  influence  of  Neil  Kinnock  and 
John  Smith  as  key  `modernisers'  of  Labour's  approach  to  policy  and  the  party  itself. 
The  second  reference  point  is  the  distinction  between  the  post-war  governments  of 
Atlee,  Wilson  and  Callaghan  thus  demonstrating  how,  in  order  to  understand  New 
Labour,  it  is  important  not  to  combine  all  of  Old  Labour  together  as  a  homogeneous 
bloc.  New  Labour's  critical  focus  is  therefore  on  its  pre-1979  predecessors  in  and 
their  successors  in  the  early  1980s.  This  is  what  New  Labour  defines  itself  against  and 41 
is  central  to  its  current  ideological  thrust,  especially  in  relation  to  the  Third  Way's 
critique  of  the  old  left: 
One  could  say  that  the  two  old  political  philosophies  of  the  Old  Left 
and  Thatcherism  were  `half  theories'.  Old  Labour  was  strong  on  social 
justice  but  never  successful  in  fostering  a  dynamic  economy... 
(Giddens  2002b). 
It  is  a  Third  Way  because  it  moves  beyond  an  Old  Left  preoccupied  by 
state  control,  high  taxation  and  producer  interests  and  a  New  Right 
treating  public  investment,  and  often  the  very  notions  of  `society'  and 
collective  endeavour  as  evils  to  be  undone  (Blair  1998:  1,  original 
emphasis). 
Blair  has  also  made  clear  New  Labour  does  not  just  signify  a  Third  Way  between  the 
individualist  right  and  the  statist  left,  it  also  represents  a  third  way  within  a  left 
defined  as  dominated  by  fundamentalists  on  one  side  and  moderates,  neither 
sufficiently  bold  nor  intellectually  engaged  enough  to  take  on  the  extremists,  on  the 
other  (Blair  1998a:  1).  New  Labour's  approach  to  different  political  trajectories  within 
Labour  serves  to  highlight  its  influences  and  suggests  the  complexity  involved  in 
mapping  clear  continuities  and  changes.  We  know  that  the  Wilson  legacy  is 
underplayed,  and  that  there  are  important  similarities  between  Blair  and  Wilson  in 
terms  of  what  they  saw  as  the  defining  characteristics  of  their  political  `moment'  and 
their  orientations  towards  policy.  Moreover,  striving  to  chart  the  most  acceptable 
course  between  state  and  market,  the  concern  for  economic  efficiency  and  the  ardent 
pursuit  of  electoral  respectability,  marked  not  only  the  Wilson  period  but,  to  an  extent, 
defines  the  middle  way  sought  by  Labour  for  a  century.  This  challenges  the  idea  of 
`newness'  and  the  idea  that  New  Labour  represents  the  complete  modernisation  and 
rejection  of  all  of  Old  Labour. 
As  noted  earlier,  New  Labour  praises  Atlee's  government,  as  one  with  a  true 
sense  of  vision  and  a  will  to  transform  Britain.  The  Atlee  government  is  perceived  to 
have  grasped  its  historic  moment  and  as  having  worked  towards  a  social  democratic 
vision,  the  pinnacle  of  which  was  the  creation  of  the  welfare  state.  By  contrast,  the 
Wilson/Callaghan  era  is  criticised  as  a  period  when  governments  failed  to  predict  how 
overweening  and  bureaucratic  its  structures  would  become.  The  Labour  governments 
of  the  1960s  and  1970s  are  depicted  as  having  failed  to  redirect  strategy  when  the 42 
post-war  welfare  state,  and  the  structures  put  in  place  in  the  Atlee  era,  had  reached  the 
limits  of  their  usefulness.  The  state  itself  is  problematised  by  New  Labour.  The  late 
1970s,  in  particular,  are  taken  to  represent  the  waste  of  the  legacy  of  Atlee.  Labour 
governments  failed  to  modernise  the  structures  and  institutions  of  the  post-war  period, 
just  as  the  `rights-claiming  golden-age'  was  coming  to  an  end. 
In  addition,  in  this  period  of  apparent  left  wing  ascendancy,  the  Wilson 
government  failed  to  take  on  "the  problem  of  an  assertion  of  the  power  of  the  factory 
floor"  (Wilson  quoted  in  Cliff  and  Gluckstein  1988:  291)  effectively  after  gaining  a 
majority  in  the  1966  election.  This  indelibly  marks  this  government  out  as  being 
beholden  to  trade  union  vested  interest  for  New  Labour.  Similarly,  the  lack  of 
recognition  of  what  could  have  been  done  and  what  ought  to  have  been  done 
characterises  New  Labour's  approach  to  the  1974-79  government.  Again,  this  is 
linked  to  Old  Labour's  problem  of  making  promises  it  could  not  keep,  with  no 
acknowledgement  that  this  was  necessary  to  convince  its  core  supporters,  and  its 
failure  to  `break  the  back'  of  union  power.  Clearly  this  government  did  not  prevent 
strikes,  culminating  in  the  Winter  of  Discontent  in  1978-79,  but  there  is  little  to 
support  the  conclusion  that  Labour  did  not  attempt  to  curb  union  power  and  militancy 
at  this  time,  or  that  Labour  did  not  promote  restraint.  The  central  issue  here  is  that,  in 
the  absence  of  the  wholesale  reform  of  party  structure,  the  unions  retained  an 
influence  that  was  not  only  a  barrier  to  future  reform,  but  was  also,  crucially  for  New 
Labour  modernisers,  a  barrier  to  Labour  regaining  the  trust  of  the  electorate.  The 
definitive  New  Labour  battle  against  the  "forces  of  conservatism"  (Blair  1999; 
2002b),  discussed  in  detail  below,  has  its  roots  in  this  analysis. 
There  are  difficulties,  however,  with  Coates  selection  of  key  periods  in  the 
making  of  New  Labour.  His  focus  on  the  period  on  the  first  few  years  of  the  1980s 
and  the  influence  of  Benn,  allows  for  rather  problematic  conclusions.  The  first  is  that 
New  Labour  has  "thrown  out  the  socialist  baby  with  the  Bennite  bathwater"  (Coates 
1999:  365)  -a  position  that  New  Labour  may  come  to  regret  if  "it  transpires  that  the 
old  beast  of  capitalism  remains  alive  and  well  into  the  next  century"  (ibid.  ).  The 
inference  is  that  New  Labour's  ideological  thrust  is  based  a  delusion  that  capitalism  is 
dead  or  at  least  in  its  death  throes.  My  argument  is  that  this  is  not  the  case,  since  New 
Labour  represents  the  zenith  of  Labour's  accommodation  with  capitalism  as  it  seeks 
to  celebrate  and  facilitate  for  capitalism  on  a  global  scale.  This  is  illustrated  in  the 
defence  of  capitalism  mounted  by  the  government  when  any  challenge  is  presented: 43 
These  protests  are  a  complete  outrage.  World  trade  is  good  for 
people's  jobs  and  peoples'  living  standards.  The  protests  and  the 
people  who  indulge  in  the  protests  are  completely  misguided  (Blair 
quoted  in  The  Guardian  16th  June  20013). 
As  this  quotation  and  New  Labour's  approach  to  the  government's  relationship  with 
business  demonstrate,  the  task  is  to  harness  capitalism  for  the  common  good  and,  in 
so  doing,  fuse  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour.  Blair  upholds  the  idea  of  classless 
society: 
The  class  war  is  over.  But  the  struggle  for  true  equality  has  only  just 
begun.  (Blair  1999). 
But,  like  all  the  other  politicians  that  have  laid  claim  to  this  position,  including  Labour 
ones,  it  is  classlessness  under  capitalism. 
Coates  also  seemingly  accepts  the  dominant  assumption  that  there  was  some 
kind  of  "socialist  baby"  to  throw  out  in  the  first  place,  that  Benn,  at  that  time, 
represented  a  socialist  tradition  within  Labour,  and,  indeed,  fundamentally,  that  his 
"bathwater"  is  fundamentally  different  from  New  Labour's,  in  the  final  analysis  of 
Labourism.  This  notion  can  be  challenged  in  the  context  of  Labour's  socialist  myth, 
noted  above,  and  the  insistence  that  Labour,  Old  and  New,  is  in  nature  a  capitalist 
workers'  party.  Of  course,  there  are  clear  differences  between  New  Labour  and  Benn. 
But  his  commitment  to  radical  left  wing  ideas  is  linked  to  the  growth  of  radicalism 
inside  and  outside  the  Labour  Party  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s,  and  is  thus  a 
product  of  the  relatively  recent  past: 
Once  the  youthful  technocrat  of  the  first  Wilson  era,  now  a  born-again 
socialist  radicalised  by  his  experience  of  workers  in  struggle 
(Whitehead  quoted  in  Jones  1996:  90). 
Whilst  it  is  important  not  to  ignore  the  strengths  of  Bennism  and  the  important  current 
within  the  Labour  Party  it  represented,  it  needs  to  be  recognised  as  just  that,  not  a 
socialist  critique  of  the  contradictions  of  reformism  or  the  parliamentary  road  to 
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socialism4.  More  recently,  despite  Benn's  sustained  resistance  to  New  Labour's  neo- 
liberal  turn  and,  particularly,  to  in  opposition  to  the  wars  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  he 
retains  an  absolute  faith  in  the  party: 
I  have  been  in  the  Labour  Party  for  60  years  and  I  intend  to  die  in  it.  I 
can  understand  why  people  move,  but  to  win  a  majority  you  have  to 
persuade  people  (Benn  2002). 
It  is  important,  therefore,  to  explore  the  links  between  New  Labour  and  key  elements 
of  Old  Labour.  It  is  also  important  not  to  focus  too  heavily  on  change,  since  this  often 
leads  to  assumptions  that  overstate  the  socialist  outlook  of  the  party  as  a  whole  rather 
than  that  of  groups  of  its  members.  As  Rees  (2001:  13)  has  pointed  out: 
Error  creeps  in  where  this  [rhetoric]  crosses  over  into  a  serious 
contention  that  the  Labour  Party  has  fundamentally  changed  its  nature. 
The  extent  to  which  Blair  and  New  Labour  are  different  should  not  be 
understated,  but  his  outlook  and  the  political  orientation  of  New  Labour  is  a  creation 
of  the  Labour  tradition  since  its  emergence  as  a  credible  political  and  parliamentary 
force.  Furthermore,  a  central  facet  of  the  experience  of  New  Labour  in  power  is  that 
important  difficulties  arise  when  leadership  and  party  management  outlook  are 
conflated  with  the  aspirations  of  ordinary  members.  This  is  often  underplayed  in  the 
effort  to  present  Old  Labour  as  more  in  tune  with  supporters.  It  is,  therefore, 
important  to  recognise  that,  because  New  Labour  demonises  the  Labour  governments 
of  the  1960s  and  1970s,  this  can  lead  to  a  romanticisation  of  them.  As  Ferguson  et.  al. 
(2002)  illustrate,  Blair's  rejection  of  central  tenets  of  the  post  war  settlement  like 
`universal'  welfare,  means  many  traditional  Labour  supporters  are  drawn  to  the  myth 
of  Old  Labour.  Yet: 
Faced  with  the  choice  of  protecting  workers  from  the  ravages  of 
economic  recession  or  sacrificing  workers  in  an  attempt  to  re- 
invigorate  the  economy  on  terms  favourable  to  business  and  the 
market,  Labour's  message  was  only  too  clear:  as  the  crisis  developed  it 
was  workers  who  were  going  to  have  to  pay  the  costs  of  economic 
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decline  through  reduced  wages,  unemployment  and  cuts  in  social 
provision.  (Ferguson  et.  al.  2002:  159). 
The  key  point  here  is  that  the  break  with  Old  Labour  is  crucially  overstated,  not  just 
by  New  Labour,  and  this  leads  to  a  revision  of  the  history  of  Labour  which 
harmonises  to  an  extent  with  the  mythology  that  both  New  Labour  and  some  of  its 
adversaries  seek  to  construct.  The  struggle  to  capture  `true'  Labour  or,  more  recently, 
`real'  Labour,  interestingly  both  inside  and  outside  of  the  Labour  Party,  may  have  an 
impact  on  the  New  Labour  project  in  the  longer  term,  especially  in  terms  of 
challenges  for  the  leadership.  Of  crucial  importance  here,  is  the  notion  that  Blairism  is 
a  temporary  phenomenon  within  Labour  and  that  its  dominance  will  be  short-lived,  its 
legacy  short  term.  This  is  exemplified  to  an  extent  in  the  `stay  and  fight'  mentality 
especially  of,  `maverick'  politicians  like  Galloway  (before  his  expulsion  from  the 
Labour  party  in  2003)  and  Benn,  who  sums  up  his  position  thus: 
I'm  not  a  member  of  New  Labour.  I'm  a  member  of  the  Labour 
Party.  .  .  the  repudiation  of  what  it  calls  Old  Labour  is  a  repudiation  of 
the  whole  party;  and  the  removal  of  Clause  4...  is  a  repudiation  of  the 
vision  for  the  future.. 
.  the  Labour  Party  is  in  the  middle  of  a  big 
identity  crisis  (Benn  quoted  in  Coates  1999:  365). 
Yet  earlier  in  Labour's  history,  `moderniser'  Benn  unequivocally  attacked  Clause 
Four: 
You  cannot  attract  and  keep  the  loyalty  of  young  people,  if  the 
majority  of  the  movement  are  still  thinking  too  much  about  the  past 
they  seem  to  be  in  (quoted  in  Cliff  and  Gluckstein  1988:  343). 
Davies  (2001)  presents  some  compelling  evidence  of  a  batten  down  the 
hatches  approach  to  being  in  power  for  some  MPs  and  trade  unionists  in  her  chronicle 
of  the  Labour  National  Executive  Committee  between  1998  and  2000.  For  Davies, 
this  is  a  period  characterised  not  only  as  one  whereby  the  Party's  internal  democracy 
was  decimated  through  the  relentless  manipulation  of  the  Millbank  Tendency,  but  also 
when  former  left-wing  colleagues  were  obviously  cowed: 
[Dennis  Skinner]  called  for  a  £5  per  week  increase  in  pensions  in  the 
forthcoming  comprehensive  public  spending  review:  `we  have  a  £22 
billion  windfall  and  we  should  use  it.  Then  we  have  a  chance  of 
recovery.  '  Skinner's  contribution  was  welcome...  But  this  was  not  the 46 
Dennis  Skinner  of  old.  He  seemed  to  have  convinced  himself  that  Blair 
was  some  kind  of  new-style  Harold  Wilson,  who  just  needed  a  steer  in 
the  right  direction  (Davies  2001:  151). 
The  alternative,  though  not  unconnected,  view  is  seemingly  to  make  a  temporary 
stand  and  await  forgiveness,  as  independent  MSP  Dennis  Canavan  in  Scotland  and 
Ken  Livingstone,  the  independent  London  Mayor  appear  to  have  done.  Both  have 
been  critical  of  central  tenets  of  New  Labour  policy,  have  been  expelled  by  the  party, 
but  have  not  joined  any  other  party  or  openly  aligned  themselves  with  left  wing 
groups  or  parties  like  Scottish  Socialist  Party  or  the  Socialist  Alliance5.  This  serves  to 
confirm  that,  even  the  most  vociferous  critics  of  New  Labour,  do  not,  in  the  final 
analysis,  conclude  that  a  fundamental  break  with  the  past  has  occurred.  The  Party  or, 
indeed,  the  Labour  Movement  is  not  rent  asunder  by  the  emergence  and  domination  of 
New  Labour.  It  is  a  question  of  applying  pressure  and  striving  to  rein  New  Labour  in. 
An  important  difficulty  here  is  that  the  negative  impact  of  internal  reform, 
demonstrated  by  Davies,  is  not  effectively  accounted  for.  Thus  Panitch  and  Leys 
(2001:  290)  argue  that,  whilst  what  distinguishes  New  Labour  can  be  linked  in  some 
way  to  the  history  of  the  Labour  party,  the  contemporary  party  has  been  reconstructed 
so  that  it  is  no  longer  "contested  terrain".  Debate,  dissent  and  division  over  outlook, 
strategy,  and  direction  are,  for  New  Labour,  key  elements  of  Labour's  failed  past.  In 
this  context,  a  key  success  for  New  Labour  has  been  the  modernisation  of  party 
structure,  creating  clear  difficulties  for  alternative  perspectives  to  emerge 
successfully.  It  is  still  possible  though  that  the  New  Labour  project  can  be  adapted  on 
the  basis  of  a  concerted  threat  against  Blair's  leadership.  Overall,  whilst  New  Labour 
help  expose  the  paradoxes  of  the  Labour  project  and  continue  to  represent  the 
contradictions  at  the  heart  of  reformism,  new  versions  of  it  can  still  emerge. 
1.3:  Assessing  New  Labour 
Despite  reservations  about  claims  of  discontinuity  between  Old  and  New 
Labour  that  spring,  to  an  extent,  from  a  misunderstanding  of  what  Labour  stands  for, 
it  is  important  to  avoid  the  assumption  that  nothing  has  fundamentally  changed. 
Rubinstein  (2000)  argues  that  the  prevailing  view  is  that  New  Labour  represents  a 
clear  break  with  Labour's  past  and  seeks  to  challenge  this  view.  However,  he  suggests 
that  New  Labour  is  simply  a  "rational  response  to  the  profound  economic  and  social 
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changes  that  have  taken  place  since  the  1970s"  (Rubinstein  2000:  161).  Yet  account 
needs  to  be  taken  of  the  central  tenets  of  New  Labour's  current  policy  and  ideological 
underpinnings,  and,  in  doing  so,  it  is  possible  to  challenge  this  conclusion.  It  is 
important  to  bear  in  mind,  in  this  respect,  that  New  Labour  and  Third  Way  rhetoric 
often  overstates  change  and  that  dominant  notions  of  change  should  not  be  accepted 
uncritically.  Change  is  the  life-blood  of  New  Labour.  The  pace  and  impact  of  change 
demanded  by  the  exigencies  of  increasing  globalisation  is  a  key  challenge  that  faces 
New  Labour  and  the  Third  Way  (Blair  1998a:  6).  Ability  to  relate  to  change  is, 
crucially,  how  New  Labour  defines  itself  in  relation  to  Old  Labour.  The  apparent  end 
of  old  certainties  needs  a  new  approach  beyond  the  reach  of  the  Old  Labour  project. 
Rubinstein's  conclusion  follows  the  New  Labour  lead  and  ignores,  as  New  Labour  do, 
the  role  New  Labour  plays  in  the  shaping  the  contours  of  change.  An  alternative 
viewpoint  is  that  constructing  change  in  this  way  helps  New  Labour  shape  and  limit 
what  can  be  expected  of  a  government  faced  with  change,  reified  in  the  New  Labour 
manner  (Atkinson  and  Savage  2001:  9).  There  is  salience  in  this  view  and  a 
consideration  of  what  we  understand  as  New  Labour  needs  to  be  interpreted  through  a 
framework  of  the  context  of  living  with  New  Labour. 
For  Driver  and  Martell  (1998)  there  are  four  possible  interpretations  of  the 
New  Labour  phenomenon,  and  it  is  through  these  that  we  can  explore  the  complexity 
of  trying  to  discern  what  is  `new'  about  New  Labour.  The  first  interpretation  is  that 
New  Labour  is  `spin  only'  with  little  substance  in  policy  terms.  This  is  a  difficult 
premise  to  uphold  since  there  clearly  is  substance  to  its  policies.  A  key  difficulty  here 
is  to  ascertain  whether  any  spin  element  is  Old  Labour  being  spun  in  a  different  way 
or  whether  this  is  Thatcherism  plus  Labour  spin.  Clearly  from  the  mid-1980s  onwards 
there  was  an  increased  concern  for  media  management  and  image  but  many  of  the 
messages  were  new.  The  "half  theories",  in  Giddens  terminology  (2002b),  could  not 
be  simplistically  spun  into  a  coherent  political  ideology.  New  Labour  is  like  any  other 
party  in  the  sense  that  it  constructs  its  political  discourse  through  language 
(Fairclough  2000).  It  is  not,  however,  simply  a  creation  of  `media-spin'  that  has  no 
substance  in  terms  of  ideology  and  policy.  If  New  Labour  is  to  achieve  its  goals  then 
social  democracy  needs  to  be  reconstructed  in  popular  terms.  The  Third  Way  needed 
to  be  cascaded  to  help  win  over  people  to  New  Labour's  ideals: 48 
The  Third  Way  is  constantly  being  talked  into  being,  new  language  is 
constantly  being  found  to  bring  [these]  elements  together  into  a 
coherent  whole  (Fairclough  2000:  4). 
The  second  view  is  that  New  Labour  is  the  same  as  before  and  that  there  is 
little  new  in  detail.  However,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  some  discontinuity  with  the  past, 
not  least  in  terms  of  New  Labour's  apparent  aim  to  eschew  the  ideological  and 
dogmatic  orientation  of  both  its  Old  Labour  and  New  Right  predecessors.  This,  in 
itself,  is  problematic  since  in  both  rhetorical  and  policy  terms  New  Labour  is  clearly 
ideological.  In  the  years  since  1997,  it  is  clear  that  New  Labour  has  rejected  a  lot  of 
what  helped  characterise  Old  Labour,  at  the  very  least  in  terms  of  public  perception. 
New  Labour  has  sought  to  forge  new  alliances  with  what  were  seemingly  old 
adversaries  in  business  and  to  restructure  relationships  with  former  allies,  most 
notably  in  the  trade  unions.  It  is  important  not  to  underplay  the  qualitative  difference 
that  results.  A  vision  to  manage  and  tame  capitalism  -  however  hollow  -  and  one  to 
celebrate  it,  and  openly  facilitate  wealth  creation  at  the  expense  of  wealth 
redistribution,  create  a  different  set  of  outcomes,  even  if  the  distinction  between  them 
is  subtle. 
The  third  interpretation  that  Driver  and  Martell  outline  is  a  pro-Labour  version 
of  the  above  that  sees  New  Labour  as  drawing  on  the  values  and  vision  of  Labour 
pioneers.  This  was  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  rhetoric  around  the  Labour  Party's 
centenary: 
Over  the  last  100  years  our  policies  have  changed  to  match  the  needs 
and  aspirations  of  the  British  people.  But  our  values  -  on  social  justice, 
solidarity  and  opportunity  for  all  -  have  been  constant  (Labour  Party 
2000:  37). 
The  last  100  years  has  taught  us  that  we  may  win  battles  but  the  war 
against  vested  interest  is  always  with  us...  But  we  will  win  and  create 
a  world  fit  for  our  children  and  our  children's  children.  That  is  what 
Keir  Hardie  and  his  followers  pledged  in  1900  and  that  is  what  Tony 
Blair  and  his  government  pledged  in  2000  (Labour  Party  2000:  4). 
However,  such  interpretations  often  serve  to  underplay  the  radicalism  of  New  Labour. 
Also,  though  they  may  be  wholly  necessary  to  keep  loyal  supporters  on  board,  it  has 49 
become  increasingly  difficult  to  substantiate  such  claims.  The  notion  of  Labour's 
apparent  suspicion  of  vested  interest  has  been  entirely  transformed.  Vested  interest  in 
New  Labour's  conceptualisation  means  former  allies,  often  in  the  shape  of  ordinary 
party  and  union  members,  and,  especially,  public  sector  workers.  Vested  interest  is 
represented  as  a  critical  barrier  to  New  Labour's  `modernisation'.  New  Labour's 
specific  vision  of  `modernisation'  is  also  crucial  here.  The  focus  of  `modernisation'  is 
on  the  structures  of  the  state  and,  as  discussed  below,  it  is  difficult  to  support  the 
conclusion  that  the  values  of  social  democracy  have  not  been  overhauled  as  a  result, 
despite  the  kind  of  rhetoric  above.  Values  are  said  to  remain  the  same  yet  New  Labour 
is  the  party  of  "genuine  transformation"  (Wright  1997:  22).  Importantly,  this 
transformation  is  most  overtly  characterised  in  relation  to  other  versions  of  Labour, 
rather  than  the  ideological  underpinning  of  other  parties,  since  New  Labour's  1960s 
and  1970s  predecessors: 
seemed  more  interested  in  defending  yesterday's  economy  than 
creating  the  conditions  for  tomorrow's...  that  seemed  to  be  on  an 
ideological  trip  from  somewhere  in  the  past  (Wright  1997:  23-24). 
This  allows  a  version  of  Old  Labour  to  be  constructed  as  not  in  tune  with  Labour 
values.  Indeed,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  this  most  recent,  and  for  many  most  obvious, 
version  of  Old  Labour  is  defined  as  not  being  Labour  at  all.  It  represented: 
A  narrow  base.  Obsessed  about  the  wrong  things.  Old  fashioned.  In 
retreat  (Blair  2003). 
The  disavowal  of  key  elements  of  Labour's  past  does  present  a  challenge  to  the  view 
that  there  is  little  new  in  New  Labour. 
Driver  and  Martell  are  also  critical  of  a  fourth  interpretation:  that  New  Labour 
represents  "Thatcherism  Mark  2".  New  Labour's  shift  away  from  the  European, 
Anglo-Saxon  model  of  social  democracy  towards  an  Anglo-American  version  and  its 
embrace  of  neo-liberalism  has  drawn  criticisms  that  overall  the  Thatcher  mould  has 
not  been  broken.  This  is  not  only  connected  to  the  fact  that  Blair  very  quickly  settled 
in  to  the  `there  is  no  alternative'  mentality  and  an  intransigent  approach  that 
characterised  Thatcher's  terms  in  office,  reiterated  recently: 50 
Get  rid  of  the  false  choices:  principles  or  no  principles.  Replace  it  with 
the  true  choice.  Forward  or  back.  I  can  only  go  one  way.  I've  not  got  a 
reverse  gear  (Blair  2003). 
It  is  also  connected  to  the  fact  that,  in  economic  terms,  New  Labour  has  shifted  to  the 
right  and  retained  the  fundamental  principles  of  Thatcherism  -  Old  Labour  were 
wrong  and  the  New  Right,  right,  in  this  respect  (Driver  and  Martell  1998:  73).  The 
Third  Way  above  all  argues  "that  many  traditional  perspectives  have  become  counter 
productive"  (Giddens  2002b)  and  this  crucially  involves  a  rejection  of,  so-called,  tax 
and  spend  and  the  embrace  of  the  free  market.  Thus,  there  is  some  validity  in  the 
claim  that,  in  relation  to  Thatcherism,  the  New  Labour  approach  has  been  one  of 
slight  modification  rather  than  radical  overhaul,  especially  in  terms  of  economics: 
For  all  the  hyperbole,  it  is  the  continuities  rather  than  the  ruptures  than 
characterise  the  Blair  era:  the  refusal  to  raise  income  tax,  the 
acceptance,  for  the  first  two  years  of  the  Tories  spending  plans  and, 
perhaps  most  starkly  of  all,  an  acquiescence  in  the  idea  that  nothing 
can  be  done  about  globalisation:  for  Tony  Blair  it  has  the  force  of 
nature  (Jacques  1998:  3). 
Problems  remain,  however,  with  the  "Thatcherism  Mark  2"  thesis.  The  first  links  to 
New  Labour's  apparent  commitment  to  the  collective,  and  to: 
Social  justice  and  goals  of  the  centre-left...  founded  on  the  values 
which  have  guided  progressive  politics  for  more  than  a  century  - 
democracy,  justice,  mutual  obligation...  (Blair  1998:  1). 
In  other  words  New  Labour  has  brought  the  `social'  back  in.  What  is  important  in 
relation  to  the  challenge  to  the  `Thatcherism  Mark  2'  thesis  is  that,  put  simply,  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  society.  However,  the  social  has  been  reasserted  in  a  uniquely  New 
Labour  way.  Commitments  to  social  justice  and  the  goals  of  the  centre  left  are  linked 
to  fostering  a  dynamic  economy.  Thus  they  are  re-conceptualised  as  intrinsic  to  neo- 
liberalism. 
Another  challenge  to  this  thesis  demonstrates  how  experience  of  New  Labour 
in  power  goes  beyond  Thatcherism.  Indeed  New  Labour  breathes  new  life  into  neo- 
liberalism: 
Ideologically,  the  neo-liberal  consensus  had  found  a  new  point  of 
stabilisation  in  the  Third  Way  of  the  Clinton-Blair  regimes...  [that 
extol]  the  compatibility  of  competition  with  solidarity.  The  hard  core 51 
of  government policies  remains  a  further  pursuit  of  the  Reagan- 
Thatcher  legacy,  on  occasion  with  measures  their  predecessors  did  not 
dare  enact  (Anderson  2000:  11). 
In  this  sense,  neo-liberalism  is  out  of  office  yet  in  power.  The  retention  of  its 
hegemony  (Callinicos  2001:  7)  in,  and  through,  the  policies  and  overall  ideological 
thrust  of  New  Labour,  alerts  us  to  the  fact  that  to  define  New  Labour  as  simply 
"Thatcherism  Mark  2"  involves  letting  New  Labour  `off  the  hook'  too  readily.  It 
remains  crucial  not  to  place  too  narrow  a  focus  on  New  Labour  as  a  product  or  result 
of  Thatcherism,  not  least  because  this  serves  to  blur  continuities  with  Labour's  past 
and  with  the  contradictions  of  reformism.  It  is  also  important  to  recognise  how 
Thatcherism  drew  on  Labour  legacy,  as  noted  above.  Moreover,  "Thatcherism  Mark 
2",  when  looked  at  in  the  context  of  New  Labour's  uncritical  acceptance  of  change  as 
unstoppable  and  irresistible,  seems  to  imply  that  its  increasing  adherence  and 
commitment  to  neo-liberalism,  and  the  market,  represent  pragmatism  with  a  `heavy 
heart'.  It  is  my  contention  that  it  is  not. 
Of  course,  New  Labour's  approach  is  linked  to  Thatcherism.  Throughout  the 
1980s  it  became  increasingly  clear  that  Labour  were  struggling  to  formulate  an 
effective  response  both  to  Thatcherism  and  to  the  polarisation  that  it  was  creating.  By 
1984-85  Labour  was  concerned  with  media  message  and  this  helped  contribute  to  the 
lack  of  understanding  and  recognition  of  feeling  against  Conservative  policy.  At  this 
stage,  the  process  of  creating  a  `new'  Labour  party  was  set  in  train  and  the  roots  of  the 
vilification  of  the  Old  Labour,  not  least  in  connection  with  its  failure  to  take  on  the 
left,  were  manifest  in  earnest.  New  Labour's  target  was  not  the  policies  of  the 
Conservatives,  still  actively  opposed  by  Labour's  traditional  allies,  but  "Militant, 
Arthur  and  all  that  nonsense"  (Blair  2003).  The  most  effective  response  to 
Thatcherism  therefore  became  `modernisation'  and  a  concerted,  persistent  attack  on 
"conservative"  forces  that  New  Labour  continues  to  define  itself  in  relation  to.  In 
addition  this  `modernisation'  means  reforming  most  vigorously  Labour's  approach  to 
the  market,  rather  than  the  New  Right's.  The  construction  of  New  Labour's  `new 
demons'  of  public  sector  workers  and  public  sector  producer  consciousness,  also 
vigorously  pursued,  does  help  differentiate  New  Labour  from  Thatcherism. 
In  rejecting  the  "Thatcherism  Mark  2"  thesis,  it  should  not  be  assumed, 
therefore,  that  New  Labour  represents  an  egalitarian  turn  per  se.  It  does  not,  since 52 
New  Labour  is  not  concerned  with  equality  of  outcome  but  with  the  very  different 
equality  of  opportunity.  This  is  an  important  distinction  between  Old  and  New  Labour 
because,  despite  the  fact  that  Old  Labour  achieved  little  in  terms  of  redistribution  of 
wealth  and  income,  between  1964  and  1968  there  were  modest  increases  in  spending 
on  housing,  health  and  education  (Ferguson  et  al.  2002:  159),  it  did  retain  some 
concern  for  equality  of  outcome.  However,  it  is  again  important  not  to  view  Old 
Labour  with  sentimentality  or  assume  its  periods  in  government  saw  lasting  changes 
in  terms  of  structural  equalities  since: 
the  1974-79  Labour  Government  was  only  too  willing  to  ditch  the 
substantial  gains  made  by  millions  of  working  class  people  in  the  two 
decades  that  followed  the  end  of  World  War  Two.. 
. 
Between  1976  and 
1978  there  was  a  9.5%  decline  in  public  spending  in  real  terms 
(Ferguson  et  al.  2002:  160). 
On  the  one  hand,  therefore,  New  Labour  does  not  fundamentally  alter  the  nature  of 
the  Labour  Party  in  terms  of  policy  orientation  and  redistribution.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  a  sense  in  which  some  of  the  underpinning  ideals  that  Old  Labour  is  assumed 
to  have  stood  for  have  been  jettisoned.  From  within,  this  is  claimed  to  represent  how 
New  Labour  upholds  old  values  -  in  a  modern  setting: 
I  believe  strenuously  that  `New  Labour'  is  about  recapturing  the  best 
of  what  Labour  has  always  stood  for  in  the  past.  Understanding  the 
need  for  commonality  in  tempering  market  excess,  balancing  equality 
and  liberty,  developing  a  concept  of  citizenship:  these  are  fundamental 
values  we  have  long  held  (Smith  1996:  15). 
What  this  leaves  us  with,  I  believe,  is  an  understanding  of  New  Labour  as  recapturing 
the  worst  of  what  Labour  stood  for.  It  embodies  an  ultimately  weak  attachment  to 
redistribution,  an  overarching  concern  to  retain  electoral  respectability  and,  especially 
in  the  eyes  of  big  business,  to  become  recognised  as  effective  managers  of  capitalist 
legitimation,  holding  onto  and  renewing  the  neo-liberal  legacy  of  Thatcherism,  either 
not  fully  grasping  or  simply  ignoring  its  worst  excesses. 
The  impact  of  this  latest  Third  Way  for  Labour  can  be  examined  through  the 
New  Labour  idea  of  `modernisation'  and,  especially,  in  the  reformulation  of  the  state. 
New  Labour  `modernisation'  means  the  deconstruction  of  the  monolithic  state  and  the 
vilification  of  those  who  seek  to  defend  it.  This  involves,  in  particular,  challenging  the 53 
values  and  assumptions  of  the  welfare  state.  A  critique  of  the  institutions  of  post-war 
social  democracy  sees  them  represented  as  a,  seemingly,  one-size-fits-all  solution  that 
is  no  longer  appropriate.  The  New  Labour  perspective  on  `modernisation'  means  the 
removal  of  these  apparent  blocks  on  creativity  and  self-help.  This  is  a  view  that  has 
gradually  emerged  within  Labour  since  the  policy  reviews  of  the  late  1980s  and  early 
1990s,  involving  becoming  selective  about  welfare  provision  in  terms  of  cost  and 
methods  of  delivery.  This  has  made  it  possible  for  New  Labour  to  re-assert  a 
commitment  to  central  tenets  of  the  post  war  welfare  state  whilst  `reforming'  it  in 
such  a  way  that,  in  the  longer  term,  could  render  it  structurally  unrecognisable, 
especially  in  terms  of  ownership  and  control  -  fully  in  line  with  new  Clause  Four 
commitments. 
The  National  Health  Service  provides  a  useful  of  example  of  how  this  works 
in  practice.  At  face  value,  `reform'  in  the  NHS  seemingly  mirrors  the  concerns  of  the 
Beveridgean  Welfare  State.  It  is  utilised,  firstly,  as  a  sign  of  New  Labour  upholding 
traditional  Labour  values  and,  secondly,  it  re-affirms,  in  relation  to  the  Conservatives, 
its  willingness  to  apparently  bring  the  social  back  in.  This  is  valuable  for  New  Labour 
in  that  it  has  allowed  it  to  be  perceived  as  the  saviour  of  the  NHS,  especially  around 
general  elections  in  1997  and  2001,  whilst  remaining  fully  in  tune  with  the 
overarching  objective  of  uniting  economic  efficiency  and  social  justice.  Although 
"public  services  are  social  justice  made  real",  and  are  apparently  "the  visible 
expression  of  the  principle  of  solidarity"  (Blair  2001),  they  are  also  targeted  for  a 
particular  version  of  reform:  money  for  results,  value  for  money  and  continuing 
macro  marketisation,  despite  the  removal  of  the,  more  overtly  neo-liberal,  internal 
market  of  the  Conservatives.  `Saving'  the  NHS  (and  public  services  more  generally) 
clearly  involves  saving  and  re-enforcing  market  principles.  This  takes  on  different 
forms,  from  allowing  major  drug  companies  to  retain  their  monopolistic  position 
(Ferguson  et  al.  2002:  33)  and,  more  recently,  purchasing  care  and  capacity  from  the 
private  sector,  fully  financed  from  the  public  purse6,  to  large  scale  Public  Private 
Partnerships  creating  new  market  opportunities  for  big  business.  Evidently,  New 
Labour's  `modernisation'  in  the  shape  of  the  dismantling  of  a  monolithic  `one-size- 
fits-all'  approach  in  the  public  sector  leaves  some  structures  intact.  It  also  exposes 
New  Labour's  particular  approach  to  social  justice  to  critical  examination. 
6  See  The  Guardian  5th  December  2001  and  The  Scotsman  19th  April  2002. 54 
The  New  Labour  commitment  to  an  ambiguous  social  justice  is,  first  and 
foremost,  one  that  rejects  the  notion  that  the  state  can  or  should  deliver  it.  This  is 
represented  as  Old  Labour  folly:  "heavy  handed  government  is  a  thing  of  the  past" 
(Giddens  2002a).  The  state,  for  New  Labour,  is  an  enabler.  The  task  is  not  to  provide 
social  justice  but  to  provide  for  it  through  creating  the  right  economic  conditions  that 
facilitate  private  sector  growth.  Social  justice  is  expected  to  develop  out  of  this 
growth,  though  crucially  no  overt  demands  are  made  upon  the  beneficiaries  of  growth. 
The  New  Labour  approach  to  `modernisation'  in  the  public  sector,  in  particular, 
demonstrates  a  crucial  synthesis  of  the  New  Right  and  Old  Labour  rather  than  an 
entirely  new  route  for  New  Labour.  It  captures,  in  my  view,  the  very  essence  of  New 
Labour  ideology:  the  return  of  the  social  fundamentally  secures  the  victory  of  the 
market. 
1.4:  The  Synthesis  of  Diversity  and  Antagonism 
From  the  synthesis  described  above,  develops  a  central  element  in  the  creation 
of  New  Labour's  political  discourse  and  the  formulation  of  policy  -  the  placing  of 
oppositional  categories  together,  often  in  terms  of  `partnerships',  that  also  serve  to 
build  up  and  to  reinforce  the  character  of  New  Labour's  version  of  the  Third  Way. 
What  have  been  considered  as  antagonistic  are  constructed  as  complementary,  and 
Old  Labour  and  the  New  Right  are  negatively  characterised  in  the  context  of  these 
antagonisms.  New  Labour  seeks  to  circumvent  antagonisms,  especially  in  relation  to 
contemporary  global  demands  as  politics  and  policy  move  `beyond  left  and  right'. 
The  rule,  for  New  Labour,  is  not  either/or  but  both: 
My  vision  for  the  twenty  first  century  is  of  a  popular  politics  which  in 
the  past  have  been  wrongly  been  regarded  as  antagonistic  -  patriotism 
and  internationalism;  rights  and  responsibilities;  the  promotion  of 
enterprise  and  the  attack  on  poverty  and  discrimination. 
.  . 
The  Third 
Way  is  not  an  attempt  to  split  the  difference  between  Right  and  Left... 
it  draws  vitality  from  uniting  the  two  great  streams  of  centre-left 
thought  -  democratic  socialism  and  liberalism...  Liberals  asserted  the 
primacy  of  the  individual  in  the  market  economy;  social  democrats 
promoted  social  justice  with  the  state  as  its  main  agent.  There  is  no 
necessary  conflict  between  the  two...  (Blair  1998a:  1). 
New  Labour  tries  to  bring  together  different  political  traditions  and  form  a  coherent 
ideology  (Mulgan  1998:  15).  As  a  result,  and  to  reinforce  the  New  Labour  synthesis, 
previously  oppositional  categories  are  fused.  The  essential  branding  of  New  Labour 55 
fundamentally  involves  reconciliation,  not  just  of  the  two  key  political  traditions  of 
the  twentieth  century  but  of  "hitherto  incompatible  opposites"  (Fairclough  2000:  9), 
which  are  given  equal  weight  and  equivalence  in  terms  of  importance  in  New  Labour 
rhetoric.  Examples  of  these,  often  presented,  as  Fairclough  notes,  in  the  form  of  lists, 
are  representative  of  central  tenets  of  Third  Way  thinking:  fairness  and  enterprise, 
centralised  government  power/devolution,  social  justice/economic  dynamism. 
On  one  hand,  it  can  be  argued  that  there  is  no  real  attempt  to  effectively 
reconcile  these  (Thompson  1996)  and,  additionally,  it  can  be  argued  that,  in  the 
absence  of  a  wholesale  transformation  of  society  other  than  that  which  New  Labour 
and  the  Third  Way  seeks  to  characterise,  these  are  simply  attempts  at  spin  with  little 
resonance  elsewhere.  On  the  other  hand,  the  very  bringing  together  of  these 
`partnerships  of  opposites'  can  be  seen  to  be  having  a  real  effect  on  policy  and, 
therefore,  on  lived  experience.  Moreover,  it  is  important  to  examine  these  in  more 
detail,  in  order  to  avoid  a  simplistic  accusation  that  New  Labour  is  unprepared  to 
engage  with  the  wider  realities  that  these  represent.  The  first  of  these  is  the  fusion  of 
neo-liberalism  and  social  democracy,  already  accounted  for  above.  The  second  is  a 
crucial  `pairing'  often  omitted  from  analyses  of  New  Labour's  synthesis  of 
incompatibles,  the  fusion  of  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour,  framed  by  and 
embodied  most  explicitly  in,  and  through,  the  rhetoric  of  flexibility,  competitiveness 
and  partnership.  To  some  degree,  this  does  not  represent  a  crucial  shift  in  Labour 
thinking.  Indeed  as  noted  earlier,  the  struggle  for  cross-class  alliances  and 
collaboration  has  been  an  essential  feature  of  Labour's  history.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
important  to  explore  this  most  recent  attempt  to  coalesce  the  interests  of  capital  and 
labour  for  a  number  of  reasons,  not  least  because  of  how  it  helps  shape  policy  and 
outlook.  Firstly,  it  is  based  on  the  outright  rejection  of  the  importance  of  class  -  both 
in  terms  of  its  meaning  and  in  terms  of  the  impact  of  class  division.  For  New  Labour 
even  the  fundamental  division  of  capitalist  society  can  be  overcome  by  recognising 
that  the  world  has  changed  to  such  an  extent  that  class  has  ceased  to  be  important.  The 
encouragement  to  understand  how  the  contemporary  community  of  individuals  can 
work  together  for  a  better  world  also  seeks  to  reinforce  New  Labour's  firm  belief  in 
the  classlessness  of  social  inequality: 
The  scourges  of  poverty,  unemployment  and  low  skill  [that]  are 
barriers..,  to  the  creation  of  a  dynamic  and  prosperous  society  (John 
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But  they  are  related  to  worklessness  and  overdependence  on  an  overweening  welfare 
state  rather  than  class  inequality.  Indeed,  in  the  New  Labour  fusion  of  cohesion  and 
competitiveness,  social  justice  and  economic  efficiency,  it  is  capital  that  is 
characterised  as  doing  badly  from  economic  conditions  rather  than  labour.  Secondly, 
the  rejection  of  class  can  also  be  linked  to  the  perceived  `failure'  of  socialism  as  a 
historical  project  for  human  advancement.  Thus,  for  New  Labour  the  ideological 
battle  that  had  distracted  its  predecessors  too  greatly  to  their  overall  detriment  has 
been  fought  and  won.  Crucially  it  has  now  been  replaced  by  the  fundamental  clash 
"between  the  forces  of  progress  and  the  forces  of  conservatism"  (Blair  1999).  Not 
only  does  this  allow  New  Labour  to  jettison  any  notion  of  historic  links  with  the 
working  class,  now  differentiated  as  "decent  hard  working  people"  versus  "the  anti- 
social"c,  but  it  also  allows  for  the  reconstruction  of  fundamental  planks  of  the  post- 
war  settlement  that  remain  important  to  the  working  class.  Crucially,  in  line  with 
Third  Way  thinking,  New  Labour  "promises  us  an  escape  from  history 
... 
Beyond  the 
Old  polarities...  "  (Callinicos  2001:  1).  Both  elements  are  fundamental  to  how  New 
Labour  distinguishes  itself  and  to  how  `modernisation'  is  justified: 
The  welfare  state  ... 
is  now  part  of  a  lapsed  historical 
endeavour...  With  the  collapse  of  socialism's  historic  ambitions,  we 
have  to  look  at  the  welfare  state  in  a  different  light  (Giddens  1994: 
150). 
It  is  important  to  recognise  that  whilst  New  Labour's  ideology  of  classlessness 
is  drawn  from  the  full  spectrum  of  post-war  politics,  it  is  still  worth  closer 
examination  in  the  contemporary  context.  The  politics  of  class  from  the  New  Labour 
perspective  do  not  reflect  the  `changing  times',  so  fundamental  to  it,  sufficiently.  Not 
only  does  this  connect  to  its  perception  of  the  anachronistic  ideology  of  Old  Labour,  it 
is  also  linked  to  a  wider  social  and  economic  context  whose  time  has  `passed'.  This  is 
clearly  evident  in  commentary  by  New  Labour  supporters  and  advisers  that  also  helps 
demonstrate  the  clear  link  between  New  Labour  and  earlier  "New  Times"  analyses: 
Labour's  prison  is  almost  palpable.  In  ideology  and  interest  it  is  the 
child  of  Fordist  mass  production,  shot  through  with  the  assumptions, 
myths  and  values  of  the  industrial  order  which  is  breaking  up  before 
our  very  eyes  (Marquand  1989:  375). 
7  See  McConnell  2003. 57 
The  approach  to  class  and  the  wider  ideological  framework  of  synthesising  the 
antagonistic  are  absolutely  central  to  how  New  Labour  represents  its  `newness'  and 
how  it  recasts  Labour's  history.  However  two  central  problems  arise  from  this,  when 
viewed  from  my  perspective  that  class  remains  the  fundamental  fault  line  that  shapes 
life  under  capitalism.  The  first  is  that  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour  are  not  readily 
fused  and  this  means  New  Labour  is  essentially  based  on  as  weak  a  foundation  as  its 
Old  Labour  predecessors.  The  ultimate  failure  of  synthesis  challenges  not  only  the 
New  Labour  project  but  also  the  validity  of  the  Third  Way  as  a  long-term  credible 
political  `alternative'  and  as  an  intellectual  school  of  thought.  Talking  the  fusion  of 
the  interests  of  capital  and  labour  into  existence  has  borne  little  fruit  for  New  Labour 
thus  far.  Workers  have  continued  to  strike8,  especially  in  the  public  sector,  and 
opposition  to  the  New  Labour  project  and  its  systematic  effects  has  grown  apace  in 
the  years  since  the  period  of  "hope  beyond  ordinary  imagining"  and  "the  abundance 
of  expectation"  after  the  1997  election  (Blair  2003).  On  the  other  side  of  the  class 
divide,  there  is  little  evidence  of  the  much-vaunted  "culture  of  duty"  (Driver  and 
Martell  2001:  37)  that  New  Labour  expects  to  create  as  concern  has  grown  over 
excessive  profits  and  executive  pay9. 
The  second  problem  is  that  New  Labour  in  power  has  demonstrated  a  clear 
willingness  to  prioritise  within  these  rhetorical  pairings.  Thus  experience  has  shown 
how,  in  the  final  analysis,  `actually  existing'  Third  Way  means  furthering  the  interests 
of  capital  over  labour,  efficiency  before  social  justice,  enterprise  first  -  fairness  second 
(if  at  all),  employer  conceived  flexibility  rather  than  worker  security  and 
entrepreneurs  more  valuable  than  public  sector  workers.  The  impact  of  New  Labour's 
8  Although  it  is important  to  note  that  strikes  have  been  at  a  historical  low.  In  2001,  for  example,  the 
number  of  stoppages  was  one  hundred  and  ninety-four,  compared  with  the  1990s  average  of  two 
hundred  and  seventy-three  (Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  2002).  Specific  increases  since  1999, 
particularly  in  terms  of  working  days  lost,  suggest  both  complexity  and  upward  trends  (see  Waddington 
2002:  351.  For  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  strike  statistics  see  Gall  2003). 
9A  useful  example  of  this  in  practice  is  cited  by  Newman  and  de  Zoysa  (2001:  86).  Head  of  the  News 
International  Corporation  Rupert  Murdoch  was  discovered  by  The  Economist  in  1999  to  have  paid  no 
UK  taxes  on  £1.4  billion  of  British  based  earnings  in  a  seven  year  period:  "the  £350million  that, 
according  to  laws  applying  to  lesser  mortals,  should  have  been  paid  would  have  been  sufficient  to 
`build  seven  new  hospitals,  fifty  secondary  schools  or  three  hundred  primary  schools"'  (Newman  and 
de  Zoysa  2001:  86;  The  Economist  20th  March  1999).  The  Rupert  Murdoch  example  is  especially 
interesting  because  of  the  relationship  that  New  Labour  sought  with  him  and  how  he  has  been 
accommodated  despite  being,  as  the  evidence  noted  above  demonstrates,  the  antithesis  of  Blair's  ideal 
of  socially  conscious  business.  Yet  as  Newsinger  has  argued:  "Blair's  courtship  of  Murdoch 
exemplifies  New  Labour's  relationship  with  the  capitalist  class...  Murdoch  required  three  things  of 
Blair:  no  repeal  of  the  anti-union  laws,  no  privacy  legislation  and  no  interference  with  cross  media 
ownership.  New  Labour  obliged"  (Newsinger  2000:  79). 58 
privileging  within  the  syntheses  of  oppositional  categories  that  it  seemingly  seeks  to 
create  is  central  to  New  Labour's  political  economy.  Evidence  of  this  privileging  can 
be  gleaned  by  examining  in  greater  detail  an  early  unifying  theme  that  New  Labour 
sought  to  deploy  to  frame  the  syntheses  of  opposites:  stake-holding. 
1.5:  A  Stake  in  `the  Project'? 
The  attempt  to  reconcile  oppositional  categories  by  New  Labour  involves  an 
appeal  to  all  sections  of  society  to  embrace  the  idea  of  progress  as  a  mutual 
endeavour,  with  each  member  of  society  having  an  important  role  to  play  in  creating 
benefits  for  all: 
It  is  only  through  recognising  that  interdependence  and  by  society  as  a 
whole  acting  upon  it  -  the  collective  power  of  all  used  for  the 
individual  good  of  each  -  that  the  individual's  interest  can  be  advanced 
(Blair  1994:  4). 
This  involves  mobilising  a  unifying  discourse  to  apparently  encourage  greater  co- 
operation  in  working  for  the  common-good,  deploying  new  ways  of  thinking.  Before 
New  Labour  took  office,  the  idea  of  the  `stake-holder  economy',  each  member  of 
society  having  a  stake  in  the  success  of  companies  and  the  development  of  high 
quality  public  services,  offered  New  Labour,  albeit  briefly,  a  unifying  theme  for  its 
project1°.  In  addition,  initially  at  least,  stake-holding  gave  New  Labour  the 
opportunity  to  present  its  clearest  possible  statement  of  intent  of  how  capitalism 
would  be  mitigated  under  New  Labour: 
At  the  heart  of  the  stake-holder  concept  lies  the  simple  proposition  that 
property  must  discharge  obligations  to  the  wider  community  as  well  as 
to  its  owners...  (Marquand  1996  quoted  in  Newman  and  de  Zoysa 
2001:  144). 
Stake-holding  demanded  state  intervention  and  there  was,  again  initially,  some  focus 
on  it  as  heralding  a  new  era  in  corporate  governance: 
It  is  time  that  we  shift  the  emphasis  in  corporate  ethos  -  from  the 
company  being  merely  a  vehicle  for  the  capital  market,  to  be  traded, 
bought  and  sold  as  a  commodity  -  towards  a  vision  of  the  company  as 
a  community  or  partnership  in  which  each  employee  has  a  stake,  and 
where  a  company's  responsibilities  are  more  clearly  delineated  (Blair 
quoted  in  Callinicos  1996:  5). 
10  Hutton  (1995)  is  a  key  proponent  of  the  concept  of  stake-holding.  For  more  detailed  analysis  of 
Labour's  rejection  of  stake-holding  see  Callinicos  (1996). 59 
Importantly,  therefore,  stake-holding  apparently  represented  the  opportunity  for  New 
Labour  to  broaden  political  debate  (Thompson  1996)  and  granted  New  Labour  scope 
to  demonstrate  the  distinctiveness  of  the  Third  Way,  especially  in  relation  to  the  neo- 
liberal  agenda  of  the  New  Right.  However,  this  `big  idea'  all  but  disappeared  from  the 
New  Labour  lexicon  by  the  1997  election.  Yet  the  `fate'  of  stake-holding  remains 
important  for  the  purpose  of  my  discussion,  because  it  helps  to  demonstrate  New 
Labour's  willingness  to  prioritise  within  the  antagonistic  categories,  described  above, 
demonstrating  also  a  stronger,  more  pervasive,  attachment  to  neo-liberal  priorities 
than  the  Third  Way  seemingly  purports. 
What  needs  to  be  borne  in  mind  is  that  New  Labour  was,  at  the  time,  striving 
to  forge  new  relationships  and  to  restructure  Labour's  traditional  alliances.  Had  New 
Labour's  political  discourse  and  policy  direction  in  office  been  framed  through  the 
sort  of  stake-holding  conceptualised  in  opposition,  then  this  would  have  severely 
limited  the  government's  approach.  The  more  democratic  form  of  corporate 
governance  in  stake-holding,  alluded  to  in  the  Blair  quotation  above,  represents  a 
threat  to  the  type  of  relationship  that  was  being  cultivated  with  business.  One  key 
problem  is its  apparent  connection  to  the  overt  regulation  of  capitalism;  in  short,  it  is 
seemingly  indicative  of  a  return  to  a  version  of  Keynesianism  that  business  would  not 
countenance.  It  also  appeared  to  be  an  adaptation,  rather  than  an  outright  rejection,  of 
Old  Labour's  approach,  especially  to  trade  union  involvement.  Stake-holding  is 
evocative  of  co-decision  making  in  firms  and  greater  cooperation.  This  difficulty  was 
compounded  by  unions  seeking  to  grasp  the  opportunity  that  stake-holding  seemingly 
represented  and  this  was  instrumental  in  New  Labour's  shift  away  from  stake- 
holding: 
[For]  as  quickly  as  those  sympathetic  to  Labour  have  pitched  their 
camp  in  the  stake-holder  box,  the  Labour  leadership  have  moved  to 
unpack  it.  Thus  when  [TUC  General  Secretary]  John  Monks  suggested 
trade  unions  as  the  representative  institutions  through  which  working 
people  could  claim  a  stake  in  the  management  of  enterprises  and  the 
national  economy,  the  Labour  leadership  was  quick  to  distance  itself 
from  his  remarks  (Thompson  1996:  38). 
Thus,  not  long  after  New  Labour's  first  explicit  association  with  stake-holding,  the 
`government  in  waiting'  announced  proposals  that  were  in  essence  an  important  shift 60 
in  both  New  Labour's  approach  to  corporate  governance  and  in  its  relations  towards 
business: 
There  is  a  limit  to  how  many  of  Britain's  corporate  ills  can  be  resolved 
by  legislation.  What  you  are  trying  to  do  is  change  people's  behaviour 
and  attitude  (Alistair  Darlings  l  quoted  in  Callinicos  1996). 
The  shift  towards  business  concerns  became  well  established  as  a  foundation  for  New 
Labour  policy  once  in  office.  For  example,  by  2001  a  review  of  the  structure  of  the 
Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  (DTI)  resulted  in  the  extension  of  the  role  of 
business  in  strategic  decision  making  which  the  Consumers  Association  likened  to 
"asking  the  foxes  to  take  over  the  chicken  coop"  and  the  TUC  accused  the 
government  of  "turning  the  DTI  into  the  CBI"  (The  Guardian,  23  November  2001). 
Significantly,  there  was  no  affirmation  of  a  specific  role  for  the  trade  unions  in  DTI 
strategy  formation.  Stake-holding  was  `dropped'  as  a  necessity  of  New  Labour's 
courtship  of  business  and  because  adherence  to  its  fundamental  principles  could  have 
exposed  the  reality  of  antagonisms  that  New  Labour  was  desperate  to  reconcile.  This 
is  confirmed  through  consideration  of  what  I  believe  New  Labour  replaced  stake- 
holding  with  as  overarching  tenets  of  its  approach:  the  ideology  of  flexibility, 
competitiveness  and  partnership.  This  became  the  unifying  theme  through  which  to 
pursue  the  aim  of  overcoming  the  contradictions  inherent  in  oppositional  categories. 
Competitiveness  became,  and  remains,  one  of  New  Labour's  new  guiding 
principles,  reasserted,  in  Third  Way  style,  from  the  perspective  of  a  `marriage'  of 
social  justice  and  economic  efficiency,  though  not  in  terms  of  yielding  more  money 
for  public  spending  from  taxation.  In  New  Labour  rhetoric,  social  justice  is  `at  stake' 
unless  economic  efficiency  is  promoted  and  the  state  creates  the  best  conditions  for  a 
competitive,  dynamic  economy.  Whilst  not  a  construction  of  the  Blairite  Party  as  such 
-  it  has  its  roots  in  the  period  of  John  Smith's  leadership12  -  what  is  important  to  my 
discussion  is  the  zeal  with  which  this  has  been  openly  embraced  and  the  form  that  it 
increasingly  takes  since  New  Labour  came  to  power.  There  is  a  clear  belief  that  what 
is  good  for  business  is  also  good  for  social  justice.  Without  a  thriving  economy  there 
11  In  1996  Alistair  Darling  was  Labour's  spokesperson  on  the  City. 
12  The  Report  of  the  Commission  on  Social  Justice  which  Smith  set  up  in  1992  offers  the  clearest 
indication  of  a  commitment  to  this  `marriage'  and  expose  of  the  roots  of  New  Labour's  endorsement  of 
it:  "We  are  a  conunission  on  social  justice,  not  on  economic  success,  but  it  is  a  constant  theme  of  this 
report  that  there  is  not  an  opposition  between  these  two  aims.  On  the  contrary,  each  demands  the  other" 
(Commission  on  Social  Justice  1994:  17). 61 
can  be  no  social  justice  because,  as  noted  earlier,  the  state's  role  is  severely  curtailed 
in  this  respect.  This  contingent  relationship  between  social  justice  and  economic 
efficiency  is  also  used  to  give  clarity  of  expression  to  New  Labour's  claim  of 
distinctiveness  from  both  its  Labour  and  New  Right  predecessors.  The  commitment  to 
redistribution  is  jettisoned:  "any  idea  of  counterbalancing,  let  alone  overthrowing 
capitalism  has  been  decisively  rejected"  (Driver  and  Martell  1998:  32)  and  the  laissez 
faire  of  the  New  Right  is  eliminated,  rhetorically  at  least,  through  the  government 
striving  to  bring: 
true  equality:  equal  worth,  an  equal  chance  of  fulfilment,  equal  access 
to  knowledge  and  opportunity  (Blair  1999). 
However,  in  line  with  the  New  Labour  shift  in  orientation  towards  business  interests, 
especially  in  terms  of  systematic  effects,  inequality  and  marginalisation  are  being 
tackled,  first  and  foremost,  because  they  are  economically  wasteful,  to  the  extent  that 
they  are  addressed  at  all.  The  "scourge  and  waste  of  social  exclusion"  (Mandleson 
1997:  6)  is  viewed  in  terms  of  its  costs  to  the  economy  overall  rather  than  in  terms  of 
impact  on  individuals.  Conceived  of  this  way,  New  Labour  can  avoid  a  return  to 
redistribution  concerns  and  moving  too  closely  to  "the  Old  Labour  agenda  of  crude 
state  intervention...  and  indiscriminate  `tax  and  spend"'  (Mandelson  1997:  7). 
The  panacea  for  social  exclusion,  which  needs  to  be  eliminated  through  the 
dual  pursuit  of  social  justice  and  economic  efficiency,  is,  in  New  Labour's  terms,  the 
ability  to  gain  paid  employment.  New  Labour's  key  task  is  to  promote  employability 
through  work-fare  programmes  and  "lifelong  learning".  Education  and  skills 
acquisition  are  seen  purely  in  terms  of  investment  and  benefits  to  employers  or  the 
economy  overall.  New  Labour  unites  social  justice  and  economic  efficiency  as  two 
sides  of  the  same  `value  coin',  though  efficiency  is  most  important,  in  line  with  New 
Labour  prioritising  of  the  interests  of  business.  New  Labour  in  power  not  only  looks 
to  business  to  secure  its  objectives,  it  also  formulates  its  objectives  in  and  through  its 
relationship  with  business.  To  have  a  job  is  to  be  saved  from  exclusion  in  New 
Labour's  terms  and  social  justice  is  achieved.  Yet  there  is  no  recognition  of  a 
`working  excluded',  only  protected  from  marginalisation  and  the  plight  facing  many 
of  their  unemployed  neighbours,  by  their  last  wage  packet.  The  `marriage'  of  social 
justice  and  economic  efficiency  shows  no  real  concern  for  winners  and  losers  or 
fairness.  This  is  a  point  which  I  will  return  to  later. 62 
New  Labour  sees  the  state's  role  as  a  facilitator  on  the  supply  side,  and  views 
its  key  objective  as  investing  in  human  capital  through  large-scale  government 
initiatives,  like  the  New  Deal  and  the  National  Minimum  Wage  (NMW),  in  order  to 
further  the  apparent  aim  of  achieving  social  justice.  Whilst,  on  the  one  hand,  this  may 
seem  a  laudable  strategy,  questions  can  be  raised  over  the  motivation  and  genuine 
commitment  behind  the  supply-side  focus.  For  example,  mechanisms  put  in  place  by 
New  Labour  to  deliver  lifelong  learning  and  encourage  skills  acquisition,  have 
encountered  problems  that  suggest  a  weak  attachment  to  them  on  the  government's 
behalf.  One,  apparently  key,  method  of  securing  the  objective  of  improving 
employability  was  the  operation  of  Individual  Learning  Accounts,  which  were 
suspended  in  October  2001  due  to  fraud  by  training  providers.  Although  two  and  a 
half  million  people  had  signed  up  to  use  them  (The  Guardian,  24th  October  2001), 
"there  is  scant  evidence  that  the  government's  initiative  is  reaching  those  people  from 
those  disadvantaged  groups  that  ministers  want  to  coax  into  learning...  "  (The 
Guardian,  11`h  September  2001).  Also,  in  post-devolution  Scotland,  the  fact  that 
responsibility  for  lifelong  learning  lies  with  the  department  of  Enterprise  and  Lifelong 
Learning  is  a  useful  marker  of  the  nature  of  New  Labour's  commitment  to  the  latter. 
Education  is  a  key  site  for  achieving  the  dual,  or  in  New  Labour's  formulation, 
complementary  aims  of  efficiency  and  justice.  However,  the  evidence  for  this  in 
practice,  discussed  below,  suggests  that  choices  are  being  taken  regarding  the  future 
of  education  whereby  the  aim  of  justice  is  apparently  marginalised.  The  question  of 
the  true  cost  of  Public  Private  Partnerships,  for  example,  is  not  suggestive  of  a 
commitment  to  justice,  since  it  is  possible  that  such  cost  will  involve  a  diversion  of 
funding  for  social  justice  objectives. 
Prioritising  economic  efficiency  over  social  justice,  whilst  bringing  them 
together  as  intrinsically  linked  under  New  Labour's  ideology  of  competitiveness,  is 
also  evident  in  its  commitment  to  the  ideology  of  flexibility  underpinning  the 
government's  approach  to  the  labour  market,  most  specifically.  Social  justice, 
couched  in  terms  of  economic  efficiency,  means  there  is  little  concern  with  the  quality 
of  jobs  or  pay.  The  focus  in  New  Labour's  approach  is,  rather,  on  the  quality  of 
workers  and  employer  costs.  As  a  result,  what  New  Labour's  strategy  effectively 
amounts  to  is  a  state  sanctioned  and  supported  expansion  of  the  low  skilled,  low 
waged,  malleable,  numerically  flexible,  segment  in  the  labour  force  which, 
increasingly,  represents  the  proliferation  of  earlier  trends  largely  associated  with  an 63 
increase  women's  participation  in  the  labour  market.  For  example,  Dex  and 
McCulloch  (1997)  note  an  increase  in  the  proportion  of  men  employed  in  flexible  jobs 
between  1986  and  1994  whereas  the  proportion  of  women  in  such  jobs  remained 
stable.  More  recently,  Cully  et  al.  (1999)  have  suggested  that  more  than  90%  of 
workplaces  use  some  form  of  flexibility,  with  sub-contracting,  the  use  of  agency 
workers  and  fixed  term  contracts,  being  the  most  common.  Unsurprisingly,  those  in 
non-permanent  jobs  are  most  worried  about  insecurity  -  36%  felt  secure  compared 
with  61%  of  the  `permanently'  employed  (Cully  et  al.  1999:  168).  Such  trends  are 
likely  to  continue  since: 
Having  the  same  job  for  life  is  a  thing  of  the  past.  Social  democrats 
must  accommodate  the  growing  demands  for  flexibility...  (Blair  and 
Schroder,  quoted  in  Rubinstein  2000:  164). 
Whilst  it  remains  the  case  that  flexibility,  either  positively  or  negatively 
assessed,  is  often  over-stated  in  terms  of  its  impact  on  the  labour  market  (see  Taylor 
2002),  its  overall  impact  is  still  important.  The  drive  towards  flexibility  impacts 
subjectively,  as  the  evidence  from  Cully  above  suggests.  In  objective  terms,  the 
flexibility  rhetoric  of  New  Labour  helps  lend  legitimacy  to  employers  who  conceive 
of  flexibility  as  worker-dispensability,  as  the  case  studied  later  in  this  research 
demonstrates.  Moreover,  recent  indications  suggest  that  in  the  area  of  labour  market 
flexibility  there  has  been  an  "absolute  convergence  of  views"  (Berlusconi,  quoted  in 
The  Guardian  16th  February  2002)  between  New  Labour  and  some  on  the  European 
Right.  Indeed  for  Blair,  labour  markets  must  be  more  flexible  and  "free  of  useless 
regulations"  (quoted  in  ibid.  ).  One  example  of  this  in  practice  is  New  Labour's 
resistance  to  the  European  Directive  on  Information  and  Consultation,  which  means 
workers  are  not  given  prior  notice  of  redundancies13.  Convergence,  in  terms  of 
economic  liberalisation  and  a  shared  vision  of  freedom  from  state  intervention,  serves 
to  challenge  its  actual  commitment  to  the  pursuit  of  social  justice  and  confirms  the 
privileging  of  business  interests  by  New  Labour.  This  throws  into  question  New 
Labour's  Third  Way  orientation  in  terms  of  its  distinctiveness  from  the  New  Right. 
13  The  European  Union  Information  and  Consultation  Directive  requires  that  companies  with  more  than 
fifty  workers  consult  them  over  key  decisions  and  has  been  resisted  by  the  UK's  representative  in  EU 
negotiations,  Lord  Goldsmith.  In  December  2001  a  deal  was  agreed  that  allows  the  UK  and  Eire  to  wait 
six  years  before  implementation. 64 
The  third  theme  that  New  Labour  uses  to  frame  its  objective  of  synthesising 
antagonisms  is  that  of  `social  partnership'.  The  balance  of  "fairness  not  favours"  and 
of  new  rights  and  responsibilities  for  workers  and  unions,  developed  under  the 
auspices  of  partnership  do  help  distinguish  New  Labour  from  the  New  Right.  Despite 
the  rejection  of  state  regulation  of  corporate  governance  and  of  making  large  scale 
explicit  demands  on  employers  that  characterise  stake-holding,  partnership  seeks  to 
encourage  the  view  that  workers  do  have  a  stake  in  the  company.  However 
partnership  must  be  considered  in  the  light  of  New  Labour's  overall  ideological 
thrust,  it  needs  to  be  viewed  in  terms  of  its  intrinsic  connections  with  New  Labour's 
commitments  to  flexibility  and  competitiveness.  It  is  not,  in  any  sense,  a  return  to, 
from  New  Labour's  perspective,  the  over-bearing  influence  of  `union  barons'  or  a 
shift  towards  Anglo-Saxon  corporatism.  It  does  represent  a  further  attempt  to  fuse  the 
interests  of  capital  and  labour  and  to  place  the  good  of  the  enterprise  at  the  centre  of 
employment  relations. 
New  Labour's  partnership  is  an  extremely  slippery  concept.  The  government, 
as  suggested  in  the  Fairness  at  Work  White  Paper  (DTI  1998a),  will  pursue 
partnerships  with  "progressive"  employers  although  the  meaning  of  "progressive"  is 
never  clearly  defined.  Unions  are  encouraged  to  do  likewise,  though  this  should  not 
be  taken  to  suggest  that  the  government  are  encouraging  tripartism,  thus  allowing  the 
government  the  freedom  to  ally  with  employers  of  its  choosing,  without  any  external 
(i.  e.  union)  scrutiny.  The  notion  of  "progressive"  in  New  Labour  rhetoric  is  also 
important  since  its  developing  relations  with  business  have  demonstrated  the  fluidity 
of  this  description  14 
. 
Despite  New  Labour  seeking  to  draw  both  sides  of  industry  into  partnership, 
and  to  suggest  that  partnership  relates  to  the  fact  that  there  is  equivalence  in  terms  of 
the  costs  and  benefits  company  success,  capitalism  will  not  countenance  a  partnership 
of  equals  (Findlay  1999:  100).  Yet  there  is  seemingly  little  recognition  of  this  in  New 
Labour  or  that: 
The  limit  to  reasonableness  is  set  by  the  fact  that  the  logic  of  capital  is 
not  the  same  as  (and  only  reflects  in  a  deformed  way)  the  experience  of 
the  workers  (Nichols  and  Beynon  1977:  119). 
14  Partnerships  with  Jarvis,  a  company  criticised  over  safety  in  respect  of  their  contract  to  maintain 
railway  tracks,  in  school  building  programmes,  for  example  and,  sponsorship  deals  from  fast  food  giant 
McDonalds  at  New  Labour's  annual  conference  illustrate  this. 65 
What  New  Labour's  partnership  actually  means  in  practice  echoes  the  sentiment 
expressed  above.  It  generally  involves  official  acquiescence  for  minor  concessions, 
mirroring  Old  Labour's  `partnership'  with  unions  that  often  involved  capitulation  over 
policy,  and  the  re-conceptualisation  of,  apparently,  deep-seated  union  aims  and 
values.  At  the  same  time,  New  Labour's  partnership  with  business,  often  operating 
under  the  auspices  of  the  marriage  of  social  justice  and  economic  efficiency,  brings 
clear  benefits,  especially  by  allowing  business  unprecedented  access  to  key  decision 
making  mechanisms  and  new  markets.  The  impact  of  this  can  be  summed  up  thus: 
Corporations,  the  contraptions  we  invented  to  serve  us,  are 
overthrowing  us.  They  are  seizing  powers  previously  invested  in 
government,  and  using  them  to  distort  public  life  to  suit  their  own 
ends...  Corporations  have  come  to  govern  key  decision-making 
processes  within  the  European  Union  and,  with  the  British 
government's  blessing,  begun  to  develop  a  transatlantic  single  market, 
controlled  and  run  by  corporate  chief  executives  (Monbiot  2000:  4-5). 
In  short,  for  capital,  partnership  with  New  Labour  means  profit. 
1.6:  Partnerships  and  Profits 
An  essential  element  of  New  Labour  thinking  is  the  new  alliance  between 
partnership  and  profit.  Clearly  this  is  recognised  by  the  TUC  and,  in  trying  to  assist  in 
the  process  of  creating  a  partnership  culture  of  the  type  apparently  envisaged  by  New 
Labour,  there  is  a  general  focus  on  the  mutual  benefits  of  partnership15.  Moreover,  the 
TUC  always  seek  to  place  the  good  of  the  enterprise  at  the  centre  of  the  call  to 
embrace  partnership: 
My  purpose  today  is  not  just  to  say  that  businesses  run  better  by 
involving  the  workforce  in  partnership  relationships,  though  I  do 
believe  that  to  be  the  case.  My  aim  is  to  demonstrate  how  partnership 
can  engage  the  workforce  and  how  that  engagement  can  contribute  to 
success...  Partnership  is  no  burden  on  business  but  the  secret  to  success 
(Monks  2000). 
However,  as  the  evidence  above  suggests,  despite  the  creation  of  individual 
partnerships  and  the  evocation  of  a  culture  of  partnership,  decisions  continue  to  be 
taken  by  companies  and  are  handled  in  ways  that  seemingly  fly  in  the  face  of  the 
TUC's  understanding  of  partnership: 
15  The  partnership  principles  of  the  TUC  are  outlined  in  the  next  chapter. 66 
Genuine  partnership  requires  a  trade-off  between  employee  flexibility 
and  security  of  employment...  (ibid). 
What  needs  to  be  examined  is  the  extent  to  which  the  Government's 
commitment  to  partnership  differs  from  that  of  the  TUC  and,  indeed,  whether  this 
commitment  in  practice  differs  from  its  representation  in  rhetoric.  A  detailed 
consideration  of  partnership  under  New  Labour  in  the  employment  relations  arena  is 
outlined  in  the  next  chapter.  However,  partnership  is  not  simply  the  preserve  of 
employment  relations  arena,  it  permeates  every  aspect  of  New  Labour  ideology. 
Fairclough  (2000),  for  example,  argues  that  the  concept  of  partnership  is  central  to 
how  New  Labour  seeks  to  manage  locally  in  the  face  of  global  demands  and  to  put  in 
place  the  local  corollary  of  the  structures  that  globalisation  is  bringing  about. 
Partnership  is  vital  to  New  Labour's  `modernisation'  of  government  since  it  helps 
bring  together  divergent  interests,  to  create  a  "networked  form  of  governance" 
(Fairclough  2000:  124),  open  to  the  influence  of  a  variety  of  agencies  -  central 
government,  private  business,  the  voluntary  sector,  academic  researchers,  and 
prescribed  `experts'.  Partnerships  are  most  vigorously  pursued  in  terms  of  public 
sector  reform  with  the  crucial  `agency'  being  private  business.  As  Fairclough  notes, 
aspirations  in  this  area  may  be  far  from  "the  messier  realities"  (ibid.  ),  not  least 
because,  as  I  have  argued  earlier,  this  seemingly  takes  little  account  of  the  ultimate 
need  and,  indeed,  will  on  the  government's  part  to  openly  privilege  some  of  these. 
Again,  in  relation  to  public  sector  reform,  this  is  not  a  partnership  of  equals  and 
clearly  there  will  be  no  privileging  of  union  interest  (Mandelson  and  Liddle  1996). 
The  government  has  demonstrated  its  willingness  to  openly  `face  down'  union  leaders 
and  public  sector  workers  critical  of  its  `modernisation'  partnerships.  As  noted  earlier, 
this  is  fundamental  to  New  Labour,  not  simply  as  a  new  method  of  raising  capital  to 
fund  improvements  in  the  public  sector.  This  is  the  front-line  of  the  battle  of  the 
twenty-first  century  -  that  between  the  forces  of  conservatism  and  the  forces  of 
progress.  From  this  perspective,  there  are  no  competing  demands  that  are  not 
reconcilable  in  the  struggle  to  reform  public  services.  Crucially,  the  increasing  level 
of  corporate  influence  in  the  public  sector,  which  can  circumvent  the  necessity  for  any 
other  partner,  is  represented  as  a  marker  of  progress  achieved,  since  this  indicates,  for 
New  Labour,  a  willingness  that  business  embraces  New  Labour  culture  of  mutual 
responsibility.  More  importantly,  it  facilitates  a  more  business-like  approach  in  the 67 
public  sector,  which  New  Labour  sees  as  the  cure  for  the  endemic  disease  of  producer 
consciousness.  The  relationship  between  these  partnerships  and  profit  is  rarely,  if 
ever,  fore-grounded.  It  is  possible,  however,  to  explore  the  alliance  between 
partnership  and  profit  in  terms  of  New  Labour's  much  sought-after  "reinvention  of 
government"  (Osborne  and  Gaebler  1993)  and  "redesigning  the  state"  (Byrne  1997). 
A  fundamental  premise  of  New  Labour  thinking  and  how  both  the  party  and 
political  programme  are  marketed,  is  the  willingness  and  ability  to  `think  the 
unthinkable'  in  the  public  sector.  There  is  a  clear  acceptance  that  new  forms  of 
governance  are  required  since,  as  noted  earlier,  the  bureaucracy  of  the  state  is 
overweening,  inflexible  and  unable  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  modern  economy.  This  is 
underpinned  by  Third  Way  concerns  about  the  failure  of  previous  governments  and  its 
premises  on  decentralised  decision  making: 
Reform  of  government  and  the  state  is  a  first  priority.  Modernising 
social  democrats  must  first  avoid  the  traditional  leftist  strategy  of 
putting  more  and  more  tasks  into  the  hand  of  the  state.  .  . 
An 
overloaded,  bureaucratic  state  is  not  only  unlikely  to  provide  good 
public  services,  it  is  also  dysfunctional  for  economic  prosperity 
(Giddens  2001  a:  5-6). 
This  ideology  serves  multifarious  purposes  for  New  Labour.  For  example,  it  allows 
for  `honest  critique'  of  Old  Labour  as  statist  and  allows  for  the  construction  of  the 
current  period  as  being  decisive  in  political  and  historical  terms: 
We  stand  on  the  eve  of  a  new  progressive  era,  capable  of  matching  or 
surpassing  the  great  eras  of  the  past.  It  requires  that  we  should 
recognise  the  moment  and  contribute  to  the  opportunity.  It's  up  to  us 
(Wright  1997:  111). 
This  also  suggests  that  the  challenges  facing  New  Labour,  in  the  arena  of  welfare  for 
example,  are  on  the  scale  of  those  faced  by  the  Labour  government  of  1945,  though 
they  are  of  a  fundamentally  qualitatively  different  character: 
Reform  is  a  vital  part  of  rediscovering  a  true  national  purpose,  part  of  a 
bigger  picture  in  which  our  country  is  a  model  of  a  21St  century 
developed  nation..  .  Above  all,  the  system  must  change  because  the 
world  has  changed  beyond  the  recognition  of  Beveridge's 
generation...  We  need  a  system  designed  not  for  yesterday,  but  for 
today  (Blair  quoted  in  Ferguson  et.  al.  2002:  164). 68 
Importantly,  this  lays  the  foundation  for  the  pragmatism  that  is  the  apparent 
embodiment  of  New  Labour's  whole  approach,  alongside  the  willingness  to  eschew 
ideological  baggage.  This  is  the  third  way  between  the  state  and  the  anti-state.  The 
overbearing,  unwieldy  state  and  the  rolled  back,  `devil  take  the  hindmost'  state  have 
been  eschewed.  They  are  replaced  by  the  reforming,  pragmatic  state  of  `whatever  it 
takes'  and  `what  matters  is  what  works'.  In  this  process,  the  state  becomes  an  enabler 
rather  than  a  provider  of  services.  An  important  aspect  in  this  apparent  pragmatism  is 
that  the  state  should  strive  to  "separate  rowing  from  steering"  (Osborne  and  Gaebler, 
1993:  316),  with  the  government  assuming  the  latter  role: 
Government  and  state  have  to  be  strong  enough  to  provide  effective 
steering  for  the  promotion  of  social  development  and  social  justice 
(Giddens  2001a:  6). 
Since  government  steering  is  apparently  reduced  to  the  role  of  facilitator,  an  important 
question  here  is,  which  groups  row?  The  answer  is  clearly  linked  to  the  networks 
mentioned  earlier.  It  also  lies  in  the  evocation  of  the  idea  of  `thinking  the  unthinkable' 
in  the  public  sector.  This  is  unambiguously  connected  to  the  pursuit  of  the  alliance  of 
partnership  and  profit  through  a  critique  of  the  public  sector  and  prescribing  a 
particular  programme.  The  guiding  principle,  fundamental  to  public  sector  reform,  is 
that  public  good  is  not  only  well  served  by  private  interests,  but  that  it  is  also  well 
served  by,  in,  and  through,  the  serving  of  private  interests  by  the  state.  In  the  public 
sector  this  means  the  intrusion  of  the  profit  motive  into  front-line  services.  It  also 
involves  an  acceptance  that,  whilst  the  market  may  have  faults  and  causes  inequality, 
market  mechanisms  can  radically  transform  public  services  beneficially.  Moreover, 
for  New  Labour,  harnessing  and  embracing  markets  means  the  long-term  aims  of 
social  justice  and  equality  of  opportunity  will  be  achieved.  This  represents  one  of  the 
central  tenets  of  Third  Way  ideology:  markets  should  no  longer  be  viewed  as 
something  to  react  against  to  secure  equality: 
Government's  enable,  not  command,  and  the  power  of  the  market  is 
harnessed  to  serve  the  public  interest  (Blair  1998:  7). 
This  is  what  underpins  the  New  Labour  shift  away  from  Old  Labour  concerns  for 
equality  of  outcome  -a  narrower  focus  on  equality  of  opportunities.  Such  a 
commitment  to  the  power  and  positive  aspects  of  the  market,  alongside  the  drive  to 69 
increase  private  business  influence  in  the  public  sector,  raises  questions  over  New 
Labour  and  the  Third  Way's  flexible,  pragmatic,  steering  rather  than  rowing 
approach.  In  terms  of  front-line  service  provision  New  Labour  seeks  to  steer  as  a 
facilitator.  But  it  is  clearly  rowing  is  in  terms  of  the  ideology  underpinning  public 
sector  reform  without  which,  from  New  Labour's  perspective,  progress  and 
`modernisation'  cannot  be  achieved. 
Thus  involvement  of  private  business  in  the  public  sector  is  crucial  for  New 
Labour.  On  the  one  hand,  New  Labour  makes  clear  a  commitment  to  improving 
public  services  through  `reform'  and  demonstrates  its  recognition  of  the  negative, 
systematic  effects  of  the  approach  of  the  previous  government.  Yet  New  Labour 
remains  constrained  by  its  self-imposed  limits,  having  earlier  pledged  public  spending 
would  remain  at  the  level  of  the  previous  administration  for  at  least  its  first  two  years 
in  government.  This,  coupled  with  anxiety  over  any  perceptible  return  to  tax  and 
spend,  makes  the  `reinvention  of  government'  in  the  image  of  business  priorities 
attractive.  Hence,  increased  private  sector  involvement  means  the  need  for  investment 
can  be  met  without  resorting  to  the  traditional  Old  Labour  method,  in  line  with  the 
Third  Way's  critique  of  traditional  perspectives: 
The  public  interest  is  often  best  served  where  the  state  collaborates 
with  other  agencies...  Structural  reform  of  the  public  services  is 
required  to  make  them  more  effective  and  responsive  to  citizen's 
needs.  Tax  and  spend  for  leftist  parties  meant  tax  and  over  ... 
It  won't 
do  to  think  of  taxation  only  in  relation  to  social  justice  (Giddens 
2002a). 
It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  there  are  sound  pragmatic  reasons  for  increased 
business  involvement.  Cash  apparently  flows  into  under-  funded  services,  helping  to 
secure  the  aims  of  social  justice  and  inclusion.  Thus  New  Labour  is  again  marked  out 
as  distinct  from  the  rampant  neo-liberalism  of  the  New  Right  and  is  distinguished 
from  Old  Labour  in  its  pragmatism,  and,  crucially,  in  its  acceptance  that  profit,  even 
profit  from  the  provision  of  public  services,  is  no  longer  a  "dirty  word"  (Mandelson 
and  Liddle  1996:  22). 
The  clearest  example  of  the  impact  of  this  seemingly  pragmatic  approach  in 
operation  is  the  proliferation  of  Public  Private  Partnerships  (PPPs),  New  Labour's 
version  of  the  much-opposed  Private  Finance  Initiative  of  the  Conservatives,  which 
help  open  up  new  markets  for  private  business.  This  represents  a  crucial  opportunity 70 
for  growth,  especially  since  any  `new'  money  that  the  government  puts  into  public 
services  is  likely  to  be  prioritised  to  service  the  debts  to  the  private  sector  for  building 
costs,  facilities  management,  and  the  cost  of  front-line  service  provision.  Since,  in  the 
longer  term,  this  type  of  provision  is  arguably  more  expensive  than  more  traditional 
methods  like  higher  direct  taxation,  it  is  questionable  whether  this  method  of 
investment  truly  represents  as  pragmatic  a  response  as  New  Labour  likes  to  suggest. 
The  extent  to  which  New  Labour  are  continually  seeking  to  make  a  practical  virtue 
out  of  an  ideological  proclivity  needs  to  be  examined.  Again,  this  is  contrasted  by 
New  Labour  to  the  `failed  pasts'  of  Old  Labour  and  the  New  Right  and  their  legacies: 
... 
Traditional  bureaucratic  structure  and  the  old  inter-relationships 
between  departments  have  been  preserved...  Britain's  bureaucracy 
remains  based  on  the  organisational  possibilities  of  1945  and  the 
quirks  of  British  history  (Byrne  1997:  12). 
Thus  New  Labour  approach  to  `modernisation'  and  `reform'  is  seemingly  root  and 
branch,  covering  the  machinery  of  government  in  the  long  term,  as  well  as  party  and 
policy.  This  involves  the  apparent  reinvention  of  government  and  the  customising  of 
service  delivery  that  has  come  to  underpin  much  of  New  Labour's  policy  orientation. 
It  also  creates  the  required  legitimacy  for  the  wholesale  critique  of  the  public  sector, 
especially  "conservative"  public  sector  workers,  who  stand  in  the  way  of 
`modernisation'.  It  helps  also  reinforce  the  apparent  need  for  private  capital  in  public 
services:  customising  government  comes  at  a  price. 
New  Labour  seeks  to  present  Public  Private  Partnerships  as  an  innovative  way 
of  getting  "private  sector  help"  (Byrne  1997:  23)  or  as  a  way  for  the  New  Labour 
government  to  "piggy-back"  (ibid.  )  business  innovation  to  save  money,  whilst 
retaining  commitments  to  traditional  values.  PPPs  are  discursively  constructed  as  a 
way  of  bringing  the  public  back  in,  in  affirmation  of  an  apparent  commitment  missing 
from  Thatcherism.  Business  is  used  to  the  common  good  and  profits  made  through 
PPPs  are  central  to  the  dynamic  economy  that  delivers  and  supports  social  justice. 
Evidently,  PPPs  are  one  of  the  most  crucial,  concrete  and  practical  applications  of  the 
New  Labour  struggle  to  fuse  antagonistic  interests  and  to  overcome  the  problems  it 
perceives  with  `old  divisions'. 
In  the  insistence  that  public  sector  reform  must  take  place  via  this  means,  New 
Labour  illustrates  both  the  key  priority  for  the  `modernisation'  of  public  services  and 71 
one  of  its  most  important  guiding  principles.  Those  who  seek  to  block  this 
`modernisation  for  profit'  are  "wreckers"  (Blair  2002b).  The  defence  of  PPPs  sees 
New  Labour  at  its  most  coherent,  most  ideological.  Ironically,  this  is  the  area  where  it 
claims  to  be  at  its  most  pragmatic.  Yet  the  role  of  private  sector  investment  through 
the  use  of  PPPs  often  represents  a  costly  financial  straitjacket  that  belies  New 
Labour's  declarations  of  pragmatism  16.  However,  from  the  point  of  view  of  business, 
the  use  of  PPPs  is  likely  to  compare  very  favourably  with  the  Conservatives' 
privatisation  of  the  public  utilities  of  the  1980s  since: 
These  new  forms  of  public  procurement  now  account  for  the  majority 
of  annually  managed  public  expenditure.  In  effect  the  annual  charges 
will  become  a  hypothecated  tax  ensuring  a  guaranteed  income  stream 
for  private  corporations  (Pollock  et.  al.  2001b:  13). 
Under  New  Labour,  therefore,  privatisation  continues  but  it  does  so  in  a  new  way  that 
secures  specific,  previously  unavailable,  guarantees  for  those  who  stand  to  benefit 
financially  from  it.  Moreover,  the  whole  notion  of  the  private  and  the  public  and, 
indeed,  privatisation  has  been  reformulated  by  New  Labour.  This  has  occurred  in  the 
context  of  a  critique  of  the  failure  of  the  Conservatives  and  the  expression  of  an 
objective  to  challenge  the  previous  administration's  undermining  of  the  public  sector, 
seemingly  indicating  a  willingness  to  chart  an  alternative  course: 
We  inherited  an  undervalued  public  sector.  It  is  absurd  that  we  ever 
got  into  the  position  under  the  previous  administration  where 
government  seemed  to  devalue  the  very  people  it  relied  on  to  deliver 
its  programme.  Where  private  was  always  best.  Where  the  public 
sector  was  always  demonised  as  inefficient...  (Blair  1999). 
Yet,  since  1997,  New  Labour  has  been  at  pains  to  stress  the  benefit  of  private 
provision,  not  in  necessarily  in  terms  of  individuals  opting  for  private  sector  services 
but  in  the  name  of  its  wholesale  `modernisation'  programme.  Paradoxically,  New 
Labour's  approach  to  private  provision  is  collectivised  privatisation  and  evokes  a 
somewhat  incongruous  `solidarity  of  the  private'. 
Ultimately,  New  Labour's  `thinking  the  unthinkable'  in  the  public  sector 
means  using  private  sector  money.  Further,  allowing  private  sector  influence  and 
16  This  point  is  illustrated  by  Monbiot  (2000).  See  also  Ferguson  et  al.  for  details  of  the  refurbishment 
of  Glasgow's  secondary  schools  through  Public  Private  Partnership  that  is  "estimated  to  cost  over  £34 72 
methods  potentially  facilitates,  for  New  Labour,  the  achievement  of  three  important 
ends  that  it  will  judge  the  success  of  reform  against:  the  transformation  of  public 
provision  in  the  `image  and  likeness'  of  the  private;  a  reduction  in  direct  welfare 
spending;  and  the  granting  of  access  to  new  markets  to  the  private  sector.  As  this 
takes  shape,  it  is  clear  that  New  Labour  seeks  to  `marry'  for  profit  organisations  with 
a  rarely  defined  public  interest.  This  is  often  coupled  with  vigorous  campaigning  that 
seeks  to  secure  public  acceptance  of  partnerships,  paid  for  from  the  public  purse. 
These  partnerships  are  made  more  difficult  to  resist  since  the  government 
demonstrates  a  willingness  to  spend,  in  the  short  term,  in  order  to  create  favourable 
conditions  for  partnerships.  In  relation  to  the  transfer  of  council  housing  to  a  quasi- 
private  partnership  in  Glasgow,  for  example,  New  Labour's  Scottish  Executive 
promised  to  write-off  Glasgow's  housing  debt  of  £900  million  if,  and  only  if,  tenants 
voted  for  the  transfer.  On  a  smaller  scale: 
Glossy  brochures  and  slick  presentations  from  consultant  public 
relations  experts  back  the  pro-transfer  argument,  helped  by  massive 
funding.  Tenants  who  wish  to  make  the  case  against  or  put  forward 
alternative  proposals  have  to  rely  on  their  own  (usually  non-existent) 
resources  (The  Guardian  30th  May  2001). 
New  Labour's  accommodation  of  the  New  Right  legacy  involves  the  adoption 
of  the  `public  bad,  private  good'  ethos.  The  use  of  PPPs  reflects  this.  Yet  it  is  also 
used  by  New  Labour  to  demonstrate  its  concern  to  deliver  high  quality  public  services 
in  line  with  its  apparent  commitment  to  traditional  Labour  values.  There  is  an 
assumption  that  this  approach  can  help  New  Labour  widen  its  electoral  support  base 
by  appealing  to  `new'  supporters,  more  amenable  to  private  sector  involvement  in 
public  service  provision.  However,  as  McKibbin  (2001:  9)  has  argued:  "most  people 
believe  there  are  certain  things  that  are  the  domain  of  the  public,  and  from  which 
private  profit  should  be  excluded".  It  is  misguided,  therefore,  to  assume,  as  New 
Labour  seems  to,  that  "the  middle  class  equals  the  private  sector,  and  the  Government 
must  therefore  promote  the  private  sector"  (ibid.:  6). 
It  is  becoming  clear  that  using  PPPs  does  not  reveal  the  government  `calling 
in'  the  private  sector  as  the  final  panacea,  since,  increasingly,  there  is  a  shift  towards 
private  first  and  last.  The  situation  now  is  not  if  or  when  the  private  sector  should 
million  more  than  through  the  public  sector  route"  (2002:  172). 73 
become  involved,  but  precisely  how.  This  demonstrates,  still  further,  an 
accommodation  of  Thatcherism  by  New  Labour  -  in  the  public  sector  `there  is  no 
alternative'  to  PPP.  Yet  there  is  a  lack  of  tangible  achievement  in  terms  of  cost  and 
efficiency  of  such  an  approach,  which  "has  its  roots  in  the  ideological  Treasury  view 
that  all  public  enterprise  is  necessarily  inefficient  while  all  private  enterprise  is 
necessarily  efficient"  (Hutton  2001).  Evidence  suggests  that  PPP  is  fundamentally 
flawed  and  certainly  more  costly  than  `traditional'  funding  methods.  For  example,  the 
PPP  funded  new  Edinburgh  Royal  Infirmary  will  cost  the  taxpayer  £990m  compared 
with  the  £180m  it  would  have  cost  had  it  been  publicly  funded  (Monbiot  2000:  74). 
Moreover,  contractual  arrangements  associated  with  PPPs  often  `lock'  local 
authorities,  the  NHS,  and  other  public  agencies  into  relationships  that  that,  in  the  long 
term,  may  not  represent  the  most  effective  use  of  resources: 
Under  PPP/PFI  and  these  new  forms  of  procurement,  the  government 
guarantees  to  collect  tax  from  its  citizens  on  behalf  of  the  private 
sector  over  the  next  20-30  years.  But  there  is  no  such  guarantee  to 
protect  public  services  such  as  health  and  education  (Pollock  et  al. 
2001a:  2;  2001b:  14). 
New  Labour  assures  that  "all  public  spending  is  money  for  results  and  reform"  (Blair 
1998:  15)  but  PPP  is  the  only  show  in  town  and  the  focus  is  on  this  as  a  form  of 
procuring  of  services,  rather  than  on  results  and  reform  per  se.  This  has  resulted  in  a 
major  increase  in  the  cost  of  externally  purchased  goods  and  services,  from  38%  in 
1991  of  annually  managed  public  expenditure  to  57%  in  1999,  the  partial  funding  of 
which  needs  to  be  diverted  from  the  wages  bill  (Pollock  et.  al  2001b:  13). 
New  Labour's  seemingly  pragmatic  approach,  reinforced  through  its  apparent 
commitment  to  a  `what  matters  is  what  works'  formula,  is  represented  as  ample 
justification  for  this  version  of  `modernisation'  in  the  public  sector.  This  suggests  that 
there  is  a  choice  -  where  `the  public'  works  it  will  remain.  This  is  not  the  case.  The 
partnership  between  public  and  private,  in  reality  between  public  services  and  profit, 
increasingly  forms  the  core  of  front-line  service  provision.  Under  New  Labour  the 
public  sector  is  tied  to  the  rigours  of  the  globalised  market  more  vehemently  than 
under  its  New  Right  predecessors.  Thus  New  Labour's  transformation  of  the  public 
sector  clearly  involves  creating  the  most  fertile  conditions  for  the  pursuit  of  private 74 
profit  and  wealth.  This  is  not  suggestive  of  a  pragmatic  response17.  Rather  it 
demonstrates  New  Labour's  ideological  commitment  to  neo-liberalism.  Arguably,  in 
this  context,  it  is  only  a  Third  Way  in  the  sense  that  it  has  removed  barriers 
constraining  earlier  ideologies,  resulting  in  redistribution  for  the  few  and  neo- 
liberalism  for  the  many. 
1.7:  From  Producer  to  Consumer:  the  Elimination  of  Vested  Interest? 
A  crucial  element  of  New  Labour  `modernisation'  of  the  public  sector  and  the 
proliferation  and,  increasingly  compulsive,  use  of  PPP  is  the  construction  of  a  shift 
away  from  a  focus  on  producer  interests  to  those  of  consumers,  often  conveyed  as 
"putting  the  customers  in  the  driving  seat"  (Osboume  and  Gaebler  1993  172).  This 
also  helps  frame  an  ideology  being  talked  into  existence  that  seemingly  relates  to  the 
priorities  for  a  changed  and  changing  world.  Producers  are  constructed  by  New 
Labour  as  representative  of  the  vested  interest  in  the  battle  against  the  forces  of 
conservatism.  Unsurprisingly,  this  shift  clearly  harmonises  with  fundamental  premises 
of  the  Third  Way  rejection  of  Labour's  failed  past  and  any  connection  to  an  `old' 
socialist  endeavour:  "socialism  above  all  is  concerned  with  production  rather  than 
consumption"  (Giddens  1994:  55).  New  Labour  sees  a  focus  on  accountability  to 
consumers  as  central  to  its  conceptual  distance  from  "economic  determinist  version" 
of  socialism  "based  around  class  interest"  that  was  "harder  edged  and  radical"  (Blair 
1994:  2),  that  is,  the  version  it  associates  with  Old  Labour  in  the  1960s  and  1970s.  At 
the  same  time,  in  this  context,  New  Labour  seeks  to  forge  connections  with  the 
assumed  ethical  socialism  of  the  party's  founding  principles: 
By  contrast,  socialism  as  defined  by  certain  key  values.  .  . 
has  the 
historic  opportunity  now  to  give  leadership...  It  is,  if  you  will,  social- 
ism. 
.  . 
Once  socialism  is  defined  in  this  way  as  a  set  of  principles...  then 
it  can  liberate  itself. 
.. 
It  can  move  beyond  the  battle  between  the  public 
and  the  private  sector  and  see  the  two  as  working  in  partnership... 
(Blair  1994:  4). 
Also  central  to  this  is  the  relationship  between  rights  and  responsibilities, 
another  core  component  of  the  New  Labour  ideology.  This  is,  again,  used  to 
differentiate  Old  Labour  from  New  Labour,  in  the  sense  that  Old  Labour  were  too 
'7  This  point  is  further  demonstrated  in  a  report  by  the  Audit  Commission  in  2003,  comparing  the 
quality,  cost  and  delivery  times  of  a  sample  of  early  PFI  schools  which  found  that  this  method  of 
funding  brought  no  clear  overall  benefits  (Audit  Commission  2003:  2). 75 
focused  on  rights  without  encouraging  an  understanding  that  these  come  at  a  price.  A 
crucial  element  of  Old  Labour's  failed  past  is  in  its  continuing  allegiance  to  the  rights 
claiming,  state  providing  (by  right),  post  war  settlement.  New  Labour  promises  a 
balance  between  rights  and  responsibility,  a  partnership  more  appropriate  to  the 
contemporary  context.  Experience  of  New  Labour  in  power  again  demonstrates  how, 
within  such  rhetorical  pairings,  it  is  prepared  to  privilege,  and  rights  are  subordinated 
to  responsibilities,  particularly  in  relation  to  New  Labour's  restructuring  of  welfare. 
Yet  the  opposite  is  the  case  in  relation  consumers  and  producers.  Consumers  have 
rights,  asserted,  demanded  on  their  behalf  and  supported  by  the  government,  whereas 
producers  (that  is  workers)  have  responsibilities,  not  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
modernisation,  and  to  place  the  interests  (rights)  of  consumers  before  their  own.  Old 
Labour  is  constructed  as  beholden  to  worker/union  rights,  New  Labour's  concern  for 
the  rights  of  the  consumer  promises  freedom  from  the  negative  effects  of  this  legacy. 
Old  Labour  was: 
... 
A  party  that  represented  producer  interests,  [which]  could  not 
properly  represent  consumer  interests,  not  least  in  the  private  sector 
(Wright  1997:  23). 
The  shift  from  producer  interests  is  central  to  New  Labour's  attempt  to  forge  new 
alliances,  and  to  how  it  represents  itself  as  no  longer  the  party  automatically 
associated  with  the  trade  unions,  conceived  of  as  the  ultimate  vested  interest, 
especially  in  the  public  sector.  This,  as  Driver  and  Martell  (1998:  68)  point  out,  is 
"remarkable  for  a  party  formed  out  of  organised  labour,  with  long  running  links  with 
unions".  It  also  demonstrates  how,  in  its  ideology  of  `modernisation  and  reform',  New 
Labour  has  re-conceptualised  the  whole  notion  of  vested  interest.  For  New  Labour, 
producer  interest,  especially  in  the  public  sector,  is  synonymous  with  vested  interest. 
And  it  is  the  only  vested  interest  that,  in  the  context  of  `reform',  New  Labour  is 
interested  in. 
This  position  is  problematic,  in  the  sense  of  the  relationships  New  Labour 
seeks  to  form  and  those  it  seeks  to  undermine.  New  Labour  uses  the  increasing  role  of 
the  private  sector  in  public  services  to  demonstrate  its  ideological  distance  from  Old 
Labour.  The  shift  from  producer  to  consumer  interests  is  used  to  confirm  this,  and 
appear  as  a  government  in  tune  with  people's  needs.  Yet  New  Labour  assumes  that 
only  `conservative'  producers  are  critical  of  its  approach  to  `modernisation'.  The 76 
government  assumes  the  private  sector  will  deliver  quality  public  services  and  only 
wreckers  will  be  ungrateful.  The  example  of  rail  privatisation,  though  not  under  a 
New  Labour  PPP,  illustrates  how  this  may  not  turn  out  to  be  the  case.  The  crucial 
problem  here  is  that,  in  its  approach  to  modernisation,  New  Labour  has  shown  willing 
to  support  a  clear  vested  interest,  private  business  making  profits  from  public  services. 
New  Labour's  driving  and  legitimising  force  is  to  forge  lasting  connections 
with  business.  Indeed,  in  Blair's  first  Labour  party  conference  speech  as  Prime 
Minister  in  1997,  business  was  assured  New  Labour  was:  "a  government  on  your  side, 
not  in  your  way"  (The  Financial  Times,  1st  October  1997).  By  2001,  this  seemed  to 
have  paid  off  as  the  chief  executives  of  fifty  eight  companies  stated  they  were  backing 
New  Labour  (The  Times  14th  May  2001).  However,  this  support  is  not  granted 
unconditionally  and  is  always  contingent  upon  New  Labour  creating  favourable 
conditions  for  profit.  Thus,  despite  New  Labour's  apparent  commitment  to  eliminate 
vested  interest  from  the  public  sector,  the  use  of  the  private  finance  suggests  that,  in 
the  longer  term,  a  `new'  vested  interest  will  be  supported.  New  Labour's  apparent 
return  to  Labour's  traditional  values,  its  rejection  of  the  divisions  of  socialism,  result 
in  the  maximum  possible  accommodation  of  business  interests.  The  use  of  PPPs  and 
the  stated  shift  towards  support  for  consumer  interests  demonstrates  how,  in  the  NHS 
for  example,  "instead  of  the  comparatively  timid  `Thatcher-Enthoven'  internal 
market"  New  Labour  favour  a  "wide  open  market"  (Enthoven"  quoted  in  Socialist 
Worker  18th  May  2002). 
1.8:  Globalisation  'At  Work' 
The  concern  to  shift  focus  from  producer  to  consumer  interest  is  connected  to 
a  concern  to  appear  novel  and,  crucially,  to  demonstrate  New  Labour's  pragmatism  in 
relation  to  the  more  ideological  Old  Labour  and  New  Right.  By  comparison  New 
Labour  is  constructed  as  business-like,  unrestrained  by  dogma,  as  well  as  eclectic  and 
forward  thinking.  Crucially,  New  Labour  sees  this  approach  as  vital  to  meet  the 
demands  of  globalisation,  demands  that,  at  the  same  time,  it  seeks  to  construct  in 
public  consciousness  as  characterising  New  Labour's  `date  with  destiny': 
18  Alain  Enthoven  was  the  architect  of  the  internal  market  in  the  NHS  under  the  Conservative 
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This  is  the  challenge:  finding  security  and  stability  in  a  world  pushed 
even  faster  forward  by  the  irresistible  forces  of  history  and  invention 
(Blair  quoted  in  Held  1998:  26-27). 
In  the  increasingly  global  economy  of  today,  we  cannot  compete  in  the 
old  way.  Capital  is  mobile,  technology  can  migrate  quickly  and  goods 
can  be  made  in  low  cost  countries  and  shipped  to  developed  markets 
(Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  1998  cited  in  Fairclough  2000:  23). 
A  global  market,  global  brands,  world-wide  access  to  each  other  and  to 
information  both  give  us  a  sense  of  strength  as  consumers  and  humble 
us  before  the  power  that  has  produced  this  situation.  Governments  face 
their  first  great  challenge  of  the  post-cold  war  era...  We  could  take  the 
advice  of  the  Stop  the  World  campaigners,  retreat  to  our  national 
economies  and  close  our  markets.  But  this  would  put  at  risk  the  real 
benefits  that  globalisation  and  global  capitalism  have  brought  to 
millions  (Straw  200119) 
In  the  construction  of  itself  as  `new',  New  Labour  mobilises  the  discourse  of 
globalisation  to  demonstrate  how  well  its  outlook  fits  with  the  context  for  government 
that  globalisation  creates.  There  can  be  no  retreat  to  the  approaches  of  Old  Labour, 
since  the  old  instruments  through  which  it  sought  to  achieve  its  ends  are  blunted  by 
the  forces  of  globalisation  and  the  New  Right  whose  "dogmatism  had  become  a 
serious  threat  to  national  cohesion"  as  old  certainties  were  replaced  (Blair  1998a:  6- 
7).  New  Labour  represents  the  antithesis  of  what  Straw  termed  the  "stop  the  world 
campaigners".  Only  New  Labour  is  up  to  the  job  of  understanding  and  relating  to  the 
profound  changes  brought  about  by  a  globalisation,  from  which  "no  country  is 
immune"  (Blair  quoted  in  Atkinson  and  Savage  2001:  8).  Globalisation,  however,  is 
defined  in  a  mythical  way  that  seeks  to  dis-empower  those  that  suffer  the  worse 
excesses  of  living  in  the  contemporary  global  economy  (Allen  2000).  This  serves  dual 
and  interconnected  purposes  for  New  Labour.  Firstly,  its  vision  promises  success  in 
working  through  the  demands  of  globalisation.  Divested  of  ideological  baggage  and 
armed  with  pragmatism,  only  New  Labour  can  rise  to  the  challenge.  Secondly, 
globalisation  serves  to  justify  New  Labour  "not  dodging  tough  choices"  en  route  to 
leading  "one  of  the  great,  radical,  reforming  governments  of  British  history"  (Blair 
quoted  in  the  Financial  Times,  1s`  October  1997).  Not  only  is  globalisation  "a  driving 
19  In  2001  Jack  Straw  was  Home  Secretary. 78 
force  behind  the  ideas  of  the  Third  Way"  (Blair  quoted  in  Savage  and  Atkinson  2001: 
8),  it  also,  crucially,  offers  New  Labour  "yet  another  modus  vivendi  with  capital  (this 
time  under  the  banner  of  `realism'  in  the  face  of  `global  competition')"  (Panitch  and 
Leys  2001:  13). 
New  Labour's  approach  to  globalisation,  and  how  it  is  defined  in  relation  to 
globalisation,  serves  to  demonstrate  how  this  is  representative  of  a  contemporary 
manifestation  of  Labour's  historic  accommodation  with  capital,  as  Panitch  and  Leys 
suggest.  It  needs  to  be  considered  in  relation  to  the  central  tenets  of  New  Labour's 
ideology  that  I  have  drawn  out  above  and  some  of  the  examples  already  presented. 
New  Labour's  wider  priorities  in  terms  of  its  commitments  to  flexibility, 
competitiveness  and  partnership,  for  example,  are  fully  resonant  with  its 
understanding  of,  and  route  through,  globalisation.  Similarly,  its  approach  to  public 
sector  `modernisation'  is  grounded  in  its  sense  of  `changing  methods  for  a  changing 
world'.  Evidence  of  this,  and  that  New  Labour's  ideological  commitments  take 
precedence  over  practical  concerns,  can  be  gleaned  from  the  government's  embrace  of 
the  exigencies  and  priorities  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Trade  and  Services 
(GATS),  many  of  which  demand  the  freeing  up  of  indigenous  public  services  for 
world  trade: 
A  huge  range  of  services  are  potentially  up  for  grabs  as  GATS 
identifies  160  sectors  grouped  into  11  categories,  the  provision  of 
which  should  be  open  to  competition.  The  categories 
include...  'educational',  `health  related  and  social'...  The  ICFTU  has 
criticised  the  fact  that  there  is  no  `exemption  of  health,  education  and 
other  vital  public  services  from  the  trade  liberalisation  provisions'  of 
GATS  (Labour  Research  February  2002). 
Moreover,  in  terms  of  Public  Private  Partnerships,  from  the  seemingly  pragmatic 
perspective  of  New  Labour,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  the  government  would 
allow  the  norm  for  formal  PPP  contracts  to  be  thirty  years.  At  face  value  this  seems 
starkly  at  odds  with  the  approach  of  a  government  fixated  on  differentiating  itself 
from  the  Old  Labour  mistake  of  clinging  to  a  post-war  settlement  long  after  its 
benefits  had  begun  to  wane  and  emphasising  the  intensified  pace  of  change  of 
globalisation: 79 
In  just  a  few  short  years  the  world  has  moved  from  sheltered  to  open 
economies;  from  local  to  regional  to  global  commerce  (Brown  2001, 
emphasis  added). 
That  `modernisation'  and  `reform'  in  the  public  sector  is  a  national  project, 
intrinsically  linked  to  a  global  market  place,  is  illustrated  with  reference  to  the  recent 
£2.3  billion  `outsourcing'  of  NHS  information  technology  services  in  England,  with 
Kellogg,  Brown  and  Root  (a  subsidiary  of  US  energy  firm  Halliburton)  being  awarded 
project  management  contract  worth  £37  million  (Computer  Weekly  March  2003). 
New  Labour's  approach  to  globalisation,  therefore,  must  be  viewed  in  the 
context  of  the  relationship  it  is  forging  with  business.  Thus  it  is  also  clearly  connected 
to  the  `economic  efficiency  results  in  social  justice'  formula,  and  the  development  of 
human  capital.  Through  mobilising  the  discourse  of  `the  knowledge  economy'  New 
Labour  and  the  Third  Way  characterise  `changing  times  at  work': 
There  is  no  longer  any  doubt  that  the  new  economy  is  real  and  that  its 
impact  is  omnipresent...  Technological  innovation  is  the  main  factor 
involved  in  the  rapid  and  progressive  shrinking  of  the  manufacturing 
industry 
...  The  blue-collar  working  class,  the  main  focus  of  traditional 
leftist  politics,  is  disappearing.  It  isn't  true  that  manufacturing  jobs  are 
simply  being  replaced  by  routinised  service  occupations...  It  is  skilled 
workers  especially  `symbolic  workers',  who  are  in  demand  in  the 
knowledge  economy...  (Giddens  2001  a:  4). 
Workers  are  constructed  as  assets,  `empowered'  and  `enabled'  (Blair  1998:  7),  and  this 
is  framed  through  an  assumption  that,  in  "progressive"  companies  which  rise  to  the 
new  challenges  of  "continuous  improvement,  innovation  and  investment  in 
capabilities"  (Blair  1998b),  there  is  a  perceptible  shift  from  "us  and  them"  towards 
"us  and  us"  (Commission  on  Social  Justice  1994:  75).  Yet  globalisation  creates  "a 
more  insecure  and  demanding  labour  market"  (Blair  1998a:  9)  and  New  Labour's  task 
is  to  ensure  workers,  who  as  a  result  "will  change  jobs  more  often"  (ibid),  are 
equipped  to  meet  its  demands.  Thus  New  Labour  is  apparently  prepared  to  invest  in 
skills  acquisition  through  a,  thus  far  ill-defined,  programme  of  life-long  learning  and 
the  promotion  of  flexibility  or,  as  Mandelson  (1997:  7)  has  termed  it: 
flexibility-plus  -  plus  higher  skills..  .  plus  partnership  with 
business...  plus  an  imaginative  Welfare  to  Work  programme...  plus 
minimum  standards  of  fair  treatment  in  the  workplace..  . 
(emphasis 
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"Flexibility-plus"  is  worthy  of  further  attention  in  terms  of  the  sort  of 
flexibility  that  is  emerging  under  New  Labour  in  reality,  and  in  terms  of  minimum 
standards  at  work,  since  these  fully  demonstrate  the  nature  of  its  embrace  of 
globalisation  overall.  New  Labour's  flexibility  rhetoric  is  imbued  with  positive 
connotations.  It  is  based  on  the  notions  of  dialogic  employers  that  view  workers  as  the 
cornerstone  of  the  success  of  the  enterprise,  and  of  influential  multi-skilled  workers 
fully  equipped  to  meet  the  challenge  of  the  next  task  or,  more  often,  the  next  job, 
since  employment  not  job  security  is  central  to  New  Labour's  approach  to 
globalisation.  Yet  evidence  suggests  this  is  not  the  case.  For  example,  in  assessing  the 
level  of  influence  that  employees  exercised,  Cully  et  al.  (1999:  140-3)  found  that 
whilst  only  a  third  of  respondents  said  they  had  little  or  no  influence  at  work, 
managers  had  the  greatest  level  of  job  influence.  Moreover,  the  most  widespread  form 
of  influence  was  over  how  work  was  carried  out,  as  opposed  to  influence  over  pace  of 
work  and  range  of  tasks.  This  clearly  suggests  that  New  Labour's  claims  of  a 
globalisation  managed  through  a  recognition  and  embrace  of  a  `knowledge'  economy, 
bringing  about  a  proliferation  of  functional  flexibility  and  empowerment,  can  be 
challenged20.  Contemporary  flexibility  often  means  what  Gray  (1995:  12)  has  termed 
"flexploitation".  This  point  is  further  developed  later  in  relation  to  the  case  study  of 
WCCI. 
In  relation  to  New  Labour's  commitment  to  only  minimum  standards  of 
protection  for  workers,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  little  effort  to  mitigate  the  worst  effects 
of  the  ways  in  which  business  responds  to  globalisation.  For  example,  New  Labour's 
limited  embrace  of  European  Union  legislation  demonstrates  in  whose  interests  it  acts 
when  shaping  its  response  to  globalisation.  Its  concern  to  appease  the  CBI's  fears  that 
laws  made  at  supranational  level  mean  over-positive  workers'  rights  "by  the  back 
door"  (The  Guardian  Pt  August  2000),  mould  New  Labour's  parsimonious  approach 
to  embracing  `Social  Europe'  type  initiatives.  New  Labour  opt-outs  and  partial 
implementation  of  crucial  European  Directives  like  the  Working  Time  Directive  and 
the  Information  and  Consultation  Directive,  illustrate  this  point  but  they  also 
challenge  the  notion  that  globalisation  ties  the  hands  of  national  governments.  New 
Labour  can  apparently  retreat  to  the  national  and  "return  to  policies  of  isolation" 
20  Harrison  (1997)  and  Sennett  (1998)  both  offer  critical  accounts  of  flexibility  and  its  impact  on 
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(Blair  1998a:  6)  as  long  as  this  fits  with  its  demands  regarding  flexibility, 
competitiveness  and  partnership. 
Moreover,  New  Labour's  failure  to  implement  International  Labour 
Organisation  (ILO)  standards  that  the  UK  is,  on  paper  at  least,  committed  to  (see 
Hendy  2001)  illustrates  the  nature  of  its  accommodation  of  globalisation  -  benefits  to 
global  workers  can  and  will  be  resisted.  This  is  often  couched  in  terms  that  resistance 
is  for  the  workers'  own  good: 
The  Americans  argued  in  Seattle  that  there  should  be  a  rule  in  the 
WTO  that  says  any  country  that  has  child  labour  has  barriers  against 
its  trade.  But  that  would  punish  every  single  poor  country  in  the  world 
(Clare  Short  quoted  in  The  Observer  20th  December  2000)  21. 
This  approach,  and  the  retention  of  central  tenets  of  the  Thatcherite  industrial 
relations  settlement,  often  in  contravention  of  the  ILO,  not  only  further  demonstrates 
New  Labour's  accommodation  of  the  New  Right  legacy,  it  is  also  indicative  of  New 
Labour's  engagement  with  globalisation  as  a  top-down,  winner-centred  affair. 
Contemporary  experience  at  work  confirms  that  New  Labour's  approach  to 
globalisation  is  firmly  rooted  in  the  context  of  crucial  elements  of  New  Labour's 
ideology  overall.  New  Labour's  rejection  or  limited  embrace  of  what  are,  possibly, 
globalisation's  more  positive  aspects,  from  the  dismissal  of  global  protestors  as  "stop 
the  world  campaigners"  and  limitations  placed  on  European  Union  initiatives,  to 
opening  up  the  emerging  UK  `market'  in  public  services  to  multi-national 
corporations  results  in  a  globalisation  in  the  interests  of  the  few.  It  is  also  interesting 
to  note  that  the  deconstruction  of  the  perceived  monolithic  one-size-fits-all  model  is 
sought  on  a  national  scale  yet  reinforced  globally  in  the  activities  of  the  World  Bank, 
the  World  Trade  Organisation  and  the  G8,  with  the  support  of  the  UK  government22. 
1.9:  Conclusion 
I  have  demonstrated  above  how,  in  analysing  New  Labour,  it  is  important  to 
take  account  of  the  complexity  and  tensions  at  the  heart  of  the  New  Labour  project.  In 
doing  so,  however,  'I  do  not  claim  that  this  is  a  fully  comprehensive  assessment  of 
every  aspect  of  New  Labour.  There  is  no  reference  to  New  Labour's  developing 
2'Clare  Short  was  the  International  Development  Secretary  at  this  time. 
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morality  or  explicit  consideration  of  its  conceptualisation  of  communitarianism. 
Rather,  it  is  a  selective  account  as  I  have  sought  to  root  this  particular  consideration  of 
New  Labour  within  the  wider  aims  of  the  thesis. 
As  a  party  and  as  a  coherent  political  ideology,  New  Labour  is  as  much  a 
product  of  a  century  of  social  democratic  development  as  it  is  the  `result'  of  the 
fundamental  changes  of  the  last  two  decades.  Of  course,  New  Labour  is  post- 
Thatcherite  and  it  operates  within  a  terrain  marked  out  by  an  earlier  period  of  neo- 
liberal  ascendancy.  Yet,  as  I  have  sought  to  outline,  neo-liberalism  itself  did  not 
emerge  in  a  vacuum,  since  its  hegemonic  rise  was  shaped  too  by  the  reversal  of  gains 
for  the  working  class  by  its  Old  Labour  predecessors. 
That  said,  I  have  also  made  clear  that  New  Labour  is  novel  in  many  ways.  In 
striving  to  construct  the  notion  of  a  new  force  in  British  politics,  drawing  on  an 
emergent  Third  Way  trajectory  that  "almost  all  centre-left  parties..  . 
have  restructured 
their  doctrines  in  relation  to"  (Giddens  2002b),  New  Labour  have  mythologised,  both 
positively  and  negatively,  key  moments  in  Labour's  history.  It  is  questionable 
whether  New  Labour  is  simply  charting  a  practical  course,  which  it  sees  as  the  only 
alternative  in  the  prevailing  circumstances,  as  this  does  not  fully  account  for  New 
Labour's  role  in  moulding  these  circumstances.  What  is  clear  is  that  New  Labour's 
response  to  late  twentieth  and  early  twenty-first  century  developments  has  served  to 
re-invigorate  a  neo-liberalism  that  seemed  out  of  touch  with  contemporary  problems 
and  the  demands  of  a  world  still  characterised  by  a  division  between  `winners  and 
losers'.  New  Labour's  struggle  to  synthesise  their  interests  have  had  little  impact  on 
the  systematic  effects  of  this  division.  Indeed,  New  Labour's  relationship  with 
business,  representing  something  of  a  new  turn  for  Labour,  and  its  battle  against  the 
forces  of  conservatism,  the  Project's  "wreckers",  serves  to  exacerbate  this  division. 
Considering  this  relationship  in  detail  draws  our  attention  to  questions  that  can 
be  raised  over  New  Labour's  supposed  pragmatism  and  its  seemingly  novel  ability  to 
draw  on  the  `best'  of  the  two  failed  pasts  of  the  New  Right  and  the  most  recent 
incarnation  of  Old  Labour.  New  Labour's  endeavour  to  escape  the  burdens  of  history 
does  have  firm  ideological  roots  and  its  commitments  are  ideologically  rooted. 
Moreover,  its  endeavour  to  synthesise  key  elements  of  earlier  traditions,  and  the 
corollary  fusion  of  what  are  often  diametrically  opposed  interests,  represent  the  sort  of 83 
`grand  design'  that  New  Labour  seemingly  rejects.  New  Labour's  policy  direction, 
especially  in  the  public  sector,  and  its  commitment  to  the  ideology  of  competitiveness, 
flexibility  and  partnership  demonstrate  an  adherence  to  dogma,  albeit  in  a  new  format. 
Finally,  New  Labour  remains  the  capitalist  workers  party  of  Old,  despite  the 
restructuring  of  its  traditional  allegiances.  It  is  another  version  of  Labour's  historic 
accommodation  with  capitalism,  another  third  way.  Yet,  as  its  time  in  government 
progresses,  the  crucial  separation  of  politics  and  economics  that  serves  to  sustain 
Labour  is  challenged.  The  interconnectedness  of  politics  and  economics  is  more 
readily  exposed  in  the  modus  operandi  being  developed  by  New  Labour.  As  a  result 
New  Labour  remains  dependent  on  its  most  enduring  alliance  -  that  with  the  trade 
unions  -  to  ensure  that  a  sense  of  the  benefits  for  the  working  class  from  the 
separation  of  politics  and  economics  is  maintained.  It  is  to  that  relationship  that  I  now 
turn,  to  examine  its  contemporary  contours  within  the  New  Labour  political  economy. 83 
CHAPTER  TWO:  NEW  LABOUR  AND  THE  UNIONS: 
CONTINUITY  AND  CHANGE 
Every  year,  this  time  of  year  I  come  to  the  TUC.  Every  year  the  press 
report,  there'll  be  a  row  between  you  and  me.  They  say  I'll  come  and 
beat  a  drum,  unleash  the  annual  cry,  change  your  ways,  clean  up  your 
act,  modernise  or  die.  Well  modernised  you  have,  I  say,  New  Labour, 
new  unions  too.  Both  for  the  future,  not  the  past.  For  the  many  not  the 
few.  So  the  links  between  us  change,  you've  changed  and  so  have  we. 
You're  welcome  now  in  Number  10  but  no  beer  today,  just  tea.  ' 
2.1:  Introduction 
The  previous  chapter  outlined  central  tenets  of  New  Labour's  underpinning 
ideology:  the  drive  to  chart  a  course  beyond  the  Old  Left  and  the  New  Right;  the 
attempt  to  synthesis  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour;  the  restructuring  of  `old' 
alliances  and  the  formation  of  new  ones;  and  the  shift  away  from  producer  interests 
towards  consumer  interests.  These  features  frame,  and  are  framed  by,  New  Labour's 
overarching  concern  to  do  battle  with  `the  forces  of  conservatism'  that  stand  in  the 
way  of  New  Labour's  `modernisation'  programme.  They  also  impact  on  New 
Labour's  relationship  with  trade  unions.  The  intention  in  this  chapter  is  to  examine 
this  relationship  in  the  light  of  the  development  of  a  New  Labour  political  economy 
that  perceives  unions  as  "conservative  about  change"  (Mandelson  and  Liddle 
1996:  225). 
The  focus  of  this  chapter  is  on  both  change  and  continuity.  In  terms  of 
continuity,  the  nature  of  the  continuing  connections  between  New  Labour  and  the 
unions  suggests  that  what  has  been  noted  as  a  "contentious  alliance"  (Minkin  1991) 
also  remains  an  "enduring  alliance"  (Mcllroy  1998).  Continuity  is  an  important 
element  of  the  relationship  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions,  not  least  because 
New  Labour  clearly  promotes  the  notion  of  fundamental  change.  Yet,  as  noted  in  the 
previous  chapter,  New  Labour,  in  turn,  both  demonises  and  mythologies  Labour's 
past,  particularly  with  respect  to  the  relationship  with  the  unions.  It  is  important 
remain  aware  of  New  Labour's  specific  characterisation  of  Old  Labour  when 
exploring  this  relationship.  It  is  also  important  to  recognise  that,  as  New  Labour  has 
1  Blair's  speech  to  the  TUC,  10  September  1999  (The  Herald  15`h  September  1999). 84 
developed,  so  have  the  unions.  Whilst  both  retain  central  features  of  past  traditions 
which,  as  discussed  below,  are  crucial  to  sustaining  the  relationship,  there  are 
qualitatively  new  elements  to  both  that  need  to  be  considered.  Indeed,  it  could  be 
argued  that  the  shifting  fortunes  of  the  trade  unions,  throughout  the  late  1970s  and 
1980s  especially,  had  a  significant  influence  of  the  creation  of  New  Labour2. 
Central,  and  increasingly  influential  elements,  in  the  party  hierarchy  sought  to 
respond  to  what  is  believed  to  be  the  irreversible,  and  even  highly  desirable, 
decimation  of  trade  union  power.  If  New  Labour  is  about  `modernisation'  then  first 
and  foremost  this  has  to  involve  a  "reckoning  with  betrayal"  and  recognising  "what 
happened  to  Labour  in  recent  times"  (Wright  1997:  21-22).  New  Labour's  focus  in  this 
respect  is  on  Old  Labour's  relationship  with  the  unions  which,  for  New  Labour,  was 
one  of  granting  favours  to  unions,  contrary  to  Labour's  true  socialist  ideals 
(Mandleson  and  Liddle  1996:  11).  Thus  New  Labour  ensures  that  the  decimation  of 
trade  union  power  is  upheld  and,  indeed,  that  it  is  mirrored  in  its  own  party  structures 
through  the  formal  reduction  of  union  organisational  influence  within  the  party.  This 
is  important  since,  increasingly,  the  retention  of  formal  links  between  New  Labour 
and  the  unions  means,  in  effect,  unconditional  financial  support  for  very  little  in 
return,  in  terms  not  only  of  internal  influence  but  also  of  wider  improvements. 
However,  it  is  also  important  in  the  context  of  continuity  and  change,  since  New 
Labour's  characterisation  of  the  relationship  often  belies  the  extent  to  which  the  role 
of  right-wing  union  leaders  within  the  structures  of  the  party  was,  and  remains,  one  of 
supporting  the  policy  thrust  of  the  parliamentary  party,  in  the  face  of  opposition  from 
union  members  (Thorpe  1999:  133;  Panitch  and  Leys  2001).  Thus  my  discussion  of 
the  contours  of  the  contemporary  relationship  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions  is 
framed  by  a  recognition  that,  in  order  to  characterise  it  effectively,  it  is  necessary  to 
go  beyond  New  Labour's  mythology  of  Old  Labour. 
Overall,  this  chapter  is  concerned  to  draw  out  central  features  of  the 
relationship  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions  that  are  essential  to  an 
understanding  of  the  wider  aims  of  the  whole  thesis.  As  will  be  discussed  below,  the 
balance  of  power  in  the  workplace  and  in  industrial  relations  more  generally  that 
2  Mcllroy  argues  that  "the  emergence  of  New  Labour  can  only  be  understood  through  analysis  of 
developments  in  both  party  and  unions"  (1998:  537). 85 
developed  during  the  two  decades  of  Conservative  rule  -  made  all  the  more  acute 
after  the  defeat  of  the  Miners  in  1985  -  remains  under  New  Labour.  No  decision  is 
made  by  the  New  Labour  government  that  shifts  that  balance  in  the  direction  of 
workers.  If  unions'  commitment  to  the  return  of  a  Labour  government  is  rewarded  to 
any  extent,  it  does  not  happen  at  the  expense  of  upsetting  this  balance.  As  in  other 
spheres,  what  New  Labour  offers  is  limited  scope  and  opportunity  (rather  than 
promoting  equality  of  outcome)  for  a  particular  type  of  trade  unionism  that  poses  little 
threat  to  employers  and,  importantly,  to  New  Labour.  At  the  same  time,  this  involves 
striving  to  close  off  possibilities  for  strong  oppositional  trade  unionism,  especially  in 
the  public  sector,  where,  arguably,  the  unions  could  do  New  Labour  most  damage. 
Crucially,  it  is  made  clear  that  a  New  Labour  government  will  not  be  allowed  to 
founder  "on  the  rock  of  Labour's  unwillingness  to  offend  entrenched  union  interest" 
(Mandelson  and  Liddle  1996:  24). 
As  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership, 
and  a  specific  type  of  reform  in  the  public  sector  define  New  Labour's  ideology,  and 
this  has  an  impact  upon  the  working  lives  of  millions,  in  both  the  public  and  private 
sectors.  New  Labour's  relationship  with  the  unions  needs  to  be  redefined  to  take 
account  of  what  these  concepts  actually  mean  in  practice.  On  the  whole,  the  unions 
have  accepted  the  recasting  of  their  relationship  with  Labour  and  this  alerts  us  to  the 
possibility  that  the  relationship  has  not,  in  fact,  been  radically  transformed.  It  is 
certainly  different.  Unions  are  weaker  in  the  workplace  generally  and  weakened 
within  the  structures  of  the  Labour  party.  However,  the  union  leadership,  at  least,  is 
satiated  by  the  very  existence  of  'a  Labour  government  that  delivers  little  of  the 
unions'  already  modified  demands.  The  resilience  of  the  relationship,  in  the  face  of 
parsimonious  employment  relations  legislation  and  often-overt  provocation  in  the 
public  sector,  serves  to  demonstrate  how  the  institutionalisation  of  Labour  as  the  party 
`of  the  working  class'  disarms  both  unions  and  workers.  The  context  of  New  Labour 
exposes  the  weaknesses  in  the  relationship  but  it  is  not  fissured  irreversibly.  Despite 
criticisms,  ideological  and  financial  links  are  retained.  There  remains  contention  over 
key  issues:  public  sector  reform,  the  provision  of  "ineffective  rights"  (Labour 
Research  Department  1998:  32),  the  increasingly  strong  relationship  with  business, 
and  the  war  in  Iraq,  for  example.  However,  support  for  the  historic  link  remains,  in 
the  main,  and  challenges  are  often  crouched  in  terms  of  `reclaiming  the  Labour  Party' 86 
from  the  Blairite  right.  Overall,  the  unions'  voice  in  parliament  has  become  at  best  a 
whisper,  at  worst,  and  more  frequently,  speaks  in  outright  contravention  of 
fundamental  union  principles. 
New  Labour's  employment  relations  and  legislation,  and  its  approach  to 
labour  market  flexibility  that  is  demonstrably  an  "ideological  Trojan  horse  for  the  full 
neo-liberal  agenda  in  employment  policy"  (Gray  1998:  2),  are  clear  examples  of  what 
this  means  in  practice.  Despite  Labour's  and  unions'  earlier  vociferous  critique  of 
their  Conservative  opponents,  especially  in  respect  of  industrial  relations,  no  long- 
term  radical  alternative  to  the  Conservatives'  assault  on  the  unions  developed.  The 
emergence  of  New  Labour  means  the  wholesale  acceptance  that  the  Thatcher  years,  in 
particular,  brought  "lasting  policy  achievements"  and  changes  for  in  industrial 
relations  for  "the  better"  (Mandelson  and  Liddle  1996:  12-13).  Official  union 
challenges  to  this  position  have  been  muffled  in  the  extreme  and,  partly  as  a  result,  an 
embrace  of  Thatcher's  industrial  relations  settlement  remains  absolutely  central  to 
New  Labour  ideology.  Indeed,  the  discursive  construction  of  New  Labour  keeping  the 
unions  at  arms'  length  (Mandelson  and  Liddle  1996:  227)  is  fundamental  to  the  notion 
of  a  `modernised',  electable  and  re-electable,  Labour  party.  Trade  unions  are 
perceived  as  only  one  pressure  group  amongst  many: 
Unions  are  probably  the  biggest  voluntary  group  in  the  country  and 
they  have  a  powerful  voice.  But  they  are  not  the  only  voice  and  we 
have  to  govern  in  the  interests  of  everyone  ('Senior  Government 
Source',  quoted  in  the  Daily  Record  13th  September  1999). 
Any  engagement  with  the  trade  unions  on  the  government's  part  is,  therefore, 
presented  as  a  reflection  of  New  Labour's  "openness  to  legitimate  opinion" 
(Mandelson  and  Liddle  1996:  152).  Yet,  crucially,  unions  need  to  be  kept  both  in 
abeyance  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  `on  board',  especially  in  relation  to  reform  in  the 
public  sector  where,  as  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  New  Labour  seeks  radical 
transformation  and,  in  the  process,  a  redefined  social  democracy.  Paradoxically,  the 
`new'  arm's  length  relationship  between  the  two  arms  of  the  Labour  Movement,  and 
the  retention  of  union  allegiance  both  in  opposition  and  in  government,  are  both 
central  for  New  Labour.  Again,  this  challenges  the  notion  of  a  fundamental  break  with 
the  past  since,  to  a  large  extent,  New  Labour  success  continues  to  be  contingent  on 87 
union  leaders  `holding  the  line'  as  an  expression  of  Labour  Movement  solidarity,  as 
was  the  case  with  Old  Labour.  Yet  New  Labour's  revision  of  the  Old  Labour 
relationship  with  the  unions  in  the  1960s  and,  in  particular,  the  1970s,  represents  it  as 
defined  by  concessions  to  the  unions  at  the  expense  of  political  success:  a  `buy-in' 
rather  than  a  `sell-out'. 
Similarity  with  Old  Labour  in  this  context  is  underplayed  by  New  Labour,  as 
the  idea  of  a  `new'  relationship  with  the  unions  is  central  to  the  Third  Way 
orientation.  As  noted,  this  does  not  reject  wholesale  the  free  market  of  the 
Conservatives,  unfettered  by  union  influence  or  interference.  Embrace  of  the  market 
to  deliver  its  aims  and  curbing  union  power  are  celebrated  by  New  Labour.  Nor,  as 
noted  above,  does  New  Labour  rhetoric  translate  into  a  complete  disavowal  of  the  Old 
Labour  relations  with  the  unions.  The  unions  continue  to  deliver  for  New  Labour.  The 
`new'  relationship  with  the  unions  is  `Third  Way'  in  orientation  through  two  central 
components.  Firstly,  New  Labour  shares  with  New  Right  a  concern  with  the 
individual  over  the  collective  as  the  most  appropriate  response  to  the  changes  of  the 
last  three  decades.  Trade  unions  are  the  ultimate  embodiment,  for  New  Labour,  of  an 
era  of  collectivism  that  has  long  since  passed.  Yet,  within  this  formulation,  New 
Labour  recognises  the  weaknesses  in  the  New  Right's  renunciation  of  the  social.  Thus 
collectivism  is  rejected  in  favour  of  collective  responsibility  and  New  Labour 
facilitates  a  return  to  the  social,  restructured  as  market  solidarity.  Secondly,  a  crucial 
role  for  unions  is  retained,  if  under-stated,  especially  relation  to  the  New  Labour 
ideology  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership. 
From  the  perspective  of  New  Labour,  `modern'  (modernised)  unions  reject  the 
`old'  antagonism  and  conflict  of  the  past  and  are  crucial  in  delivering  the  partnership 
message  directly  to  the  mass  of  members.  At  face  value,  such  unions'  ability  to 
communicate  the  New  Labour  message  to  members,  their  continuing  adeptness  at 
delivering  acquiescence,  save  a  few  notable  exceptions,  are,  arguably,  at  least  as 
important  as  the  continuation  of  the  funding  of  the  Labour  party.  New  Labour's  re- 
conceptualisation  of  the  social  involves  its  construction  as  "neutral  territory" 
(Newman  and  De  Zoysa  2001:  237),  and  the  synthesis  of  the  interests  of  capital  and 
labour  clearly  needs  to  be  supported  by  unions.  Indeed,  the  changes  in  the  orientation 
of  unions  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  towards  a  consensual,  increasingly  accommodative 
approach  to  employers  (Darlington  1994a)  have  been  central  to  the  development  of 88 
key  elements  of  New  Labour.  Moreover,  since  New  Labour  has  built  its  new 
relationship  with  business  essentially  on  the  central  premise  that  there  would  be  no 
return  to  the  militancy  of  the  1970s,  unions  have  a  central  role  to  play  in  the  delivery 
of  this  New  Labour  promise.  Thus,  whilst  New  Labour  legislation  on  employment 
rights,  especially  the  statutory  recognition  procedure,  was  developed  taking  full 
account  of  employer  demands,  it  also  serves  to  reinforce  a  particular  type  of  trade 
unionism:  consensual,  accommodative  and  bureaucratically  driven,  centrally  focused 
on  business  interest  and  competitiveness.  The  existence  of  New  Labour  serves  to 
proscribe  collectivist,  conflictual,  trade  unionism,  and  its  employment  relations 
legislation  ossifies  the  opposite  tendencies  by  giving  them  legal  and  structural 
expression.  The  coup  de  grace  for  New  Labour  is  that  it  remains  in  a  position  to  do  so 
whilst  the  party  retains  the  support  of  the  major  trade  unions  leaders,  even  if  support 
for  the  government  is  often  qualified.  The  implications  of  this  will  be  considered 
below. 
Changes  in  the  decision  making  structures  within  the  Labour  Party, 
centralising  the  control  of  the  parliamentary  party  and  strengthening  the  power  of  the 
leader,  have  resulted  in  the  explicit  reduction  in  union  and  party  member  influence 
and  this  was  central  to  the  creation  of  New  Labour  (Panitch  and  Leys  2001;  Davies 
2001).  The  reduction  in  union  power  within  the  party  has  helped  weaken  any 
obligation  that  the  Labour-union  link  seemingly  evokes.  The  effects  of  pressure  from 
unions,  where  there  are  fundamental  clashes  of  orientation  between  them  and  the 
government  are  extremely  limited,  especially  when  confined  to  bureaucratic  lobbying. 
The  difference  between  New  Labour  and  key  affiliated  unions  in  their  approach  to  the 
public  sector  is  crucial  here. 
New  Labour's  approach  to  public  services  and  the  crusade  to  rid  them  of  so- 
called  vested  interests  in  the  shape  of  the  entrenched,  old  fashioned,  attitudes  of 
public  sector  workers  (producers),  and  the  challenge  to  what  it  perceives  as  "self 
indulgent  rhetoric"  (Blair  quoted  in  The  Guardian  11th  September  2002)  on  the  part  of 
public  sector  unions,  places  a  strain  on  the  relationship,  that  in  some  cases  leads  to 
open  conflict.  New  Labour's  continuation  of  the  Conservatives'  ideology  of 
"producer  capture"  (Corby  and  White  1999:  10)  that  assumes  that  public  sector 
managers,  workers  and  unions  will  act  as  much  in  their  own  interests  as  in  the 89 
interests  of  client  consumers  or  service  users,  albeit  through  different  mechanisms3,  is 
a  central  strand  in  its  approach  to  the  public  sector.  Although  public  sector  union 
leaders  are  opposed  to  what  Leys  (2001)  has  termed  the  "commodification  of  the 
public  sector"  in  the  shape  of  the  government's  Public  Private  Partnership  initiatives, 
they  bring  little  influence  on  bureaucratic  channels.  Also,  whilst  the  government  do 
face  militant  challenges  to  its  position  on  the  public  sector,  the  weakening  of  trade 
union  power  through  earlier  Conservative  anti-union  legislation,  privatisation  in  the 
public  sector,  and  deindustrialisation  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  plus  the  subordination 
of  overall  union  (membership)  demands  and  earlier  expectations  to  the  ultimate  prize 
of  having  Labour  elected,  means  New  Labour  faces  weaker  opponents  internally  as 
well  as  externally. 
Yet  New  Labour  still  faces  particular  difficulties  in  relation  to  the  public 
sector  that  are  worth  outlining.  Firstly,  New  Labour  seeks  to  appear  most  radical  and 
to  ensure  that  its  `forces  of  progress'  dominate  the  public  sector,  even  if  `reform' 
places  New  Labour  in  direct  conflict  to  the  interests  of  its  workers,  upon  whose 
unions  New  Labour  still  depends  for  support.  Secondly,  public  sector  militancy,  with 
its  overtones  to  the  Winter  of  Discontent  of  1978-79  is  politically  embarrassing  to 
New  Labour  in  the  extreme  and  has  the  potential  to  overtly  divide  loyalties  within  the 
party.  Thus  any  militancy  can  be  used  by  opposition  parties  to  suggest  that  New 
Labour  has  not  modernised.  This,  in  turn,  can  have  serious  implications  for  New 
Labour's  relationship  with  business.  Thirdly,  and  perhaps  more  contentiously,  in  the 
public  sector  it  is  more  difficult  to  put  a  positive  spin  on  New  Labour's  apparent 
achievements  in  the  arena  of  employment  relations.  Whilst  many  measures  like 
statutory  recognition  and  the  National  Minimum  Wage  (NMW),  for  example,  are 
welcomed  overall,  they  still  represent  a  limited  achievement,  well  below  union 
demands4.  Moreover,  the  continuing,  albeit  often  limited,  strength  of  trade  unions  in 
the  public  sector  means  that  many  of  the  individual  rights  that  New  Labour  introduced 
represent  already  existing  rights  to  the  majority  of  those  employed  by  state  agencies. 
Lastly,  the  existing  influence  of  the  private  sector  within  public  services,  linked  to 
3  For  example,  for  the  Conservatives  Compulsory  Competitive  Tendering  (CCT)  was  crucial  in  this 
respect.  CCT  has  been  rejected  in  favour  of  PPP/PFI,  though  PFI  is  a  creation  of  the  Conservative 
4  Indeed,  the  main  public  sector  union,  UNISON,  which  had  campaigned  vigorously  for  a  minimum 
wage  during  Labour's  years  in  opposition,  initiated  a  campaign  against  the  rate  it  was  set  at,  early  in 
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both  the  initiatives  of  the  previous  administration  and  New  Labour  reforms,  is  viewed 
by  both  workers  and  unions  as  having  brought  about  cuts  in  staffing,  services,  pay  and 
conditions.  New  Labour's  overall  orientation  in  the  public  sector,  and  the  continuation 
of  PFI/PPP,  seemingly  ignores  that  public  sector  unions  remain  unconvinced  of  the 
validity  of  the  proliferation  of  such  funding  and  management  mechanisms.  Yet  Blair 
and  New  Labour  are  clear  what  the  effects  of  union  recalcitrance  on  the  issue  of 
public  sector  reform  would  be.  It  would  mean  interference  with  the  consumer  choice 
that  the  government  sees  as  fundamental  to  its  `new'  relationship  with  public  service 
consumers  and,  ultimately,  the  return  of  a  Conservative  government  due  to  New 
Labour's  failure  to  deliver  (Blair  The  Guardian  11`h  September  2002).  Despite  the 
construction  of  a  `new'  relationship  with  unions,  New  Labour  still  perceives  striving 
to  avoid  such  problems  as  a  joint  responsibility  (ibid.  ).  Unions  must  embrace  the 
`transformation'  of  the  public  sector  as  envisaged  by  New  Labour  to  avoid  their 
extinction  and  that  of  New  Labour.  Thus,  when  exploring  the  nature  of  the 
relationship  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions,  it  is  as  important  to  consider  life 
`working  for  New  Labour'  in  the  public  sector  as  it  is  to  consider  working  life  `under 
New  Labour'  more  generally.  This  also  allows  for  an  exploration  of  New  Labour's 
concern  for  partnership  in  the  workplace  and  the  tension  between  this  and  its 
ideological  drive  in  the  public  sector.  It  is  important  to  examine  how  much  ground  is 
given  in  the  name  of  partnership  by  New  Labour  and  to  assess  what  sort  of  `partner' 
New  Labour  makes. 
Before  moving  on,  it  is  worth  stating  clearly  an  important  distinction  that  is 
made  throughout  this  chapter  -  that  between  the  trade  union  bureaucracy  and  ordinary 
rank  and  file  union  members.  Unless  otherwise  indicated,  the  `union'  position  and 
orientation  discussed  here  is  that  of  the  union  leadership.  It  is  accepted  that  there  is  a 
dichotomy  and  tension  within  trade  unions  between  leaders  and  members  in  terms  of 
interests,  action  and  outlook.  It  is  also  complex  in  terms  of,  for  example,  how 
bureaucratic  outlook  can,  and  does,  permeate  the  whole  of  the  union  movement.  This 
is  especially  the  case  in  periods  when  militancy  is  at  a  low  level  and  sustained  defeats 
allow  a  batten-down-the-hatches  mentality  to  breed.  However,  the  distinction  between 
the  bureaucracy  and  the  rank  and  file  remains  a  "meaningful  generalisation  of  a  real 
contradiction"  (Darlington  1994a:  32;  Callinicos  1995:  16-17).  It  is  impossible, 
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union  leadership.  In  terms  of  both  former  and  current  contours  of  the  relationship 
between  Labour  and  the  unions,  it  is  fundamentally  important  that  this  distinction  is 
maintained.  Similarly,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  New  Labour  does  not 
necessarily  embody  the  outlook  of  ordinary  Labour  party  members.  Primarily  then, 
the  Labour-union  relationship  is  one  between  the  controlling  hierarchy  of  the  Labour 
party,  inside  and  outside  government,  and  the  upper  echelons  of  the  union  movement 
and  the  wider  bureaucracy  of  full-time  officialdom.  The  subject  of  this  chapter, 
therefore,  is  largely  the  debilitating,  bureaucratic  `knot'  that  their  combined 
endeavours  help  create  within  the  Labour  Movement  as  a  whole.  The  chapter  is 
framed  by  recognition  that  there  is: 
... 
A  fundamental  cleavage  of  interests  that  exists  between  full-time 
union  officials  [and  the  union  leadership]  and  rank-and-file  members 
within  trade  unionism  under  capitalism  (Darlington  1994a:  32). 
This  analysis  of  New  Labour's  relationship  with  the  unions  demonstrates  a  crucial 
way  in  which  the  essence  of  this  dichotomy  is  manifested  and  reproduced. 
2.2:  Taking  the  link  `beyond  left  and  right'? 
When  the  Conservatives  came  to  power  in  1979,  the  unions  were  at  their  peak 
with  over  thirteen  million  members  and  union  density  at  55%.  In  1997,  the  year  of 
New  Labour's  election,  union  membership  was  around  7.4  million,  the  lowest  level  of 
membership  since  1945  and  density  was  down  to  less  than  30%  (Department  of  Trade 
and  Industry  2002:  343).  General  developments  in  the  labour  market,  due  to 
restructuring  and  deindustrialisation,  have  taken  their  toll  on  unions  and  the  growth  of 
part-time  and  service  sector  employment  largely  meant  a  growth  in  non-union  labour 
until  relatively  recently.  Crucially,  from  the  perspective  of  New  Labour,  this  is 
indicative  of  a  fundamentally  altered  working  class  whose  allegiances  New  Labour 
seeks  to  attract.  By  the  1990s,  New  Labour  endeavoured  to  relate  to  these  changes 
through  seeking  to  diminish  the  sense  of  Labour  and  the  trade  unions  as  two 
intrinsically  connected  element  of  a  Labour  Movement,  perceiving  the  notion  of 
Labour  being  bound  up  with  unions  as  a  serious  electoral  handicap.  An  alternative 
"big  tent"  approach  emerged  to  facilitate  the  largest  possible  electoral  base  for  New 
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devoid  of  the  need  to  appeal  to  traditional  supporters  ideologically  attached  to  the 
Labour  Movement  (German  2000:  14). 
One  of  the  most  important  elements  of  the  legacy  of  two  decades  of 
Thatcherism  was  that  the  relative  decline  and  weakening  of  trade  unions  created  space 
and  scope  for  New  Labour  to  accept  much  of  the  ideology  espoused  by  the  New 
Right.  This  included  acceptance  of  the  Right's  approach  to  the  unions:  they  interfere 
with  the  operation  of  the  market,  act  as  a  barrier  to  competition,  and  can  hinder 
reform.  For  New  Labour,  confrontational,  unreconstructed,  unions  defend  the  vested 
interest  of  workers  and  militant  unions,  and  this  made  Labour  unpopular,  forcing  the 
party  into  the  political  wilderness  over  two  decades.  As  noted  in  the  introduction, 
New  Labour  sees  the  anti-union  legislation  of  the  previous  Conservative  government 
as  valuable  and  remains  committed  to  the  retention  of  the  majority  of  it: 
We  have  changed  the  way  we  make  policy  and  put  our  relations  with 
trade  unions  on  a  modem  footing  where  they  accept  they  can  get 
fairness  but  no  favours  from  a  Labour  government...  In  industrial 
relations,  we  make  it  clear  that  there  will  be  no  return  to  flying  pickets, 
secondary  action,  strikes  with  no  ballots  or  the  trade  union  laws  of  the 
1970s.  There  will  instead  be  minimum  rights  for  the  individual  at  the 
workplace,  where  our  aim  is  partnership  not  conflict  between 
employers  and  employees  (Blair  1997). 
This  demonstrates  how  New  Labour  seeks  to  distance  the  party,  especially  the 
parliamentary  party,  from  the  trade  unions,  both  in  an  ideological  sense  and  in  terms 
of  their  influence  in  the  party,  through  the  transformation  of  Labour's  internal  voting 
system.  From  this  perspective,  the  electability  and  continuing  success  of  New  Labour 
appears  dependent  on  convincing  the  public  of  two  important  changes.  The  first  was 
that  the  New  Labour  project  had  achieved  a  transformation  in  the  relationship 
between  the  political  and  industrial  arms  of  the  Labour  Movement,  suggesting  New 
Labour  had  a  freedom  to  act  independently  of  the  unions,  in  a  way  none  of  its  Labour 
predecessors  in  government  could.  That  this  change  was  accepted  by  the  unions  not 
only  demonstrated  how  New  Labour's  and  unions'  outlooks  are  inextricably  linked 
through  historic  connections,  but  also  the  experience  of  years  in  the  political 
wilderness: 
Unions  acquiesced  in  change,  and  reform  was  not  simply  a  matter  of 
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leaders  perceived  a  Labour  government  as  necessary,  if  insufficient, 
for  union  recovery.  To  deal  with  their  industrial  predicament,  they 
moved  in  the  same  direction  as  Labour  -  though  differences  remained 
(Mcllroy  1998:  552). 
Secondly,  fully  convinced  of  the  benefits  of  the  anti-union  legislation  of  the  1980s 
and  1990s,  New  Labour  confirms  this  repeatedly  and  explicitly,  to  circumvent  the 
exploitation  of  Labour's  organic  links  with  the  unions  by  political  opponents.  In  the 
process,  unions  are  reminded  of  their  weakened  position  due  to  the  demographic 
shifts  of  the  past  two  decades,  noted  above,  and  the  Conservative  legislation  of  the 
same  period.  The  New  Labour  position  is  one  of  there  being  no  alternative  in  terms  of 
industrial  relations  reform.  In  the  face  of  this,  unions  seek  to  demonstrate  an 
understanding  of  this  position  and  have  already  conceded  its  value  in  terms  of 
Labour's  future  electoral  success,  subordinating  principle  to  pragmatism: 
After  1983,  and  especially  after  1987,  solely  campaigning  for  the 
return  of  a  Labour  government  and  expecting  it  to  reverse  Tory  anti- 
union  laws  was  no  longer  viable  or  credible  (Leopold  1997:  34). 
It  is  important  to  note  that  such  shifts  in  official  union  position  did  not  simply  mirror 
the  tendencies  emerging  in  the  Labour  Party  at  the  time,  which  became  concretised  as 
New  Labour,  they  were  absolutely  central  to  its  creation.  As  Darlington  (1994a)  has 
demonstrated,  the  years  of  New  Realism,  and  the  marginalisation  of  union  influence 
overall,  meant  unions  adopted  an  accommodative,  conciliatory,  bureaucratically- 
driven,  approach  evident  in  workplace  trade  unionism  in  the  late  1980s  and  1990s. 
This  is  also  reflected  in  their  overall  orientation,  especially  in  the  political  sphere,  and 
helped  to  plant  the  seeds  from  which  New  Labour  grew.  In  addition,  unions' 
acquiescence  and  active  participation  in  the  modernisation  of  the  Party's  internal 
organisation,  that  saw  their  influence  greatly  reduced,  made  it  difficult  for  the  unions 
to  fight  for  radical,  beneficial  changes  once  Labour  had  been  elected5. 
Hence  by  1997,  it  was  clear  to  unions  that  there  was  to  be  no  wholesale  repeal 
of  the  anti-union  legislation  of  the  Thatcher  years,  yet  their  support  for  New  Labour 
and  the  return  of  a  Labour  government  remained  firm.  For  example,  they  provided 
s  The  end  of  individually  sponsored  MPs,  the  reduction  of  the  unions'  vote  at  Labour's  annual 
conference  and  the  introduction  of  `one-member,  one-vote',  all  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  unions 
influence.  The  overall  union  support  for  the  new  Clause  Four  and  for  Blair  in  the  leadership  election  of 
1994  illustrates  the  commitment  to  the  modernisation  of  the  Labour  party  on  the  part  of  the  unions. 94 
£11  million  and  one  hundred  thousand  workers  to  New  Labour's  election  campaign 
(Mcllroy  1998:  554).  Blyton  and  Turnbull  have  suggested  that,  continuing  union 
support  in  the  face  of  Labour's  disavowal  of  their  former  core  demands,  casts  the 
relationship  in  a  particular  light,  summed  up  thus  by  a  trade  union  official: 
The  relationship  between  Labour  and  the  trade  unions  is  rather  like 
that  between  parents  and  teenage  offspring:  `You  can  drive  me  to  the 
disco,  pay  for  my  booze,  but  park  round  the  corner  so  my  mates  don't 
see  you'  (quoted  in  Blyton  and  Turnbull  1998:  127). 
Crucially,  the  "mates"  in  this  quotation  refers  to  New  Labour's  increasingly  strong 
relationship  with  business.  This  has  been  outlined  in  some  detail  in  the  preceding 
chapter  and  will  be  discussed  below.  However,  it  is  worth  pausing  here  to  highlight 
more  explicitly  both  the  employment  relations  changes  and  the  general  direction  of 
policy  that  unions  were  prepared  to  implicitly  support. 
There  was  the  clear  atrophy  of  key  elements  of  Labour's  opposition  to  the 
Conservatives  throughout  the  1980s  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  1990s,  where  they 
were  critical  of  employment  laws,  including  those  aimed  at  breaking  union  power. 
What  New  Labour  both  condoned  and  promoted  were  the  serious  restrictions  on 
industrial  action  like  the  ban  on  secondary  (solidarity)  action,  complicated  balloting 
procedure  including  compulsory  postal  balloting  before  strikes,  restrictions  on 
picketing  and  an  effective  ban  on  spontaneous,  unofficial  strikes6.  If  unions  were  to  be 
revitalised  under  a  Labour  government,  if  their  influence  was  to  increase,  then  clearly 
this  would  not  be  done  through  high  profile  victories  against  employers,  facilitated  via 
favourable  employment  laws.  Indeed,  setting  out  New  Labour's  proposals  for  a 
framework  of  minimum  standards  in  the  workplace  that  were  intended  to  "draw  a  line 
under  the  issue  of  industrial  relations  law",  Blair  made  clear  that  there  would  be  no 
radical  transformation  to  hinder  employers: 
Even  after  the  changes  we  propose,  Britain  will  have  the  most  lightly 
regulated  labour  market  of  any  leading  economy  in  the  world  (Blair 
1998c). 
6  As  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  Hendy  (2001)  outlines  the  UK  continuing  breaches  of  international 
law  under  New  Labour  and  a  lack  of  compliance  with  International  Labour  Organisation  conventions 
which  the  UK  signed  up  to  under  the  previous  administration  but  never  adhered  to.  These  alongside  the 
continuing  use  of  common-law  that  Hendy  describes,  help  characterise  the  full  employment  relations 
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New  Labour's  Third  Way,  based  on  the  dominant  notion  of  an  ever-changing 
world  and  its  fundamental  principle  of  the  reconciliation  and  synthesis  of  the  interests 
of  capital  and  labour,  means  `old  battles'  between  employers  and  workers  are  no 
longer  relevant  in  the  `new'  world  of  work,  where  the  collectivism  of  earlier  decades 
has  been  superseded  by  individual  concerns.  From  this  perspective,  work  no  longer 
involves  the  formation  of  bonds,  nor  is  it  the  key  site  in  the  advancement  of  collective 
"  interests: 
Institutions,  such  as...  work,  appear  as  before,  but  although  the  outer 
shell  remains,  inside  all  is  different  and  they  have  become  `shell 
institutions'  (Giddens  2001b). 
New  Labour  perceives  developments  in  the  world  of  work,  associated  with 
globalisation  and  the  intensification  of  the  pace  and  scope  of  change,  as  resulting  in 
conflict  and  confrontation  becoming  the  out-moded,  useless,  methods  of  the  past.  This 
is  a  past  defined  by  an  overarching  and  ultimately  futile  concern  with  industrial 
division: 
The  Third  Way  regards  the  old  problems  of  labour  law  as  those 
concerning  trade  unions,  collective  bargaining,  and  industrial  conflict. 
A  key  division  in  the  old  politics  concerned  attitudes  towards 
legitimacy  of  trade  unions,  the  desirability  of  collective  bargaining  and 
restrictions  on  industrial  conflict.  But  the  Third  Way  no  longer  regards 
these  issues  as  especially  pertinent  (Collins  2001:  301). 
In  addition,  for  New  Labour,  preoccupation  with  "the  old  problems  of  labour 
law",  apparent  appeasement  of  unions  by  previous  Labour  governments,  allowing 
them  undue  influence  and,  by  the  end  of  the  1970s,  the  breakdown  of  Labour's 
relationship  with  the  unions  because  of  their  leaders'  unwillingness  to  have  that 
influence  limited,  resulted  in  electoral  catastrophe.  The  re-casting  of  the  Labour-union 
relationship  and  the  re-branding  of  Labour  as  New  Labour  involves  overstating  the 
benefits  to  unions  of  their  relationship  with  New  Labour.  It  also  underplays  the  union 
bureaucracy's  involvement  in  toeing  the  line  for  Labour  in  the  years  before  the 
emergence  of  organised  rank  and  file  militancy  from  the  mid  1960s  onwards.  In  the 
1970s,  constraints  placed  on  unions  through  playing  the  game  for  Labour  "brought 
few  benefits  and  not  a  few  costs"  (Thorpe  1999:  145).  Alternatively,  then: 96 
What  unions  enjoyed  under  Labour  government  was  not  so  much  the 
power  to  determine  substantive  drift  of  policy  as  the  ability  to 
participate  in  a  new  set  of  procedural  rights  which  created  the 
impression  of  influence  that  the  resulting  drift  of  policy  so  belied 
(Hain  1986:  117). 
This  helps  highlight  the  problematic  nature  of  the  manner  in  which  New 
Labour  has  sought  to  construct  the  relationship  between  Labour  and  the  unions.  There 
has  been  particular  concern  to  critique  the  perceived  left  wing  radicalism  of  Labour  in 
the  late  1960s  and  1970s,  yet: 
The  workers  and  a  growing  strata  outside  the  manual  workers  were 
looking  for  a  lead  and  a  policy.  They  did  not  get  it.  They  got  instead 
the  Wilson  years  -  and  many  of  them  lost  faith  and  hope  in  the  mass 
party  of  working  people  (Hobsbawm  cited  in  Panitch  and  Leys  2001: 
16). 
In  this  context,  what  is  also  underplayed  is  the  extent  to  which  Labour 
`modernisation'  in  the  past,  especially  in  terms  of  union  activity  and  involvement,  has 
some  parallels  with  New  Labour's  approach.  Importantly,  it  can  be  linked  to  periods 
when  unions  shifted  away  from  acquiescence  and  subordination  to  parliamentary 
Labour.  In  this  sense,  unions  under  a  Labour  government  were  accepted  and 
embraced  as  `partners'  as  long  as  the  government  line  was  not  breached.  Militancy 
and  pressure  on  union  leaders  to  orientate  towards  the  interests  of  the  rank  and  file, 
helped  usher  in  plans  to  reform  unions.  The  setting  up  of  the  Donovan  Commission  in 
1965  and  the  much  opposed  In  Place  of  Strife  white  paper,  with  its  focus  on  the 
balance  between  rights  and  responsibilities  (Thorpe  1999:  139)  are  evidence  of  this. 
At  this  distance,  this  seems  quintessentially  New  Labour,  though  clearly  Old  Labour 
was  operating  on  different  terrain  in  terms  of  the  balance  of  class  forces.  New  Labour 
seeks  to  characterise  Labour  as  in  the  pockets  of  unions  at  crucial  points  in  the  period. 
Yet  an  awareness  at  the  time  of  the  image  of  this  as  electoral  baggage  saw  Labour 
move  into  Conservative  territory  -  criticising  unions  and  claiming  the  upper  hand  in 
terms  of  ability  to  `sort  them  out'.  In  this  respect,  Thorpe  (1999:  141)  usefully  argues 
that  only  the  "shotgun  remarriage"  of  Labour  and  the  unions,  brought  about  by 
Heath's  election  as  Prime  Minister  and  the  Industrial  Relations  Act  in  1971,  sustained 
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reasons  than  those  proffered  by  New  Labour.  Moreover,  those  years  characteristically 
involved: 
Maintaining  wage  restraint  and  limiting  strikes..  .  with  dire  long  term 
consequences.  Indeed  a  plausible  case  can  be  made  that  the  seeds  of 
Thatcherism  were  planted  here  (Panitch  and  Leys  2001:  19). 
The  presentation  of  an  homogenised  orientation  of  the  Labour  governments  of 
the  1960s  and  1970s  by  New  Labour,  and  conflating  the  diverse  contours  of  the 
Labour-union  relationship  over  two  decades,  underplays  important  features  of  both. 
For  example,  Healey's  1974  claim  of  a  future  Labour  government  being  prepared  to 
"squeeze  the  rich  until  the  pips  squeak"  was,  as  the  often  bitter  experience  for  workers 
of  the  1974-1979  Labour  government  demonstrated,  motivated  more  by  the  wave  of 
workers  militancy  of  the  "Glorious  Summer"  of  1972  and  its  impact  on  workers' 
confidence  and  consciousness  (Darlington  and  Lyddon  2001),  as  it  was  by  any 
socialist  conviction  to  support  working  people  or  look  favourably  on  the  unions.  It 
was,  arguably,  an  attempt  to  convince  that  `deals'  secured  for  workers  from  a  Labour 
government  by  the  union  bureaucracy  were  firmly  based  on  an  ideological 
commitment  to  them  and,  importantly,  to  renew  faith  in  a  "top-down"  approach  that 
union  members  had  decisively  rejected  (Thorpe  199:  139).  Moreover,  the  leadership 
of  the  Labour  Party  "has  always  been  concerned  to  prove  its  `fitness  to  govern"' 
(Hyman  1989:  45).  For  New  Labour,  this,  alongside  the  flawed  interpretation  of  the 
Wilson/Callaghan  era,  fundamentally  framed  the  case  for  both  the  modernisation  of 
the  Labour  Party  and  a  redefinition  of  their  relationship  with  the  unions. 
At  the  same  time,  it  should  be  recognised  that,  by  the  end  of  the  1980s,  union 
leaders  needed  little  convincing  that  the  world  had  indeed  changed,  especially  in 
respect  of  their  own  power  and  influence.  The  continuing  development  of  New 
Unionism  under  Monks'  leadership  at  the  TUC  encouraged  unions  to  identify  more 
closely  with  the  interests  of  business  (Taylor  1998:  305).  This  was  based,  essentially, 
on  acceptance  that  future  success  for  trade  unions  lay  in  formalising  the  conciliatory 
approach  that  they  had  generally  adopted  by  the  early  1990s.  This  does  not  simply 
mean  that  unions  could  find  common  cause  with  New  Labour.  It  is,  conversely,  the 
foundation  upon  which  the  New  Labour  accommodation  with  the  New  Right's  free 
market  and,  especially,  the  concern  to  appease  business  interests,  is  based. 
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synthesis  of  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour  did  not  develop  against  the  grain  of 
union  outlook. 
Two  decades  of  Thatcherism  had  allowed  for  employer  ambivalence  to  trade 
unions  in  the  private  sector  and,  crucially,  in  `new'  industries,  outright  anti-union 
strategies.  After  the  election  victory  in  1997,  with  New  Labour  in  power,  union 
leaders  could  point  to  the  fact  that  the  government  had  modified  some  of  the  worst 
excesses  of  Conservative  legislation.  Whilst  there  was  no  radical  break  with 
Conservative  measures  in  industrial  relations,  various  proposals  like  the  National 
Minimum  Wage  (NMW),  statutory  recognition  and  the  implementation  of  the 
European  Social  Chapter  suggested  something  of  a  `leftward  shift'  (Undy  1999). 
Benefits  to  millions  of  workers  due  to  legal  changes,  including  some  that,  although 
limited  in  scope,  are  beneficial  to  the  trade  union  movement  overall,  have  been 
delivered  by  New  Labour.  It  is  these  new  rights,  alongside  a  belief  that  an  apparently 
pro-European  stance  would  reap  further  benefits  for  workers,  which  provided  many 
union  leaders  with  the  necessary  justification  for  their  continuing  support  of  New 
Labour  in  government.  New  Labour's  social  justice  rhetoric  was  seemingly  on  the 
way  to  being  delivered  in  the  workplace.  However,  an  implicit  rejection  on  the  part  of 
New  Labour  of  the  Conservatives  xenophobic  approach  to  Europe,  did  not  result  in 
the  wholesale  embrace  of  what  the  unions  saw  as  Europe's  more  `pro-worker' 
orientation.  As  has  been  outlined  in  the  preceding  chapter,  New  Labour's  approach  to 
Europe  in  government  has  been  one  of  encouragement  towards  a  pro-business, 
flexible  labour  market  approach  in  line  with  its  own.  Blair's  refusal  to  countenance  an 
EU  wide  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  that  would  "create  a  level  playing  field  for 
British  workers  within  the  EU"  (The  Herald  23rd  June  2000),  and  the  apparent  breach 
of  the  Government's  obligations  under  key  articles  of  the  Council  of  Europe's  Social 
Charter  (Hendy  2001:  33),  also  help  demonstrate  the  limitations  placed  on  the 
possible  benefits  of  `social'  Europe  by  the  New  Labour  government7. 
The  extent  to  which  unions'  views  were  taken  into  account  as  New  Labour's 
employment  legislation  was  being  developed  should  also  be  noted.  Union  influence 
7  The  Blair  government  has  sought  to  minimise  the  impact  of  European  Directives  throughout  their 
period  in  office,  as  noted  in  the  previous  chapter.  Another  example  of  this  was  in  the  interpretation  of 
rights  to  parental  leave.  The  government  stated  that  such  rights  were  only  available  to  parents  of 
children  born  or  adopted  after  the  15`h  December  1999,  the  date  the  new  regulations  came  into  force. 
However,  the  Directive  gives  parents  the  right  to  up  to  three  months  leave  that  can  be  anytime  up  until 
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was  limited,  and  key  pieces  of  legislation  clearly  demonstrate  the  New  Labour 
government  bending  to  the  will  of  employers.  The  level  that  the  National  Minimum 
Wage  was  set  at,  the  complicated  procedure  for  statutory  recognition  and  the  overall 
limitations  of  the  Employment  Rights  Act  1999,  discussed  in  more  detail  in  later 
chapters,  are  all  indicative.  The  official  response  of  the  unions,  generally,  has  been 
one  of  full  participation  in  due  process,  where  views  are  sought  and  a  weak  critique  of 
laws  that  do  not  fully  meet  their  aims  overall.  That  unions  have  sought  legal  redress 
against  the  government,  over  their  interpretation  of  positive  European  legislation, 
does  suggest  that  the  fact  that  government  is  Labour,  does  not  preclude  unions  from 
mounting  effective  challenges.  However,  for  the  purposes  of  my  analysis,  it  is 
important  to  note  the  apparent  lack  of  influence  this  seemingly  demonstrates,  whilst 
recognising  how,  despite  differences,  challenges  are  often  counter-balanced  by  over 
positive  analyses  of  the  benefits  of  legislative  changes: 
We  have  not  spent  the  last  20  years  battling  to  achieve  a  Labour 
government  to  then  throw  it  all  away  two  and  a  half  years  into  power. 
The  government  is  delivering  on  working  rights.  There  are  more  things 
we  want,  but  there  has  been  significant  progress  (Morris8  quoted  in 
The  Guardian  14`h  September  1999). 
Because  there  is  much  unfinished  business,  don't  ever  fall  into  the  trap 
of  underestimating  what  has  been  done....  (Monks  quoted  in  The 
Guardian  11`h  September  2002). 
Moreover,  the  granting  of  certain  rights  and  the  positive  assessment  of  them,  should 
not  detract  from  New  Labour's  continuing  commitment  to  re-invigorate  the  market 
and  its  overall  accommodation  with  New  Right  philosophy.  Thus  the  New  Labour 
version  of  modem  trade  unionism  is  one  that: 
Must  be  consistent  with  market  efficiency,  any  resurgence  must 
involve  the  growth  of  a  new  business  unionism,  fiercely  antagonistic  to 
independence,  conflict  and  militancy  (Mcllroy  2000:  21). 
The  possibility  of  alternative,  more  militant,  responses  to  weaknesses  in  New 
Labour's  programme  are  also  closed  off  by  the  union  bureaucracy,  demonstrated  by 
8  In  1999  Bill  Morris  was  leader  of  the  Transport  and  General  Workers  Union. 100 
an  often  explicit  convergence  of  approaches  in  terms  of  the  contemporary  role  of 
unions  and  identification  with  business  goals: 
Effective  trade  unionism  is  no  longer  about  extracting  the  maximum 
level  of  concessions  from  an  employer.  It  is  no  longer  about 
adversarial  bargaining  and  conflict.  It  is  about  joint  problem  solving 
and  the  recognition  of  joint  interests  (Monks  quoted  in  McCarthy 
1997:  53). 
In  addition,  the  anti-union  legislation  that  New  Labour  retains  on  practical  and 
political  terms  as  both  popular  and  just,  whilst  still  supported  by  the  unions  in  general, 
demonstrates  the  debilitating  effects  of  their  relationship  on  the  unions'  ability  to 
bring  about  more  positive  changes  in  the  interests  of  workers  generally.  New 
Labour's  employment  relations  settlement  is  shaped  by  its  overarching  concern  to 
appease  business,  and  the  union  bureaucracy,  especially  the  TUC,  promote  the  notion 
that  opportunity  for  them  too  lies  in  their  identification  with  company  goals  and 
competitive,  macro-level  aims  (Monks  1996). 
This  apparent  convergence  of  views  is  rooted  not  simply  in  accepting  and 
advocating  New  Labour  solutions,  but  is  linked  to  important  developments  within 
trade  unionism.  Unions'  earlier  eschewal  of  the  confrontational  approach  of  the  late 
1960s,  1970s  and  early  1980s  allowed  this  to  develop  as  a  central  element  of  New 
Labour  `modernisation'.  There  is,  however,  a  sense  in  which  the  union  bureaucracy  is 
still  striving  to  relate  to  the  neutral  terrain  that  New  Labour  seeks  to  create  through  its 
syntheses.  Thus  unions  want  to  be  perceived  as  having  a  crucial  role  in  the  success  of 
the  enterprise  economy.  Paradoxically,  however,  the  overall  shift  in  unions' 
orientation  away  from  a  conflictual,  militant,  approach,  expressed  politically  as  a 
movement  towards  a  rights-based  legislative  strategy  to  represent  workers'  interests, 
leaves  them  needing  more  from  political  campaigning  (Ludlam  2003:  86).  Thus,  in 
effect,  unions  need  to  gain  more  benefits  from  their  links  with  Labour  than  New 
Labour  are  prepared  to  concede.  However,  the  development  of  an  official  trade 
unionism  orientated  towards  business  interests,  helps  circumscribe  the  contemporary 
nature  of  the  official  politics  of  the  Labour  Party  no  longer  defined  in  terms  of  an 
ideological  commitment  to  reduce  structural  inequalities  (Lavalette  and  Mooney 
1999).  Moreover,  although  the  union  bureaucracy  may  fully  concur  with  New 
Labour's  opposition  to  independent,  militant  trade  unionism,  the  retention  of  the  `anti- 101 
worker'  orientation  of  the  Conservatives  and  the  embrace  of  neo-liberalism  by  New 
Labour,  that,  for  workers,  is  fully  demonstrated  in  its  commitment  to  universal 
flexibility,  creates  tension.  Continuing  support  for  New  Labour,  and  an  acceptance  of 
its  claims  regarding  the  nature  of  the  global  economy  by  the  union  bureaucracy,  not 
only  represents  support  for  a  government  not  committed  to  unions'  traditional 
interests,  it  also  results  in  diminishing  scope  to  act  in  pursuit  of  those  interests.  Any 
active,  collective,  pursuit  of  traditional  interests  is  perceived  to  threaten  fundamental 
tenets  of  New  Labour  ideology. 
Two  points  are  worth  re-iterating.  The  first  is  the  role  played  by  the  union 
bureaucracy  in  the  creation  of  New  Labour,  not  simply  in  terms  of  support  for  key 
changes  that  reduced  unions'  influence  within  the  Labour  Party,  but  also  in  the  way 
that  shifts  in  union  orientation  are  reflected  in  New  Labour  ideology.  The  second  is 
that,  in  terms  of  the  relationship  with  the  unions,  the  distinction  between  New  Labour 
and  previous  Labour  governments  is  again  overdrawn.  From  a  New  Labour 
perspective,  the  "too  close  and  incestuous"  relationship  between  unions  and  Old 
Labour  involved  a  pro-worker,  pro-union  stance  for  governments  that,  in  the  final 
analysis,  benefited  unions  to  the  detriment  of  Labour  (Mandelson  and  Liddle  1996: 
224).  The  willingness  and  ability  of  Labour  governments  to  retreat  from  positive 
reforms  and  ignore  union  pressure  are  underplayed.  However,  whilst  remaining  aware 
of  both  these  points,  it  is  also  important  to  note  that  the  political  economy  of  New 
Labour  and  the  palpable  rejection  of  the  social  reformism  that  gave  life  to  the  Labour 
Party,  have  created  a  new  terrain  upon  which  the  relationship  with  the  unions 
operates.  This  helps  shape  the  nature  of  the  relationship  and  the  nature  of  the 
limitations  to  acting  in  the  interests  of  union  members. 
2.3:  Fairness  not  Favours 
New  Labour's  plans  to  move  ideologically  `beyond  left  and  right'  have 
involved  an  accommodation  with  the  legacy  of  the  Thatcherite  industrial  relations 
settlement  and  an  embrace  of  the  neo-liberal  agenda.  The  move  `beyond'  the  left  has 
seemingly  involved  the  outright  rejection  of  what  are  perceived  as  key  elements  of 
Old  Labour  links  with  unions,  though  continuing  ideological  connections  are 
underplayed  in  the  analysis  that  informs  the  New  Labour  position.  The  promise  to 
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intrinsically  connected  by  New  Labour  to  a  dynamic  enterprise  economy,  did  allow 
for  the  development  of  proposals  apparently  beneficial  to  individual  workers,  unions 
and  their  members.  As  noted  earlier,  New  Labour  made  clear  its  intent  to  do  this 
without  facilitating  any  return  to  what  is  perceived  as  the  destructive  militancy  that, 
for  New  Labour,  characterised  the  whole  of  the  1970s.  Importantly,  this  has  been 
characterised,  as  much  of  New  Labour's  ideological  thrust  has,  not  as  a  rejection  of  all 
that  Labour  ever  stood  for.  It  is,  rather,  a  return  to  the  values  of  `true'  Labour.  Under  a 
New  Labour  government: 
There  should  be  no  expectation  of  unjustified  favours  -  just  as  there 
never  was,  before  the  aberrations  of  the  1970s  (Mandelson  and  Liddle 
1996:  26). 
Unions  could  expect  no  special  favours  from  New  Labour  and,  there  was  no  promise 
of  a  growth  in  influence  in  government  decision  making.  The  balance  of  power  in 
industry  and  beyond  would  remain  with  employer  interests.  Given  New  Labour's 
ideological  thrust  and  their  closeness  to  business,  as  the  effectiveness  of  CBI  lobbying 
as  employment  relations  law  was  being  developed  demonstrated,  the  election  of  a 
New  Labour  government  meant  overall  employer  strength  could  be  reinforced.  To  this 
end,  New  Labour  offered  only  a  muffled  challenge  to  some  of  the  worst  excesses  of 
employer  power  in  the  workplace,  through  a  narrowly  focused  and  piecemeal 
legislative  programme,  whilst  making  claims  that  a  radical  new  culture  in  the 
workplace  would  emerge  as  a  result.  Fundamentally,  change  in  employment  relations 
needed  to  fit  with  the  "pursuit  of  strong  markets,  modern  companies  and  the  creation 
of  an  enterprise  economy"  (Blair  1998c).  Fairness  and  "minimum  standards  of 
protection  in  the  workplace"  (ibid.  )  were  available  only  to  the  extent  that  they  fitted 
with  the  government's  competitiveness  objectives.  However,  the  balance  between 
fairness  and  competitiveness  is  not  readily  struck  and  there  is  no  universal  standard  by 
which  fairness  can  be  measured.  Moreover,  as  I  argued  earlier,  the  relationship  that 
New  Labour  constructs  between  competitiveness,  cohesion  and  social  justice  sees 
competitiveness  privileged  over  fairness,  prescribing  a  particular  meaning  for 
fairness.  As  a  result,  some  of  the  rights  that  have  been  provided  are  not  available  for 
many  workers.  This  clearly  has  an  impact  on  individual  workers.  In  addition,  it  has 
wide  reaching  implications  for  the  union  movement,  even  when  they  are  prepared  to 
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One  important  example,  which  challenges  the  notion  of  fairness  that  the 
government  espouses  and  that  limits  opportunities  for  growth  on  the  part  of  the 
unions,  is  the  exclusion  of  workers  in  small  firms  from  statutory  recognition 
provisions.  The  `right'  to  representation  and  to  statutory  recognition  is  only  a  right  for 
those  in  workplaces  of  more  than  twenty  one  workers.  Thus  thirty  percent  or  over 
eight  million  workers  are  excluded  from  this  `right'  (Smith  and  Morton  2001:  124). 
Whilst  unions  could  bring  specific  benefits  in  terms  of  competitiveness,  like  helping 
"employers  to  explain  the  company's  circumstances  and  the  need  for  change" 
(Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  1998a:  21)  and  "collective  representation  can  give 
employees  a  more  effective  voice  in  discussion  with  employers"  (ibid.  ),  legal 
compulsion  to  recognise  union  collective  representation  in  small  workplaces  was 
deemed  "inappropriate"  (Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  1998a:  24). 
This  raises  serious  questions  around  "fairness",  even  at  the  most  basic  level.  It 
also  results  in  further  complexity.  Research  by  the  Citizens  Advice  Scotland  (CAS) 
on  the  impact  of  New  Labour's  Employment  Rights  legislation  found  that  60%  of  its 
cases  on  employment  concerned  small  businesses  (CAS  2001:  8).  This  research  helps 
demonstrate  how,  having  been  denied  the  right  to  statutory  recognition  afforded 
workers  in  larger  enterprises,  these  workers  can,  and  do,  struggle  to  lay  claim  to  other 
rights  like  the  National  Minimum  Wage  and  those  afforded  under  the  European 
Working  Time  Directive.  This  may  well  be  linked  to  a  lack  of  the  representative  voice 
that  being  unionised  and  having  union  recognition  could  bring.  Although  workers  in 
larger  enterprises  are  affected  by  employer  non-compliance  and  continuing 
recalcitrance,  those  in  smaller  workplaces  are  particularly  restricted  in  their  ability  to 
organise  for  improved  conditions  through  union  membership.  Thus,  it  can  be  argued, 
the  exclusion  of  millions  of  workers  from  New  Labour's  collective  rights  restricts 
their  ability  to  take  up  the  promised  individual  rights. 
The  exclusion  of  small  workplaces,  where  only  8%  of  people  working  were 
union  members  in  1999  (Financial  Times  8th  July  1999),  also  creates  problems  for 
unions.  Access  to  workers  is  difficult,  and  the  potential  for  unions  to  recruit  on  the 
basis  of  possible  recognition  is  denied.  Clearly,  despite  the  positive  elements  of 
statutory  recognition  for  union  growth,  this  has  a  limiting  effect.  Whilst  the  eight 
million-plus  excluded  workers  represent  potential  recruits  for  unions,  they  have  no 104 
obvious  means  of  communicating  with  these  workers  directly,  since,  only  once 
recognition  procedure  is  relatively  far  advanced,  can  unions  gain  limited  access.  The 
limitations  created  by  this  exclusion  further  impact  on  unions'  willingness  to  focus  on 
this  group,  as  the  benefits  of  recruitment  are  less  obvious  than  those  available  where 
recognition  is  a  distinct  possibility.  These  workers  struggle,  therefore,  to  access  many 
of  the  benefits  of  New  Labour's  `fairness'  agenda  and  serious  limits  are  placed  on 
how  the  union  movement  benefits  from  statutory  recognition  as  a  whole.  In  this 
context,  questions  can  also  be  raised  regarding  New  Labour's  social  justice  agenda. 
As  noted  earlier,  social  justice  is  an  ambiguous  concept  in  the  hands  of  New  Labour, 
as  is  fairness.  Exclusions  from  apparent  rights  for  millions  of  workers,  however, 
further  reveal  the  character  of  `actually  existing'  social  justice  under  New  Labour. 
This  also  suggests  the  government's  fundamental  commitment  to  ensuring  there  being 
no  return  to  the  militancy  of  the  1970s,  is  reinforced  by  exclusions  within  the 
promotion  of  positive  rights  that  guarantee  there  will  be  no  return  to  the  numerical 
strength  of  the  late  1970s,  when  membership  was  over  thirteen  million.  Thus,  whilst 
such  exclusions  are  a  separate  barrier  to  unionisation,  invoked  by  the  apparently 
positive  and  seemingly  most  positive  legislation  in  terms  of  union  growth,  it  needs  to 
be  appraised  in  terms  of  the  wider  New  Labour  context. 
This  helps  to  illustrate  a  fundamental  principle  of  New  Labour's  fairness 
agenda;  even  modest  reforms  must  be  compatible  with  the  drive  to  make  the  economy 
more  competitive  in  the  face  of  globalisation.  New  Labour  uses  the  notion  of  fairness, 
couched  in  terms  of  competitive  advantage,  to  fully  demonstrate  commitment  to  free 
market  capitalism,  whilst  seemingly  laying  claim  to  an  added  sense  of  decency  and 
morality,  characteristic  of  traditional  social  democratic  values.  Above  all,  it  is  a 
pragmatic  commitment  to  efficiency  in  terms  not  incompatible  with  New  Labour's 
social  justice  objectives.  Any  specific  commitments  to  social  justice  `at  work'  are, 
therefore,  both  weakly  defined  and  weakly  pursued  by  New  Labour,  and  delivery  of 
social  justice  is  focused  on  more  general  reforms.  The  following  chapters  trace  the 
implications  of  this. 
Fairness  is  not,  therefore,  about  the  restoration  or  creation  of  employment 
rights  per  se,  or  rights  for  rights'  sake.  For  workers  (and  trade  unions)  they  come  with 
responsibilities,  and,  for  employers,  with  potential  commercial  gain: 105 
...  In  offering  new  rights  we  will  demand  that  employees  in  turn  accept 
their  responsibilities  to  co-operate  with  employers.  There  will  be  no 
return  to  the  days  of  industrial  conflict...  Within  a  flexible  and  efficient 
labour  market,  the  Government's  approach  will  improve  both  fairness 
and  comprehensiveness  (Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  1998a:  14). 
The  [Fairness  at  Work]  White  Paper  establishes  new  ground  rules  for 
fair  treatment,  allowing  employees  to  form  effective  relationships  with 
employers...  The  Government  believes  that  if  these  relationships  are 
properly  developed  and  managed  companies  will  have  the  best  chance 
to  enhance  their  performance  and  profitability  -  and  so  our  national 
prosperity  (ibid:  7&  8). 
Moreover: 
The  rights  are  not  accorded  to  workers  out  of  respect  for  basic  values 
or  to  ensure  compliance  with  ideal  standards  of  fairness  and  justice. 
Instead  the  legal  rights  are  justified  primarily  because  it  is  believed 
that  they  will  contribute  to  the  enhancement  of  efficient  business 
methods,  innovation  improvements  in  design,  more  successful 
marketing  and  so  forth  (Collins  2001:  303). 
Hence,  appeals  to  employers  to  embrace  the  fairness  agenda  highlight  competitive 
benefits  in  approaching  workers  in  a  specific  way  in  order  to  harness  their  "skills 
experience  and  initiative"  (Cook9  1996).  In  large  workplaces  at  least,  this  also 
involves  drawing  unions  to  the  negotiating  table,  "to  foster  a  long  term  partnership  of 
trust  between  workers  and  management  to  work  together  in  common  enterprise" 
(ibid).  The  benefits  therefore  are  two-fold:  tapping  into  the  workforce  as  a  key 
management  resource  in  the  face  of  competitive  pressure  and  the  possibility  of 
gaining  competitive  edge  through  refusing  to  contemplate  the  notion  of  antagonistic 
management-worker  relations.  New  Labour  can  only  offer  this  through  the  sole 
version  of  trade  unionism  it  is  prepared  to  countenance.  New  Labour  appealing  to 
business  as  a  government  `on  your  side,  not  in  your  way'  needs  similarly  disposed 
unions.  The  weakening  of  union  power  and  the  union  bureaucracy's  response  to  it,  the 
acceptance  of  the  ideology  of  competition,  and  the  increasingly  pervasive 
commitment  to  self-discipline,  signified  that  this  could  be  accomplished.  What  is 
more,  coupled  with  unions'  continuing  support  for  the  New  Labour,  this  arguably 
afforded  the  scope  within  which  to  develop  a  fundamental  feature  of  New  Labour 
9  In  1996  Robin  Cook  was  Shadow  Foreign  Secretary. 106 
ideology.  Therefore,  fairness,  as  conceptualised  by  New  Labour,  is  wholly  premised 
on  enterprise,  efficiency,  and  competition  not  representation,  equality  nor  even- 
handedness.  The  development  of  this  as  a  fundamental  element  of  what  defines  New 
Labour,  involved  the  mutual  denial  by  both  New  Labour  and  unions,  though  perhaps 
not  in  equal  measure,  "of  a  distinct  `labour'  interest"  (Hyman  1989:  190). 
2.4:  A  New  Era?  Partnership  and  Flexibility 
Clearly,  the  principles  of  shared  goals  and  `mutual'  interests  between 
employees,  their  representatives  and  employers  have  been  central  to  the  development 
of  New  Labour,  and  to  the  evolution  of  unions  at  the  beginning  of  the  twenty-first 
century.  In  order  to  safeguard  these  principles  and  to  facilitate  the  desired  and,  from 
the  New  Labour  perspective,  required,  new  workplace  culture,  the  concept  of 
partnership  has  been  developed  as  the  preferred  modus  operandi  in  the  sphere  of 
employment  relations.  Indeed,  the  government's  commitment  to  minimum  standards 
of  protection  at  work  is  essentially  premised  on  the  provision  of  such  standards  acting 
as  a  basis  for  building  partnerships  at  work,  between  employer  and  employee 
representatives.  Avid  promotion  of  partnership  both  defines  New  Labour  as  having 
moved  `beyond  left  and  right'  -  in  this  case  beyond  antagonism  at  work  -  and  is 
perceived  as  an  important  mechanism  through  which  change  can  be  assured. 
Crucially,  the  possible  proliferation  of  partnership  agreements  in  individual 
workplaces,  and  of  a  general  partnership  culture  that  New  Labour  expect,  represents 
the  necessary  apparatus  with  which  to  ensure  the  marginalisation  of  the  industrial 
conflicts  of  the  past.  Evidently,  despite  the  claims  of  arms  length  relations  and  of  one 
interest  group  among  many,  New  Labour  still  need  union  acquiescence  and  need  to 
secure  continuing  official  commitment  to  a  partnership  agenda.  The  union 
bureaucracy  has  manifestly  supported  this  approach,  not  solely  as  a  pragmatic 
response  to  the  possibility  of  an  invitation  to  the  negotiating  table  after  decades  of 
marginalisation,  nor  simply  in  recognition  of  some  of  the  barriers  placed  on  numerical 
growth  by  employment  relations  legislation.  For  example,  at  the  1999  Trades  Union 
Congress,  the  then  leader  of  the  engineering  union,  the  AEEU,  suggested  that  the 
TUC  and  CBI  should  have  biennial  joint  conferences  (The  Guardian  14th  September 
1999).  In  addition,  official  union  embrace  of  partnership  is  demonstrated  more 
generally  in  the  TUC  development  of  a  `wish-list'  of  six  key  principles,  centred  on  a 
shared  worker-management  commitment  to  the  organisation  and  recognition  of 107 
distinct  and  legitimate  interests  (TUC  1999a)1°.  Official  TUC  responses  to  union 
trends,  especially  in  terms  of  low  strike  figures,  consistently  seek  to  confirm 
partnership  as  the  "dominant  mode  in  industrial  relations"  (TUC  1998b,  1999b).  In 
addition,  in  January  2001,  a  separate  TUC  partnership  institute,  devoted  to  developing 
partnership,  and  supporting  workers  and  employers  seeking  to  develop  workplace 
partnerships,  was  launched. 
Partnership  has  been  characterised  as  "the  TUC  `s  very  own  Third  Way 
between  what  Monks  calls  `militant  trade  unionism  and  80s  style  macho 
management"'  (The  Guardian  15th  September  1999).  For  many  union  leaders, 
partnership  is  not  just  perceived  as  an  opportunity  for  participation  in  order  to 
improve  unions'  strength  and  influence.  It  represents  the  central  mechanism  through 
which  to  institutionalise  the  conciliatory  tendencies  of  the  late  1980s  and  1990s. 
Partnership  is  the  full  acceptance  of  employer  interests,  agreed  in  advance  of  any 
management  offensive,  and  circumscribes  how  a  union  can  operate  in  the  face  of  any 
such  offensive.  It  can  be  characterised  as  a  binding  contractual  commitment  to  the 
6"unity  of  the  graveyard'  -  in  which  sparks  of  rank  and  file  militancy  are  immediately 
extinguished  from  above"  (Darlington  1994a:  279).  New  Labour's  desired  new 
culture  in  the  workplace  is  based  on  the  ability  of  unions  to  remould  themselves  into 
an  acceptable  partner  to  do  business  with  business.  This,  in  turn,  is  based  on  a  lack  of 
recognition  of  the  hostility  unions  have  faced  over  the  last  two  decades  and  that  even 
the  strongest  unions  are  "overall  weaker  than  their  opponents"  under  capitalism 
(Darlington  1994a:  34).  Fundamentally,  it  demands  a  lack  of  struggle  and  of  the  sort 
of  activity  and  debate  that,  ironically,  threaten  unions'  ability  to  create  the  base  upon 
which  `rights'  like  recognition  can  be  fought  for.  The  fundamental  antagonism 
between  capital  and  labour  is  subordinated  to  the  mythology  of  the  mutual  gains 
workplace.  Again,  for  New  Labour,  its  ability  to  appeal  to  the  `two-sides'  of  industry 
represents  a  key  benefit  of  Third  Way  thinking.  As  a  fundamental  principle  of  this, 
that  ostensibly  defines  its  transcendence  from  both  right  and  left,  is  the  co-operation 
of  employers  and  workers  and  the  synthesis  of  their  interests  that  needs  to  be 
established  and  maintained.  Partnership  is  perceived  as  fulfilling  that  role. 
10  The  TUC  six  partnership  principles  are:  a  joint  (union-employer)  commitment  to  company  success,  a 
recognition  of  each  others  legitimate  interests,  commitment  to  employment  security,  mutual  concern 
for  quality  of  working  life,  information  sharing  and  mutual  gains  from  improvements  to  business 
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On  one  hand,  restrictions  and  restraints  placed  on  unions  and  weaknesses  in 
New  Labour's  legislative  programme  help  reinforce  the  apparent  need  for  unions  to 
embrace  this.  On  the  other  hand,  the  acceptance  of  the  ideology  of  competition 
coupled  with  a  belief  that  unions'  survival  depends  on  government  and  employer 
support,  meant  that  New  Labour's  partnership  thrust  pushed  at  an  open  door  (Driver 
and  Martell  1998:  74).  Thus,  it  is  not  the  case  that  a  parsimonious  legislative 
programme  forced  unions  into  a  `partnership  corner',  though  it  did  arguably  leave  the 
unions  gaps  in  potential  growth  and  legitimacy  that  needed  to  be  filled.  The  seeds  of 
the  ideology  of  partnership  have  clearly  fallen  on  fertile  ground,  despite  of  the  fact,  or 
arguably,  because  it  involved  encouragement  to  the  unions  to: 
Develop  the  opportunity  of  being  invited  to  the  negotiating  table, 
rather  than  to  develop  the  collective  strength  with  which  to  force  entry 
to  it  (Brown  1999:  168). 
First  and  foremost,  New  Labour's  evocation  of  partnership  is  imbued  with  a  particular 
view  of  organised  labour  as  weakened  and  with  a  disavowal  of  unions  as  an 
autonomous  force.  In  this  context,  official  union  action  and  overall  orientation, 
presented  as  in  the  `best  interests  of  the  workforce',  primarily  seek  to  protect  the 
institutional  security  of  the  union.  Moreover,  demonstrably,  competition  and 
partnership  cannot  be  separated: 
Workplace  partnerships  achieve  better  standards  and  results  in  the 
workplace  than  legislation  alone...  Partnership  is  good  for  business 
because  it  leads  to  increased  productivity,  improves  higher 
performance  and  higher  profits.  It  is  good  for  the  workforce  because  it 
gives  them  greater  stake  in  the  success  of  the  business.  And  it's  good 
for  the  economy  because  it  leads  to  greater  competitiveness  and 
innovation  (Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  1998b'  ). 
They  are  intrinsically  linked,  fundamental,  features  of  New  Labour.  As  with 
`fairness',  `partnership'  is  couched  in  terms  acceptable  to  business  and  premised  on 
terms  acceptable  to  business.  Comparable  with  competitiveness  and  fairness,  official 
union  response  to  partnership  typically  is  not  incongruous  with  New  Labour's 
partnership  ideals.  However,  the  espousal  of  industrial  harmony  and  of  the 
overarching  notion  of  common  goals,  is  a  rhetorical  device  with  little  basis  in  material 
11  Quoting  Ian  McCartney,  then  Minister  of  State  at  the  DTI. 109 
reality.  One  of  the  most  important  observations  that  can  be  made  is  that  the  ideology 
of  partnership  is  inevitably  flawed.  It  is  not  a  partnership  of  equals,  nor  can  it  ever  be, 
because: 
The  balance  of  power  between  management  and  workers  in  any 
specific  workplace  is  only  an  expression  of  [this]  more  basic  power 
relation  between  the  capitalist  class  and  the  working  class... 
(Darlington  1994a:  34). 
Thus,  on  the  part  of  both  New  Labour  and  of  the  unions,  partnership  as  a 
strategy  is,  on  this  basis,  fundamentally  flawed.  For  New  Labour  it  means  a  lack  of 
recognition  of  oppositional  interests  and  of  a  fundamental  antagonism  that  simply 
cannot  be  talked  out  of  existence.  Put  simplistically,  a  central  New  Labour  principle 
does  not  rest  on  a  robust  structural  foundation.  Any  militant  challenge  from  workers, 
whether  confined  by  partnership-style  agreements  or  not,  poses  a  particular  threat  to 
the  stability  of  a  New  Labour  government.  For  the  unions,  the  possibility  of 
partnership,  based  on  the  ideological  circumvention  of  the  reality  of  the  separate  and 
independent  interests  of  capital  and  labour  in  the  workplace,  leaves  little  room  for 
manoeuvre  when  employers  threaten  the  `ultimate  sanction'  or  decide  to  close  a 
workplace.  For  New  Labour,  partnership  is  a  key  method  of  obscuring  the  reality  of 
separate  interests.  For  the  union  bureaucracy,  the  real  opportunity  they  are  presented 
with  through  partnership  is  to  create  a  firmer  structural  basis  through  which  to  resume 
their  position  as  Mills'  "managers  of  discontent"  (1948:  9).  The  official  abdication  of 
struggle  in  recent  decades  (Hyman  1989:  178)  has  been  granted  a  formal  regulatory 
framework  and  a  clear  focus  on  the  "we"  of  the  enterprise,  rather  than  "them  and  us", 
affords  unions  "the  opportunity  to  participate  at  the  highest  organisational  level" 
(Findlay  1999:  103).  The  character  of  the  relationship  between  New  Labour  and  the 
unions  lies  at  the  heart  of  both  these  positions.  Partnership  is  fully  embraced  in  the 
way  the  union  bureaucracy  promotes,  threatens  independence,  and  limits  the  capacity 
of  union  members  to  take  action,  even  in  defence  of  general  union  interests.  Its 
acceptance  also  allows  unions  to  promote  a  cornerstone  of  New  Labour  ideology  and 
to  justify  continuing  support  on  the  basis  of  mutual  benefits  and  pragmatism. 
Importantly,  this  further  formal  accommodation  of  employer  interests  is  a  method 
through  which  to  ensure  the  long-term  survival  of  New  Labour,  and  the  efficacy  of 
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of  membership  to  mount  of  effective  challenges  against  employers,  which  would  also 
damage  New  Labour.  Union  compliance  is  essential  and  a  common  commitment  to  an 
agenda  that  has  the  good  of  the  enterprise  at  its  core  creates  legitimacy  for  that  agenda 
and,  incongruously,  for  unitarist  management  strategies  when  regarded  appropriate. 
Again,  this  is  not  to  imply  any  fundamental  shift  in  the  relationship  between 
New  Labour  and  earlier  Labour  governments.  The  `Social  Contract'  of  the  Wilson- 
Callaghan  government  in  the  mid-1970s  can  be  usefully  characterised  as  embryonic 
partnership,  "with  its  spirit  of  class  collaboration  between  government,  employers  and 
trade  unions"  (Darlington  1994a:  38).  In  the  early  1960s  Wilson  told  the  TUC  that  "a 
Labour  government  and  the  unions  would  be  `partners  in  a  great  adventure"'  (Thorpe 
1999:  133)  but  the  contrast  between  this  and  reaction  to  union  militancy  when 
confronted  with  it,  evokes  clear  parallels  between  his  governments  and  New  Labour12. 
However,  such  parallels  do  not  rule  out  the  need  to  identify  meaningful 
differentiation.  For  example,  New  Labour's  increasingly  close  relationship  with 
business,  and  its  electoral  success,  creates  the  scope  to  avoid  overt  partnership 
between  the  government  and  the  unions,  despite  the  continuing  need  for  their  support 
and  acquiescence.  Partnership,  for  New  Labour,  is  between  employers  and  employees 
primarily  and,  if  necessary,  between  unions  and  employers.  Conversely,  the 
government  is  in  partnership  with  business  and  promotes  partnership  between  the 
state  and  the  private  and  voluntary  sectors.  Yet,  paradoxically,  New  Labour  achieve 
some  of  the  perceived  benefits  of  partnership  in  their  relationship  with  unions:  a  clear 
identification  with  the  goals  of  the  `enterprise',  promotion  of  the  notion  of  shared 
interests  that  seek  to  diminish  fundamental  differences,  and,  crucially,  a  mediator  to 
convince  workers  of  the  value  or,  indeed,  the  necessity  of  otherwise  unpalatable 
policy. 
The  problematic  nature  of  this  is  exposed  when  the  final  piece  of  New 
Labour's  ideological  jig-saw  of  employment  relations  -  flexibility  -  is  considered. 
One  of  the  most  pervasive  problems  with  flexibility  is  that  it  is  an  amorphous  notion 
that  New  Labour  never  clearly  defines.  In  the  New  Labour  version,  there  is  no  clear 
distinction  between  numerical  and  functional  flexibility,  which  would  allow  effective 
12  The  National  Seamen's  strike  in  1966,  offers  a  clear  illustration  of  this,  during  which  Wilson  coined 
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measurement  of  the  benefits  flexibility  is  assumed  to  have.  Working  `flexibly'  means 
not  applying  rigidity  in  terms  of  tasks,  working  hours  and,  crucially,  in  terms  of 
tenure.  It  is  portrayed  as  worker-,  especially  carer-,  friendly  and  as  creating  the  scope 
for  workers  to  balance  their  domestic  with  their  employment  commitments,  whilst 
making  little  demand  on  employers  to  financially  support  `flexible'  initiatives13.  It  is 
also  characterised  as  presenting  workers  with  opportunities  for  `upskilling',  as 
allowing  gaps  in  employment  to  be  bridged,  and  as  a  springboard  from  which 
unemployed  and  low-skilled  workers  can  improve  the  `employability'  central  to  the 
development  of  the  human  capital  fundamental  to  New  Labour's  social  justice  aims. 
However,  there  is  little  evidence  that  flexibility  has  resulted  in  upward  job  mobilityla. 
It  is  above  all,  a  method  of  giving  New  Labour's  acceptance  and  promotion  of  `no 
jobs  for  life'  a  positive  slant.  Moreover,  flexibility  helps  New  Labour  justify  a  lack  of 
concerted  action  over  job  creation  and  the  gap  that  has  resulted  in  labour  supply 
outstripping  demand,  especially  in  areas  where  the  de-industrialisation  of  the  1980s 
has  most  impact.  In  addition,  the  restructuring  of  the  benefits  system  on  the  basis  that 
work  is  the  best  form  of  welfare,  means  a  continuous  labour  supply  that  can  be  as 
flexible  as  required.  Thus,  despite  rhetoric  that  flexibility  should  not  be  used  by 
employers  in  a  particular  way:  "we  don't  want  a  workforce  that  is  flexible  only  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  easily  dismissed"  (Cook  1996),  there  are  no  safeguards  in  place  to 
ensure  that  this  is  not  the  case.  For  many  workers,  being  flexible  means  taking  on  the 
status  of  `perma-temp'  whereby  even  long  term  relationships  with  particular 
employers  do  not  result  in  rights  connected  with  tenure.  In  this  respect,  social  justice 
translates  in  a  situation  where  many  workers  are  effectively  unable  to  sever  links  with 
employers,  whose  understanding  of  flexibility  is  clearly  that  it  is,  first  and  foremost,  a 
government  sanctioned  method  of  tying  workers  to  production  cycles  without  the 
burden  of  responsibility  for  them.  Furthermore,  the  terms  under  which  such  workers 
are  employed  and  the  exploitation  of  a  lack  of  clarity  or  even  dilution  (in  terms  of 
European  Directives)  of  legislation,  mean  these  workers  often  find  it  difficult  to  take 
advantage  of  the  `new'  benefits  that  New  Labour  has  brought  about.  This 
13  Green  (2001)  has  noted  the  intensification  of  "work  effort"  since  1981  and  the  concentration  of 
working  hours  into  fewer  working  households  thus  resulting  in  longer  working  hours.  Moreover  recent 
evidence  suggests  that  a  "long  hours  culture"  and  the  struggle  to  maintain  an  effective  work-life 
balance  is  applying  a  pressure  to  working  families  not  being  alleviated  by  government  initiatives 
(Joseph  Rowntree  Foundation  2003). 
14  See  Joseph  Rowntree  Foundation  (1998)  and  Booth  et  al.  (2000). 112 
demonstrates  a  central  tension  at  the  core  of  New  Labour's  approach  to  labour  market 
flexibility.  The  rhetoric  of  policy  documents  has  portrayed  a  concern  for  workers' 
security: 
Only  with  a  well-motivated  and  secure  workforce  can  Britain  have  the 
level  of  productivity  we  need.  An  insecure  workforce  with  no 
commitment  to  or  from  the  firms  in  which  they  work  will  not  deliver 
the  productivity  and  competitiveness  Britain  needs  (New  Economic 
Future  for  Britain  (1995),  cited  in  McCarthy  1997:  48,  emphasis 
added). 
Yet,  as  the  underlying  thrust  of  the  above  quotation  indicates,  like  fairness  and 
partnership,  flexibility  cannot  be  detached  from  the  overarching  concern  for 
competitiveness.  It  is  this  that  frames  New  Labour's  whole  approach  to  flexibility  and 
helps  preclude  the  establishment  of  any  specific  legal  safeguards  to  protect  workers 
from  `flexibility  abuse'  or  "flexploitation"  (Gray  1995:  12): 
The  concern  to  promote  competitiveness  through  flexibility 
discourages  the  adoption  of  mandatory  and  inalienable  rights.  Fixed 
rights  may  [either]  conflict  with  the  optimal  arrangement  of  work  from 
the  point  of  view  of  competitiveness...  (Collins  2001:  310-11). 
Again,  this  poses  clear  problems  for  the  unions  both  in  terms  of  both  how 
workers'  interests  are  represented  and  in  terms  of  their  relationship  with  New  Labour. 
Flexibility,  in  the  context  of  employment  relations,  represents  a  clear  example  of  New 
Labour's  accommodation  with  the  New  Right.  New  Labour  in  power  has 
demonstrated  the  hollowness  of  the  flexibility  `as  a  benign,  or  even  benevolent  force' 
myth.  In  the  current  experience  of  many  workers,  flexibility  represents  the 
intensification  of  insecurity  and  of  the  operation  of  the  free  (labour)  market  unfettered 
by  state  regulation  or  union  influence.  It  is,  at  the  same  time,  a  cornerstone  of  New 
Labour's  Third  Way  ideology  and  a  clear  challenge  to  the  existence  of  a  Third  Way 
distinct  from  the  Conservative's  neo-liberal  agenda. 
Union  support  for  this  is  therefore  problematic.  The  whole  notion  of  security 
is  absolutely  central  to  trade  unions  as  many  members  still  regard  unions'  traditional, 
protective  role  as  a  fundamental  reason  for  membership  (Waddington  and  Whitson, 
1994:  37).  Thus,  many  people  do  perceive  unions  as  the  ultimate  safeguard  against 
insecurity.  Recent  evidence  from  the  OECD  suggests  workers  in  the  UK  are  among 113 
the  most  insecure  in  the  developed  world  with  41%  claiming  to  be  insecure  at  work 
(TUC  2002b)'5.  Moreover,  unions'  institutional  security  is  ultimately  contingent,  in 
the  long  term,  on  workers'  security,  as  the  1980s  demonstrated  in  sharp  relief.  This  is 
recognised  by  the  unions'  to  the  extent  that  concern  for  security  underpins  the  TUC's 
version  of  partnership'  6.  Yet  the  flexibility  promoted  by  a  government  the  unions 
support  threatens  to  undermine  the  security  they  need  to  survive.  The  `disposability' 
of  people  who  work  for  employers  that  operate  with  the  unhindered  flexibility  to  "cut 
free  from  place"  (Sennett  1998:  136)  in  the  name  of  competitiveness,  adds  a  specific 
burden  to  unions  even  in  the  light  of  moderately  supportive  legislation'7.  Furthermore, 
flexibility  and  endeavour  to  remain  competitive  in  the  manufacturing  sector  has 
resulted  in  a  loss  of  two  hundred  and  two  thousand  jobs  between  December  2000  and 
March  2002  (TUC  2002d)  and  this  is  likely  to  continue.  An  emerging  trend  of  "Rice 
Krispie  redundancies"  (Financial  Times  27th  June  2003),  whereby  workers  hear 
second  hand  that  they  are  losing  their  jobs,  also  indicates  how  employers  use 
contemporary  flexibility  against  the  interests  of  workers18.  The  main  difficulty  for  the 
unions  is  how  to  respond  to  the  specific  conditions  created  by  the  contemporary  nexus 
of  flexibility  and  competitiveness,  and  their  impact  on  working  lives.  Having  accepted 
the  ideology  of  competition  and  their  potential  role  as  industrial  partners,  this  places 
serious  limitations  on  the  development  of  an  effective  strategy  to  combat  the  worst 
effects  of  flexibility.  Demonstrably,  unions  are  unable  to  rely  on  New  Labour  to 
develop  a  more  `worker-centred'  flexibility,  given  its  overarching  ideological 
commitments. 
Herein  lies  a  paradox  at  the  centre  of  New  Labour's  relationship  with  the 
unions  that  demonstrates  how,  at  a  fundamental  level,  the  distinction  between  this  and 
the  Old  Labour  relationship  with  unions  can  be  challenged,  despite  the  new  terrain 
New  Labour  constructs.  The  positive  impact  of  their  support  for  New  Labour  is  out- 
weighed  by  the  pressure  unions  are  placed  under  by  crucial  elements  of  the  very 
programme  they  help  sustain,  just  as  it  was  under  Old  Labour.  There  are,  however, 
15  According  to  the  OECD  research  the  UK  is  second  bottom  of  the  'job  security  league'.  Only  Korean 
workers  are  more  insecure  -  46%  (TUC  2002b). 
16  This  is  again  couched  in  terms  acceptable  to  business:  "many  employers  embrace  partnership  as  a 
way  of  increasing  flexibility  in  the  workplace.  Good  partnerships  complement  flexibility  with  action  to 
improve  employment  security  in  the  workplace"  (TUC  Partnership  Institute,  2003). 
This  point  is  explored  further  with  reference  to  the  case  study  workplace  discussed  in  later  chapters.  18  An  example  of  this  was  the  closure  of  Motorola  in  Bathgate,  Scotland  where  workers  heard  of  the 
closure  en  route  to  begin  their  shift  (Sunday  Herald,  29`h  April  2001). 114 
some  important  points  that  need  to  be  made  in  this  respect.  The  first  is  that  this  is 
seemingly  less  of  a  problem  for  New  Labour  since  unions  are  perceived  as  less 
important.  Yet  the  continuing  reliance  on  union  support,  especially  during  elections  19 
9 
is  well  documented  (German  2000;  Ludlam  2003).  The  second  is  that  there  have  been 
crucial  ideological  shifts  under  New  Labour  that  add  to  the  pressures  unions  face. 
Arguably,  from  the  perspective  of  workers,  New  Labour  represents  a  fusion  of  the 
worst  of  Old  Labour  and  the  New  Right,  rather  than  a  benevolent  transformation 
`beyond  left  and  right'.  Hence  unions  support  for  New  Labour  means  support  for  a 
Third  Way  which: 
Operates  within  the  same  political  economy  as  the  right;  free  market 
capitalism  works.  It  offers  no  critique  of  the  capitalist  system,  no 
systematic  programme  of  reform  and  no  strengthening  of  those  forces, 
whether  public  institutions  or  those  in  civil  society,  that  might  offer 
countervailing  power.  To  build  up  trade  unions,  for  example,  threatens 
the  flexibility  of  the  labour  market  (Hutton  1999:  99). 
Continuing  official  union  support  for  New  Labour  forces  us  to  consider  a 
crucial  aspect  of  the  Labour-union  relationship  and  the  fundamentally  contradictory 
nature  of  trade  unionism  in  Britain.  Hyman  (1989:  133)  has  argued  that: 
There  is  an  elaborate  dialectic  between  capitalist  production,  class 
struggle  and  state  power  which  cannot  be  grasped  by  a  mechanical 
dichotomy  between  the  `economic'  and  the  `political'. 
This  `false  dichotomy'  between  the  political  and  the  economic  is  part  of  what 
characterises  trade  unions  as  contradictory,  and  it  serves  to  confine  the  two  `arms'  of 
the  Labour  Movement  in  Britain  to  self  limiting  and  distinctly  separate  horizons  and 
goals.  It  is  also  "used  to  prevent  workers  mobilising  their  vast  potential  industrial 
strength  against  the  power  of  the  capitalist  class  concentrated  in  the  state"  (Darlington 
1994a:  27).  This  encourages  conservatism  within  the  trade  unions,  which  means  that, 
whilst  they  serve  to  encroach  on  capitalism  and  have  made  considerable  gains  on 
behalf  of  workers  since  their  foundation,  they  also  seek  to  constrain  workers  to  act  in 
ways  that  best  secure  trade  unions'  own  survival  within  the  existing  relations  of 
19  The  impact  of  devolution  is  important  here  since  New  Labour  need  to  fight  separate  election 
campaigns  for  the  London  and  Welsh  assemblies  and  the  Scottish  parliament  as  well  as  the 
Westminster  and  European  elections. 115 
subordination  and  domination.  This  remains  unchanged  as  a  fundamental 
characteristic  both  of  trade  unionism  and  of  the  unions'  relationship  with  Labour. 
Thus,  accord  with  New  Labour's  political  programme  is  granted  on  the  basis  of 
potential  economic  gains:  the  minimum  wage,  unions'  numerical  growth,  etc. 
Explicit  and  sustained  critique  at  a  political  level  is  subordinated,  as  this  not  only 
threatens  to  undermine  the  relationship  but  would  also  involve  the  unions'  shifting 
from  their  distinct  horizon  and  confronting  unions'  (as  currently  constituted)  own 
apparent  need  to  operate  within  the  institutions  of  capitalism.  Moreover,  this  would 
involve  a  challenge  to  a  century  old  bureaucratic  principle  that  workers  should  look 
solely  to  the  Labour  Party  to  effect  meaningful  political  change.  The  difficulty  for 
unions  under  New  Labour  is  that,  arguably,  the  limited  gains  made  in  the  economic 
sphere  and  the  limitations  placed  by  New  Labour's  ideological  thrust  on  further  gains, 
can  help  expose  to  members  the  debilitating  effects  of  the  Labour-union  relationship, 
and  this  ideological  split  of  a  `two  armed'  Labour  Movement  with  separate  horizons. 
Key  aspects  of  New  Labour  policy,  when  considered  from  this  perspective,  have  the 
potential  to  expose  the  falseness  of  the  dichotomy  between  the  political  and  the 
economic.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  relationship  is  on  the  cusp  of  irretrievable 
breakdown,  or  that  free  from  the  Labour  Party  unions  will  assume  `their  true  role  on 
the  stage  of  history'20.  It  is  simply  to  posit  that  there  are  critical  features  within  New 
Labour  that  fundamentally  diverge  from  traditional  union  interests,  which  cannot  be 
fully  overcome  in  the  longer  term.  Increasingly,  the  new  rhetoric  of  New  Labour  does 
not  allow  the  same  ideological  obfuscation.  And  this,  despite  the  acquiescence  of 
some  union  leaders,  places  particular  pressure  on  the  relationship  between  New 
Labour  and  the  unions,  the  effects  of  which  New  Labour  underplays.  This  pressure  is 
at  its  most  acute  in  the  current  period  in  the  public  sector  and  New  Labour  has  thus  far 
faced  greatest  resistance  from  workers  and  their  unions  there. 
2.5:  Working  'for'  New  Labour 
As  argued  earlier,  the  public  sector  is  particularly  significant  for  New  Labour, 
in  terms  of  the  potential  damage  that  militancy  there  could  inflict  on  the  government 
and  the  possible  impact  of  worker/union  recalcitrance  on  its  specific  plans  for 
20  By  their  very  existence  unions  represent  a  clear  challenge  to  capital.  Indeed  "the  concerted  effort  to 
break  the  trade  unions  as  an  independent  force  crystallises  quite  decisively  the  value  of  their  creative 
and  irreplaceable  role  in  a  socialist  movement"  (Anderson  1967:  273).  The  point  however  is  to 
problematise  this  role  in  the  light  of  the  developments  of  the  last  twenty  years. 116 
`reform'  and  re-conceptualisation  of  the  public  sector.  New  Labour's  Third  Way  in 
the  public  sector  means  seeking  a  "synergy  between  public  and  private,  utilising  the 
dynamism  of  markets  but  with  the  public  interest  in  mind"  (Giddens  1998:  100), 
specific  elements  of  which  have  been  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter.  In  addition, 
New  Labour  took  office  without  any  commitment  to  reversing  the  privatisation  of  the 
Conservative  years,  and  the  legacy  of  Thatcherism  in  the  public  sector  is  embraced 
and  enhanced  (Mandelson  and  Liddle  1996:  1).  Despite  major  problems  in  the  public 
sector  caused  by  under  resourcing  and  ineffective  provision,  resulting  in  low  worker 
morale,  in  their  first  term  at  least  New  Labour  pledged  to  keep  to  the  spending  limits 
of  the  last  Conservative  government.  Yet,  according  to  the  TUC: 
The  story  of  the  years  up  to  1997  has  been  a  sorry  one  of  decline  and 
retrenchment,  of  public  squalor  and  private  affluence,  of  growing 
poverty,  especially  among  children  (TUC  2002c). 
Even  by  New  Labour's  second  term  in  office  (2001)  the  share  of  GDP  spent 
on  public  services  was  23.6%  compared  with  28%  in  1984  under  the  Conservatives 
(TUC  2002c).  Furthermore,  public  spending  is  circumscribed  in  a  particular  way:  all 
public  spending  is  "money  for  results  and  reform"  (Blair  1998a:  15).  As  with  the 
private  sector,  reform  in  the  public  sector  is  intrinsically  linked  to  the  central 
principles  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership,  outlined  above.  Although 
the  policy  of  Compulsory  Competitive  Tendering  (CCT)  in  local  government  was 
abolished,  New  Labour  insist  that  public  sector  managers  "keep  the  emphasis  on 
competition"  (Blair  1998b:  17)  through  the  development  of  a  `Best  Value'  regime  that 
in  practice  is  not  too  distinct  from  CCT.  New  Labour  is  concerned  to  promote  an 
entrepreneurial  spirit  across  the  public  sector  and  facilitate  the  continuation  of  its 
marketisation  in  a  way  more  far  reaching  than  the  Conservatives  attempted.  The 
synergy  of  public  and  private  also  means  the  continuing  shift  from  virtually  wholly 
public  provision,  and  a  new  twist  to  the  internal  `mixed'  economy  New  Labour's 
predecessors  sought  to  fashion  in  the  public  sector.  Thus,  as  noted  earlier,  a 
cornerstone  of  the  reform  of  the  public  sector  is  the  continuation  of  the  Conservatives' 
Private  Finance  Initiative,  revamped  as  Public-Private  Partnerships  (PPPs),  granting 
business  the  unprecedented  opportunity  to  profit,  on  a  large  scale,  from  involvement 
in  front-line  service  delivery  in  local  government,  health,  and  education,  and  other 117 
key  services.  Again  this  demonstrates  how  promoting  synthesis  involves  privileging 
one  particular  set  of  interests  for  New  Labour. 
Importantly,  reform  in  the  public  sector,  and  the  operation  of  PPPs  in 
particular,  represent  a  key  site  of  divergence  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions 
especially,  though  not  exclusively,  public  sector  unions.  One  result  of  this  is  that 
conflict  and  militancy  has  been  at  its  most  acute  in  the  public  sector  throughout  New 
Labour's  time  in  government.  It  is  useful,  therefore,  to  consider  the  New  Labour- 
union  relationship  in  this  context.  Moreover,  as  Smith  and  Morton  (2001)  have 
forcefully  argued,  underpinning  values  and  ideological  orientation  can  dilute 
apparently  positive  legislation.  Thus,  in  considering  employment  relations  under  New 
Labour,  overarching  principles  must  also  be  central  to  analysis.  By  way  of  illustration, 
it  is  worth  considering  the  impact  in  the  public  sector  of  some  of  New  Labour's 
legislation.  Firstly,  it  should  be  noted  that,  despite  restructuring  in  the  public  sector 
that  involved  job  losses  and  the  often  wholesale  transfer  of  groups  of  workers  to 
private  sector  employers  over  the  Conservative  years,  unions  have  remained  strong. 
Union  density  of  just  under  60%  in  2001  (Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  2002: 
345)  and  membership  of  public  sector  unions  at  over  three  million  in  1996  (Mathieson 
and  Corby  1999:  201)21  suggest  that,  to  a  large  extent,  public  sector  unions  have 
weathered  the  storm22,  numerically  at  least.  Membership  decline  in  the  private  sector 
(40%  compared  with  2%  in  the  public  sector),  particularly  amongst  manual  workers 
in  manufacturing,  has  resulted  in  greater  prominence  and  influence  for  public  sector 
unions  like  UNISON  (Carpenter  2000:  203).  However  such  relative  strength  is  not 
reflected  in  wages  and  conditions  and  there  is  little  in  the  New  Labour  agenda  that 
translates  as  generalised  improvements  in  this  respect.  For  example,  the  crucial  plank 
of  New  Labour's  employment  relations  legislation  -  the  `right'  to  union  recognition  - 
has  a  limited  impact.  Whilst  public  sector  workers  are  likely  to  recognise  the  benefits 
that  increased  membership  through  increasing  recognition  rates  may  bring  to  the 
Labour  Movement  as  a  whole,  such  benefits  are  not  immediately  apparent,  either  in 
21  This  figure  includes  members  of  the  police  federation  but  not  members  of  non-public  sector  unions 
like  the  GMB,  TGWU  and  MSF  working  in  the  public  sector  (Mathieson  and  Corby  1999:  201-202). 
22  This  is  not  to  suggest  however  that  the  public  sector  unions  did  not  suffer  losses.  Job  cuts, 
derecognition  -  most  notably  at  the  Government  Communications  Headquarters  (GCHQ)  -  and  shifts 
in  the  views  of  managers  (Corby  and  White  1999:  18)  have  had  a  negative  impact  though  less 
profoundly  so  than  in  the  private  sector.  The  right  to  join  a  union  at  GCHQ  was  restored  by  New 
Labour  in  1997,  though  strikes  are  still  outlawed. 118 
terms  of  obvious  improvements  to  their  working  conditions  or  in  a  strengthening  of 
power  and  influence  in  the  decisions  the  government  makes  that  affect  them.  In 
addition,  despite  the  overall  lack  of  general  benefits,  the  negative  elements  of  the 
legislation  can  still  be  felt.  For  example,  the  problem  of  the  small  workplace 
exclusion  from  statutory  recognition,  outlined  earlier,  has  an  impact  for  members  of 
public  sector  unions,  since  small  workplaces,  like  care  homes,  contain  UNISON 
members  (UNISON  1998). 
Secondly,  possible  benefits  of  the  National  Minimum  Wage  are  severely 
limited  because  it  was  set  at  such  a  low  rate  (£3.60  in  1999),  especially  for  workers 
that  remained  directly  employed  by  the  state,  for  whom  national  bargaining  offered 
some  protection  of  wages  and  conditions,  despite  continuing  chronic  low  pay  for  large 
numbers  in  the  public  sector.  Set  at  such  a  low  level,  the  minimum  wage  was  and 
remains  a  "bittersweet  victory"  (UNISON  2003a:  8)  and  public  sector  unions  continue 
to  campaign  for  a  "living  wage"  that  represents  a  "low  cost  but  acceptable  standard  of 
living"  (ibid.  ).  Public  sector  unions  have  been  at  the  forefront  of  both  general 
campaigns  to  raise  the  level  of  the  minimum  wage,  and  directly  involved  in  action 
against  employers  demanding  wage  increases  above  minimum  wage  level23.  Yet, 
despite  continuing,  relatively  strong,  links  with  Labour,  such  general  campaigns  have 
had  limited  impact.  TUC  calls  for  a  £5  minimum  (The  Herald  25h  August  2000)  and 
internal  pressure  from  within  the  Labour  party  (The  Herald  27th  January  2000),  have 
made  little  impact  on  the  government's  resolve  to  ensure  that  incremental  increases 
must  "pose  no  economic  threat"  (senior  government  minister  quoted  in  The  Herald 
15th  February  2000),  resulting  in  minimal  overall  increases  in  four  years. 
The  National  Minimum  Wage  clearly  reflects  New  Labour's  overarching 
ideology  of  competitiveness.  Moreover,  the  problem  that  the  examples  above  help 
highlight  in  terms  of  the  New  Labour-union  relationship  is  that  public  sector  workers, 
and  increasingly  their  unions,  are,  at  one  level,  a  more  difficult  constituency  to 
appease.  Parsimonious,  if  moderately  supportive,  legislation  offers  little  improvement 
23The  series  of  one  day  and  selective  strikes  by  UNISON  members  across  the  whole  of  local 
government  in  Scotland  between  September  2000  and  February  2001  is  one  clear  example  of  this.  The 
"Gimme  -  5"  campaign  demanded  £5  per  hour,  5%  or  £500  per  year,  whichever  was  greater. 119 
in  the  public  sector  after  years  of  being  low  paid  and  undervalued24.  Moreover  the 
New  Labour  focus  on  efficiency,  and  on  the  apparent  "outcomes  society  wants,  rather 
than  the  outputs  that  public  sector  organisations  produce  or  the  physical  assets  they 
have  at  their  disposal"  (Leadbeatter  2000:  207)  reveals  in  sharp  relief  the  overall 
continuation  and  intensification  of  the  Conservatives  "anti-public  sectorism" 
(Ferguson  et.  al.  2002:  164).  In  addition,  in  the  public  sector,  the  relationship  between 
New  Labour  and  business,  in  the  shape  of  both  the  drive  to  deliver  new  and 
exceptional  commercial  opportunities  and  the  adoption  of  a  managerialist  approach  to 
employment  relations,  creates  specific  problems  for  its  relationship  with  the  unions. 
New  Labour  seeks  to  `redefine'  the  public  sector.  Thus  far,  this  has  involved  further 
privatisation  and  quasi  privatisation,  and  the  all  too  obvious  presence  of  large 
corporations  in  schools  and  hospitals.  The  import  of  business  language  and  style,  as 
well  as  funding,  is  becoming  a  critical  feature  of  the  public  sector  under  New  Labour. 
This  has  resulted  in  a  further  blurring  of  the  distinction  between  the  public  and  private 
sectors. 
Corby  and  White  (1999:  19)  argue  there  has  been  a  decline  in  the  public 
service  ethos  due  to  a  combination  of  factors,  including  this  business  influence.  Given 
that  this  influence  continues  to  increase  and,  indeed,  proliferates,  the  whole  notion 
that  arguably  underlies  public  sector  work  -  that  of  working  for  "the  common  good" 
(The  Guardian  20`h  March  2001)  is  being  undermined.  In  one  sense  this  may 
demonstrate  the  extent  to  which  the  `synergy  of  public  and  private'  is  being  achieved. 
However,  this  is  difficult  for  New  Labour  in  that,  despite  the  context  of 
modernisation,  the  government  retains  the  Old  Labour  necessity  to  keep  the  unions  in 
line  or  "on  message",  in  New  Labour  parlance.  Direct  experience  of  working  with 
`external  yet  internal'  private  consultants,  non-public  sector  line-managers  and 
facilities  managers,  and  of  working  in  landscapes  transformed  by  the  presence  of 
company  logos,  alongside  the  more  general  problems  discussed  here,  threatens 
allegiance  and  worker  loyalty  to  the  service.  In  short,  the  blurring  of  the  public- 
private  distinction  by  New  Labour  undermines  the  necessary  commitment  by  public 
sector  workers  to  any  sense  of  `the  common  good'.  This  is  particularly  risky  for  New 
24  Some  research  has  suggested  an  acute  decline  in  job  satisfaction  among  public  sector  workers  during 
the  1990s,  and  noted  increased  stress,  depression  and  a  "very  heavy  workload"  (The  Guardian  22nd 
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Labour,  especially  since  a  fundamental  demand  its  modernisation  programme  makes 
on  public  sector  workers  is  that  they  must  place  the  interests  of  the  consumer  before 
their  own,  which  is,  in  effect,  an  appeal  to  their  own  commitment  to  a  `common 
good'.  This  risk  is  further  compounded  by  the  distinction  New  Labour  insists  on 
between  producers  and  consumers.  This  distinction  is  problematic  and  not  readily 
drawn  since  one  in  three  families  "includes  someone  working  in  the  public  services" 
(The  Guardian  20th  March  2001).  Moreover,  a  clear  majority  of  public  service 
consumers  (75%)  believe  its  workers  are  underpaid,  undervalued,  and  advocate  the  re- 
establishment  of  respect  for  them  (ibid).  Cross-class  support  for  tax  increases  to 
improve  spending  on  key  public  services  (Evans  2000:  54),  in  contrast  to  the  New 
Labour  position,  also  suggests  that  government  views  are  at  odds  with  the  consumers 
whose  interests  it  is  seemingly  seeking  to  represent.  This  is  a  point  that  I  will  return  to 
below. 
Yet,  in  the  context  of  public  sector  reform,  New  Labour  does  apparently  seek 
a  partnership  with  the  trade  unions,  and  possibility  of  such  a  partnership  facilitating 
the  radical  reform  of  public  services  has  been  given  greater  prominence  in  recent 
years.  At  the  2002  Trades  Union  Congress,  for  example,  though  couched  in  New 
Labour's  radical  modernising  rhetoric,  and  clearly  in  step  with  its  business  ethos, 
Blair  apparently  offered  unions  just  that: 
Money  is  not  all  the  services  need.  They  need  change  and  reform,  new 
ways  of  working,  new  ways  of  delivering  services,  new  partnerships 
between  public,  private  and  voluntary  sectors,  and  between  managers 
and  unions.  More  choice  for  consumers  of  those  services.  On  these 
issues,  I  offer  a  partnership  on  this  basis.  No  preconceptions  on  either 
side.  One  test  only  -  what  is  good  for  the  service  and  good  for  the 
users  of  the  services  (quoted  in  The  Guardian  I  th  September  2002). 
Union  influence  is,  however,  clearly  limited.  At  face  value,  this  is  indicative  of  New 
Labour  seeking  to  participate  in  a  partnership  with  unions  over  public  sector  reform 
whereby  "genuine  concerns  about  workforce  conditions"  will  be  taken  into  account 
(Blair,  ibid.  ).  Arguably  this  serves  three  purposes  for  New  Labour.  Firstly,  there  is  a 
recognition  that  public  sector  unions  need  to  embrace  New  Labour  modernisation  - 
on  side,  not  in  the  way.  Secondly,  ostensibly  it  represents  a  move  `beyond  left  and 
right'  -  the  public  are  well-served  and  public  sector  workers  are  fully  involved  in 
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sector  unions  as  `partners'  in  the  `modernisation'  of  the  public  sector  creates  scope  to 
portray  them  as  `wreckers'  if  they  do  not  fully  endorse  it. 
Significantly,  however,  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  government  is  a  model 
partnership  employer.  Indeed  the  whole  approach  of  the  state-as-employer  has  been 
one  of  antagonism  towards  public  sector  workers  as  a  vested  interest  and  the  New 
Labour  government  is  the  most  open  and  consistent  employer-critic  of  union  interest. 
As  the  "ultimate  employer"  (Hain  quoted  in  McCarthy,  1997:  5611)  New  Labour  has 
the  ultimate  opportunity  to  demonstrate  its  partnership  credentials  explicitly. 
The  new  culture  of  conciliation,  accommodation  and  `mutual  gains',  could  have  the 
government  as  its  best  exemplar.  Yet  New  Labour's  paradoxically  ideological 
commitment  to  pragmatism  over  ideology,  embodied  in  the  mantra  `what  matters  is 
what  works'  precludes  any  overt  and  consistent  partnership  orientation.  Experience  of 
New  Labour  in  power  has  demonstrated  how  there  is  little  in  its  approach  that  is  an 
effective  counterweight  to  the  damage  to  morale  and  trust  of: 
pay  restraint...  unsuitable  and  unfair  performance  related  pay...  the 
contracting-out  of  many  specialised  and  complex  functions  on  terms 
subsequently  shown  to  be  unduly  favourable  to  private  operators... 
and  the  unremitting  hostility  to  all  aspects  of  the  role  and  function  of 
public  sector  trade  unionism  (McCarthy,  1997:  55). 
Moreover,  measurement  of  `what  works'  is  never  clearly  defined,  nor  is  the  role  of 
public  sector  workers  opinion  in  `what  works'  or  does  not.  My  argument  is  that  `what 
works'  for  New  Labour  is  what  casts  it  in  the  light  of  supreme  moderniser:  no 
unwieldy  ties  to  the  public  sector  or  its  `producers',  no  undue  or  overbearing 
influence  from  their  representatives,  and  no  `tax  and  spend'  of  the  past  to  fund 
improvements.  Crucially,  `what  works'  can  be  also  defined  as  what  most  clearly 
differentiates  New  Labour  from  its  Old  Labour  predecessors.  Thus,  a  continuing 
theme  has  been  that  any  reluctance  on  the  part  of  public  sector  workers  and  unions 
will  not  be  a  barrier  to  the  reforms  envisaged: 
[Labour  Councillors  will]  take  tough  decisions,  even  where  this  brings 
them  into  conflict  with  public  sector  unions  (Mandelson  and  Liddle, 
1996:  227). 
25  Peter  Hain  was  a  Shadow  employment  minister  in  1997. 122 
Where  policy  has  to  be  adapted  or  changed  it  will  be.  .  .  There  will  be  a 
dialogue,  there  will  be  consultation.  But  no  vested  interest  will  have  a 
veto  on  reform  (Blair  quoted  in  The  Guardian  16`''  July  2001). 
In  terms  of  the  relationship  with  New  Labour,  public  sector  unions  face 
particular  problems,  for  there  are  fundamental  differences  between  them.  The  TUC, 
for  example,  has  continually  restated  its  opposition  to  "PFI,  PPP  and  the  further 
privatisation  or  commercialisation  of  public  services"  (TUC  2003)  as  have  individual 
public  sector  unions,  most  notably  UNISON,  and  the  civil  service  union  PCS,  as  well 
as  large  general  unions  with  public  sector  members  like  the  GMB  and  TGWU.  On 
this  basis,  New  Labour  has  struggled  to  convince  its  public  sector  `partners'  of  its 
status  as  a  dialogic  employer.  Some  union  objectives  have  been  met,  to  an  extent,  - 
over  the  'two-tier  26  workforce  that  privatisation  creates  and  the  establishment  of  a 
Local  Government  Pay  Commission,  for  example  (TUC  2003).  But  gains  made 
through  negotiation  with  public  sector  employers  remain  limited.  Moreover,  in  the 
public  sector,  employment  relations  are  "shot  through  with  the  all-important 
dimension  of  political  power"  (Corby  and  White  1999:  3),  and  `working  for'  New 
Labour  means  these  relations  are  shaped  by  a  particular  ideological  thrust  that  also 
needs  to  be  examined  on  the  context  of  the  New  Labour-union  relationship.  Put 
simply,  conflict,  militancy  and  resistance  in  the  public  sector  is  immediately,  if  not 
necessarily  explicitly,  resistance  and  militancy  over  fundamental  principles  of 
government  policy.  Moreover,  victory  in  one  area  of  the  public  sector  is  assumed  to 
have  a  `knock-on'  effect  across  the  whole  sector  in  terms  of  potential  claims  by  other 
workers  for  improvement.  More,  importantly,  perhaps  for  New  Labour  (since  wage 
claims  can  still  be  rejected),  militancy  over  a  seemingly  particularised  issue  can 
threaten  to  expose  flaws  in  the  overall  ideological  premises  that  policy  is  founded  on. 
Public  sector  militancy,  therefore,  places  the  relationship  between  New 
Labour  and  the  unions  under  its  greatest  strain.  Essentially,  in  this  respect,  there  is 
clear  continuity  with  previous  Labour  governments.  However  New  Labour's 
programme  and  underpinning  values  means  there  are  qualitative  differences  that 
impact  on  its  relationship  and  highlight  its  contradictory  nature.  Even  small,  specific 
26  When  public  sector  workers  are  transferred  to  the  private  sector  (in  PPP  contracts,  for  example)  any 
protection  in  terms  of  conditions  of  service  that  are  negotiated  are  not  applicable  to  workers  employed 
after  the  transfer  takes  place.  Unions  are  concerned  about  this  creating  a  two-tier  workforce  in  the  long 
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and  localised  strikes  that  appear  straightforward  can  and  do  involve  `taking  on'  New 
Labour's  whole  ideological  thrust  in  terms  of  public  sector  reform.  For  example,  the 
`unofficial'  strike  by  social  workers  in  Glasgow  in  1998  demonstrated  the  political 
will  to  fight  any  opposition  to  the  government's  creation  of  a  synergy  of  public  and 
private.  In  this  case,  though  ostensibly  about  the  transfer  of  home  care  workers  to  a 
new  department,  thus  breaching  a  UNISON  boycott,  the  strike  quickly  embodied  a 
challenge  to  the  government's  embryonic  Best  Value  regime,  the  key  mechanism  to 
ensure  "pressure  [is  put]  on  local  government  to  raise  its  game"  (Blair  1998a:  17),  and 
to  the  threat  of  the  further  privatisation  of  key  services.  The  risks  for  the  hegemonic 
Labour  bureaucracy  in  the  city  were  great,  since  plans  were  already  in  place  to 
transfer  all  local  authority  housing  to  a  quasi-private  housing  association  and  to 
modernise  the  city's  secondary  schools  under  a  Public  Private  Partnership.  A  victory 
for  these  members  threatened  to  halt  the  envisaged  reform  of  local  government  in 
Glasgow.  At  same  time,  this  strike  gave  Labour  councillors  the  opportunity  to 
demonstrate  their  receptiveness  to  New  Labour  principles  in  a  city  that,  in  no  small 
measure,  is  synonymous  with  entrenched  traditions  of  militancy  and  working  class 
rebellion.  Despite  its  opposition  to  New  Labour  policy,  UNISON  repudiated  the 
strike,  wrote  to  every  striker  demanding  they  return  to  work,  and  national  and  Scottish 
leaders  demonised  key  branch  activists  relentlessly  for  years  after  the  strike  had 
ended27.  This  strike  provided  an  early  demonstration  of  the  New  Labour  approach  to 
public  sector  employment  relations  and  local  government  generally  whereby  the: 
Redefinition  of  social  justice  in  terms  of  opportunity  and  community  means 
treating  social  service  departments  as  part  of  the  problem  rather  than  part  of 
the  solution  (Jordan  2001:  528). 
Union  leadership  opposition  to  workers  fighting  the  New  Labour 
`modernisation'  that  fundamentally  problematises  public  sector  workers  demonstrates, 
still  further,  close,  continuing,  links  between  New  Labour  and  the  union  bureaucracy, 
in  spite  of  claims  of  a  wholesale  transformation  of  that  relationship.  Thus  unions  like 
UNISON  support  New  Labour  unequivocally,  both  financially  and  practically,  at 
local,  regional  and  national  level.  At  face  value,  private  profit  (from  involvement  in 
27  A  UNISON  investigation  was  launched  into  the  conduct  of  one  steward,  Roddy  Slorach,  in  late  1998. 
In  2000,  two  of  his  fellow  stewards  were  sacked  for  supporting  him  at  a  Glasgow  City  Council 
disciplinary  hearing.  Despite  a  decision  in  their  favour  at  an  employment  tribunal,  they  were  not 
reinstated.  Slorach  was  expelled  from  UNISON  in  2000.  Events  within  Glasgow  need  to  be  viewed  in 
the  context  of  a  wider  purge  on  lef-wing  activism  in  UNISON  that  affected  branches  in  Birmingham, 
Sheffield  and  London  (Socialist  Worker  4`h  May  2000,18t'  May  2000). 124 
the  public  sector)  may  remain  a  "dirty  word"  (Mandelson  and  Liddle  1996:  22)  for 
both  unions  and  their  members.  But,  for  the  union  bureaucracy,  the  continuation  of 
the  Labour-union  relationship  remains  paramount. 
That  strikes  with  specific  and  apparently  limited  causes  in  the  public  sector 
can  threaten  New  Labour's  ideological  foundations  is  demonstrated  in  even  sharper 
relief  when  that  strike  occurs  on  a  national  basis.  For  example,  the  national  fire- 
fighters  strike  in  2002-2003  was  initiated  as  a  fight  for  a  `professional'  annual  wage 
of  £30,000  which  the  government  claimed  would  cost  the  Treasury  £16  billion 
(Socialist  Worker  23rd  November  2002).  The  Fire  Brigades'  Union's  (FBU)  claim  also 
clashed  directly  with  the  government's  concern  to  hold  down  public  sector  pay  and  to 
avert  large-scale  militancy  in  the  public  sector.  The  government's  refusal  to  meet  its 
demands  drew  the  fifty-five  thousand  member-strong  FBU  and  the  government  into  a 
more  generalised  political  struggle  around  competing  agendas.  The  government 
seized  the  opportunity  to  tie  any  pay  rise  to  its  `modernisation'  agenda,  involving  the 
restructuring  of  work  patterns  and  the  possible  closure  of  fire  stations,  whilst  the  FBU 
argued  that  the  government's  review  of  the  fire  service  was  wholly  premised  on 
justifying  cuts  in  services  and  personnel,  the  future  privatisation  of  key  fire  service 
functions  and  the  end  of  structured  national  bargaining  on  wages  and  conditions.  The 
divergence  between  the  position  of  the  FBU  membership  and  New  Labour  was 
obvious  even  before  the  run  up  to  the  strike.  In  May  2001  the  FBU  annual  conference 
voted  in  principle  to  support  election  candidates  and  organisations  opposed  to  New 
Labour  as  long  as  they  share  policies  and  principles  with  the  FBU  membership  (The 
Guardian  9th  July  2001).  In  addition,  the  2002  strike  ballot  itself  returned  a  `yes'  vote 
of  87%  on  an  over  80%  turnout  (Fire  Brigades  Union  2002).  During  a  six  month  long 
selective  strike  the  New  Labour  government  demonised  striking  fire-fighters  and  their 
union  leaders,  in  a  manner  reminiscent  of  Old  Labour  during  the  1966  Seamen's 
Strike  and  the  last  national  fire-fighters'  strike  in  1978.  The  prospect,  and  subsequent 
reality,  of  war  in  Iraq  allowed  the  government  the  scope  to  label  the  strikers  as 
`unpatriotic'  and  to  appeal  to  the  national  interest  in  a  time  of  political  uncertainty. 
Like  the  Glasgow  social  workers,  a  victory  for  the  fire-fighters  posed  an  all 
too  visible  threat  to  New  Labour's  ideology  of  competitiveness  and  flexibility,  and  to 
its  overall  `modernisation'  strategy  in  the  public  sector.  Union  acquiescence  is 125 
absolutely  critical  in  this  arena,  and,  where  this  is  not  readily  supplied,  it  will  be 
secured  through  sustained  government  offensive.  This  challenges  the  whole  notion  of 
New  Labour  as  a  partner  of  workers  and  unions  in  the  public  sector.  A  consideration 
of  New  Labour  as  `the  ultimate  employer',  and  a  brief  discussion  of  two  particular 
examples  of  the  government  in  conflict  with  workers  (either  implicitly  or  explicitly), 
highlights  the  need  to  explore  the  impact  of  New  Labour's  whole  approach,  both  as  an 
`actor'  in  the  employment  relationship  and  as  a  creator  of  policies  that  fundamentally 
shape  the  working  lives  of  millions  of  people.  Moreover,  when  the  public  sector  is  the 
focus  of  analysis,  divergence  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions  does  not 
necessarily  involve  disagreements  over  disappointing  or  `weak'  legislation,  or  lack  of 
action  to  promote  trade  unionism.  There,  conflict  is  generally  premised  on  the 
government's  rejection  of  fundamental  union  principles  or  the  rebuttal  of  the  unions' 
often  longstanding  opposition  to  key  policy  developments. 
Again,  there  are  clear  parallels  here  with  previous  Labour  governments. 
Militant  challenges  to  Labour  government  policy  by  unions  are  met  with  sustained 
offensive  rather  than  conciliatory  approaches  which  draw  on  a  sense  of  solidarity  with 
the  relationship.  Being  perceived  as  `standing  firm'  against  the  unions  was  as  much  of 
a  defining  feature  of  Old  as  it  is  of  New  Labour.  However,  there  is  a  critical  aspect 
which  helps  highlight  an  important  qualitative  difference  between  New  Labour  and  its 
Labour  predecessors:  the  relative  health  of  the  UK  economy,  whereby  the  Treasury 
has  the  means  to  fund  public  service  improvements  on  a  large  scale.  In  the  run  up  to 
the  2001  general  election,  for  example,  there  was  a  surplus  in  public  finances  of  at 
least  £20  billion  (The  Guardian  20th  March  2001).  In  this  respect,  it  is  worth  noting 
that  Old  Labour  had  an  explicit  commitment  to  the  welfare  state  and  social  reform, 
not  readily  apparent  in  New  Labour,  but  it  achieved  office  in  periods  of  economic 
contraction  or  catastrophic  decline  (Hyman  1989:  45;  Panitch  and  Leys  2001:  86). 
With  New  Labour,  former  commitments  to  tax  and  spend  have  been  replaced  with 
chronic  under-spending  and  business  incursion  even  though  money  is  available  for  the 
public  services. 
I  noted  earlier  how  a  `false  dichotomy'  of  distinct  and  separate  horizons  of 
politics  and  economics  for  the  Labour  Party  and  the  unions  both  debilitates  the  latter 
and  sustains  the  relationship  with  Labour.  It  is  my  contention  that  New  Labour's 126 
approach  in  the  public  sector  is  of  central  importance  in  relation  to  this  `false 
dichotomy'  and  the  `Chinese  wall'  between  politics  and  economics  fundamental  to 
Labour's  historic  accommodation  with  capitalism,  since  it  creates  the  greatest  scope 
for  the  distinction  to  be  blurred.  The  New  Labour  approach  to  the  public  sector  helps 
draw  together  the  intrinsic  links  between  these  distinct  horizons.  The  re- 
conceptualisation  of  the  public  as  not  fully  separate  or  distinct  from  the  private,  and 
its  `modernisation',  framed  in  terms  of  enterprise,  efficiency  and  profit,  fuses  politics 
and  economics  in  an  arguably  novel  way.  As  a  result,  each  aspect  of  New  Labour 
ideology  is  all  the  more  evidently  framed  and  shaped  by  its  economic  concerns  and, 
importantly,  clearly  demonstrates  a  political  encroachment  into  the  unions'  economic 
horizon.  Unions'  economic  gains  are  limited  by  a  political  project  more 
comprehensively  and  coherently  against  traditional  union  interests,  placing  the 
relationship  under  serious  pressure.  This  is  evident  in  official  responses  that  attempt 
to  promote  a  positive  notion  of  a  fundamentally  changed,  yet  more  relevant,  Labour 
Party: 
We've  got  to  start  from  the  fact  that  this  is  not  a  trade  union  party.  It  was  but 
the  relationship  has  altered  because  the  sociology  of  Britain  has  altered 
(Monks  quoted  in  The  Guardian  9th  December  2002). 
These  are  important  developments,  though  their  intensification  and  impact  are  not 
easily  assessed  at  this  juncture.  In  this  context,  "the  refusal  to  give  a  serious  hike  to 
public  workers  pay  or  the  Treasury's  near  dogmatic  insistence  on  Public  Private 
Partnerships"  (The  Guardian,  20th  March  2001)  is  difficult  for  unions  to  accept  and  is 
problematic  for  union  leaders.  It  clearly  represents  a  challenge  to  their  ability  to 
convince  public  sectors  workers  that  the  relationship  with  New  Labour  brings 
important  benefits  or  that  it  leaves  unions  "better  placed  to  make  [our]  views  known  - 
loud  and  clear"  (UNISON  2003a28).  Moreover,  experience  of  New  Labour  in  power 
challenges  the  notion  that  New  Labour  and  union  members  have  in  common  what 
many  union  leaders  seek  to  mythologise,  especially  when  the  relationship  is 
seemingly  under  threat: 
28  This  statement  was  made  by  Dave  Prentis,  the  UNISON  General  Secretary  in  the  Summer  2003 
edition  of  U,  its  in-house  magazine.  Prentis  was  outlining,  in  particular,  his  response  to  the  UNISON 
conference  decision  (2003)  to  maintain  existing  political  funding  arrangements  after  a  two  year  review. 
The  split-fund  arrangement,  where  the  Affiliated  Political'  Fund  is  used  to  support  Labour  and  a 
General  Political  Fund  pays  for  general  campaigning,  though  it  is  constitutionally  barred  from  being 
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A  system  of  shared  values  has  kept  us  together  and  still  does.  We  still 
share  the  same  goals,  and  although  we  talk  about  and  apply  them  in 
different  ways,  those  shared  values  and  goals  remain  of  central 
importance  to  all  of  us.  When  our  relationship  hits  bad  times,  as  has 
happened  and  may  well  happen  as  we  go  through  the  first  period  of  the 
Labour  government,  it  is  those  shared  values  and  goals  that  keep  us 
together.  .  . 
The  relationship  is  based  fundamentally  on  those  shared 
values  which  have  not  changed  in  100  years  and  I  do  not  expect  to 
change  in  the  next  100  years  (Sawyer29  2000:  129). 
New  Labour's  ideological  thrust  in  the  public  sector  and  beyond,  its  effective 
rejection  of  public  sector  workers  as  partners,  and  the  continuation  of  the  anti-public 
sectorism  of  the  Conservative  governments  of  the  1980s  and  1990s,  act  as  a  barrier  to 
the  creation  of  the  New  Labour  ideal  of  a  cultural  shift  in  employment  relations  there. 
They  also  help  create  a  new  context  within  which  the  relationship  between  New 
Labour  and  the  unions  operates.  This,  alongside  the  paradox  of  the  weakness  of 
unions  in  the  face  of  New  Labour  and  their  leaders'  relative  strength  in  delivering 
acquiescence,  has  helped  bring  about  important  developments,  the  effects  of  which 
continue  to  unfold. 
The  first  has  been  the  pressure  within  unions  affiliated  to  the  Labour  Party  in 
recent  years  to  discuss  the  continuation  of  that  affiliation  at  annual  conferences  and 
whether  political  funds  could  donate  to  other  parties.  This  has  also  involved  reduction 
in  funding  from  some  unions  on  the  basis  that  New  Labour  is  acting  contrary  to 
member's  interests  (Ludlam  2003).  The  struggle  to  "democratise"  union  political 
funds  is  not  without  complexity  and  continues  to  meet  with  strong  opposition.  This  is 
linked  to  the  second  development:  the  role  and  presence  of  the  left  in  unions30.  One  of 
the  clearest  manifestations  of  this  has  been  the  election  in  recent  years  of  a  so-called 
`awkward  squad'  of  union  leaders  that  are  characterised  by  their  overt  criticisms  of 
New  Labour  and  their  defence  of  publicly  funded  and  state-supported  public 
services31.  This,  in  itself,  is  becoming  increasingly  problematic  and  there  is  clear 
evidence  that  this  type  of  critique  is  becoming  more  generalised  within  the  union 
movement.  The  2003  Trades  Union  Congress  opposed  key  government  policies  on 
29  (Lord)  Tom  Sawyer  was  the  first  General  Secretary  of  UNISON  and  is  a  former  Chairman  and 
General  Secretary  of  the  Labour  Party. 
30  For  a  concise  and  well-argued  account  of  the  importance  and  influence  of  left-wing  trade  unionists 
and  political  activists  see  Darlington  (2002). 
31  Most  prominent  among  this  group  are  Mark  Serwotka  of  the  civil  service  union,  PCS,  Bob  Crow  of 
the  rail  union,  the  RMT,  Billy  Hayes  of  the  postal  workers  union,  the  CWU,  and  TGWU  leader  Tony 
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university  top-up  fees  and  foundation  hospitals  and  denounced  New  Labour's 
retention  of  anti-union  laws  and  the  occupation  of  Iraq  (Financial  Times  10`" 
September  2003;  Socialist  Worker  13`h  September  2003).  Notably  in  the  current 
period: 
Few  union  leaders  could  be  accurately  described  as  moderates  these 
days 
...  In  short,  the  language  used  by  union  leaders  at  the  Congress 
suggests  that  everyone  has  to  be  "awkward"  now  -a  contrariness  based 
in  part  on  anger  at  issues  such  as  foundation  hospitals  and  Iraq.  The 
latter  issue  started  [Mr  Woodley's]  calls  for  Tony  Blair's  resignation. 
Even  if  these  points  are  resolved,  for  many  leaders  it  will  not  be 
enough.  They  regard  New  Labour  as  a  virus  that  has  taken  over  the 
body  politic  of  the  Labour  Party  and  that  will  due  course  be  eradicated 
(Financial  Times  12th  September  2003). 
Undoubtedly,  this  poses  particular  problems  in  terms  of  the  relationship 
between  New  Labour  and  the  unions.  However,  as  before,  the  intention  here  is  not  to 
suggest  that  breakdown  in  that  relationship  is  imminent.  There  are  crucial, 
countervailing  tendencies.  The  first  is  connected  to  the  tendency  of  some  union 
leaders  to  try  to  separate  out  different  functions  for  unions  within  the  framework  of 
the  relationship,  as  a  way  of  `working  through'  the  contradiction  at  its  heart.  This 
involves  unions  distinguishing  between  Party  and  government  and  `uncoupling'  their 
integral  role  in  the  Labour  Party  from  negotiation  and  even  confrontation  with  their 
government  `partner'  (Sawyer  2000).  In  short,  partnership  issues  should  be  kept  out  of 
party  business  and  vice-versa.  Explicit  acceptance  and  proliferation  of  this  strategy 
could  help  breath  new  life  into  the  relationship  at  a  critical  point  in  its  history.  The 
second  tendency  -  based  on  the  notion  of  reclaiming  the  Labour  Party  from  the  Blair 
and  `modernisers'  -  is  prevalent  and,  as  alluded  to  in  the  quotation  above,  more 
closely  resonates  with  the  sentiment  of  some  of  the  left  within  the  union  leadership, 
though  its  grip  is  weakening  as  New  Labour's  second  term  progresses. 
32 
The  struggle  to  wrestle  the  Labour  Party  from  the  grip  of  its  current  Third 
Way  orientation  and  its  commitment  to  neo-liberalism  is  still  seen  as  a  plausible 
strategy.  The  earlier  distinction  between  New  Labour  and  Old  Labour  has  been 
32  The  decision  by  the  RMT  to  break  its  financial  links  with  New  Labour  in  Scotland  (The  Mirror  9th 
December  2003)  and  support  the  Scottish  Socialist  Party,  and  the  growing  union  support  for  a  left  wing 
electoral  challenge  to  New  Labour  in  the  2004  elections  are  indicative  of  this  (see  Socialist  Review 
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reformulated  as  one  between  New  Labour  and  `Real'  Labour.  It  has  also  become 
increasingly  significant  in  New  Labour's  second  term  and  important  evidence  of  this 
in  operation  is  beginning  to  emerge.  For  example,  in  the  2003  elections  to  the  Welsh 
Assembly,  the  Welsh  Labour  Party  campaigned  (and  won)  on  "the  traditional  values 
of  Welsh  Labour  -  no  to  foundation  hospitals,  abolishing  prescription  charges, 
subsidised  bus  travel  for  pensioners  and  young  people  and  opposition  to  university 
top-up  fees"  (UNISON  2003b).  Such  a  strategy  is  shot  through  with  the  assumption 
that  the  debilitation  of  the  unions,  the  failure  to  ensure  long-term  improvements  for 
workers  in  both  the  public  and  private  sectors,  and  to  deliver  progressive  measures 
that  counteract  the  worst  excesses  of  the  Thatcherite  legacy,  are  features  of  New 
Labour  not  of  Labour  per  se.  Yet,  as  discussed  above,  this  involves  invoking  a 
mythology  of  a  more  beneficial  relationship  that  has  been  transformed  over  two 
decades.  This  is  crucial,  not  least  because  it  is  to  an  extent  where  the  positions  of  the 
left  and  right  converge,  though  they  clearly  approach  this  from  different  perspectives. 
Ironically,  it  is  perhaps  Blair's  warning: 
The  idea  of  a  leftwing  Labour  government  as  the  alternative  to  a 
moderate  and  progressive  one  is  the  abiding  delusion  of  100  years  of 
our  party  (quoted  in  The  Guardian  1  0`h  September  2003). 
that  is  closer  to  the  reality  of  Labour  history. 
2.6:  Conclusion 
Clearly  having  a  Labour  government  has  had  an  impact  on  trade  unionism  in 
the  contemporary  UK.  Moderately  supportive,  if  limited  in  scope  and  limiting  in 
character,  legislation  has  facilitated  some  growth  in  both  membership  and  union 
recognition  deals  in  specific  periods.  For  example,  between  November  1999  and 
October  2001  there  were  six  hundred  and  twenty  nine  new  union  recognition  deals 
with  employers  signed,  compared  with  one  hundred  and  fifteen  between  January  1997 
and  November  1998  (TUC  2002a).  Union  membership  has  increased  by  one  hundred 
and  seventy-eight  thousand  since  1997  also  though  an  increase  of  eighty-two 
thousand  between  1999  and  2000  needs  to  be  assessed  in  the  context  of  a  reduction  of 
thirty  thousand  the  following  year  (Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  2002:  344). 
Overall,  therefore,  net  gains  have  not  only  been  limited  over  the  period  of  New 
Labour's  tenure  thus  far,  but  they  are  also  not  protected  from  other  trends,  like 130 
manufacturing  decline.  The  loss  of  over  one  million  union  members  between  1991 
and  2001  (ibid.  )  is  far  from  being  recouped  through  the  legislative  programme  that 
New  Labour  brought  forth.  The  predictions  of  some  union  leaders  that  union 
membership  would  be  boosted  by  two  million  members  (The  Herald  5th  June  2000) 
were  premature  and  perhaps  based  on  the  over-positive  assessment  of  New  Labour. 
Expectations  of  union  resurgence  on  the  basis  of  the  legislation  have  not  been 
realised.  The  limits  on  gains  are  clearly  connected  to  the  limits  of  the  legislation,  but 
they  are  also  linked  to  New  Labour  ideology.  When  flexibility,  competitiveness  and 
partnership  are  focused  on,  a  less  than  positive  picture  begins  to  emerge.  This 
suggests  that  future  predictions  and  expectations  need  to  account  for  wider  ideological 
premises  as  well  as  the  new  rights.  The  overall  impact  of  this  on  the  public  and 
private  sectors  suggests  that  unions  have  gained  little  in  terms  of  power,  influence  and 
numerical  strength  since  New  Labour's  election  in  1997.  The  enduring  character  of 
the  relationship  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions  seemingly  delivers  more  for 
New  Labour  than  it  does  for  the  unions.  Whilst  the  legislation  may  have  resulted  in  an 
otherwise  absent  legitimacy  for  trade  unionism  in  some  workplaces  and  may  act  as  a 
foundation  for  union  renewal  (Gall  2001),  this  amounts  to  legitimacy  for  a  particular 
type  of  trade  unionism  (Mcllroy  2001),  institutionally  divested  of  its  oppositional 
character.  Official  union  acceptance  of  the  ideology  of  flexibility,  competitiveness 
and  partnership  serves  to  preclude,  in  the  long  term,  the  sort  of  militancy  that  Kelly 
(1996)  has  argued  remains  the  most  effective  counterweight  to  employer  offensive.  In 
this  sense,  the  legislative  programme  and,  indeed,  the  election  of  New  Labour  is,  to  an 
extent,  something  of  a  pyrrhic  victory.  An  examination  of  New  Labour  in  the  public 
sector,  in  particular,  offers  further  evidence  of  this. 
None  of  this  is  to  suggest  that  unions  are  powerless.  The  TUC  have 
maintained  campaigns,  like  that  to  increase  the  National  Minimum  Wage,  and  are 
often  vociferous  critics  of  some  of  the  weaknesses  in  employment  relations 
legislation,  though  they  are  weakly  pursued.  Yet  the  considerable  support  for  the 
repeal  of  all  anti-union  legislation  at  the  2003  Congress  -a  position  that  had  been 
marginalised  from  official  orientation  since  at  least  the  mid-1990s  -  demonstrates  a 
renewed  pressure  on  official  union  response.  Evidence  continues  to  emerge  of  the 
contentiousness  of  the  alliance  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions,  especially  when 
analysis  encompasses  the  wider  membership.  The  consistent  and  active  support  for 131 
the  anti-war  movement  since  2001,  and  widespread  campaigning  against  New 
Labour's  public  sector  `reform'  that  has  clear  resonance  with  the  views  of  the  public 
in  general  (The  Guardian,  20th  March  2001),  are  important  examples  of  this. 
Moreover,  New  Labour  is  still  a  party  born  of  organised  labour  and  there  remains 
concern  to  keep  unions  `on  side'  with  more  obvious  appeals  to  partnership  in  New 
Labour's  second  term  of  office.  Pressure  to  do  this  is  likely  to  increase  after  the 
decisions  taken  at  the  2003  TUC  congress,  especially  with  a  general  election  due  in 
2005  and  the  clear  possibility  of  a  leadership  contest  on  the  horizon  (The  Guardian 
10`h  September  2003). 
The  scope  remains,  therefore,  either  to  achieve  greater  gains  for  members 
through  leaders'  exploitation  of  the  relationship  or  to  expose  the  debilitating  overall 
effect  of  the  relationship  itself.  The  campaign  to  `democractise'  union  political  funds, 
focused  on  a  drive  to  loosen  unions  from  their  binding  institutional  links  to  the  Labour 
Party,  and  the  often  overt  support  openly  given  to  socialist  alternatives  by  some  trade 
unions,  are  important  examples  of  this.  Such  initiatives  are  linked  both  to  the 
`awkward  squad'  and  the  re-emergence  of  wildcat  strikes33.  This  threatens  the 
foundations  of  the  powerful  bureaucracy  of  the  trade  union  movement.  However,  the 
bureaucracy  meet  such  threats  using  the  financial,  political  and  administrative 
resources  at  its  disposal  to  initiate  counter-offensives  against  independent  militant 
action  and  initiatives  that  challenge  the  existing  arrangements  for  the  operation  for 
political  funds  (Socialist  Alliance  2002). 
One  important  legacy  of  the  last  decades  is  that  the  contemporary  Labour 
Movement  has,  within  it,  generations  of  members  weaned  on  the  pragmatism  and 
class  compromise  that  these  resources  have  been  used  to  promote  and  support.  The 
spirit  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership  applies  conservative, 
bureaucratic,  pressure  not  matched  by  pressure  to  have  unions'  core  demands  met  by 
the  government  they  support.  Moreover,  the  bureaucracy  is  not  above  laying  claim  to 
`success'  in  the  name  of  the  relationship  between  Labour  and  the  unions.  This  clearly 
demonstrates  some  resonance  with  Minkin's  analysis  of  an  alliance  sustained  by 
"rules  of  solidarity...  that  produce  within  unions  a  sense  of  responsibility  for  the 
Labour  Party"  (1991:  654).  However,  his  overall  assessment  of  a  contentious  yet 
33One  key  example  of  this  was  the  'unofficial'  strike  by  thousands  of  postal  workers  in  late  2003. 132 
mutually  beneficial  alliance  is  seriously  challenged  by  some  of  the  evidence  above. 
Increasingly,  the  notion  of  a  "transactional  consciousness  which  adds  a  vital 
contribution  to  overall  unity"  (Minkin  1991:  654)  is  blurred  as  a  consequence  of  the 
New  Labour  settlement.  In  the  current  context,  it  is  difficult  to  accept  his  conclusion, 
and  that  of  some  of  the  union  leaders  discussed  above,  that  the  relationship  draws 
strength  "from  an  understanding  of  shared  historical  projects"  (ibid),  since  there  are 
clear  and  fundamental  differences  in  trajectory  especially  in  respect  of  the  public 
sector  -  the  focal  point  of  any  former  sense  of  joint  historical  endeavour. 
Unions  still  remain  a  concentration  of  labour  power.  This  results  in  an  inherent 
tension  whereby  improvements  for  workers  are  gained  in  the  context  of 
accommodation  and  compromise  with  employers.  Two  decades  of  defeats  have  lead 
to  an  overarching  belief  at  the  top  of  the  Labour  Movement  that  only  accommodation 
and  compromise  can  bring  gains.  The  current  ideological  configuration  New  Labour 
embodies,  and  the  unions'  acceptance  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership, 
further  exacerbates  this  tension.  Driving  through  a  New  Labour  agenda  with  clear 
links  to  business  objectives  in  the  name  of  efficiency,  prosperity  and  even  social 
justice  has  a  major  impact.  Arguably  one  crucial  sign  is  that  politics  and  economics 
can  be  linked  in  public  and  political  consciousness  more  obviously  than  at  any  other 
time  in  Labour  Movement  history.  In  the  public  sector,  New  Labour's  aim  for  a 
synergy  of  public  and  private  is  at  the  heart  of  the  antagonism  between  it  and  public 
sector  unions.  The  question  remains  whether  this  synergy  can  fully  occur  and  the 
separate  horizons  of  politics  and  economics  that  sustain  the  Labour-union  relationship 
be  maintained.  In  terms  of  members'  interests,  the  blurring  of  this  distinction  offers 
scope  to  challenge  the  notion  that  the  "enduring  alliance"  is  fundamentally  a 
beneficial  alliance.  Moreover,  the  fallacy  that  New  Labour's  overall  approach  to 
employment  relations  is  premised  on  -  that  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour  can  be 
reconciled  -  leaves  it  fundamentally  exposed. 133 
CHAPTER  THREE:  A  'TARTAN'  THIRD  WAY?  NEW  LABOUR 
AND  SCOTTISH  DEVOLUTION 
3.1:  Introduction 
The  Third  Way's  apparent  concern  for  the  renewal  of  social  democracy  and 
the  reinvigoration  of  political  engagement,  seemingly  involves  bringing  decision 
making  closer  to  the  people.  Devolved  government,  especially  for  Scotland  and 
Wales,  was  New  Labour's  central  mechanism  to  demonstrate  commitment  to  this  aim. 
Indeed,  devolution  has  been  defined  as  "the  largest  programme  of  de-centralisation  in 
British  history"  (Mandelson  1997:  4).  This  chapter  seeks  to  explore  the  extent  of  that 
de-centralisation  in  terms  of  the  New  Labour  overall  project  in  the  context  of 
Scotland.  It  is  premised  on  the  argument  that  Scotland  is  a  critical  site  for  assessment 
since,  first  of  all,  devolution  in  Scotland  meant  a  home  rule  parliament  and  hence 
represented  the  greatest  scope  for  de-centralisation.  Secondly,  Scotland  is  important 
because  the  creation  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  in  1999  was  heralded  as  the 
opportunity  to  develop  a  new  type  of  politics  (Brown  et  al.  1999:  12),  distinct  from 
the  stale,  adversarial,  `yah-boo',  politics  of  Westminster.  The  Parliament  was  also 
expected  to  open  up  the  possibility  of  developing  `Scottish  solutions  for  Scottish 
problems',  representing  New  Labour  pragmatism  in  practice.  Importantly,  the  issues 
around  the  election  for  the  Scottish  Parliament  in  1999  mark  this  as  a  decisive  year  in 
terms  of  my  argument  overall.  That  year  in  Scotland  also  represents  a  crucial 
watershed  in  Labour's  transition  from  Old  to  New  Labour.  This  is  a  process  that,  as  I 
argue  below,  the  union  bureaucracy  played  a  central  role  in  shaping.  This  is  important 
in  Scotland  but  it  also  has  wider  implications  throughout  politics  in  the  UK  and, 
therefore,  a  case  study  of  Scotland  is  central  to  our  understanding  of  the  whole  New 
Labour  project. 
Due  to  constraints  of  time  and  space  I  have  eschewed  any  attempt  to  offer 
fully  detailed  histories  of  either  the  process  of  devolution  in  the  making,  or  of  four 
years  of  political  devolution  in  practice.  However,  this  chapter  is  informed  by  detailed 
research  into  the  first  parliamentary  election  campaign  in  1999  and  an  analysis  of  key 
political  developments  at  that  point  and  since.  It  is  also  focused  on  the  extent  to  which 
New  Labour  ultimately  pursues  a  distinct  agenda  in  Scotland  compared  with  that 
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New  Labour's  approach  there.  New  Labour's  key  ideological  premises  in  relation  to 
flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership,  and  regarding  the  public  sector,  are  also 
considered  in  the  context  of  Scotland.  Fundamentally,  devolution  has  to  be  considered 
in  the  context  of  New  Labour's  ideological  premises  in  order  to  assess  the  extent  to 
which  the  aim  of  bringing  decision  making  closer  to  people  is  being  achieved. 
A  central  element  of  my  argument,  thus  far,  has  been  New  Labour's  concern 
to  synthesise  oppositional  categories  and  to  represent  its  project  as  the  method  to 
overcome  the  antagonisms  that  define  `Old  Left'  and  `New  Right'.  Crucial  in  New 
Labour's  syntheses  is  that  of  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour.  It  is  important, 
therefore,  to  outline  specific  contexts  in  which  capital  and  labour  act.  In  this  respect, 
the  `promise'  of  a  Scottish  Parliament,  and  of  the  creation  of  a  new  political  culture, 
helps  define  Scotland  as  a  distinct  arena  within  which  to  analyse  New  Labour. 
The  very  nature  of  devolution  when  characterised  as  de-centralisation, 
suggests  an  opportunity  to  relate  appropriately  and  effectively  to  geographical 
difference  and  regional  particularism.  The  idea  that  Scotland  is  different  is  pervasive, 
and,  by  the  time  of  New  Labour's  election  in  1997,  the  notion  that  Scotland  had 
suffered  a  `democratic  deficit'  over  two  decades  under  the  Conservatives  was 
persistent.  In  some  respects,  devolution  was  perceived  as  a  reward  for  Scotland's 
continuing  support  for  Labour  throughout  this  period.  It  was  also  a  central  mechanism 
though  which  to  address  Scotland's  wholesale  rejection  of  Thatcherism  as: 
The  legacy  of  Thatcherism  was  far  more  influential  [than  nationalism], 
based  on  hostility  towards  the  public  services  and  a  rejection  of  civil 
society,  of  untrammelled  arrogance  which  could  reorganise  local 
government  against  all  public  opinion  and  of  increasingly  centralised 
government  (Smith  1999:  249). 
Devolution  and  the  creation  of  a  Scottish  Parliament  allowed  New  Labour  to 
seemingly  address  the  legacy  of  Thatcherism  and  rampant  neo-liberalism,  in  terms  of 
social  and  economic  problems,  most  keenly  experienced  in  Labour's  heartlands, 
without  dismantling  the  Thatcherite  settlement,  remaining  faithful  to  central  tenets  of 
neo-liberalism.  Moreover,  possible  dissent  in  the  face  of  New  Labour's  ideological 
thrust  overall  needed  to  be  circumvented  or,  if  possible,  eradicated,  in  this  act  of  faith 
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claims  regarding  devolution  not  only  resonated  effectively  with  Third  Way  concerns 
for  democratic  renewal  and  over  `big'  government,  they  crucially  seemingly  chimed 
with  expectation  in  Scotland: 
The  demand  for  more  democratic  self-governance  is  fed  by  better 
educated  citizens  and  the  free-flow  of  information  provided  by  new 
technology  and  media.  We  must  meet  this  demand  by  devolving  power 
and  making  government  more  open  and  responsive.  Devolution  and 
local  governance  are  not  just  important  in  themselves:  open,  vibrant, 
diverse  democratic  debate  is  a  laboratory  for  ideas  about  how  we 
should  meet  social  needs  (Blair  1998a:  17). 
Thus  the  creation  of  a  Scottish  Parliament  was  expected  both  to  reflect 
specifically  `Scottish'  values  and,  as  noted  above,  offer  `Scottish  solutions  for 
Scottish  problems'.  However,  the  `devil'  is  not  just  in  the  detail  of  this  or  that  policy 
but  also  in  the  underpinning  ideology.  Hence,  I  will  argue  below  that,  whilst  the  thrust 
of  policy  developments  is  often  represented  as  distinctly  Scottish  solutions,  it  is 
thoroughly  New  Labour  in  the  final  analysis.  Such  `solutions'  are  also  represented  as 
chiming  effectively  with  what  are  constructed  as  specifically  Scottish  values,  in  terms 
of  a  stronger  commitment  to  egalitarianism  in  Scotland  (McCrone  1992)  and  of  a 
more  left-wing  orientation  that  sees  Scotland  mythologised  as  a  "residual  bastion  of  a 
latent  social  democracy"  (Mooney  and  Scott  2003:  2).  Put  simplistically,  this  is 
suggestive  of  a  Scotland  where: 
The  advocates  of  Morningside  care  more  for  the  single  mothers  of 
Cranhill  than  the  stockbrokers  of  Surrey  do  for  the  unemployed  of 
Brixton  (The  Observer  14`h  March  1999). 
On  the  one  hand,  New  Labour  in  Scotland  have  drawn  effectively  on  such  myths, 
especially  when  seeking  to  secure  a  `yes'  vote  in  the  devolution  referendum  and  in  the 
first  Scottish  parliamentary  election  campaign  in  1999.  On  the  other,  this  element  of 
apparent  Scottish  distinctiveness  is  problematic  for  New  Labour  since  Scotland's 
obvious  commitment  to  Labour  may  also  reflect  a  commitment  to  the  Labour  of  the 
Keynesian  post-war  settlement  -  in  short  -  to  Old  Labour.  However,  appeals  in  New 
Labour  rhetoric,  at  least,  to  the  distinctiveness  of  Scottish  values  were  used  as  a 
mechanism  to  reinvigorate  Scotland's  allegiance  to  Labour  in  its  New  Labour  guise. 
Whilst  common  sense  assessments  of  Scottish  values  are  imbued  with  the 
mythology  of  radical,  egalitarian  Scotland  (Gall  2003:  5),  myths  need  to  be  rooted, 136 
however  tenuously,  to  an  element  of  reality.  For  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  one  key 
element  of  reality  examined  is  Scotland's  relationship  to  the  public  sector,  in  terms  of 
a  strong  connection  that  has  continued  in  the  contemporary  period  due,  in  some 
measure,  to  material  disadvantage  that  clearly  intensified  during  two  decades  of 
Conservative  government.  This  is  problematic  for  New  Labour  since  it  places 
limitations  on  how  it  appeals  to  Scottish  distinctiveness.  The  continuing  reliance  on 
the  public  sector  in  Scotland  suggests  producer  consciousness  (or,  from  the  New 
Labour  perspective,  `mentality')  is  at  its  strongest  there.  Clearly  this  presents  New 
Labour  with  difficulty  given  its  overall  orientation  towards  consumer  commitment. 
The  unlikelihood  of  New  Labour  abandoning  this  commitment  or  the  `public  bad  - 
private  good'  ethos  that  underpins  its  approach  to  public  sector  reform,  has  specific 
consequences  in  Scotland.  These  began  to  emerge  clearly  in  the  period  around  the 
first  Scottish  election  in  1999.  A  brief  analysis  of  the  issues  at  that  time,  and  of  the 
interim  years  of  devolution  in  practice,  help  demonstrate  a  central  argument  of  this 
chapter  -  that  the  existence  of  the  mythology  of  Scottish  value-distinctiveness  has 
resulted  in  a  more  vigorous  pursuit  of  New  Labour's  `modernisation'  and  reform  in 
the  public  sector,  that  its  rhetoric  in  Scotland  and  appeals  to  `Scottish  values'  belie. 
Arguably,  then,  Scotland  is  different  though  not  in  the  way  that  one  might  expect. 
Further,  New  Labour  in  Scotland  has  sought  to  develop  its  relationship  with 
business  in  a  particular  way  and,  from  the  outset,  it  was  clear  that  the  creation  of  the 
Scottish  Parliament  was  to  be  used  as  a  springboard  from  which  to  engage  business. 
Commitment  to  business  interests  framed  through  the  ideology  of  flexibility, 
competitiveness  and  partnership  is  persistent  and  pervasive  in  Scotland,  as  it  is 
elsewhere  in  the  UK,  and  there  have  been  intense  efforts  to  involve  business  in 
decision  making  in  Scotland.  However  the  creation  of  the  Parliament  offered  New 
Labour  a  greater  opportunity  to  increase  business  influence  overtly.  In  the  process  of 
trying  to  forge  a  new  relationship  with  business  and  `grow'  the  Scottish  economy, 
New  Labour  appeals  to  what  are  represented  as  a  central,  different  though  not 
separate,  set  of  Scottish  values  -  those  connected  to  the  apparent  `entrepreneurial 
spirit'  of  Scotland.  Thus,  New  Labour's  overall  assumption  that  the  interests  of  capital 
and  labour  can  be  fused,  and  its  objective  to  ensure  this  happens,  are  evident  in 
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Overall,  devolution  has  not  allowed,  what  might  have  been  expected  to  be  a 
`soft'  version  of  New  Labour  to  develop.  Scottish  solutions  for  specifically  Scottish 
problems  are,  in  the  final  analysis,  thoroughly  New  Labour  solutions.  What  became 
apparent,  from  as  early  as  1999,  was  that  New  Labour  de-centralisation,  in  practice, 
meant  the  exploitation  of  national  and  regional  difference,  and  the  embrace  of  myths 
whilst  remaining  ideologically  intact.  This  has  also  resulted  in  the  development  by 
New  Labour  of  a  specific  type  of  mainstream  politics  in  Scotland:  "the  politics  of 
vision"  that  characterise  the  contemporary  centre-left  (Hassan  and  Warhurst  1999:  2). 
This  chapter  seeks  to  demonstrate  how  the  New  Labour  vision  for  Scotland,  though 
mobilising  what  is  apparently  specifically  Scottish,  especially  juxtaposing  the  historic 
and  the  novel  -  embodied  in  the  notion  of  a  `new'  politics  -  parallels  the  New  Labour 
world  view,  despite  appeals  to  distinctiveness. 
3.2:  The  `Settled  Will'  of  the  Scottish  People? 
For  many  people,  1999  marked  a  decisive  year  in  Scotland  in  terms  of  key 
changes  to  its  democratic  institutions  and  the  possibility  of  the  development  of  a 
`new'  political  consensus.  It  is  important  therefore  to  discuss  key  issues  that  emerged 
around  the  election  held  in  that  year,  though,  as  noted,  it  is  not  possible  to  offer  a 
detailed  account  of  them.  The  focus  of  this  section,  therefore,  is  on  issues  that 
emerged  at  this  time  which  are  important  in  the  context  of  the  wider  aims  of  this 
chapter  and  my  overall  argument.  The  section  is  also  framed  by  two  overarching 
concerns.  The  first  is  to  elucidate  how  the  Scottish  parliamentary  election  campaign  in 
1999  fully  demonstrates  New  Labour  striving  to  retain  control  in  a  context  that,  at 
face  value  at  least,  sees  it  at  its  most  concessionary.  The  second  is  to  characterise  the 
context  of  the  Scottish  election  as  the  definitive  battle-ground  between  Old  and  New 
Labour,  and  to  demonstrate  how  1999  represents  a  decisive  moment  in  the  process  of 
transition  from  Old  to  New  Labour,  a  process  that  was  all  but  complete  by  the  second 
Scottish  election  in  2003. 
One  of  the  most  important  elements  of  the  creation  of  the  Scottish  Parliament 
was  that  it  seemingly  demonstrated  New  Labour's  readiness  to  de-centralise  decision 
making.  After  two  decades  of  rule  by  a  party  voted  for  by  only  a  minority  in  Scotland, 
the  idea  of  home  rule  resonated  as  a  method  for  addressing  a  democratic  deficit  in  the 
long  term.  The  Parliament  was  promoted  as  a  "fair  and  just  settlement  for  Scotland" 
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accountable  to  the  people  of  Scotland"  (Dewar  1997  in  Chadwick  and  Heffernan 
2003:  181).  This  was  supported  by  people  in  Scotland,  who  expected  the  Parliament 
to  improve  "democratic  effectiveness"  and  almost  four  out  of  five  people  were 
optimistic  that  it  would  be  responsive  to  Scottish  people's  needs  (Brown  et  al.  1999: 
141).  Moreover,  not  only  was  the  parliament  to  be  accessible  and  accountable  to  the 
people  of  Scotland,  it  was  also  expected  to  actively  promote  equality  of  opportunity, 
ensuring  that  minorities  were  effectively  represented  (Brown  et  al.  1999:  13).  These 
were  to  be  central  in  the  creation  of  the  `new'  politics.  Central,  also,  to  the  apparently 
new  politics  was  a  `fairer'  electoral  system  based  on  an  additional  member  system  of 
regional  party  `top  up'  lists  from  which  fifty-six  Members  of  the  Scottish  Parliament 
(MSPs)  were  elected.  This  distinct  electoral  system,  alongside  the  apparent  aim  to 
ensure  the  minority  representation,  not  only  helped  characterise  an  `inclusive' 
Scottish  polity,  it  crucially  meant  that  New  Labour  was  effectively  conceding  overall 
control  of  the  new  parliament. 
It  is  important,  however,  to  examine  this  apparent  concession  more  fully  in  the 
context  of  New  Labour's  ideology  overall.  Firstly,  it  is  worth  noting  that  many  of  the 
`new'  responsibilities  of  the  Parliament  were  already  part  of  the  remit  of  the  Scottish 
Office.  The  parliament  was  to  have  limited  legislative  competence,  with  the 
responsibility  for  many  key  areas  reserved  to  Westminster.  Many  of  the  main 
reservations  cover  areas  that  are  arguably  crucial  in  terms  addressing  the  social 
problems  from  a  Scottish  perspective.  For  example,  jurisdiction  over  social  security, 
employment,  `financial  and  economic  matters'  and  the  misuse  of  drugs,  are  reserved 
powers.  From  the  outset,  therefore,  the  terms  under  which  the  Parliament  was  set  up 
challenge  the  notion  of  de-centralisation  given  the  Parliament's  fairly  modest  powers. 
Secondly,  as  I  have  argued  in  earlier  chapters,  New  Labour,  and  Blair  in  particular, 
have  outlined  a  specific  vision  for  twenty-first  century  politics  based  on  `true'  Labour 
values  and  a  liberal,  social  democratic,  consensus.  With  the  Liberal  Democrats 
increasingly  emerging  as  New  Labour's  most  likely  coalition  partner  in  Scotland  in 
1999,  the  Scottish  Parliament  offered  a  renewed  base  for  the  consensual  politics 
fundamental  to  the  Third  Way'.  Thirdly,  there  was  also  criticism  that  the  list  system 
1  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  New  Labour  did  not  seek  an  overall  majority  in  the  Parliament.  It  is  simply 
to  note  that  a  coalition  parliament  with  New  Labour  as  the  strongest  partner  is  not  incongruous  with 
Third  Way  thinking  and  that  a  specific,  apparent  yielding  of  power  can  actually  result  in  the 
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allowed  for  a  certain  amount  of  patronage,  which  allowed  `party  favourites'  to  be 
selected  and  returned  ahead  of  those  who  were  seemingly  more  competent  and, 
potentially,  more  popular  with  voters. 
Paradoxically,  despite  New  Labour's  rhetoric  in  respect  of  fairness  and 
responsiveness,  its  selection  process  for  parliamentary  candidates  was  the  focus 
negative  attention  as  it  seemed  to  indicate  that  the  prospect  of  parliamentary 
devolution  did  not  translate  into  power  for  the  Scottish  Labour  Party.  The  media  and 
opposition  parties  characterised  Labour  in  Scotland  as  controlled  by  a  "Millbank 
Mafia"  (The  Herald  7th  April  1999)  of  modernisers  whose  task  it  was  to  ensure  that 
Scottish  Labour  did  not  deviate  from  the  New  Labour  project.  It  is  clear  that  this  was 
linked  to  opposition  parties  seeking  to  make  political  capital  during  the  period  of  an 
election  campaign  -  indeed  a  crucial  theme  exploited  by  the  Scottish  National  Party 
(SNP)  was  that  of  `London  Labour'  which  Labour  activists  found  difficult  to  counter 
(The  Observer  11`h  April  1999). 
Moreover,  it  is  also  the  case  that  New  Labour  did  make  strident  efforts  to 
maintain  the  ideological  efficacy  of  its  project  by  making  clear  that  New  Labour  in 
Scotland  would  not  be  allowed  to  deviate  from  the  leadership's  views  on  key  issues. 
A  crucial  example  of  this,  discussed  in  detail  later,  was  the  leadership's  support  for 
private  finance  being  used  for  public  sector  reform  (The  Observer  11`''  April  1999)  to 
which  an  estimated  half  the  New  Labour  MSP  candidates  were  opposed  (The 
Scotsman  5th  May  1999).  Candidates  for  election  were  assessed  by  a  selection  panel, 
as  opposed  to  using  the  `one  member,  one  vote'  principle  that  had  apparently  been  so 
central  to  the  modernisation  of  the  Labour  party  and  the  creation  of  New  Labour2. 
New  Labour's  selection  panels'  rejection  of  experienced  and  competent  candidates  for 
election  to  the  parliament,  who  were  popular  with  party  activists,  seemingly 
confirmed  New  Labour's  `control  freak  tendency'  and  fuelled  speculation  that 
prospective  candidates  were  subjected  to  an  `ideological'  test  (Brown  et  al.  1999:  19). 
By  far  the  most  prominent  candidate  rejected  by  New  Labour's  selection  procedure 
was  Dennis  Canavan,  the  popular  Westminster  Labour  MP  for  Falkirk  West, 
2  The  use  of  an  electoral  college  in  New  Labour's  selection  of  its  candidate  for  leader  of  the  Welsh 
Assembly,  a  key  element  of  the  devolution  package,  was  also  criticised  in  this  context.  Blair's  favoured 
candidate  Alun  Michael  was  narrowly  elected  over  Rhodri  Morgan,  the  clear  preference  of  the  Welsh 
membership  of  the  Labour  Party.  The  trade  union  block  vote,  so  long  the  subject  of  New  Labour's 
distain,  ensured  Michael  won  (Scotland  on  Sunday  21"  February  1999). 140 
defending  a  majority  of  over  thirteen  and  a  half  thousand  (1997).  As  a  vociferous 
critic  of  PFI/PPP  and  a  supporter  of  the  abolition  of  student  tuition  fees,  his  rejection 
as  official  New  Labour  candidate  was  illustrative  of  the  New  Labour  strategy  to 
ensure  that  its  candidates  and  subsequent  MSPs  were  `on  message'  and  fully 
supportive  of  `modernisation'.  Moreover,  Canavan's  claims  that  his  non-selection  was 
New  Labour  exacting  its  revenge  for  his  voting  against  the  government  on  cuts  in 
benefits  and-  student  loans  (The  Herald  25th  April  1999),  suggested  that,  despite  de- 
centralisation  rhetoric,  the  selection  process  for  the  Scottish  Parliament  enabled  New 
Labour  to  punish  dissent.  Importantly,  one  opinion  poll,  conducted  in  advance  of 
official  campaigning,  suggested  that  a  majority  of  Scots  believed  that  the  Scottish 
Labour  Party  was  a  "puppet  party  controlled  by  its  London  leadership"  (The  Observer 
7th  February  1999).  Canavan's  decision  to  stand  independently  of  Labour  as  `the  MP 
for  Falkirk  West',  on  a  distinctly  left  wing,  pro-public  sector,  platform  presented  New 
Labour  with  difficulties,  not  least  since  it  helped  expose  the  Scottish  election  as  a 
critical  site  where  ideological  battle  between  Old  and  New  Labour  would  be  fought. 
Interestingly,  this  fight  took  place  both  inside  and  outside  the  Labour  Party  itself. 
My  argument  that  1999  and  the  Scottish  parliamentary  election  were  decisive 
in  terms  of  the  `ideological  battle'  between  Old  and  New  Labour,  is  supported  by  an 
analysis  of  further  important  political  developments:  the  `leftward'  shift  of  the  SNP  in 
key  policy  areas,  the  emergence  of  a  distinct  New  Labour  position  in  these  areas, 
seemingly  incongruous  with  wider  Scottish  opinion,  and  the  emergence  of  an 
embryonic  socialist  left,  embodied  in  the  creation  of  the  Scottish  Socialist  Party  (SSP) 
in  late  1998. 
The  period  in  the  run  up  to  the  Scottish  election  in  1999  saw  the  SNP  shift  its 
focus  away  from  the  question  of  Scottish  independence  by  increasingly  attempting  to 
attract  votes  around  `social  issues'.  Indeed,  in  the  party's  manifesto,  the  pledge  to 
hold  a  referendum  on  independence  in  the  first  term  of  the  new  parliament  came  tenth 
on  a  list  of  pledges,  behind  those  to  abolish  tuition  fees  and  the  Private  Finance 
Initiative  (PFI/PPP)  (Scottish  National  Party  1999),  allowing  it  to  be  represented  as  a 
left  alternative  to  New  Labour.  This  resonated  effectively  with  the  preferences  of 
Scottish  voters,  51%  of  whom  in  an  ICM  poll  believed  that  independence  should  be 
subordinated  to  other  concerns,  if  the  SNP  gained  the  majority  of  seats  in  the  new 
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Chancellor  Gordon  Brown  announced  a  one  pence  tax  cut  in  his  1999  budget,  the 
SNP  announced  its  `penny  for  Scotland'  policy,  suggesting  that  Scots  forgo  this  one 
pence  reduction  on  the  standard  rate  of  income  tax  and  that  the  £700  million  saved  be 
used  to  increase  public  spending.  Increasingly,  as  the  party  now  most  closely 
associated  with  a  `tax  and  spend'  agenda,  the  SNP  moved  into  Old  Labour  territory 
and  "shrewdly  exploited  the  political  space  that  now  lies  between  the  social  liberalism 
of  New  Labour  and  the  old  left"  (The  Observer  7th  February  1999).  The  SNP  made 
clear  its  intention  to  try  to  attract  votes  from  people  left  behind  by  New  Labour  -  its 
core  support  in  "the  cities,  the  housing  schemes,  the  trade  unions  and  the  municipal 
workforces"  (The  Observer  1  l`"  April  1999)  -  with  its  promise  of  "social  democracy 
with  a  Scottish  face"  (Salmond  quoted  in  ibid).  This  drew  criticism  that  the  SNP  had 
cynically  adopted  this  stance  because  its  leaders  believed  "that  is  where  the  country's 
political  heart  lies....  and  that  there  were  votes  by  the  barrow-load  to  be  won  by  a 
party  which  positioned  itself  in  `Old'  Labour  territory"  (Neil  l999)3. 
However,  the  SNP's  position  did  present  New  Labour  with  particular 
difficulties,  since  evidence  at  the  time  suggested  that  Labour  supporters  were 
increasingly  disaffected  with  the  failure  of  New  Labour  to  advance  a  more 
progressive  agenda,  and  crucially,  with  its  continuing  support  for  PFI/PPP  (The 
Observer  7`"  February  1999,18`h  April  1999;  The  Herald  16`h  April  1999).  Indeed 
there  was  also  some  agreement  amongst  voters  (49%)  that  New  Labour  in  government 
was  "just  as  right  wing  as  the  Tories"  (The  Observer  7`h  February  1999).  More 
importantly,  perhaps,  for  New  Labour,  was  that  as  the  SNP  attempted  to  convince 
voters  that  it  was  a  left  wing  alternative,  both  parties  increasingly  became 
"interchangeable  for  many  voters:  amongst  the  supporters  of  these  parties,  the  other  is 
by  far  the  most  popular  second  preference"  (Brown  et  al.  1999:  151).  The  key 
challenge  in  the  `new'  politics  for  New  Labour  was  to  differentiate  itself  whilst 
"trying  to  inspire  loyalty  with  Labour  switchers  inspired  by  the  SNP's  leftist 
populism"  (D.  Alexander4,  quoted  in  The  Observer  1  1th  April  1999). 
3  Although,  there  is  not  the  scope  to  discuss  this  fully,  it  is  worth  noting  that  Neil's  commentary  has 
some  salience.  Two  important  examples  that  seemingly  support  his  position  are  the  SNP's  use  of  PFI 
and  support  for  it  in  the  Perth  in  Kinross  Council  which  it  controlled  at  this  time  and  its  apparently 
contradictory,  `New  Labour  style',  pursuit  of  business  support  throughout  the  election  period. 
4  Douglas  Alexander,  MP  for  Paisley  South  and  aide  to  Gordon  Brown,  outlined  New  Labour  approach 
to  the  1999  election  in  a  key  policy  document  in  1997. 142 
New  Labour  sought  to  counter  the  SNP  by  reinforcing  the  idea  of  Scottish 
independence  as  a  messy  and  costly  `divorce'  and,  crucially,  New  Labour  was 
represented  as  the  defender  of  the  Unionist  faith,  a  position  long  associated  with  the 
Conservatives  in  Scotland.  Indeed,  New  Labour  arguably  further  paralleled  the 
Conservatives  by  adopting  the  type  of  negative  approach  to  elections  that  they  had 
used  effectively  against  Labour,  especially  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.  Key  elements  of 
the  SNP  agenda  were  parodied  as  misguided,  ideological  suicide,  in  the  way  Labour 
had  been  by  the  Conservatives,  clearly  presenting  a  challenge  to  the  notion  of  a  `new' 
politics  in  Scotland.  Thus: 
For  unilateralism,  read  Kosovo;  for  the  Daily  Mail,  read  the  Daily 
Record;  for  tax  and  spend,  read,  well,  tax  and  spend;  for  Clause  Four, 
read  separatism  (The  Herald  13th  April  1999). 
Centrally  connected  to  this  was  New  Labour's  overt  effort  to  develop  a  key 
ideological  concern  in  the  Scottish  context,  its  positive  relationship  with  business. 
Whilst  this  is  discussed  in  detail  below,  it  is  important  to  note  that  New  Labour  sought 
to  differentiate  itself  from  the  SNP  by  demonstrating  the  capacity  for  fiscal  discipline 
and  an  ability  to  work  well  with  business,  which  had  arguably  resulted  in  victory  at 
the  1997  election.  A  victory  for  the  SNP  would  serve  to  discourage  investment  and 
job  creation.  New  Labour,  on  the  other  hand,  had  evidently  adopted  policies  since  its 
election  in  1997  which  "have  shown  that  New  Labour  understands,  and  is  committed 
to,  working  with  business  for  the  renewal  of  our  country"  (McConnell  1999).  This 
seemingly  demonstrated  the  `import'  of  the  New  Labour  tendency  of  privileging 
wealth  creation  over  wealth  redistribution  to  Scotland  and  underpinned  a  raft  of 
policies  that,  arguably,  Labour's  grassroots  support  there  found  difficult  to 
countenance.  Moreover,  in  its  approach  to  business,  New  Labour  cast  the  SNP  in  a 
negative,  clearly  Old  Labour  light,  stressing  the  burden  on  business  it  would  create, 
which,  I  would  argue,  helped  set  the  tone  of  the  Scottish  election  as  a  key  site  in  the 
battle  between  Old  and  New  Labour. 
A  consideration  of  important  debates  over  key  policy  areas  further  supports 
this  argument.  By  far  the  most  important  of  these  was  that  over  the  use  of  private 
S  Jack  McConnell  MP  was  the  Scottish  Labour  Party's  Environmental  Affairs  spokesperson  until  his 
election  to  the  Scottish  Parliament  in  1999.  He  became  the  First  Minister  of  Scotland  in  November 
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finance  in  the  public  sector  not  least  because,  in  the  context  of  the  continuation  and 
proliferation  of  PFI/PPs,  New  Labour  appeared  most  divided  along  `traditional'  and 
`modernised'  lines.  As  noted  earlier,  the  New  Labour  leadership  had  made  it  clear  that 
there  would  be  no  deviation  from  its  position  and  sought  to  ensure  that  the  few 
traditionally  pro-trade  union,  pro-public  spending,  anti-poverty,  parliamentary 
candidates  within  its  ranks,  who  had  managed  to  make  it  through  the  party's  selection 
procedure,  were  brought  into  line.  One  such  candidate  was  John  McAllion,  the  most 
well  known  amongst  Scottish  Labour's  potential  `awkward  squad',  whom  many 
expected  to  become  the  `Tony  Benn'  of  Holyrood,  who  was  promoted  to  become  one 
of  Donald  Dewar's  spokespeople  during  the  campaign.  This  failed  as  a  strategy  to 
underplay  division  and  dissent  over  fundamental  New  Labour  premises,  to  an  extent, 
since  McAllion  continued  to  make  his  opposition  to  PFUPPPs  clear  by  publicly 
calling  on  prospective  MSPs  to  find  an  alternative  (The  Scotsman  30th  April  1999)  and 
stating  that  there  was  "no  real  alternative  to  public  investment"  (The  Herald  8th  March 
1999).  McAllion's  position  clearly  found  resonance  with  Labour  supporters  and  was 
also  echoed  by  key  Labour  figures  in  Scotland.  For  example  "the  party's  biggest  fund 
raiser  north  of  the  border",  its  treasurer,  Bob  Thompson,  claimed  that  PFI  schemes 
meant  workers  "were  being  sold  like  feudal  serfs"  (The  Observer  18th  April  1999). 
Thompson  also  urged  a  re-think  on  PFI/PPPs,  claiming  they  were: 
Bad  for  the  tax-payer  and  too  expensive.  It  means  our  hospitals  and 
our  schools  are  going  to  be  owned  and  run  by  private  companies  and  I 
think  that  is  wrong.  I  would  call  on  New  Labour  to  rethink  their  policy 
(quoted  on  BBC  News-Online  16`h  April  1999). 
Moreover,  a  BBC  Newsnight  survey  revealed  that  at  least  twenty-five  of  New 
Labour's  Scottish  parliamentary  candidates  were  against  PFI/PPPs  (The  Observer  18th 
April  1999). 
There  was  also  clear  and  vociferous  opposition  to  PFIIPPPs  in  the  trade  unions 
in  Scotland,  and  the  STUC  annual  congress  in  April  1999  was  a  crucial  flashpoint  in 
the  battle.  In  his  opening  address  to  the  congress,  the  General  Secretary,  Bill  Speirs, 
stated  that  "public  services  must  not  be  seen  as  a  drain  on  funding  and  that  PFI  must 
be  stopped  as  it  was  inefficient  and  short  termist"  (Speirs  1999).  With  many  unions 
using  this  as  the  arena  to  bring  their  opposition  into  the  open  and  Congress  itself 
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the  issue  was  increasingly  presented  as  a  fissure  within  Labour  and  with  its  traditional 
allies  that  was  "cracking  open  day  by  day"  (BBC  News-Online  10h  April  1999).  This 
situation  was  exacerbated  by  New  Labour  claims  that  staff  affected  by  the 
controversial  Edinburgh  Royal  Infirmary  (ERI)  PFI  project  were  "absolutely 
delighted"  with  it  (MacKay6  quoted  in  The  Herald  16`h  April  1999).  These  were 
roundly  rejected  by  workers  there,  and  New  Labour  faced  mounting  opposition  to  PFI 
from  outside  the  Labour  Movement,  most  notably  from  the  British  Medical 
Association  (BMA).  Moreover,  New  Labour's  apparent  vulnerability  on  the  issue  was 
further  demonstrated  when  their  most  likely  coalition  partner  in  the  new  parliament,  if 
they  failed  to  gain  overall  control,  the  Liberal  Democrats,  condemned  PFI  in  their 
election  manifesto  as  "expensive  and  inefficient"  (Scottish  Liberal  Democrats  1999). 
Overall,  in  response,  New  Labour  sought  to  suggest  that  the  development  of  a  new 
infrastructure  in  Scotland  depended  on  the  use  of  private  finance  and  to  openly  reject 
"the  misguided  notion  that  the  Scottish  taxpayer  is  well  served  by  a  narrow 
ideological  approach  to  partnership  with  the  private  sector  which  can  only  leave 
Scotland  with  fewer  schools  and  hospitals"  (W.  Alexander  quoted  in  The  Herald  16th 
April  19997).  Hence  the  New  Labour  position  on  financing  `modernisation'  in  health, 
education  and  housing  -  key  devolved  areas  -  was  maintained,  and  opposition  was 
dismissed  as  an  `outmoded',  even  Old  Labour,  concern  for  ideology  over  pragmatism. 
Thus,  New  Labour  fought  its  election  campaign  in  Scotland  fully  supportive  of 
an  extremely  unpopular  policy  that  paradoxically  presented  its  greatest  test  in  terms  of 
de-centralisation,  and  bringing  decision  making  closer  to  the  people  of  Scotland.  The 
use  of  private  finance  for  public  services,  coupled  with  New  Labour's  continuing 
support  for  `up-front'  student  tuition  fees  -a  policy  that  all  the  mainstream  parties, 
including  the  Conservatives,  were  opposed  to  -  arguably  demonstrated  in  sharp  relief 
to  Scottish  voters  the  `distance'  Labour  had  travelled  in  its  transition  to  New  Labour. 
Hence  the  party  of  free  education  was  exposed  as  the  party  of  fee  education  and  the 
New  Labour  flagship  PFI  policy  set  it  against  its  traditional  support. 
The  third  strand  of  my  argument  that  the  Scottish  election  in  1999  was 
decisive  in  terms  of  the  ideological  battle  between  Old  and  New  Labour  concerns  the 
6  Angus  MacKay  was  the  New  Labour  Scottish  Parliamentary  candidate  for  Edinburgh  South  in  1999. 
7  Wendy  Alexander,  MP  for  Paisley  North  was  Scottish  Labour's  finance  and  industry  spokesperson 
and  Scottish  parliamentary  candidate  in  1999. 145 
creation  of  the  Scottish  Socialist  Party  (SSP)  and  its  emergence  as  a  credible,  if  infant, 
political  force.  Although  it  is  recognised  that  this  process  was  embryonic  at  that  time, 
it  remains  important  to  note  the  development  of  an  alternative,  largely  non- 
mainstream  party  that,  in  many  ways,  was  also  moving  into  the  political  space  created 
by  New  Labour's  apparent  abandonment  of  the  assumed  values  of  Old  Labour.  The 
possibility  of  a  `new'  Scottish  polity  and  the  creation  of  a  Scottish  Parliament 
provided  the  SSP  with  a  platform  "to  proclaim  the  arrival  of  a  new  and  viable  socialist 
force  that  can  play  a  major  role  in  the  coming  period"  (SSP  1999a).  The  party,  it  was 
suggested,  was  well  placed  to  fill  the  vacuum  created  by  the  "death  of  the  socialist 
soul  of  the  Labour  Party"  (Sheridan  quoted  in  The  Herald  13`h  April  19998).  The  party 
expected  its  left  wing,  pro-public  sector,  programme,  focused  on  material  inequalities 
and  the  rejection  of  "the  profit-driven,  free-market  system"  (ibid)  to  "have  a  real 
resonance  with  the  people  of  Scotland"  (Bonnar  19999). 
Thus  the  SSP  sought  to  relate  to  what  it  perceived  as  a  gulf  between  the  values 
of  the  Scottish  people  and  those  which  guided  the  mainstream  political  parties, 
especially  Labour,  who  had  for  so  long  been  able  to  rely  on  their  allegiance.  It 
therefore  proposed  a  new  system  of  values  based  on  priorities  for  the  NHS,  public 
sector  funding,  education  and  collective  ownership,  which  it  perceived  were  more  in 
tune  with  the  interests  of  ordinary  working  class  people  in  Scotland  (Scottish  Socialist 
Party  1999b).  This  allowed  the  SSP  the  opportunity  to  set  itself  against  "the  old  and 
the  mainstream  view  that  the  free  market  is  the  only  show  in  town...  to  point  the  finger 
at  capitalism...  to  cut  through  the  propaganda  that  nothing  can  be  done  ...  to  challenge 
the  New  Labour  notion  that  wealth  creation  is  more  important  than  wealth 
redistribution"  (Sheridan  1999).  Although  it  was  seemingly  moving  into  Old  Labour 
territory,  the  SSP  sought  to  differentiate  itself  as  a  new  political  force  by  claiming  its 
aim  was  not  to  "reincarnate  Old  Labour  or  the  ghost  of  Keir  Hardie  or  return  to  the 
radical  reformism  long  associated  with  Scottish  politics"  (McCoombes  199910)  and 
stating  its  long-term  objective  of  the  creation  of  an  "independent  socialist  Scotland". 
8  Tommy  Sheridan  is  the  National  Convener  of  the  Scottish  Socialist  Party.  He  was  Scottish 
parliamentary  candidate  for  the  Glasgow  Pollok  constituency  in  1999  and  first-placed  on  the  SSP's 
Glasgow  `top-up'  list. 
9  Based  on  an  interview  on  21s`  February  1999  with  Bill  Bonnar,  Scottish  Socialist  Party  spokesperson.  10  Alan  McCoombes  was  the  editor  of  the  SSP's  Scottish  Socialist  Voice  in  1999. 146 
The  SSP  manifesto  outlined  a  programme  rooted  in  the  `poverty  motivated', 
community  politics  which  had  been  central  to  its  development  and,  arguably,  central 
to  political  developments  in  Scotland,  especially  in  the  West.  Whilst  focusing  on 
policies  concerning  key  devolved  areas,  the  SSP  also  demanded  an  extension  of  the 
powers  of  the  parliament  to  include  responsibility  for  all  taxation  that  was 
underpinned  by  a  call  to  "carry  out  a  wholesale  redistribution  of  wealth  from  big 
business  and  the  rich  to  the  working  class  and  the  poor"  (Scottish  Socialist  Party 
1999b),  and  control  over  the  benefits  system  and  employment  legislation.  The  SSP 
arguably  offered  a  political  home  to  disaffected  Labour  supporters.  Despite  its 
protestations,  the  party  was  perceived,  to  an  extent,  as  the  standard  bearer  of  Old 
Labour  values  and  policies.  It  also  presented  a  distinctly  left-wing  programme  not 
coupled  with  an  overarching  concern  to  appeal  to  business  interests  like  that  of  the 
SNP.  New  Labour's  de-centralisation  in  practice,  therefore,  helped  give  life  to  a  new 
political  force  in  Scotland  and,  as  a  result,  the  possibility  for  voters  to  retain  Old 
Labour  allegiance  by  not  voting  Labour  was  opened  up  in  the  most  significant  way  for 
many  decades.  Moreover,  in  the  context  of  Scottish  devolution,  as  Brown  et  al.  (1999: 
151)  noted  :  "policy  preferences  matter  above  all  else..  .  vague  talk  about  the  renewing 
democracy  has  not  resonated  with  the  people  so  much  as  quite  traditional  concerns 
with  social  and  economic  policy".  In  this  respect,  the  SSP  played  (and  continue  to 
play)  a  crucial  role  in  exposing  key  distinctions  between  Old  and  New  Labour,  and 
thus  helped  define  1999  as  a  significant  moment  in  the  transition  to  New  Labour  in 
Scotland. 
The  outcome  of  the  Scottish  election  in  1999,  and  the  subsequent  election  in 
2003,  remains  relevant  in  the  context  of  the  argument  outlined  above.  As 
demonstrated  in  Table  1.,  to  some  extent  New  Labour  did,  and  continues  to,  retain  the 
support  of  its  traditional  base,  if  this  support  is  more  qualified.  It  emerged 
comfortably  ahead  in  terms  of  `first  past  the  post'  seats  and  in  `top  up'  list  voting,  in 
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Table  1. 
Scottish  Parliament  Election  Results,  May  1999 
First  Ballot  &  Seats  Second  Ballot  &  Seats  Total  Seats 
Labour  39%  53  33%  3  56 
SNP  29%  7  28%  28  35 
Conservatives  16%  0  16%  18  18 
Liberal-  14%  12  13%  5  17 
Democrats 
Others  2.7%  1  6.8%  3  3* 
*includes  1  Independent,  1  SSP  and  1  Green  Party  MSP. 
(Adapted  from  Mooney  and  Johnstone  2000) 
It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that  New  Labour's  success  was  tarnished  by  the  fact  that 
a  reduction  on  its  1997  vote  of  between  seven  and  nine  percentage  points  across  both 
ballots.  New  Labour  also  polled  less  in  the  list  vote  than  it  had  in  1983  -  arguably  a 
high  water-mark  for  Old  Labour".  Moreover  the  election  of  the  candidate  New 
Labour  had  publicly  rejected,  Canavan,  who  not  only  beat  his  New  Labour  opponent 
by  twelve  thousand  votes  but  also  achieved  55%  of  a  turnout  of  63%  in  Falkirk  West, 
did  suggest  something  of  a  continuing  commitment  to  Old  Labour  values.  The 
election  of  Scottish  Socialist  Party  convener,  Tommy  Sheridan,  from  the  Glasgow 
`top-up'  list  having  come  third  on  the  constituency  vote  behind  New  Labour  and  the 
SNP,  is  also  indicative  of  this  commitment.  In  addition,  the  SNP  made  something  of  a 
breakthrough  in  Scotland's  Central  Belt  -  traditionally  Labour  territory  -  and, 
whereas  in  1997  there  were  four  seats  where  New  Labour  held  a  less  than  twenty 
point  lead  over  a  second-placed  SNP  candidate,  there  were  now  thirty-four  such  seats 
(Curtice  1999).  At  this  stage  the  "battle  for  the  hearts  and  minds  of  a  nation"  (Sunday 
Herald  9`h  May  1999)  was  clearly  set  to  continue. 
Specific  outcomes  of  the  Scottish  election  in  1999,  therefore,  did  seem  to 
present  a  challenge  to  the  idea  that  that  "Scots  still  embrace  Tony  Blair's  new  Labour 
vision....  [which  is]  just  as  popular  with  voters  north  of  the  border  as  it  is  south"  (Neil 
11  For  a  concise  breakdown  of  voting  in  Scotland  in  general  elections  1945-1997  see  Brown  et  al.  1999: 
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The  Scotsman  26`h  April  1999).  Equally,  though,  the  notion  that  these  outcomes  would 
help  create  a  `red  shift'  manifest  in  the  Scottish  Parliament  proved  premature.  On  the 
whole,  for  example,  New  Labour  have  not  faced  its  predicted  nemesis  in  the 
parliament  in  the  shape  of  a  divisive,  "socialist  faction"  from  within  its  own  ranks 
(The  Scotsman  27`h  February  1999;  18th  March  1999).  Indeed,  from  this  historical 
vantage  point,  I  would  argue  that,  as  ideological  battleground  for  the  Labour  Party, 
1999  marked  the  beginning  of  a  process  of  Old/New  Labour  convergence  in  terms  of 
its  leadership  and  policy  thrust.  This  in  turn  has  had  an  impact  on  wider  attitudes  to 
the  Scottish  Parliament  and  its  effectiveness.  Given  earlier  `faith'  in  the  institution 
before  its  creation,  it  has  clearly  not  lived  up  to  expectations.  For  example  in  1999, 
according  to  the  Scottish  Social  Attitudes  survey,  56%  of  respondents  believed  the 
Scottish  Parliament  would  increase  the  standard  of  education  in  Scotland.  By  2002 
this  had  decreased  to  25%.  In  terms  of  the  democratic  effectiveness  that  New  Labour, 
in  particular,  placed  at  the  centre  of  its  claims  for  devolution,  in  2002  only  31% 
agreed  that  the  parliament  had  given  people  more  say  in  how  Scotland  is  governed, 
compared  with  the  64%  in  1999  who  predicted  it  would  (McCrone  2003). 
The  `awkward  squad'  outside  the  Labour  Party  -  Canavan,  Sheridan  and 
Green  Party  MSP,  Robin  Harper  -  have  made  something  of  an  impact,  raising  issues 
like  the  provision  of  free  school  meals,  for  example,  and,  in  Sheridan's  case, 
introducing  a  successful  Bill  to  end  the  practice  of  `poinding'  and  warrant  sales  for 
debt  recovery  12.  But  they  remained  a  minority  force,  though,  as  demonstrated  in  the 
table  below,  parliamentary  activity  and  extra-parliamentary  campaigning  have  helped 
consolidate  and  improve  both  the  Green  Party  and  the  Scottish  Socialist  Party  after 
their  break-through  in  1999: 
12  This  specifically  Scottish  process  involved  impounding  and  selling  the  property  of  a  debtor.  In  recent 
years,  it  was  most  commonly  used  in  the  recovery  of  poll-tax  and  council  tax  debts  owed  to  local 
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Table  2. 
Scottish  Parliament  Election  Results,  May  2003 
First  Ballot  &  Seats  Second  Ballot  &  Seats  Total  Seats 
Labour  35%  46  29%  4  50 
SNP  24%  9  21%  18  27 
Conservatives  17%  3  16%  15  18 
Liberal  15%  13  12%  4  17 
Democrat 
Green  -  0  6.7%  7  7 
Scottish  6.2%  0  6.9%  66 
Socialist 
Others  3.5%  2  9.0%  2  4* 
*includes  3  Independents  and  1  Senior  Citizens  Unity  MSP. 
(Adapted  from  BBC  News-Online  2  °d  May  2003). 
As  discussed  below,  the  issue  of  PPP/PFI  has  continued  to  be  contentious 
(Speirs  200113)  though,  in  terms  of  official  parliamentary  activity,  it  has  not  become 
the  "most  defining  issue  of  the  Scottish  Parliament"  (McAllion  200114)  and 
opposition  to  it  from  workers,  trade  unions  and  MSPs  has  been  either  muted  or 
focused  on  extra-parliamentary  campaigning.  Moreover,  despite  an  often  negative 
experience  of  PPP  in  Scotland'5,  what  turned  out  to  be  a  muffled  challenge  to  it  in  the 
context  of  the  1999  election  by  the  unions  (again  discussed  below),  largely  helped  set 
the  tone.  Overall,  the  lack  of  overt,  concerted  and  consistent  opposition  from  an 
`awkward  squad'  within  Labour's  ranks  that  was  expected  to  emerge  after  1999,  and 
four  years  experience  of  devolution  are  indicative  of  an  important  trajectory  -  the 
ascendancy  of  New  Labour's  vision  for  `reform'  and  `modernisation'  in  Scotland. 
Support  from  a  coalition  partner  in  Scotland  that  has  evidently  accepted  the  New 
Labour  vision,  despite  some  early  success  in  forcing  through  at  least  one  key  element 
13  Based  on  interview,  11`h  June  2001. 
14  Based  on  interview,  20th  November  2000. 
15  For  example,  the  Edinburgh  Royal  Infirmary  PFI  project  continued  to  be  the  focus  of  negative 
publicity.  The  hospital  cost  £180  million  to  build  but  the  taxpayer  is  likely  to  pay  more  than  £1  billion 
in  rent  to  the  private  consortium  running  it  over  a  thirty  year  period  (Sunday  Mail  2°d  December  2001). 150 
of  its  own,  arguably  more  progressive  1999  agenda  16,  helped  strengthen  New  Labour 
overall.  Having  outlined  above  key  processes  that  helped  define  what  was 
characterised  as  a  `new'  era  in  Scottish  politics,  I  now  turn  to  examine  some  of  these 
in  greater  detail  and  to  explore  `actually  existing'  New  Labour  in  government,  in 
Scotland. 
3.3:  The  Vision  of  Modernisation  through  Knowledge 
Two  key  strands  of  New  Labour  ideology  are  clearly  evident  in  its  approach  to 
Scotland  and  are  crucial  in  framing  both  rhetoric  and  policy.  They  are  `modernisation' 
and  the  assumptions  that  characterise  the  `knowledge  economy'.  Embracing 
`modernisation'  and  the  `knowledge  economy'  are  central  and  overarching  elements 
upon  which  the  success  of  the  government's  objectives  in  the  Scottish  Parliament  is 
contingent.  From  New  Labour's  perspective,  `modernisation'  has  also  been  cast  as 
what  has  ultimately  delivered  devolution  and  de-centralisation,  though  as  noted,  this 
is  overstated.  The  mobilisation  of  the  vision  of  the  `knowledge  economy'  reflects 
New  Labour's  wider  concerns  regarding  the  development  of  human  capital  and  an 
apparently  paradigmatic  shift  occurring  as  a  result  of  demands  of  globalisation. 
However,  in  line  with  the  effort  to  represent,  relate  to  and,  indeed,  reinforce  the 
special  sense  of  `a  historic  moment'  in  the  context  of  devolution  in  Scotland, 
embracing  the  knowledge  economy  has  been  presented  as  a  once  in  a  life-time 
opportunity  for  Scotland's  problems  to  be  solved. 
Hopes  for  the  knowledge  economy  in  Scotland  are  also  imbued  with  a  further, 
specifically  Scottish  twist,  linked  to  its  supposedly  enduring  social  democratic  values 
and,  crucially,  are  intrinsically  connected  to  the  generalised  benefits  of  economic 
transformation: 
The  Scottish  Parliament  shares  its  infancy  with  the  information  age. 
For  the  new  Scotland,  the  real  opportunity  of  the  information  age  is  not 
simply  technological  or  economic,  but  the  opportunity  to  renew  some 
of  our  most  revered  values  of  social  justice  and  equality  of  worth  (W. 
Alexanders7,1999:  166). 
16  The  Liberal  Democrats  made  the  abolition  of  `up  front'  student  tuition  fees  in  Scotland  a  condition  of 
power  sharing  in  the  new  Scottish  Executive  in  1999. 
17  In  May  1999  Wendy  Alexander  became  the  Minister  for  Communities  in  the  Scottish  Executive. 151 
The  possible  opportunities  for  economic  growth  are  generally  framed  in  terms  of  the 
demands,  challenges  and  expectations  of  the  `knowledge  economy',  as  are  economic 
initiatives  and  strategies.  Policy  is  defined  as  in  the  service  of  both  relating  to  what  is 
assumed  to  already  exist,  and  of  helping  to  create  the  appropriate  conditions  to  allow 
the  knowledge  economy  to  develop  further.  For  example: 
We  will  significantly  improve  the  skills  base  of  Scotland  to  be  better 
prepared  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  knowledge  economy.  We  will 
increase  the  apprenticeship  programme  to  30,000  (Scottish  Executive 
2003a:  218). 
As  Warhurst  and  Thompson  (1999:  88)  have  argued: 
Knowledge  work  has  [thus]  become  a  mantra  for  the  country's  future 
economic  development,  offering  Scotland  a  rationale  for  the 
development  of  human  capital  in  the  workplace,  a  blueprint  for  the 
creation  and  expansion  of  competitive  `world  class'  Scottish  firms,  the 
attraction  and  continued  presence  of  foreign  firms  in  Scotland  and  so  a 
way  of  preventing  Scotland  becoming  a  peripheral  low  skill,  low  wage 
national  economy  within  the  intensely  competitive  global  economy. 
Yet  the  whole  notion  of  the  knowledge  economy  is  problematic,  not  least 
since  its  apparent  characteristics  are  notably  vague,  involving  the  development  and 
utilisation  of  knowledge  skills  that  are  not  only  not  clearly  defined  and  are 
represented  as  motor  of  both  economic  and  democratic  growth: 
In  the  economy  of  the  21s`  century,  knowledge,  human  capital,  is  the 
future  and  fairness  demands  it  is  open  to  all  (Blair  2003). 
The  `knowledge  economy'  is  uncritically  accepted  as  the  next  `big  thing'  and  in 
Scotland  in  economic,  social,  and  even  cultural  terms  it  is  utilised  as  an  ideological 
`life-rafft'  marshalled  to  both  inspire  and  to  appear  inspired.  However  in  Scotland,  as 
in  the  rest  of  the  UK,  it  represents  a  vision  that  is  being  talked  into  existence  with  very 
limited  results.  Little  close  attention  is  paid  to  the  quality  of  jobs  that  the  knowledge 
vision  assumes  will  be  created.  It  is  not  clear,  for  example,  how  Scotland  will  be 
prevented  from  becoming  (or  for  many,  remaining)  a  low  skill,  low  wage  economy. 
Also,  whilst  a  shift  to  services  away  from  `traditional'  industries  like  manufacturing 
18  This  document  set  out  the  priorities  of  the  Labour-Liberal  Democrat  coalition  government  after  the 
second  Scottish  parliamentary  elections  in  May  2003. 152 
that  dominated  the  Scottish  economy  in  the  past  can  be  assumed,  in  rhetorical  terms, 
to  mean  a  shift  towards  `knowledge  work',  the  reality  is  very  different  -job  content  is 
often  not  what  could  in  any  way  be  classed  as  `knowledge'  work.  Such  work  is  often 
so  routinised  that,  even  when  it  loosely  involves  the  transfer  of  knowledge,  it  bears 
little  resemblance  to  the  emancipatory  `knowledge'  work  central  to  the  New  Labour 
vision.  Indeed  as  Warhust  and  Thompson  note: 
The  `McJob'  not  the  `iMac  job'  is  more  likely  to  characterise  new 
employment  (1999:  88). 
From  the  perspective  of  this  research,  the  continuing  existence  of  peripheral,  low- 
skill,  employment  that  the  knowledge  economy  is  expected  to  obliterate  in  the  longer 
term,  raises  questions  regarding  the  relationship  between  the  New  Labour/Third  Way 
knowledge  vision  and  the  hard  reality  of  a  lack  of  evidence  of  work  being 
transformed: 
The  blue-collar  working  class,  the  main  focus  of  traditional  leftist 
politics  is  disappearing.  It  isn't  true  that  manufacturing  jobs  are  simply 
being  replaced  by  routinised  service  occupations  or  `McJobs'.  It  is 
skilled  workers,  especially  `symbolic'  workers  who  are  in  demand  in 
the  knowledge  economy,  not  unskilled  workers,  who  are  in  fact 
threatened  with  marginality.  Moreover,  even  low-level  service 
occupations  can  provide  an  avenue  of  mobility  into  better  paid  jobs  in 
a  way  blue-collar  work  by  and  large  did  not  (Giddens  2001  a:  4). 
Neither  four  years  of  devolution,  nor  so-called  de-centralisation,  have  helped  bring 
about  the  highly  skilled  (and  perpetual  upskilling),  highly  valued  and  well  paid 
`knowledge'  work  both  predicted  by  Giddens  and  apparently  sought  after  by  the 
government  in  Scotland.  Indeed,  in  relation  to  the  main  case  study  of  this  research,  the 
electronics  industry  is  one  of  Scotland's  largest  exporter  and  major  players  in  the 
Scottish  economy.  A  key  argument  of  later  chapters  is  that  the  domination  of  local 
labour  markets  by  both  large  electronics  firms  and  the  clusters  of  smaller  one  that 
have  emerged  around  them,  has  a  specifically  negative  impact  on  economies.  This 
severely  limits  the  possibility  of  a  knowledge  economy  materialising  as  characterised 
in  the  knowledge  vision.  Moreover,  electronics  remained  until  recently  a  largely 
manufacturing  based  industry  in  Scotland.  `Silicon  Glen'  has  not  evolved  in  a  way 
that  necessarily  mirrors  `Silicon  Valley'  in  the  USA.  Rather,  the  retention  of  research 
and  development  functions  in  the  `home'  countries  of  electronics'  major  players,  has 153 
resulted  in  a  `host'  country  like  Scotland  relying  on  employment  from  labour 
intensive  functions  that  are  vulnerable  to  alternative,  `offshore',  competition  and  to 
developments  in  the  labour  process.  This  vulnerability  has  been  fully  demonstrated  in 
the  first  four  years  of  devolution  as  more  than  eleven  thousand  jobs  were  lost  in 
electronics  in  Scotland  between  1999  and  early  2003  (The  Herald  12`h  January  2003). 
The  `knowledge  economy'  is  also  interrelated  to  New  Labour's  vision  of 
work,  not  least  in  the  sense  that  appropriately  trained,  and  skilled,  knowledge  workers 
are  seemingly  unlikely  to  ever  encounter  a  lack  of  work.  It  is  also  linked  to  the  New 
Labour  vision  of  work  as  the  panacea  for  ending  social  exclusion  and  eradicating 
poverty  in  Scotland.  Unsurprisingly,  the  Scottish  solution  to  the  Scottish  problem  in 
this  respect  mirrors  that  of  New  Labour  in  the  rest  of  the  UK: 
For  most  people  of  working  age,  the  best  way  to  avoid  poverty  is  to  be 
in  paid  work.  Work  is  invariably  the  best  route  out  of  poverty.  Two 
thirds  of  people  who  escaped  from  poverty  in  the  early  1990s  did  so 
because  someone  in  their  household  either  started  work  or  increased 
their  earnings.  So  this  is  a  government  defined  by  its  commitment  to 
work  (W.  Alexander  1999:  158). 
This  demonstrates  a  further  contradiction,  both  in  terms  of  the  knowledge  economy 
and  in  terms  of  New  Labour's  characterisation  of  work.  The  vision  of  the  knowledge 
economy  and  the  representation  of  its  benefits  are  implicitly  underpinned  by  a  `high 
road'  strategy  of  growth  and  development'  9.  Yet  little  evidence  is  advanced  that  this 
`high  road'  is  available  or  that  employers  are  prepared  to  adhere  to  it.  As  Harrison 
(1997:  213)  has  pointed  out,  contemporary  capitalist  economies  and  their  labour 
markets  continue  to  be  defined  in  terms  of  seeking  a  "low  road  to  company  profit" 
that  involves  cheapening  labour  and  costs,  `outsourcing'  to  less  developed  countries, 
and  subcontracting  to  low  wage  employers.  There  is  clear  evidence  that  major  players 
in  the  Scottish  economy  are  well  advanced  in  a  journey  down  this  `low  road',  as  will 
be  demonstrated  in  the  following  chapters.  Devolution,  thus  far,  has  been  unable  to 
address  this  and  the  New  Labour  ideology  of  work  ending  poverty  and  exclusion  does 
seem  to  be  premised  on  a  contradictory  `quantity  over  quality'  that,  though  obscured 
in  `knowledge'  and  other  rhetoric,  has  clearly  negative  results.  As  with  the  rest  of  the 
19  See  Harrison  1997:  213,  Warhurst  and  Thompson  1999,  and  Warhurst  2002  for  outline  definitions  of 
this  `high  road'  generally  and  its  `knowledge'  work. 154 
UK,  there  is  little  recognition  of  continuing  exclusion  in  work.  For  example,  since  the 
creation  of  the  Scottish  parliament  the  numbers  of  working  poor  have  increased  by 
40%  (Milne  2003:  7).  Focusing  attention  and  resources  on  promoting  already 
exaggerated  positive  aspects  of  the  `knowledge  economy'  (Warhurst  and  Thompson 
1999:  88)  can  serve  to  detract  from  fundamental  New  Labour  claims  regarding  the 
benefits  of  work.  Underlying  the  New  Labour  vision  for  Scotland  is  that  any  work  is 
to  be  welcomed.  This,  and  the  reinforcing  of  the  knowledge  vision  in  the  Scottish 
context,  helps  demonstrate  a  central  element  of  New  Labour's  Third  Way  that  sees 
continuities  in  socio-economic  processes  marginalised  in  relation  to  change  (Raco 
2002a:  42). 
3.4:  An  Entrepreneurial  Vision? 
One  central  element  of  the  New  Labour  vision  for  Scotland,  exposed  clearly 
during  the  1999  election  campaign,  was  its  desire  to  foster  a  positive  relationship  with 
business,  both  indigenous  and  international  corporations  (MacDonald  199920).  Whilst 
this  has  clear  resonance  with  New  Labour's  UK  wide  orientation,  as  noted  earlier, 
business  has  been,  and  continues  to  be,  vigorously  pursued.  This  has  resulted  in  an 
active  engagement  with,  what  are  assumed  to  be,  specifically  Scottish  values. 
Although  Scotland's  political  history,  especially  over  the  last  two  decades,  is 
suggestive  of  both  a  rejection  of  neo-liberalism  and  a  continuing  commitment  to  the 
approach  that  helped  characterise  what  became  known  as  Old  Labour,  the  relationship 
with  business  became  central  to  New  Labour's  vision  of  the  `new'  Scotland.  Indeed 
the  construction  of  a  `new'  relationship  with  business  represented  a  point  of 
convergence  with  a  New  Labour  nationalism.  This  is  not  based  on  the  perceived 
stronger  traditions  of  social  solidarity  and  labourism,  the  focus  on  which  had  stood 
Labour  in  good  stead  in  Scotland  during  the  years  of  Conservative  domination  in  the 
U.  K.,  but  on: 
The  new  spirit  of  enterprise  in  Scotland.. 
.a  nation  where  successful 
enterprise  and  social  justice  can  go  hand  in  hand...  [where]  politicians 
and  public  servants  can  support  the  wealth  creation  of  Scottish 
industry  and  commerce...  (McConnell  1999). 
20  Lord  MacDonald  of  Tradeston  was  the  Scottish  Development  Minister  in  the  UK  in  1998. 155 
This  is  also  clearly  linked  to  a  concerted  effort  to  adapt  the  Scottish  political  history  to 
the  demands  of  the  New  Labour  project.  Thus,  at  the  earliest  opportunity,  New 
Labour  sought  to  redefine  the  rejection  of  Thatcherism  in  Scotland  in  order  to  ensure 
resonance  with  the  government's  own  priorities: 
What  [Scots]  found  most  unacceptable  about  Thatcherite  Britain  was 
not  its  commitment  to  enterprise  -  that  would  indeed  have  been 
strange  in  the  country  of  James  Watt  and  Andrew  Carnegie  -  but  its 
lack  of  commitment  to  social  justice  (Brown  and  Alexander  1998). 
This  analysis  is  important  because,  firstly,  it  is  not  completely  at  odds  with  Thatcher's 
own  assessment  of  the  impact  of  her  project  in  Scotland:  "the  balance  sheet  of 
Thatcherism  in  Scotland  is  a  lop-sided  one:  economically  positive  but  politically 
negative"  (Thatcher  quoted  in  Mitchell  1999:  33)  and,  secondly,  it  sought  to 
demonstrate  how  well  the  concerns  of  the  Third  Way  echo  Scottish  tradition.  The 
concern  to  promote  the  enterprise  values  of  the  New  Right  alongside  New  Labour's 
concern  for  social  justice,  were  characterised  as  particularly  relevant  in  Scotland. 
Thus,  the  notion  of  an  imagined  community  of  entrepreneurs  was  marshalled  in  a 
distinct  way  in  Scotland  and  this  is  important  in  defining  New  Labour's  particular 
orientation  there. 
As  Raco  (2002b)  has  argued,  one  important  role  devolution  played  was  that  it 
helped  create  the  scope  for  the  government  in  Scotland  to  fully  engage  the  business 
community  and  prioritise  its  needs  effectively.  Scotland  could  undergo  the 
transformation  into  a  dynamic  entrepreneurial  economy,  through  the  mobilisation  of 
business  in  the  service  of  both  devolution  and  the  delivery  of  social  justice.  Despite 
similarities  with  the  UK  settlement  in  this  respect,  and  clear  connections  between  this 
strategy  and  New  Labour's  overall  supportive  relationship  with  business,  and  the 
ideology  of  competitiveness  outlined  in  earlier  chapters,  important  distinctions  need 
to  be  drawn  between  the  Scottish  and  UK  New  Labour  positions.  As  alluded  to  above, 
the  vision  of  the  `new'  Scotland  drew  quite  explicitly  on  two  central  discourses  of  an 
imagined  past  and  future  for  Scotland  -  entrepreneurial  and  socially  just  Scotland, 
both  imbued  with  an  independence  of  spirit,  linking  individual  endeavour  to  the 
common  good: 
From  the  beginning  social  justice  has  been  central  to  our  ambitions  for 
Scotland.  Central  to  our  determination  to  build  a  society  founded  on 156 
the  values  of  fairness,  equality  and  opportunity.  .  .1  want  to  live  in  a 
Scotland  that  is  prosperous  and  outward  looking  and  ambitious  for  its 
future. 
.  .1  want  a  Scotland  where  achievement  is  celebrated  and  the 
value  of  everybody's  contribution  is  appreciated.  Creating  and 
sustaining  economic  growth  is  central  to  that  goal...  Everyone  needs  to 
be  engaged  in  that  task  -  creating  and  sustaining  wealth  for 
themselves,  for  their  families  and  for  their  country  (McConnell  2002 
quoted  in  Mooney  and  Scott  2003:  4-5). 
[Business  leaders  should]  encourage  again  those  Scottish  values  that 
were  once  so  pronounced  in  the  culture  of  self-help  and 
entrepreneurial  ambition.  Where  our  hard-headed,  practical 
predecessors  invested  for  the  industrial  revolution  and  mass 
production,  our  innovation  may  have  been  even  more  creative, 
weightless  and  instantaneous.  Imagineers  as  well  as  engineers 
(MacDonald  quoted  in  Raco  2002a,  40;  2002b:  17). 
Whilst  this  has  clear  resonance  with  the  marriage  of  social  justice  and  economic 
efficiency  at  the  heart  of  New  Labour's  political  economy,  the  particularly  Scottish 
twist  illustrated  here  is  important.  Firstly,  it  allows  for  claims  that  devolution  and 
Scottish  policy  is  indeed  relevant  and  specifically  Scottish  -  hence  meeting  key 
objectives  -  whilst  remaining  firmly  within  New  Labour's  overall  ideological 
priorities.  New  Labour's  Third  Way  struggle  to  create  syntheses  between  seemingly 
incompatible  positions,  discussed  earlier,  is  clearly  evident  in  this  respect.  Devolution 
and  the  harnessing  of  business  interests  for  the  `common  good'  represents  how  the 
New  Labour  approach  of  overcoming  antagonisms  has  developed  in  the  Scottish 
context.  The  fusion  of  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour  in  Scotland  became  possible, 
from  the  New  Labour  perspective,  in  a  location  where  antagonism  has  historically 
been  perceived  to  be  at  its  most  acute.  New  Labour  has  also  sought  to  synthesise 
distinct  sets  of  values  and  mobilise  them  as  a  single  set  presented  as  wholly  and 
characteristically  Scottish.  Secondly,  the  powerful  assumptions  regarding  Scotland  as 
more  left-wing  than  the  rest  of  the  UK,  and  even  as  the  last  bastion  of  the  statist  social 
democracy  most  closely  identified  with  Old  Labour,  were  effectively  addressed. 
Actively  drawing  business  into  devolution  in  a  positive  way,  not  only  gave  New 
Labour  the  opportunity  to  try  to  allay  business  fears  that  the  new  layer  of  government 
meant  the  `return'  of  an  expansionist,  over-regulatory,  state,  it  presented  it  with  the 
opportunity  to  differentiate  itself  from  the  SNP  from  the  perspective  of  business.  Even 
in  Scotland,  New  Labour  offered  a  `safe  pair  of  hands',  fully  in  tune  with 157 
entrepreneurial  interest.  In  doing  so,  the  private  sector  was  valorised  and  a  particular 
version  of  tradition  was  utilised  to  support  this.  At  the  same  time,  a  clear  recognition 
of  the  continuing  appeal  of  a  more  egalitarian  tradition  in  Scotland  meant: 
[The]  desire  to  remove  `old  fashioned'  attitudes,  mentalities  and 
practices  [took]  on  a  greater  salience  in  Scotland  (Raco  2002a:  37). 
Thirdly,  the  active  role  of  business  in  devolution  was  legitimised  through  the  creation 
of  New  Labour's  business  manifesto  for  the  parliamentary  elections  in  1999  and  the 
Pathfinders  Initiative  -a  partnership  between  the  government  and  business  leaders  in 
key  sectors21: 
We  have  recognised  the  need  to  have  business  involved,  not  only  in 
developing  policy,  but  in  implementing  policy,  and  business  has 
responded  to  Labour's  lead.  We  are  ambitious  for  Scotland  and  for 
Scotland's  business,  and  we  have  set  ourselves  the  objective  of 
ensuring  that  Scotland  is  one  of  the  world's  leading  new  economies. 
We  want  Scotland  to  be  a  great  place  to  do  business  (Dewar  quoted  in 
The  Herald  30`h  April  1999). 
Thus,  like  their  UK  counterparts,  the  business  community  in  Scotland  were  granted 
the  scope  to  take  full  advantage  of  New  Labour's  apparent  ending  of  `one-size-fits- 
all'  governance  (Turok  et  al.,  2003:  9),  encouraged  by  the  New  Labour  notion  of 
`Scottish  business  solutions  for  Scottish  business  problems'.  Indeed,  when  examined 
as  ideology,  the  seemingly  pragmatic  mantra  of  de-centralisation  through  devolution 
and  `Scottish  solutions  for  Scottish  problems',  is  actually  driven  by  an  overarching 
commitment  to  `business  solutions  for  Scottish  problems'.  Hence: 
Demands  are  made  to  make  Scottish  society  more  business-like  - 
adopting  the  mentalities  and  practices  of  the  business  community  to 
further  Scotland's  place  in  the  global  environment  (Raco  2002b:  19). 
New  Labour's  approach  in  Scotland  also  shares  the  Third  Way  duality  that 
defines  its  orientation  in  the  rest  of  the  UK;  social  justice  and  economic  efficiency  are 
two  sides  of  one  coin.  However,  the  apparently  continuing  salience  of  Old  Labour 
values,  demonstrated  most  obviously  in  Scotland's  rejection  of  Thatcherism,  was  still 
21  Pathfinders  to  the  Parliament  was  published  in  March  1999  and  was  the  culmination  of  collaboration 
between  the  government  and  business  leaders  in  key  sectors  in  the  Scottish  economy,  setting  out  a 
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problematic  for  New  Labour.  In  this  context,  it  is important  to  bear  in  mind  a  central 
Third  Way  premise: 
The  new  social  democracy  seeks  to  preserve  the  basic  values  of  the 
left:  a  belief  in  an  inclusive  society,  a  commitment  to  combating 
inequality  and  protecting  the  vulnerable  -  but  it  holds  that  many 
traditional  perspectives  have  become  counter  productive  (Giddens 
2002b). 
In  political  terms,  problems  were  manifest  in  two  important  ways.  Firstly,  New 
Labour  in  Scotland  faced  its  main  challenge  from  an  SNP  arguably  seeking  to 
configure  its  own  Third  Way  outlook  in  terms  of  a  capacity  for  fiscal  discipline  and 
social  justice  aims.  Whilst,  for  New  Labour,  the  battle  to  promote  itself  as  the  safest 
pair  of  hands  for  the  economy  was  won  in  1997  at  UK  level,  its  pro-business,  pro- 
market  orientation  had  to  be  re-affirmed  in  the  context  of  devolution.  Secondly,  Third 
Way  wisdom  asserting  that  "the  limited  electoral  support  for  direct  redistribution  of 
income  to  the  poor"  (Giddens  2002a)  was  of  less  relevance  in  Scotland,  since  such  an 
approach  clearly  was  supported  electorally  there.  The  contradiction  that  this  exposed 
for  New  Labour  in  Scotland  meant  that  in  policy  and  rhetoric  New  Labour  sought  to 
promote: 
An  alternative  discourse  to  that  of  a  socially-oriented,  civic  Scottish 
society.  [Instead]  Scotland  is  promoted  as  a  community  of 
entrepreneurial  dynamism  with  a  history  of  innovation  and 
industrialism.  Cultures  of  self-help  and  practicality  are  articulated  in 
place  of  collective  welfare  and,  by  implication,  a  less  entrepreneurial 
society  (Raco  2002a:  40). 
This  business  influence  was  not  just  palpable  in  rhetorical  terms  but  also  in  the 
direction  of  policy.  For  example,  although  in  the  successful  devolution  referendum  in 
1997  a  clear  majority  (64%)  had  voted  for  tax  varying/raising  powers  for  the  Scottish 
parliament  of  plus  or  minus  three  pence  in  the  pound,  New  Labour  made  it  quite  clear 
that  this  would  not  be  used.  In  power,  the  first,  New  Labour  dominated,  Scottish 
Executive  agreed  not  to  use  these  powers  in  the  first  term  of  the  Parliament  (and 
subsequently  not  until  at  least  2007)  to  placate  Scottish  business  concerns  that  they 
would  be  disadvantaged  in  relation  to  non-Scottish  competitors.  This  resulted  in  the 
`loss'  of  a  possible  income  stream  for  the  Scottish  Executive  of  up  to  £690  million  per 
year  (McCrone  1999:  117).  Thus,  the  attraction  of  the  notion  of  civic,  socially  just, 159 
Scotland,  however  mythological,  brought  forth  key  counter-balances  from  a  business 
community  concerned  the  `new'  Scotland  might  have  the  `wrong'  focus.  If  Scotland 
remained  committed  to  the  so-called  tax  and  spend  agenda  of  Old  Labour  then  this 
was  subordinated  to  business  demands.  Overall,  appeals  to  `entrepreneurial'  Scotland, 
the  rejection  of  `left  wing  reformist'  Scotland,  whilst  utilising  common  assumptions 
about  shared  progressive  values  and  actively  mobilising  business  to  the  cause  of 
devolution,  and  explicitly  taking  account  of  its  demands,  demonstrated  a  clear  shift  in 
emphasis  for  Labour  in  Scotland. 
Importantly,  continuing  to  marshal  key  assumptions  about  Scottish  society 
regarding  social  justice  and  community  alongside  the  accommodation  of  business 
interests,  has  opened  up  scope  for  a  further  New  Labour  synthesis  of  interests. 
Enterprise  and  competitiveness  is  granted  a  new  and  crucial  role  as  the  `social  glue'  of 
Scotland  and  has  pervaded  a  range  of  Scottish  Executive  policies  from  1999  onwards. 
Whilst  the  interdependence  of  social  justice/inclusion  and  economic  success  are 
central  to  New  Labour's  ideological  thrust  overall,  demonstrably  this  is  given  a 
distinctively  Scottish  flavour  without  tangible  divergence  from  its  neo-liberal  agenda. 
The  shift  towards  `competitiveness  as  cohesion'  is  demonstrated  in  key  policy 
documents: 
Growing  Scotland's  economy  is  our  top  priority.  A  successful 
economy  is  key  to  our  future  prosperity  and  a  pre-requisite  for  building 
first  class  public  services,  social  justice  and  a  Scotland  of  opportunity. 
(Scottish  Executive  2003:  1,  emphasis  added). 
At  the  same  time  cohesiveness  is  characterised  as  promoting  competitiveness  (Turok 
et  al.  2003)  and  this  fits  clearly  with  New  Labour's  free  market  priorities,  whilst 
seeking  to  echo  what  are  presented  as  specifically  Scottish  concerns.  To  re-iterate  a 
point  made  in  earlier  chapters,  New  Labour's  over-positive  assessment  of  the  role  of 
competitiveness  and  its  dependence  on  economic  efficiency  to  deliver  social  justice, 
underplays  negative  aspects  of  this  focus,  ignoring  how: 
The  ways  in  which  big  business  has  been  reorganising  itself  to  become 
more  competitive  are  proliferating  low  wage,  insecure  employment 
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This  is  particularly  problematic  given  the  difficulties  that  Scotland  continues  to  face 
in  terms  of  low  income,  poverty,  morbidity  and  mortality,  and  poor  housing  for 
example  (Brown  et  al.  2002).  Despite  the  pursuit  of  the  dual  objectives  of  efficiency 
and  justice  by  the  government  in  Scotland,  the  proportion  of  working  age  people 
living  below  60%  of  the  median  British  household  income  after  housing  costs  rose 
between  1999  and  2002  (Scottish  Executive  2002a:  50).  What  is  often  lost  in  the 
notion  of  a  marriage  of  competitiveness  and  cohesion  is  that,  seeking  to  mobilise  an 
assumed  sense  of  egalitarian  ideals  in  rhetoric  does  not  necessarily  translate  into  the 
wholesale  creation  of  a  programme  of  radical,  progressive,  policies.  As  a  result,  whilst 
there  are  differences  in  policy  in  some  areas,  New  Labour's  neo-liberal  settlement 
"premised  on  and  actively  promote[s]  income  inequality  and  insecure  employment" 
(Mooney,  Scott  and  Brown  2003:  19),  similarly  sets  the  agenda  in  Scotland.  Thus: 
...  There  is  no  simple,  direct  or  all  encompassing  relationship  between 
cohesion  and  competitiveness  [at  the  level  of  the  city].  The  two  do  not 
necessarily  go  together  particularly  in  the  direction  from  cohesion  to 
prosperity...  Narrowly  focused  economic  growth  that  excludes  part  of 
the  population  from  improvements  in  economic  well  being  may  well 
undermine  cohesion  by  increasing  social  disparities,  stress  and 
insecurity...  (Turok  et  al.  2003:  55). 
It  is  also  useful  to  outline  a  further  example  that  serves  to  demonstrate  both  the 
influence  of  business  and  the  increasingly  explicit  appeal  to  Scotland's 
entrepreneurial  values  by  New  Labour,  and  their  apparent  salience  in  terms  of  future 
success.  Education  in  Scotland  is  one  aspect  of  the  "holy  trinity"  (McCrone  1992:  21; 
Brown  et  al.  1999:  3),  alongside  the  legal  system  and  religion  that  are  characterised  as 
both  separate  and  distinct  from  the  rest  of  the  UK.  Clearly,  in  the  devolved  Scotland, 
separateness  and  distinctiveness  remain  in  these  areas.  Yet  education  in  Scotland 
offers  one  of  the  clearest  examples  of  the  `fit'  with  New  Labour's  overall  vision  and 
the  obvious  prioritising  of  business  interests  with  regard  to  educational  priorities: 
In  a  world  of  rapid  change,  entrepreneurship  will  become  a  core  skill 
which  all  our  young  people  will  need  to  exploit  the  opportunities 
emerging  from  science  and  technology,  culture  and  communications 
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We  will  make  sure  that  every  pupil  has  the  opportunity  to  learn 
entrepreneurial  skills  at  school.  We  will  expand  the  number  of  Scottish 
schools  involved  in  Enterprise  Education  from  10%  to  100%  (Scottish 
Executive  2003a:  3). 
Indeed,  at  each  stage,  education  is  defined  explicitly  as  fully  in  the  service  of 
business: 
We  will  encourage  local  authorities  to  give  school  pupils  the 
opportunity  for  `hands  on'  enterprise  initiatives...  We  will  use  the 
Future  Skills  Scotland  Unit  to  identify  the  needs  of  business  and  we 
will  focus  on  education  and  training  services  and  the  career  guidance 
service  to  meet  them  (Scottish  Executive  2003a:  3&  4). 
It  is  clear  that  this  does  not  diverge  from  New  Labour's  overall  approach  and: 
The  subsequent  elaboration  and  implementation  of  education  reforms 
geared  explicitly  to  the  principles  of  the  free  market  and  to  perceived 
national,  industrial  and  commercial  `needs'  have  had  as  much  impact 
north  of  the  border  as  they  have  on  the  south  (Littlewood  cited  in 
Mooney  and  Poole  2002:  7). 
What  is  distinct  is  that  this  takes  places  within  the  context  of  a  continuing  myth  of 
Scottish  education  as  exceptional  and  crucially  linked  to  egalitarian  values  (McCrone 
1992).  Significantly,  "making  government  more  accountable  to  the  people  of 
Scotland"  and  "policies  on  health,  housing  and  education"  responding  "more  directly 
to  Scotland's  needs"  (Dewar  1997,  emphasis  added)  is  focused  on  privileging 
business  needs,  and  `other  interests'  are  perceived  through  a  prism  of  economic 
demands.  Moreover,  the  role  of  education  as  the  bastion  of  growing  the  enterprise 
culture  co-exists  with,  and  is  intrinsically  linked  to,  education  being  offered  as  an 
important  income  stream  for  business  in  the  `new'  Scotland. 
3.5:  Reforming  the  Public  Sector  in  Scotland 
As  outlined  in  earlier  chapters,  New  Labour  pursues  a  particular  version  of 
`reform'  and  `modernisation'  in  the  public  sector  that  seemingly  has  the  interests  of 
the  consumers  of  public  services  firmly  at  their  core.  Despite  devolution,  much  of  the 
New  Labour  settlement  in  terms  of  public  service  delivery  remains  the  responsibility 
of  the  UK  government,  and  key  policy  areas  are  reserved  to  the  Westminster 
Parliament.  Thus  the  welfare,  work,  benefits  and  taxation  systems  are  the  same  in 
Scotland  as  they  are  in  the  rest  of  the  UK.  Yet  policy  in  these  areas,  especially  in 162 
terms  of  public  sector  funding,  was  a  critical  issue  in  the  1999  election  campaign. 
Since  Scotland  does  have  problems  in  relation  to  poverty,  especially  in  the 
conurbations  in  the  Central  Belt,  relating  specifically  to  de-industrialisation,  economic 
restructuring,  spatial  polarisation  and  demographic  changes,  there  is  overall  greater 
dependence  on  public  services.  The  responsibility  for  these  is  split,  with  the  Scottish 
Parliament  controlling  social  housing,  health,  and  education  -  key  elements  of  the 
devolved  settlement.  Thus  future  policy  in  these  key  areas  represented  the  most 
appropriate  arena  to  `test'  New  Labour's  apparent  de-centralisation  Importantly, 
apparent  satisfaction  with22,  and  dependence  on,  the  public  sector  in  Scotland  are 
often  conflated  and  represented  as  being  characteristically  linked  to  seemingly 
Scottish  values:  "Scotland's  public  services  are  firmly  rooted  in  equality,  solidarity, 
social  justice  and  democracy"  (Smith  1999:  252-253).  Thus  devolution  was  viewed  by 
some  as  a  crucial  mechanism  through  which  to  realise  a  dream  of  Scotland 
determining  "its  own  destiny  in  those  areas  that  really  matter  in  the  nature  and 
delivery  of  its  public  services"  (Smith  1999:  250). 
However,  as  my  earlier  analysis  of  the  Scottish  election  in  1999  demonstrated, 
the  possibility  of  "bottom  up  solutions"  (Mandelson  and  Liddle  1996:  17),  suggested 
by  New  Labour  in  the  context  of  Scottish  devolution,  did  not  extend  to  public  sector 
funding  nor  to  developing  a  clear  policy  programme  in  the  public  sector  at  odds  with 
New  Labour's  ideological  thrust.  Put  simply,  in  this  respect,  what  New  Labour's 
devolution  settlement  entailed  was  that  `means'  were  not  devolved,  just  `ends', 
clearly  in  line  with  New  Labour's  overall  approach.  The  outcome  of  the  first  Scottish 
election  and  the  battle  within  Labour  that  occurred  around  it,  as  well  as  subsequent 
policy  developments,  confirm  this.  One  of  the  most  significant  outcomes  of 
devolution,  thus  far,  is  that  it  has  resulted  in  support  for  an  ideological  commitment  to 
`modernising'  old  fashioned  values  in  the  public  sector,  and  ridding  it  of  the 
apparently  inherent  conservatism,  summed  up  in  the  New  Labour  mantra  `what 
matters  is  what  works'.  Thus  public  sector  reform  in  Scotland,  like  the  rest  of  the  UK, 
means,  for  New  Labour,  that: 
In  any  conflict  between  pragmatism  and  ideology,  pragmatism  will 
always  prevail....  We  believe  that  the  interests  of  the  consumers  must 
always  be  put  before  those  of  producers.  Even  the  best  of  the 
22  Scottish  Executive  Central  Research  Unit  (1999:  1-2),  cited  in  Smith  1999:  251. 163 
traditional  public  services  could  lose  sight  of  their  main  goal  -  to  serve 
the  public  -  and  often  did  (McLeish  quoted  in  The  Herald  21st  August 
200123). 
Whilst  laying  claim  to  the  notion  that  devolution  would  bring  about  `Scottish 
solutions  for  Scottish  problems',  it  is  clear  that  these  have  to  be  rooted  in  the  overall 
New  Labour  approach,  and  Scottish  solutions  are  adapted,  indeed,  Scottish  problems 
are  redefined,  in  order  to  fit  with  the  `new'  pragmatism  of  New  Labour.  The  broader 
New  Labour  agenda,  promoting  the  private  sector's  role  in  public  service  delivery, 
remains  paramount. 
An  important  difficulty  for  New  Labour  is  with  Scotland's  continuing 
connection  to  the  public  sector  through  dependence,  and  its  continuing  commitment  to 
public  sector  values,  real  or  imagined.  This  creates  a  specifically  Scottish  problem,  to 
some  extent,  in  that  Scotland  is,  at  face  value  at  least,  all  the  more  likely  to  retain  the 
vestiges  of  the  `producer  focus'  New  Labour  seeks  to  eradicate.  Not  only  is  welfare 
service  delivery  of  crucial  importance  in  Scotland,  but,  in  major  conurbations,  other 
key  services  are  of  crucial  importance.  In  terms  of  housing,  for  example,  the 
Conservatives  `right  to  buy'  legislation  had  a  lesser  impact,  and  local  authority 
provided  social  housing  remained  significant  well  into  the  1990s.  For  example,  this 
type  of  housing  represented  31%  of  all  tenure  in  Scotland  as  late  as  1995  compared 
with  18%  in  England,  and  owner  occupation  at  the  time  was  still  a  full  ten  percentage 
points  behind  England  (English  1998:  125).  Moreover,  in  areas  of  the  greatest 
deprivation,  reliance  on  public  sector  provision  is  much  higher.  In  addition,  the  public 
sector  in  Scotland  is  a  major  employer  with  an  estimated  one  in  five  of  the  working 
population  in  the  public  sector  in  some  capacity  (Scottish  Executive  2003b:  30).  By 
1999,  overall  per  capita  public  spending  in  Scotland  was  25%  higher  than  in  England 
(Neil  1999)  and  this  suggested,  from  the  New  Labour  perspective,  a  greater  need  to 
progress  its  `modernisation'  agenda.  This,  as  noted  throughout,  takes  place  in  line 
with  the  rest  of  the  UK,  and  involves  the  continuation  of  the  Conservatives' 
privatisation,  the  use  of  private  finance  to  fund  improvements,  and  the  outsourcing  of 
key  functions  to  the  private  sector.  Some  of  this  activity  has  had  an  explicit  impact  in 
Scotland,  though  not  necessarily  linked  to  specifically  Scottish  policy.  The 
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privatisation  of  the  (UK)  National  Savings  Bank  at  the  end  of  the  1999,  for  example, 
saw  the  transfer  of  more  than  four  thousand  jobs  to  the  private  sector,  more  than  half 
of  which  were  in  Glasgow24.  Thus  devolution  has  made  little  positive  impact  in  this 
respect.  Moreover,  privatisation  impacts  on  consumers  of  public  services  as  well  as 
producers  and,  as  Mooney  (2002a:  139)  has  argued,  it  is  experienced  differently  by 
different  sections  of  society.  The  poor  can,  and  do,  become  further  marginalised 
through  the  privatisation  of  services.  It  is  questionable  whether  the  rigour  with  which 
privatisation  and  private  sector  involvement  in  the  delivery  of  public  services  reflects 
a  genuine  concern  to  develop  Scottish  solutions.  Rather  it  reflects  a  concern  to  drive 
out  reliance  on  public  sector  provision  and  any  residual  producer  focus  in  Scotland. 
Thus: 
The  notion  of  the  public  (as in  public  services,  public  sector)  is  being 
reformulated  as  something  that  now  necessitates  the  involvement  of 
the  private  sector  or  the  market  (Mooney  2002b:  3). 
This  has  occurred  to  such  an  extent  that  the  whole  notion  of  investment  now  conflates 
private  sector  investment  and  investment  by  the  state.  For  example,  claims  regarding 
future  investment  often  increasingly  obscure  the  source  of  that  investment: 
We  will  continue  to  use  the  record  level  of  investment  in  our  public 
services  to  secure  new  and  better  facilities,  particularly  for  our  schools 
and  hospitals... 
We  will  develop  the  largest  ever  school  building  programme  in 
Scotland's  history,  renewing  200  more  schools  by  2006,  rising  to  3000 
by  2009  (Scottish  Executive  2003a:  12  &17). 
This  is  reinforced  through  continual  reference  to  New  Labour's  apparent  commitment 
to  putting  the  consumer  first  and  a  focus  on  individual  choice.  For  the  1999  Scottish 
election  campaign  this  was  clearly  manifested  in  the  debate  over  PFIIPPP: 
24  See  Macgregor  2001  for  a  comprehensive  review  of  major  changes  in  public  sector  employment 
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I  am  going  to  do  what  is  correct  for  patients,  and  use  the  best  and 
quickest  methods  of  delivering  that  for  patients  (Galbraith  quoted  in 
The  Herald  14`h  April  199925). 
And  has  continued  in  government  rhetoric  since: 
The  interests  of  the  pupil,  the  patient  the  passenger  and  the  victim  of 
crime  will  always  come  first  (Scottish  Executive  2003a:  12). 
Thus  the  crucial  mechanism  through  which  New  Labour's  `modernisation'  has 
been  pursued  -  PPP  -  can  be  represented  as  of  secondary  importance  in  relation  to 
service  delivery  in  the  devolved  Scotland,  as  funding  `means'  are  underplayed  in  such 
rhetoric.  Yet  PPP  is  actually  pursued  more  vigorously  in  relative  terms  in  Scotland. 
For  example,  more  than  a  third  of  PFI/PPP  projects  announced  by  early  1999  were  in 
Scotland  (The  Observer  14th  February  1999).  At  a  regional  level  there,  is  further 
evidence  of  this,  and,  crucially,  in  Glasgow,  the  city  synonymous  with  the  values  of 
municipal  socialism,  the  process  of  reform  through  opening  up  public  services  for 
private  sector  profit  is  well  under  way.  In  this  city,  the  modernisation  of  the  entire 
secondary  school  system  in  2001-2002  represented  the  "largest  education-based 
Public  Private  Partnership  in  the  UK"  (Mooney  et  al.  2003:  17)26.  Moreover,  at  the 
same  time,  New  Labour's  housing  stock  transfer  programme  for  Europe's  largest 
social  landlord  since  the  1960s  (ibid:  18)  represented,  for  many,  a  concerted  attempt 
to  rid  the  city  of  the  most  obvious  and  enduring  monument  to  municipal  socialism  - 
council  housing  (The  Economist  cited  in  Mooney  et  al.  2003:  13).  Devolution, 
therefore,  has  served  to  reinforce  and,  indeed,  strengthen  New  Labour's  position  in 
relation  to  its  `modernisation'  programme,  despite  opposition  to  its  controversial 
funding  mechanisms.  These  examples  serve  to  demonstrate  how  the  rhetoric  of 
Scottish  solutions  for  Scottish  problems  is  clearly  tightly  limited  by  the  continuing 
focus  on  the  overall  thrust  of  the  New  Labour  agenda. 
3.6:  Working  with  New  Labour  in  Scotland:  The  Trade  Unions 
In  keeping  with  the  narrative  and  analytical  direction  of  my  argument  overall, 
it  important  to  explore  the  position  of  the  trade  unions  in  Scotland,  and  the  contours  of 
ZS  Galbraith  was  the  Health  Minister  in  Scotland  in  1999.  Here  he  was  speaking  in  defence  of  PFUPPP. 
26  A  PPP  project  to  `modemise'  the  entire  primary  school  system  in  Glasgow  was  introduced  in  2003. 166 
the  relationship  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions  in  the  Scottish  context,  albeit 
briefly. 
It  is  often  assumed  that  trade  unionism  is  stronger  in  Scotland  and  that 
Scottish  trade  unionism  is  more  oppositional  in  character  and  more  militant.  This  can 
be  argued  to  be  the  case  in  terms  of  strike  activity  (Gall  2003:  20-36)  and  in  terms  of 
numerical  strength  (Gall  2003:  39-40)27.  It  is  not  possible  to  discuss  this  fully.  My 
purpose  here  is  to  briefly  explore  the  extent  to  which  what  appears  a  greater 
propensity  for  militancy,  and  an  apparently  stronger  union  movement,  impacts  on  the 
relationship  between  the  unions  in  Scotland  and  New  Labour,  and  benefits  workers 
overall.  In  this  respect,  it  is  also  important  to  return  to  the  crucial  issue  of  PPP  and  to 
explore  the  role  of  trade  unions  in  the  ideological  battle  between  Old  and  New  Labour 
in  this  context. 
Although  trade  unions  in  Scotland  played  an  important  part  in  the  delivery  of 
devolution,  in  terms  of  keeping  up  the  pressure  for  home-rule  during  the  1980s  and 
1990s  (Aitken  1997),  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  industrial  relations  settlement  of 
New  Labour  is  the  same  for  Scotland  as  it  is  for  the  UK.  The  reservation  of  key 
powers  at  Westminster  leaves  little  room  for  manoeuvre  on  employment  relations  on  a 
Scottish  basis,  especially  in  terms  of  the  private  sector.  This  places  clear  limitations 
on  the  apparent  pursuit  of  Scottish  solutions  to  Scottish  problems  `at  work'.  The 
delivery  of  social  justice  at  work  in  Scotland  mirrors  that  of  the  rest  of  the  U.  K. 
Despite  an  apparent  commitment  by  New  Labour  to  reduce  high  levels  of  poverty  and 
social  exclusion  in  Scotland,  the  level  of  the  minimum  wage  serves  to  limit  the  impact 
of  work  on  poverty.  Yet,  as  shown  earlier,  the  focus  on  work  as  the  route  out  of 
poverty  by  New  Labour  in  the  UK  is  also  clearly  evident  in  Scotland.  The  problems  of 
this  settlement,  outlined  elsewhere  in  the  thesis,  also  have  a  similar  impact  in 
Scotland,  though  it  is  important  to  outline  some  differences.  With  regard  to  the 
benefits  of  the  Employment  Relations  Act  in  Scotland,  in  terms  of  statutory 
recognition,  for  example,  unions  in  Scotland  have  utilised  the  legislation  relatively 
effectively.  They  have  the  second  highest  average  level  of  all  new  recognition 
agreements  of  eleven  UK  regions  (13%  compared  with  14%  in  the  top  two  regions) 
between  1999  and  2002  (Gall  2003:  44-45).  Moreover,  statutory  recognition  is  also 167 
important  in  Scotland,  since  it  creates  the  potential  to  recruit,  organise  and  bargain  in 
previously  `infertile'  or  openly  hostile  sectors.  A  leading  edge  sector  in  the  Scottish 
economy  like  electronics,  for  example,  infamous  for  non-unionism  and  anti-unionism, 
faced  its  first  institutional  challenge  (Findlay  1999:  98)  in  the  shape  of  statutory 
recognition.  Whilst  the  combination  of  hurdles  to  recognition  built  into  the  Act,  and 
twenty  years  of  diminishing  power,  meant  companies  faced  their  weakest  ever 
opponents,  unions  in  Scotland  are  among  the  most  active  campaigners  for  recognition 
deals  (Gall  2003:  45). 
In  terms  of  New  Labour's  partnership  agenda,  Findlay  has  argued  that  there 
was  a  particular  `ripeness'  for  this,  and  the  possible  cultural  shift  in  employee 
relations  in  Scotland: 
The  size  of  the  political,  business  and  trade  union  community  in 
Scotland  facilitates  close  contacts  at  senior  levels.. 
. 
Both  Scotland's 
industrial  and  trade  union  history,  and  successive  opinion  polls  suggest 
that  reforms  to  workplace  governance  would  fall  on  receptive  ears. 
Similarly  the  disaffection  of  Scottish  employees  with  the  highly 
individualist  orientation  of  current  management  practice  and  their 
concerns  regarding  poor  relationships  between  trade  unions  and 
employers...  suggest  the  appropriateness  of  a  uniquely  Scottish 
solution  based  on  collective  rights...  (Findlay  1999:  100). 
Despite  an  apparent  lack  of  institutional  support  for  it  in  Scotland,  and  the  persistence 
of  the  reputation  of  Scottish  militancy,  partnership  has  been  embraced  and  has  taken  a 
relatively  greater  hold  in  Scotland,  than  in  the  rest  of  the  UK.  A  location  characterised 
as  synonymous  with  adversarial  industrial  relations  has  concluded  twice  the  number 
of  partnership  agreements  that  could  be  expected,  given  the  size  of  the  workforce 
(Gall  2003:  52).  This,  alongside  the  recognition  successes,  noted  by  Gall,  suggests 
two  important  developments.  The  first  is  that  the  union  movement  in  Scotland  has 
drawn  advantages  from  some  of  New  Labour's  legislative  changes  in  the  employment 
relations  arena.  The  second,  and  perhaps,  more  significant,  development  is  that  its 
apparent  embrace  of  the  partnership  agenda  represents  at  least  some  trade  union 
acceptance  in  Scotland  of  New  Labour's  fusion  of  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour. 
27  This  is  an  over-simplification  of  Gall's  arguments  which  comprehensively  unpack  crucial  features 
behind  such  statistics  using  regional  and  European  comparisons. 168 
Whilst  this  clearly  parallels  trade  union  support  for  New  Labour  in  the  rest  of 
the  UK,  it  is  still  important  to  explore  the  relationship  between  the  unions  and  New 
Labour  in  Scotland  in  greater  detail,  in  the  context  of  the  `new'  Scotland.  Like  their 
UK  counterparts,  the  unions  in  Scotland  share  an  `enduring  alliance'  with  Labour 
(Mcllroy  1998).  However  the  Scottish  Trades  Union  Congress  (STUC)  has  no 
political  affiliation  to  the  Labour  Party  as  such  and  its  "special  relationship"  with  the 
party  is  maintained  "through  the  affiliation  to  Labour  of  individual  unions  in 
Scotland"  (Speirs  2001).  Although  this  lack  of  affiliation  to  the  Labour  Party  may  be 
taken  to  indicate  a  level  of  political  distance  from  New  Labour,  and  the  scope  to  act 
against  its  interests,  the  history  of  this  relationship  suggest  that  this  analysis  is 
problematic.  The  unions  in  Scotland  have  played  a  significant  role  in  Labour's 
success,  especially  in  terms  of  achieving  electoral  dominance  over  many  decades.  The 
unions  and  New  Labour  have  remained  ideological  kin,  and  the  cross  fertilisation 
between  key  trade  unionists  and  the  Party  is  seemingly  more  overt  in  Scotland28.  The 
fight  for  a  home-rule  parliament  helped  reinforce  this.  Despite  recognised  weaknesses 
in  New  Labour's  industrial  relations  settlement,  privileged  and  pervasive  business 
interest  outlined  for  Scotland,  and  its  commitment  to  a  Third  Way  devoid  of  a  clearly 
defined  role  for  trade  unions  (Giddens  1998;  Waddington  2003:  337),  the  Scottish 
Parliament  seemingly  represented  the  possibility  of  developing  Scottish  Labour 
solutions  for  Scottish  labour  problems.  After  New  Labour's  election  victory  in  1997, 
and  the  successful  referendum  vote,  therefore,  the  next  important  battle  for  the  unions 
and  New  Labour  in  Scotland  was  to  secure  a  Labour  victory  at  elections  for  the  new 
Parliament. 
However,  as  noted  earlier,  the  crucial  issue  of  PPP  threatened  to  undermine 
this  relationship  and  union  opposition  to  it  was  at  the  centre  of  key  public  sector  union 
demands,  presented  in  their  own  manifestos  for  the  new  Scottish  parliament 
(UNISON  1999;  Transport  and  General  Workers'  Union  1999).  In  the  ideological 
battle  between  Old  and  New  Labour,  that  I  have  argued  occurred  in  1999,  this 
opposition  placed  the  majority  of  unions  and  the  STUC  firmly  in  the  Old  Labour 
28  In  the  1999  elections  this  was  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  number  of  union  officials  standing  as  New 
Labour  candidates.  For  example  there  were  five  from  UNISON  alone  standing  in  constituency  vote. 
Significantly,  two  UNISON  officials  were  disciplined  for  bring  the  union  into  disrepute  by  criticising 
New  Labour,  especially  over  PFI/PPP  (The  Herald  16`h  April  1999  and  see  Irvine  2000). 169 
6camp'29.  Unions'  overall  hostility  to  PPP  was  summed  up  in  the  STUC's  own 
manifesto  for  the  Scottish  Parliament: 
The  STUC  believes  that  public  services  are  most  efficiently  and 
effectively  delivered  and  ensure  best  value  for  the  community  and 
individuals  when  they  are  provided  by  directly  employed  public 
service  workers.......  Using  the  Private  Finance  Initiative  to  fund 
investment  in  capital  projects,  such  as  schools,  hospitals  and  houses 
should  be  avoided.  The  PFI  is  an  inefficient  means  of  financing  the 
provision  of  public  services.  It  is  a  short-term  solution  to  a  long-term 
problem  of  under  investment  (STUC  1999a). 
Yet,  the  battle  expected  over  PPP  with  New  Labour  did  not  fully  materialise.  Indeed, 
instead  of  the  1999  STUC  Congress  dealing  PPP  and,  as  a  result  New  Labour,  a  fatal 
blow  in  Scotland,  it  capitulated  on  the  basis  of  a  concession,  negotiated  with  Gordon 
Brown,  to  discuss  "how  best  practice  could  apply  in  PFI  deals"  (The  Scotsman  22nd 
April  1999)  and  on  "better  protection  for  transferred  workers"  (Speirs  2001).  Hostile 
motions  were  shelved  and  replaced  with  a  General  Council  statement  that  removed 
earlier  calls  for  a  complete  moratorium  on  PFI: 
Congress  continues  to  have  serious  concern  over  the  funding 
mechanisms  being  used  to  deliver  this  investment  through  PFI, 
including  the  major  issues  relating  to  staffing  and  conditions  of 
service.  Congress  recognises  that  on  these  issues,  initiatives  such  as 
the  provision  of  proper  framework  agreements,  may  offer  a  way 
forward  and  calls  for  further  discussions  with  the  Government  and  the 
new  Scottish  Parliament  to  ensure  that  common  principles,  based  on 
best  practice,  apply  across  the  public  sector  (STUC  1999b). 
Thus,  in  respect  of  a,  if  not  the,  crucial  issue  of  the  Scottish  Parliamentary  elections, 
the  unions  offered  only  a  muffled  challenge  to  New  Labour  and  continued  to  support 
the  Party  practically  and  financially,  despite  being  `stonewalled'  over  their  opposition 
to  what  emerged  as  its  key  ideological  premises. 
It  is  important  now  to  examine  this  in  relation  to  my  arguments  overall.  What 
the  issue  of  PPP  demonstrated  and  continues  to  demonstrate,  is  that  where  there  are 
29  Although  there  is  not  the  scope  to  discuss  this  in  detail,  it  is  important  to  note  that  there  was  some 
support  for  PFI/PPP  from  unions  in  Scotland  whose  members  depended  on  such  contracts  for  work.  In 
April  1999,  the  examples  of  the  Ministry  of  Defence  contract  to  the  BAe  Systems  yard  in  Govan, 
Glasgow  and  an  information  technology  upgrade  in  the  Post  Office  were  cited  as  examples  of  the  need 
to  retain  PFI/PPP  (The  Scotsman  22  °d  April  1999). 170 
significant  differences  between  Party  and  union  demands,  the  union  bureaucracy  acts 
in  the  interests  of  the  Party,  often  citing  pragmatism  as  the  reason  for  so  doing: 
In  the  end  the  STUC  took  the  pragmatic,  trade  union  route  [over  PPP] 
rather  than  the  political  one  and  confrontation  was  successfully 
avoided  -  that's  something  we're  proud  of  (McNeil  199930) 
This  apparently  pragmatic  approach  helps  to  elucidate  a  further  point  concerning 
unions  in  relation  to  devolution.  Ultimately,  what  New  Labour  `de-centralisation 
through  devolution'  actually  represented  was  a  further  layer  of  governance  with 
which  to  conduct  bureaucratic  lobbying,  and,  arguably,  more  scope  to  do  so  through 
greater  access  to  key  members  of  the  Scottish  government  (Smith  200131;  McAveety 
200132). 
In  1999,  New  Labour  in  Scotland  was  at  its  most  vulnerable  over  PFI/PPP,  yet 
the  unions  did  not  grasp  the  opportunity  to  maintain  and  consolidate  opposition  to  a 
flag-ship  policy.  This,  however,  does  not  simply  represent  a  blow  dealt  to  PPP  in  the 
`wrong  direction'  since,  as  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  union  opposition  to  New 
Labour's  flag-ship  policies  has  rarely  been  allowed  to  result  in  concerted  and  overt 
challenges.  The  important  point  is  that,  effectively  marginalising  opposition  to  PPP 
during  the  Scottish  election  campaign,  was  a  key  element  of  a  wider,  crucial 
development. 
If,  as  I  have  argued,  1999  and  the  first  election  for  the  Scottish  Parliament 
represented  a  watershed  in  the  transition  from  Old  to  New  Labour  in  Scotland,  then 
the  complicity  of  the  trade  unions  in  this  process  needs  to  be  understood.  Further,  this 
gave  New  Labour  the  necessary  momentum  to  consolidate  its  Third  Way  premises  in 
the  Scottish  context,  and  turned  out  to  be  indicative  of  how  its  relationship  with  the 
unions  would  operate  under  devolution.  The  continuing  link  with  the  unions  in 
Scotland,  and  the  mediation  of  the  bureaucracy,  has  made  an  important,  positive 
contribution  to  New  Labour's  experience  of  devolution  thus  far.  The,  arguably, 
greater  need  by  New  Labour  for  union  support  in  the  context  of  an  extra  layer  of 
30  Based  on  short  interview,  8`h  August  1999.  Duncan  McNeil  was  elected  MSP  for  Greenock  and 
Inverclyde  in  1999  and  again  in  2003. 
31  Based  on  interview,  21"  March  2001.  Matt  Smith  is  the  leader  of  UNISON  in  Scotland. 
32  Based  on  interview,  20th  November  2000.  Frank  McAveety  was  the  Labour  leader  of  Glasgow  City 
Council  until  his  election  as  an  MSP  for  Glasgow  Shettleston  in  1999  and  again  in  2003. 171 
governance  and,  effectively,  biennial  elections,  has  brought  little  in  the  way  of 
obvious  benefits  for  trade  union  members.  Certainly,  the  unions'  earlier  critique  of 
New  Labour's  public  sector  reforms  and  funding  through  private  finance  has  not  been 
sustained  in  any  systematic  way. 
Indeed,  the  outcome  of  the  ideological  battle  over  PPP  in  1999  gives  the 
appearance,  at  least,  that  differences  in  orientation  have  been  overcome,  with  the  New 
Labour  position  clearly  remaining  ascendant.  Moreover  no  union  `awkward  squad'  to 
parallel  that  in  the  wider  union  movement  has  emerged,  though  the  decision  of  the 
RMT's  Scottish  region  to  pursue  branch  affiliation  to  the  SSP,  discussed  in  the 
previous  chapter,  suggests  that  `external'  influence  can  be  brought  to  bear.  This  is  not 
to  suggest  that  there  is  no  militancy  in  Scotland  or  that  unions  are  so  weakened  in 
Scotland,  by  their  relationship  with  New  Labour  there,  that  opposition  to  them  has 
been  actively  extinguished  for  the  foreseeable  future.  On  the  contrary,  in  2002,  for 
example,  the  number  of  strikes  in  Scotland  was  greater  than  in  any  other  region  (Gall 
2003:  20).  Yet,  there  is  little  to  support  Waddington's  conclusion  that  in  that  year 
there  was  an  obvious  "heightening  tension  in  relations  between  trade  unions  and  the 
Labour  government"  (2003:  335)  in  the  Scottish  context  nor  that  "the  extent  of 
disagreement  between  the  two  is  now  more  pronounced  than  at  any  time  since  1997" 
(Waddington  2003:  335).  I  would  argue  that  devolution  has  served  to  marginalise  any 
overt,  distinctly  Scottish,  challenges  to  New  Labour  that  call  into  question  the  whole 
nature  of  the  relationship  between  it  and  the  unions,  for  the  time  being  at  least. 
Significantly,  however,  whilst  it  may  have  been  possible  in  the  past  to  argue  that: 
The  only  obviously  available  political  vehicle  for  socialism  in  Britain 
is  the  Labour  Party,  which,  to  put  moderately,  is  not  without  its 
ideological  incoherence  and  confusing  twists  and  turns  of  policy 
(Nichols  and  Armstrong  1976:  127) 
contemporary  political  developments  in  Scotland  do,  at  face  value,  point  at  the 
possibility  at  least  of  an  alternative  conclusion.  The  existence  and  growing  popularity 
of  the  SSP33,  and  its  electoral  success  (Table  2.  above)  present  a  challenge  to  the 
bureaucratic  premise  that  `there  is  no  alternative'  which  helps  sustain  New  Labour  in 
Scotland. 
33  Membership  of  the  SSP  has  grown  from  four  hundred  in  1999  to  approximately  three  thousand  in 
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To  return  to  a  point  made  in  the  previous  chapter  regarding  the  two  distinct 
horizons  that  the  Labour  Party  and  the  trade  union  bureaucracy  seek  to  maintain  in 
terms  of  politics  and  economics  (Hyman  1989),  it  would  appear  that  devolution  has 
ultimately  served  to  reinforce  this  `false  dichotomy'.  Vulnerability  in  terms  of 
flagship  policy  and  a  new  arena  within  which  union  criticisms  of  New  Labour  can  be 
aired,  have  not  been  systematically  exploited.  Indeed,  the  bureaucratic  closeness  of 
New  Labour  and  the  unions  in  Scotland  serves  ultimately  to  weaken  the  movement 
overall.  Whilst  devolution  helps  create  a  different  context  within  which  the 
relationship  between  New  Labour  and  the  unions  operate,  this  has  not  resulted  in  New 
Labour  in  Scotland  being  less  troublesome  for  the  unions  and  more  inclined  to  meet 
their  demands,  despite  its  apparently  greater  vulnerability.  Nor  has  the  relationship 
between  unions  and  New  Labour  served  to  deliver  a  "land  of  milk  and  honey" 
(Mooney  and  Poole  2002)  for  unions  and  their  members  in  Scotland,  despite  the 
rhetoric  of  opportunity,  possibility  and  involvement.  Indeed,  the  issue  of  PPP  helps 
demonstrate  overall  accommodation  of  New  Labour's  demands  and  indicates  a  clear 
lack  of  unions  grasping  opportunities  to  use  the  creation  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  to 
develop  their  critique  of  central  tenets  of  New  Labour's  ideology.  On  the  contrary,  the 
unions  ultimately  `delivered'  for  New  Labour  in  Scotland,  and  the  process  of 
devolution  was  made  easier  as  a  result. 
3.7:  Conclusion 
I  have  made  clear  that  the  much-vaunted  `historic'  opportunity  to  create 
Scottish  solutions  for  Scottish  problems  excluded  any  radical  departure  in  terms  of 
New  Labour's  reform  and  `modernisation'  programme  in  the  public  sector,  and  the 
ideological  commitments  so  strenuously  adhered  to  by  New  Labour  in  the  rest  of  the 
UK  have  not  been  relaxed  in  Scotland  even  in  key  devolved  areas.  Thus: 
Devolution  gave  the  people  of  Scotland  and  Wales  the  power  to  elect 
their  own  governments,  not  to  redesign  the  political  platform  of  each 
party...  [nor]  that  Scottish  Labour  politicians  have  free  reign  to 
redesign  the  party's  values  and  core  policies  ... 
(The  Guardian  11`n 
May  1999). 
This,  in  turn,  demonstrates  how,  New  Labour's  perspective  is  informed  and  moulded 
through  the  Third  Way  conviction  that  "no  feasible  alternative  model  to  the  Third 
Way  exists"  (Giddens  2002b).  The  1999  Scottish  election,  and  the  experience  of  four- 173 
plus  years  of  devolution,  has  been  fundamental  in  marginalising  any  residue  of  an  Old 
Labour,  non-Third  Way  alternative,  even  in  the  locale  and  context  where  difference 
and  alternative  solutions  were  seemingly  both  possible  and  desirable.  As  I  have 
argued  above,  the  trade  union  bureaucracy  in  Scotland  played  a  crucial  role  in  this 
outcome.  This  role  was  more  overt  in  Scotland  than  in  the  rest  of  the  UK  and 
significantly,  especially  in  terms  of  the  important  issues  of  the  election  in  1999,  this 
helped  undermine  support  for  alternatives,  in  the  public  sector  in  particular.  To  the 
extent  that  1999  did  present  a  historic  opportunity,  then  it  was  one  the  unions  failed  to 
exploit  in  their  members'  overall  interests. 
Since  Blair  has  subsequently  revealed  he  "has  no  reverse  gear"  (Blair  2003),  it 
is  important  to  recognise  that,  despite  devolution,  this  applies  equally  in  Scotland.  As 
with  New  Labour  elsewhere  in  the  UK,  commitment  to  neo-liberalism  means: 
terms  like  `capitalism',  `class'  `exploitation',  `domination'  and 
`equality'  have  been  superseded  and  usurped  by  the  now  familiar  - 
`flexibility',  `globalisation',  `new  [knowledge]  economy',  `exclusion' 
and  `communitarianism'  (Bourdieu  and  Wacquant  2001:  2). 
In  the  devolved  Scotland  these  have  not  only  been  framed  in  terms  of  a  particular 
`historic'  moment,  but  also  through  appeals  to  assumed  national  characteristics.  Full 
consideration  of  the  overarching  neo-liberal  concerns  of  New  Labour,  equally  evident 
in  Scotland,  arguably  needs  to  temper  any  assertion  of  a  `better',  more  socially  just 
Scotland  distinct  from  the  UK  New  Labour  settlement,  since  neo-liberal 
"commonplaces"  are: 
notions  or  theses  with  which  one  argues  but  over  which  there  is  no 
argument  (Bourdieu  and  Wacquant  2001:  2). 
Thus,  even  in  the  context  of  devolution  and  de-centralisation  rhetoric,  an  evaluation  of 
New  Labour's  claims  for  Scotland  must  account  for  the  fact  that  any  specifically 
`Scottish  solutions'  will  have  to  be  neo-liberal,  market  solutions.  Experience  of  the 
so-called  `new'  politics  demonstrates  its  underpinning  by  a  `politics  of  vision', 
prevalent  in  not  only  mobilising  contradictory  discourses  of  entrepreneurial  and 
socially  just,  democratic,  Scotland  but  in  its  seeking  to  shape  understanding  of  the 
Scottish  context,  that  can  serve  to  obscure  the  explicit  application  of  neo-liberalism's 
central  tenets  of  marketisation,  competitiveness  and  flexibility,  and  the  Third  Way's 174 
"what  matters  is  what  works".  That  this  application  is  done  in  the  name  of  the  pursuit 
of  social  justice  and  social  inclusion,  represented  as  specifically  relevant  in  Scotland, 
does  little  to  temper  its  effects,  as  the  following  chapters  amply  demonstrate. 175 
CHAPTER  FOUR:  WORKING  THE  `THIRD  WAY':  WEST 
COAST  COMPUTER  INDUSTRIES 
Work  is  central  to  the  Government's  attack  on  social  exclusion.  Work 
is  the  only  route  to  sustained  financial  independence.  But  it  is  also 
much  more.  Work  is  not  just  about  earning  a  living.  It  is  a  way  of 
life.. 
. 
Work  helps  to  fulfil  our  aspirations  -  it  is  the  key  to 
independence,  self  respect  and  opportunities  for  advancement...  Work 
brings  a  sense  of  order  that  is  missing  from  the  lives  of  many 
unemployed  young  men..  . 
(Harman  19971). 
4.1:  Introduction 
Thus  far,  I  have  examined  New  Labour  in  detail,  but  largely  at  a  general  level. 
It  is  also  important  to  explore  a  specific  example  of  working  life  under  New  Labour, 
in  order  to  draw  out  the  impact  of  its  ideological  premises  and  to  explore  how  its 
commitment  to  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership  are  experienced  by 
workers. 
One  of  the  central  questions  that  this  research  originally  sought  to  address  was 
whether  the  provision  of  new  legal  rights  in  the  workplace  by  the  New  Labour 
government,  particularly  in  the  form  of  statutory  union  recognition,  represented  a 
renewed  potential  for  labour  militancy,  though  it  should  be  clear  from  the  preceding 
chapters  that  it  was  always  quite  unlikely  that  New  Labour  would  deliberately  create 
the  conditions  for  this.  However,  as  I  have  outlined  throughout,  underpinning 
ideology  is  absolutely  central  to  our  understanding  of  the  context  of  experience  that 
New  Labour's  political  economy  shapes.  Thus,  whilst  reference  is  made  in  the 
following  chapters  to  specific  elements  of  New  Labour's  legislative  programme  and, 
in  particular,  its  employment  relations  settlement,  this  case  study  need  to  be 
understood  in  the  context  of  my  argument  overall. 
Through  exploring  one  detailed  example  of  working  life  under  New  Labour,  I 
seek  to  demonstrate  central  contradictions  in  its  ideological  premises,  and  offer  clear 
evidence  that  the  syntheses  of  interests  central  to  the  New  Labour  and  Third  Way 
ideology  are  not  easily  reached.  Flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership,  for 
I  Harriet  Harman  was  then  Minister  for  Social  Security  in  the  New  Labour  government,  quoted  in 
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example,  considered  in  the  light  of  this  case  study,  are  clearly  shown  as  combining  to 
create  a  countervailing  force  to  the  effective  representation  of  workers  and  to  the 
development  of,  what  I  would  argue,  is  necessarily  oppositional  trade  unionism. 
Moreover,  important  aspects  of  this  case  study  help  to  challenge  a  fundamental  New 
Labour  premise,  demonstrated  to  full  effect  in  the  Harman  quotation  above,  that  work, 
any  work,  is  the  panacea  to  what  it  perceives  creates  social  exclusion  in  the  UK. 
I  also  seek  to  draw  out  what  devolution  means  for  work  and  employment  in 
Scotland.  Again,  this  relates  to  context  rather  than  the  impact  of  specific  pieces  of 
Scottish  legislation.  A  combination  of  key  powers  being  reserved  to  the  Westminster 
Parliament,  including  employment  legislation,  and  New  Labour's  overall  ideological 
commitments,  mean  that  devolution  has  made  little  positive  difference.  This  is  not, 
however,  to  suggest  that  devolution  is  not  important  in  relation  to  this  case  study  and 
the  wider  issues  that  it  is  indicative  of.  Indeed,  what  I  seek  to  demonstrate  in  the  final 
chapter  is  how  devolution  has  impacted  negatively,  largely  because  it  has  helped 
create  a  blurring  of  political  responsibility  in  respect  of  work  and  employment  in  the 
devolved  Scotland.  The  rhetoric  of  `Scottish  solutions  for  Scottish  problems'  is 
exposed  as  contradictory  in  the  context  of  reserved  powers,  in  the  crucial  arena  of 
employment  relations.  The  devolution  settlement  has  resulted  in  job  creation  being  an 
objective  of  the  Holyrood  Parliament,  whereas  work  and  employment,  in  terms  of 
conditions,  pay  and  the  overall  treatment  of  workers  remains  the  responsibility  of 
Westminster.  The  evidence  presented  here  suggests  that  the  new  layer  of  governance 
represents  a  further  New  Labour  ideological  obfuscation,  which  acts  as  a  barrier  to 
strategic  development  in  relation  to  work,  certainly  in  respect  of  those  `dream  jobs'  of 
the  `knowledge  economy'. 
4.2:  West  Coast  Computer  Industries 
A  central  aim  of  my  research  was  to  narrate  a  process  of  developing  militancy 
that  emerged  in  perhaps  the  unlikeliest  of  factories.  I  felt  this  was  significant  within 
the  Labour  Movement  for  a  number  of  reasons.  In  1998,  the  production  workers  at 
electronics  firm  West  Coast  Computer  Industries  (WCCI),  at  the  time  an  increasingly 
successful  subsidiary  of  the  Laird  Group,  began  to  gain  media  coverage  for  taking  the 
type  of  militant  action  assumed,  particularly  by  New  Labour  and  a  trade  union 
movement  increasingly  moulded  by  a  conciliatory  approach  to  employers,  as  outdated 
and  ineffective.  They  joined  the  steel-workers  union,  the  Iron  and  Steel  Trades 
Confederation  (ISTC)  in  significant  numbers  and  had  begun  to  organise  intensely 177 
within  an  electronics  industry  that  seemingly  represented  a  `black-hole'  in  terms  of 
this  sort  of  activity.  Although  it  has  been  argued  that  trade  unionism  in  electronics  is 
more  complex  than  it  seems,  and  trade  union  organisation  is  not  precluded  in  the 
sector  in  any  `once  and  for  all'  sense  (Findlay  1993),  organisational  difficulties  in  this 
sector  have  helped  construct  a  popular  mythology  of  electronics  as  `union-free'. 
WCCI  was  also  significant  terms  of  the  Scottish  economy.  In  1998  it  was  the  tenth 
biggest  employer  in  Scotland  and  ranked  seventy-third  in  the  top  five  hundred 
Scottish  businesses  (Scottish  Business  Insider  1999)  with  a  reported  turnover  that  year 
of  £330  million  (Scottish  Computer  Headline  2000).  In  Inverclyde2,  an  area  around 
thirty  miles  to  the  west  of  Glasgow,  WCCI  was  the  third  biggest  employer  behind 
electronics  giants  IBM  and  National  Semiconductor,  in  1998.  It  was  a  `young' 
company  in  terms  of  its  relationship  with  the  area  compared  to  both  these  long- 
established  companies.  Although  the  company  had  been  in  operation  in  nearby 
Ayrshire  for  more  than  twenty  years,  the  Gourock  plant,  along  with  others  in  Dundee, 
had  been  acquired  from  Grimtec3  in  1997  for  £21  million.  The  factory  was  situated 
only  a  few  miles  from  the  company's  main  customer,  IBM,  and  formed  a  central 
element  in  a  cluster  of  local  companies  almost  wholly  dependent  on  `Big  Blue's' 
continuing  move  towards  flexible,  decentralised,  production.  Harrison  (1997:  220) 
characterises  this  as  "lean  and  mean"  production  whereby: 
The  business  system  is  increasingly  taking  the  form  of  lean  and  mean 
core  firms,  connected  by  contract  and  by  handshake  to  networks  of 
large  and  small  organisations  including  firms,  governments  and 
communities. 
WCCI  was  thus  representative  of  a  shift  in  the  electronics  industry  from  formerly 
paternalistic  U.  S.  -owned  companies,  like  IBM,  who  initially  operated  proactive 
employee  relations  policies,  highly  individualised  reward  systems,  and  that,  in  the 
process,  sought  to  protect  itself  from  meaningful  trade  union  activity  over  many 
decades.  This  earlier  paternalism  helped  construct  a  mythology  around  IBM  that 
further  served  to  keep  unions  at  bay: 
IBM  [was]  one  of  the  good  ones.  Unlike  the  fly  by  nights,  `Big  Blue' 
has  been  a  quality  employer  on  the  West  Coast  since  1951.  Back  in  the 
1960s  and  1970s,  it  was  a  beacon  of  hope  for  Inverclyde,  loved  not 
only  for  its  conditions  but  its  attitude  (The  Observer  12th  January 
2003). 
2  Inverclyde  includes  the  towns  of  Port  Glasgow,  Greenock,  Gourock,  Inverkip,  Skelmorlie,  Wemyss 
Bay  and  Kilmalcolm. 
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However,  the  arrival  of  such  younger,  UK-owned  companies,  offering  less  favourable 
terms  and  conditions,  like  WCCI,  has  facilitated  a  shift  within  the  older  U.  S. 
companies  especially  IBM.  IBM  has  subsequently  outsourced  much  of  its  labour 
intensive  assembly  operation  and  other  low  value  functions.  Although  thousands  of 
workers  are  still  retained  by  IBM  (decreasing  year  on  year  in  terms  of  direct 
employment),  thousands  more  workers  represent  a  secondary  labour  pool,  for  which 
the  company  bears  none  of  the  socio-economic  risk  of  earlier  paternalism,  embodied 
in  its  policy  of  `no  compulsory  redundancies'.  WCCI,  and  other  companies  in  IBM's 
human  `raw  material  hub',  are  contract  labour  operations.  Findlay  and  McKinlay 
(2000:  11)  have  argued  that  the  rationale  of  companies  like  WCCI  is: 
At  one  and  the  same  time  reminiscent  of  the  internal  contracting 
systems  of  early  19`h  century  factories  and  epitomises  contemporary 
flexible  outsourcing  regimes. 
This  flexibility  is  also  manifest  in  an  internal  labour  market  within  WCCI, 
divided  between  a  core  `permanent'  workforce  and  a  peripheral  `temporary'  group. 
The  labour  of  this  latter  group  was  sourced  from  outside  WCCI  through  employment 
agencies.  However,  the  evidence  from  this  study  unequivocally  confirms  that  the 
core/periphery  divide  of  both  the  internal  and  external  labour  market  is  problematic, 
and  experience  at  WCCI  is  difficult  to  conceptualise  in  this  neat  way.  What  the 
evidence  illustrates  is  that,  importantly,  so-called  peripheral  workers  can,  and  do,  have 
long-standing  work  relationships  with  one  particular  company  without  ever  shifting 
into  core  employment.  They  are  not  temporary  in  its  traditional  meaning,  but  have 
continuing,  if  not  continuous,  `short  term'  contracts  that  are  differentiated  only  in 
terms  of  employment  rights,  pay  and  conditions  of  employment.  Far  from  having  a 
peripheral  relationship  to  a  productive  `core'  they  are  an  absolutely  integral  part  of  it. 
Increasingly,  there  was  little  or  no  distinction  between  `core'  and  `peripheral'  tasks. 
Similarly,  `core'  workers  at  WCCI,  as  what  can  be  termed  `secondary'  IBM  labour, 
did  not  share  the  sense  of  security  that  has  until  fairly  recently  characterised  core 
employment  within  the  IBM.  These  `core'  workers  only  remained  employed  whilst 
the  company  retained  its  external  relationship  with  a  company  whose  employee 
interests  are  with  their  own  `core'  workers.  Fundamentally,  this  reliance  on  either  one 
or  a  few  external  relationships,  results  in  a  lack  of  security  and  shifts  the  meaning  of 
`permanent'.  As  I  will  discuss  below,  WCCI  and  other  companies  in  the  local  IBM 
cluster,  help  demonstrate  key  conceptual  weaknesses  in  New  Labour's  understanding 
of  the  world  of  work  that  moulds  both  its  rhetoric  and  policy. 179 
Unsurprisingly,  like  their  main  customer,  WCCI  was  extremely  hostile  to  trade 
unionism.  To  a  great  extent,  as  will  be  demonstrated  below,  this  remained  the  case 
throughout  the  period  of  the  research,  although,  crucially,  it  did  not  remain  `union- 
free'.  Firstly  at  its  Gourock  site  and,  latterly,  in  its  Ayrshire  plants,  the  ISTC  gained 
union  recognition.  Organisation  and  recruitment  at  the  former  created  the  possibility 
of  a  `beacon'  at  Gourock  for  other  workers  to  emulate,  especially  those  on  whom  the 
notable  shift  away  from  paternalism  in  longer  established  firms,  was  having  a 
profound  impact,  in  terms  of  labour  market  flexibility  and  deteriorating  wages  and 
conditions.  Long-term,  successful,  trade  unionism  in  this  workplace  had  the 
possibility  of  encouraging  others  to  organise,  especially  the  WCCI  workforce  at  the 
other  plants  in  Dundee  and  Ayrshire.  A  key  focal  point  in  the  recruitment  and 
organisational  drive  was  the  struggle  to  achieve  recognition  for  the  ISTC  at  the  plant. 
In  1998,  and  with  the  prospect  of  legislation  on  the  Fairness  at  Work  (DTI  1998a) 
proposals  looming,  including  the  `right'  to  recognition,  the  company  had  indicated  a 
preference  to  negotiate  with  the  engineering  union,  the  AEEU  (now  Amicus).  The 
WCCI  managing  director,  Albert  McDee,  had  originally  made  it  clear  that  he  would 
not  negotiate  with  the  ISTC,  which  he  considered  an  unprofessional  union  that 
stooped  to  personal  attacks  on  him.  He  also  suggested  that  the  union's  open  critique  of 
working  conditions  was  motivated  by  its  struggle  to  recruit  members,  and  had  little 
basis  in  what  he  believed  was  the  reality  of  working  for  WCCI  (ISTC  Full-time 
officer  2001). 
The  struggle  at  this  factory  also  grew  in  its  significance  for  the  wider  Labour 
Movement.  Given  the  company's  long  standing  hostility  to  unions  and  the  ISTC  in 
particular,  I  saw  this  factory  in  1998  as  a  key  site  to  assess  the  impact  of  New 
Labour's  employment  relations  legislation,  especially  the  proposed  `right'  to  union 
recognition.  The  impact  of  the  legislation,  in  terms  of  the  ability  of  workers  to  take 
full  advantage  of  an  apparently  central  plank  of  New  Labour's  employment  relations 
agenda,  and  what  this  meant  in  practice  could  be  analysed  through  the  situation  at 
WCCI.  Since  an  impetus  to  seek  out  a  collective  voice  in  this  workplace  was  clearly 
manifesting  itself  as  a  militant  orientation,  this  represented  a  useful  site  to  explore  one 
union's  and  one  workplace's  route  through  the  New  Labour  employment  relations 
settlement  in  the  context  of  a  particular  set  of  circumstances  -  militancy  and  employer 
intransigence  in  a  `new'  industry  -  not  recognised  by  the  ideology  that  underpinned  it. 
4  This  is  demonstrated  by  the  'coverage'  that  the  WCCI  struggle  and  recognition  agreement  was  given, 
for  example  by  the  TUC  (TUC  1999c)  and  by  the  press. 180 
This  factory  and  the  company's  other  Scottish  operations  were  also  highly 
significant  for  the  ISTC,  a  union  seemingly  fully  supportive  of  both  the  New  Realist 
and,  significantly,  the  New  Labour  turn  (Upham  19975).  The  ISTC  needed  to  tap  into 
a  new  membership  base.  With  the  demise  of  the  steel  industry,  membership  had 
decreased  from  one  hundred  and  eight  thousand  in  1980  to  thirty  thousand  in  1997 
(Willis  2001:  475).  Thus,  at  face  value,  New  Labour's  `fairness  not  favours'  agenda 
represented  a  life-line  for  the  ISTC.  The  union  had  also  become  a  key  player  in  the 
TUC  Organising  Academy6  and  WCCI  in  1998  represented  the  first  major  site  where 
the  success  of  its  ethos  and  method  could  be  significantly  tested: 
The  ISTC  are  at  the  leading  edge  of  the  expansion  of  the  whole  union 
movement  now.  Part  of  this  is  to  get  union  officials  out  of  their  ivory 
towers  and  force  people  like  McDee  to  face  the  facts  (ISTC  Full-time 
officer  1998). 
For  this  union,  WCCI  also  represented  the  possibility  of  a  significant  reversal 
fortunes,  especially  in  Division  One  (Scotland)  where  membership  stood  at  one 
thousand  at  the  end  of  1996  (Upham  1997:  268)7.  To  some  extent,  the  struggle  to 
organise  and  then  gain  recognition  at  WCCI  reflected  the  ISTC's  apparent  turn  to 
community  unionism  "as  a  route  out  of  crisis"  (Willis  2001:  467),  initially  in  Ayrshire 
in  October  1997.  However,  although  the  ISTC  tried  to  forge  links  with  the  local 
community  in  that  area  along  the  lines  of  those  described  by  Willis,  it  was  in  Gourock 
that  the  ISTC's  activity  bore  fruit.  For  the  Full-time  officer  involved,  there  were  clear 
reasons  for  this: 
The  issues  were  more  live  in  Gourock.  We  recruited  very  quickly  in 
the  early  part  of  1998.  The  man  [the  managing  director]  was  ruling  by 
fear  and  had  been  doing  so  in  Ayrshire  for  years.  There  was  a  different 
mentality  in  Gourock  (ISTC  Full-time  officer  2001). 
West  Coast  Computer  Industries'  increasing  notoriety  both  in  Inverclyde  and 
beyond,  due,  in  no  small  measure,  to  the  activity  of  some  of  the  respondents  of  this 
research  raising  awareness  of  conditions  at  the  factory,  marked  it  out  as  an  important 
site  through  which  to  analyse  the  era  of  New  Labour.  Over  four  years  this  company, 
I  Upham  notes  that  the  ISTC  "was  the  only  union  affiliated  to  the  [Labour]  Party  to  nominate  both 
Blair  as  Leader  and  John  Prescott  as  Deputy  Leader"  (1997:  266). 
6  The  TUC  Organising  Academy  opened  in  January  1998,  backed  by  seventeen  unions  as  the  "flagship 
of  the  TUC's  drive  to  organise"  (TUC  1998a)  to  put  into  practice  the  TUC's  shift  towards  organisation 
and  recruitment  (Labour  Research  1998a). 
7  By  1999  with  the  inclusion  of  the  WCCI  membership  this  had  doubled. 181 
its  conditions  of  work  and  its  problematic  industrial  relations,  have  become  the  most 
widely  reported  in  the  local  area.  Thus,  even  for  those  not  obviously  connected  to  the 
factory  or  the  company,  it  was  a  difficult  story  to  ignore: 
HUNDREDS  OF  WORKERS  MAKE  PROTESTS  OFFICIAL 
FURYERUPTS  OVER  SHIFTS 
UNION  GETS  TOUGH 
SHIFT  TO  RESOLVE  BITTER  DISPUTE8 
Clearly,  such  headlines  seemingly  characterised  a  set  of  circumstances  that 
represented  an  anathema  to  the  New  Labour  portrayal  of  working  and  working  life  at 
the  end  of  the  twentieth  century.  I  seek  to  demonstrate  below  how  the  experience  of 
one  group  of  workers  and  key  factors  that  help  shape  the  local  labour  market  in  which 
they  operate,  reveals  important  differences  between  New  Labour  rhetoric  and  New 
Labour  reality. 
4.3:  "Invest  in  Inverclyde"9 
It  was  also  difficult  to  ignore  the  significance  of  WCCI  both  as  a  major 
employer  and  as  a  significant  player  in  the  local  economy  of  Inverclyde.  Notably, 
in1998,  it  employed  between  one  thousand  and  fifteen  hundred  workers  in  Inverclyde. 
The  area  has  continued  to  bear  the  worst  effects  of  the  large-scale  de-industrialisation 
of  the  last  two  decades,  the  restructuring  of  the  labour  market  along  `flexible'  lines, 
and  the  institutionalised  shift  in  the  balance  of  power  in  industrial  relations  that 
characterised  the  period  of  Conservative  government.  The  emphasis  in  the  local 
economy  has  been  forcibly  moved  away  from  a  variety  of  industries,  like  marine 
engineering,  textiles,  sugar  and  shipbuilding,  towards  what  became  known  as  the 
`sunrise'  industries  of  `Silicon  Glen'  -  computer  manufacturing  and  electronics.  This 
process  has  intensified  since  the  1980s.  In  the  1990s,  there  was  further  growth  in 
electronics  locally,  largely  as  a  result  of  the  expansion  of  IBM's  supply  chain, 
whereby  components  and  labour  were  clustered  for  ready  access. 
Thus,  at  the  beginning  of  the  twenty-first  century,  Inverclyde's  economic  base 
is  narrowly  focused  on  the  electronics  industry.  As  the  industry  accounts  for  more 
than  20%  of  total  employment,  the  area's  flexible,  segmented,  labour  market  reflects 
the  priorities  of  this  industry,  noted  above  (Inverclyde  Council  2001b).  Despite  the 
8A  selection  of  headlines  about  WCCI  from  1998  (Greenock  Telegraph  and  Irvine  Herald). 
9  "Invest  in  Inverclyde"  is  a  promotional  slogan  used  by  Inverclyde  Council  to  "promote  Inverclyde  as 
an  attractive  area  in  which  to  live,  work,  visit  and  invest"  (Inverclyde  Council  2001a). 182 
continuing  segmentation  of  the  labour  market  that  such  priorities  create  and  reinforce, 
the  industry  has  become  exempt  from  criticism  by  the  local  state  because  of  reliance 
on  it  for  employment,  and  the  earlier  paternalism  of  long-established  companies  that 
meant  higher  than  average  wages  for  local  `core'  workers.  Inverclyde  helps 
demonstrate  how  the  rhetoric  of  the  `knowledge  economy',  outlined  earlier,  has  not 
translated  into  a  secure  strategy  to  create  high-value,  well  paid,  stable  employment, 
and  this  has  compounded  the  areas  difficulties.  Though,  by  late  2003,  opportunities  to 
move  from  secondary  to  primary  labour  market  are  very  limited,  and  thousands  of 
jobs  have  been  lost  or  outsourced  to  non-locally  based  companies  between  1998  and 
2003,  local  politicians,  remain  supportive  and  understanding  of  the  electronics 
industry's  `unique  position': 
We  pledge  our  full  support  to  the  electronics  industry.  We  appreciate 
that  global  market  pressures  dictate  that  companies...  need  to 
reconfigure  to  respond  to  changes  in  world-wide  demand  (Leader  of 
Inverclyde  Council  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  15`h  January 
200210) 
Unfortunately,  the  global  economy  moves  at  such  a  pace  that  it  is  often 
difficult  for  [electronics]  companies  to  offer  permanent  jobs  to  their 
employees  (Cairns  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  28`h  October 
200211) 
Electronics  companies  in  the  area  have  constructed  a  particular  brand  of 
exceptionalism  for  the  industry,  using  the  dominant  notions  of  the  trajectories  that 
help  characterise  New  Labour's  version  of  globalisation,  and  have  developed  this  by 
suggesting  that  these  have  greater  impact  in  this  industry  than  in  others.  Local 
politicians  accept  their  analyses  without  scrutiny.  The  quotation  below  illustrates  quite 
well  the  typical  form  this  exceptionalism  takes: 
We  are  at  the  mercy  of  our  customers.  If  they  want  a  job  done  then  we 
must  meet  the  deadlines  to  survive.  If  this  can't  be  done  then  I  can 
assure  you  jobs  will  go.  We  are  not  in  control  of  our  own  destiny 
(WCCI  Managing  Director  quoted  Irvine  Herald,  30th  January  1998). 
Yet  despite  the  `difficulties'  which  are  assumed  to  mark  the  industry  globally,  local 
productivity  has  been  substantial  and  clearly  helped  sustain  companies  like  WCCI, 
especially  during  the  period  after  the  collapse  of  major  Asian  economies.  At  the  end 
Inverclyde  Council  was  Labour-controlled  until  the  local  government  elections  in  May  2003. 
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of  the  1990s  the  gross  value  of  manufacturing  produced  in  Inverclyde  was  around 
£88,000  per  head  of  working  population  annually,  compared  with  a  West  of  Scotland 
figure  of  £44,900  (Inverclyde  Council  2001b:  26),  in  an  area  where  weekly  earnings 
are  only  87%  of  the  UK  average  (Inverclyde  Economic  Development  Service  2002). 
Given  the  dominance  of  electronics  in  the  local  labour  market  and  the  fact  that  this 
industry  accounts  for  more  than  90%  of  local  export  value  (ibid),  the  role  they  play  in 
the  creation  of  such  trends  is  clear.  The  local  workforce  benefits  little  from  the 
success  of  electronics  outside  the  `privilege'  of  being  employed.  Inverclyde  Council 
admits  to  the  existence  of. 
A  labour  pool  that  is  working  extremely  hard  in  a  low  wage,  low 
skilled  economy  (Inverclyde  Council,  2001b:  26). 
In  April  1998  the  overall  rate  of  unemployment  in  Inverclyde  was  7% 
compared  with  a  Scottish  average  of  5.7%,  based  on  the  number  of  benefit  claimants 
(Inverclyde  Council  Economic  Development  Department  1998:  4).  By  2001,  the 
figures  were  4.8%  and  4.1%  respectively  (Inverclyde  Council  2001b:  26),  although 
overall  the  reduction  in  percentage  rate  belies  an  increase  in  the  actual  number  of 
local  unemployed  people  of  over  three  hundred  between  1999  and  2002  (Strathclyde 
Labour  Market  Intelligence  and  Monitoring  Service  1999;  Greenock  Telegraph  20`h 
May  2002).  Moreover,  these  figures  offer  only  a  partial  representation  of  the  problems 
faced  in  the  area: 
Inverclyde  exhibits  some  of  the  most  widespread  levels  of  social 
exclusion  and  deprivation  of  any  local  authority  in  Scotland.  When 
analysed  by  postcode  sector  three-quarters  of  the  population  were 
assessed  as  being  `most  deprived'...  A  study  in  May  2000  found 
Inverclyde  to  be  one  of  the  poorest  local  authorities  in  the  U.  K.,  with 
54%  of  the  adult  population  classed  as  'poor'...  Inverclyde  exhibits 
serious  problems  of  urban  decline  with  poverty,  bad  housing  and  a 
poor  health  record  (Inverclyde  Council  200b:  17  &  23). 
Yet  the  area  was  represented  as  the  "export  capital  of  Scotland"  where  the 
value  of  manufacturing  exports  annually  has  averaged  £4.6  billion  in  recent  years 
(Inverclyde  Economic  Development  Service  2002,  citing  the  Scottish  Council  for 
Development  and  Industry  2001).  Such  success  is  not  mirrored  in  labour  market 
trends  where  the  norm  is  an  increasingly  high  level  of  `churning'  of  workers  between 
the  companies  that  supply  labour  for  IBM  directly,  those  that  undertake 
predominately  `off-site'  production  largely  on  behalf  of  IBM  (like  WCCI),  and  the 184 
unemployment  register.  This  is  made  more  complex  by  statistics  on  long-term 
sickness  and  incapacity  benefit.  In  Inverclyde  in  1999,  for  example,  there  were  more 
than  one  and  a  half  times  as  many  people  on  sickness  benefit  as  were  registered 
unemployed  (McCormick  2000).  Higher  levels  of  uptake  for  such  benefits  are  a 
feature  of  areas  where  heavy  industry  was  formerly  dominant,  and  the  increase  in 
claims  can  be  linked  to  the  lack  of  jobs  for  older  manual  workers  (ibid.  ).  That  many  of 
the  opportunities  for  work  available  are  in  local  electronics  companies  like  WCCI 
does  little  to  ameliorate  this  situation,  given  both  their  reputation  for  poor  pay  and 
poor  conditions.  In  addition,  flexible  and  temporary  contracts,  characteristic  of 
electronics  locally,  often  contain  a  `zero  hours  clause',  where  workers  are  laid  off  in 
`down  time'  yet  remain  employed  and  are  thus  unable  to  claim  benefits.  In  January 
2001  around  two  hundred  workers  in  Inverclyde  were  affected  by  a  decision  to  evoke 
such  a  clause  in  their  contract  by  their  employer  Montclaire  Electronics  12  : 
MontClaire  Electronics  is  one  of  a  number  of  suppliers  to  IBM  of 
temporary  labour  services.  IBM's  requirements  have  fallen. 
.  . 
This  is  a 
situation  which  is  outwith  our  control..  . 
This  means  that  at  this  moment 
we  do  not  have  enough  hours  for  all  employees  to  attend  work.  The 
situation  is  changing  daily  and  we  must  envisage  most  employees 
returning  to  work  sometime  in  January  (MontClaire  spokesperson 
quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  23rd  January  2001). 
Unsurprisingly  perhaps,  there  is  no  trade-off  between  pay  and  this  sort  of 
insecurity  in  Inverclyde,  despite  the  notable  success  of  electronics  there.  In  1997,  the 
average  gross  weekly  wage  for  full-time  employees  on  adult  rates  was  £323.40 
compared  with  a  Scottish  average  of  £336.80  (Inverclyde  Economic  Development 
Department  1998:  6).  By  2000  this  differential  between  Inverclyde  and  Scotland  as  a 
whole  had  almost  doubled  (Inverclyde  Economic  Development  Service  2002).  In 
2002  Inverclyde  was  placed  two  hundred  twenty-first  out  of  two  hundred  and  twenty 
nine  districts  surveyed  in  a  national  league  table  of  average  earnings  (Greenock 
Telegraph  19th  September  2002).  An  average  weekly  wage  of  £352.75  in  2001/2002 
means  that  average  pay  has  increased  by  less  than  £30  per  week  over  five  years. 
Again,  the  dominance  of  electronics  in  the  area  represents  an  added  complexity,  since 
there  has  been  a  notable  shift  away  from  higher  paid  core  workers  towards  using 
cheaper,  temporary,  workers.  In  the  case  of  WCCI,  the  hourly  rate  for  `core' 
employees  had  increased  by  twenty  three  pence  per  hour  between  1998  and  2002  to 
12  This  is  a  pseudonym  for  another  local  company  who  also  supply  labour  to  IBM  directly 185 
£5.48  (Greenock  Telegraph  5h  November  2002),  and  the  rate  for  temporary  workers 
has  increased  from  around  £3.80  in  1998  (McCafferty  1998:  15)  to  £4.50  (Greenock 
Telegraph  22nd  May  2002). 
The  impact  of  the  employment  practices  and  low  pay  of  the  electronics 
industry  on  a  significant  proportion  of  the  Inverclyde  population  is  apparent.  This  is  a 
U.  K.  wide  phenomenon.  In  1997  the  average  national  hourly  rate  for  full  time  workers 
on  adult  rates  in  this  sector  was  £6.80  per  hour  compared  to  a  higher  average  overall 
in  other  sectors,  which,  even  in  Inverclyde,  was  £7.87  (Inverclyde  Economic 
Development  Department  1998:  6).  The  situation  at  WCCI  was  more  acute,  and 
remained  so,  since,  at  that  time,  the  hourly  rate  was  £1.55  less  than  the  relatively  low 
U.  K.  average  for  electronics. 
The  shift  from  taxation  on  income  to  indirect  taxation  in  recent  decades, 
resulting  in  a  higher  overall  tax  burden  being  borne  by  the  poorest  (Brown  et  al.  2002: 
51),  has  compounded  the  impact  of  low  pay.  In  addition,  Inverclyde  residents  faced 
the  third  highest  council  tax  bills  in  Scotland  (2002/03),  with  relatively  richer  areas 
like  Edinburgh  City,  for  example,  paying  significantly  less  across  all  bandings  than  in 
this  deprived  area  (Scottish  Executive  2002b).  Moreover,  in  2001-2003  the  cost  of 
renting  a  home  from  the  local  authority  is  the  fourth  highest  in  Scotland,  higher  than 
many  nearby  `richer'  areas  like  East  Renfrewshire  (Scottish  Executive  2002c)13.  By 
early  2003,  average  house  prices  were  beyond  the  reach  of  many  workers  in 
electronics  at  £76,782  (Daily  Mail  3rd  January  2003). 
The  difficulties  for  organised,  collective,  struggle,  and  for  building  worker 
confidence  and  militancy,  are  clearly  apparent  in  these  circumstances.  Workers  are 
insecure,  and  low  paid,  with  little  `safety  net'  to  deal  with  the  unexpected.  Overall,  for 
many  workers  in  this  area,  and  elsewhere,  the  flexibility  so  central  to  New  Labour's 
agenda  for  employment  and  industry  means  dispensability  at  a  level  not  experienced 
since  the  1930s.  Young  people,  who  make  up  a  large  percentage  of  the  electronics 
workforce,  have  known  little  else  but  this  flexibility.  However,  many  electronics 
workers  have  previously  worked  in  the  area's  traditional  industries  and, 
unsurprisingly,  at  WCCI  at  least,  they  were  amongst  some  of  the  most  militant 
activists,  who  fought  for  the  recognition  of  the  union  that  in  the  summer  of  1998  they 
saw  as  their  own.  What  follows  is  the  story  of  their  struggle  to  organise  and  recruit  for 
13  Increases  in  the  cost  of  renting  a  home  by  2004  result  in  Inverclyde  Council  tenants  currently  paying 
the  highest  rents  in  Scotland. 186 
the  ISTC  and  to  achieve  union  recognition  in  the  face  of  a  harsh,  hostile,  management 
regime.  What  fundamentally  motivated  workers  to  see  this  process  through  can  be 
summed  up  with  reference  to  the  union's  own  literature  on  "good  reasons"  to  join  the 
ISTC: 
Joining  the  ISTC  brings  you  all  the  protection  of  joining  forces  with 
thousands  of  others  in  the  same  boat  to  speak  with  a  single  voice  for  a 
better  working  life  (ISTC  1999a,  1999b). 
However,  as  will  be  illustrated  below,  once  that  recognition  was  achieved, 
organisational  weakness  and  the  intensification  of  pressure  at  the  hands  of  a  unitary 
regime  served  to  undermine  the  faith  that  workers  had  had  in  the  ISTC: 
It  got  to  the  stage  where  we  were  laughing  when  we  got  that  magazine. 
The  back  page  said  ten  good  reasons  to  join  the  ISTC.  We'd  go 
through  them  all  one  at  a  time  and  say  `shite,  shite,  shite'.  But  it  wasn't 
just  laughing  cos  it  was  lies,  all  lies  and  we  were  sick  (Horse,  WCCI 
activist  2001). 
And  WCCI  workers  remained  extremely  vulnerable  as  their  mass  redundancy  in  2003 
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CHAPTER  FIVE:  FORWARD  TOGETHER 
5.1:  Resistance  and  the  Struggle  for  Representation 
In  the  previous  chapter,  I  sought  to  partially  outline  the  context  in  which  the 
`story'  of  WCCI  took  place.  The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  continue  to  narrate  the 
process  of  developing  trade  unionism  that  emerged  the  factory  between  a  period  of 
overt  militancy  in  1998  and  its  eventual  closure  in  2003. 
When  this  research  began,  West  Coast  Computer  Industries  was  a  highly 
successful  subsidiary  of  the  Laird  Group  with  a  turnover  of  £330  million.  At  that  time 
the  company  also  had  sites  in  Tayside  and  North  Ayrshire,  where  it  had  become  the 
biggest  employer  in  the  area.  The  company  also  had  operations  in  Ireland,  China  and 
the  U.  S.  A.  WCCI  was  a  significant  employer  in  Pitt  County,  North  Carolina,  having 
located  there  in  1993,  and  the  decision  to  do  so  may  well  have  reflected  company 
concerns  to  keep  costs  low,  unfettered  by  union  involvement  since  the  area: 
Has  the  lowest  unionization  rate  in  the  U.  S.  It  is  93%  union-free.  Work 
stoppages  are  non-existent.  All  of  the  manufacturers  that  have  located 
facilities  in  Pitt  County  since  1965  operate  union-free  plants  (Pitt 
County  Development  Commission  1998,2002). 
As  such,  the  lack  of  unionisation  in  this  area  has  seemingly  allowed  trends  of  pay  and 
conditions  to  develop  similar  to  those  in  Inverclyde  (and  other  area  where  electronics 
dominates).  For  example,  in  2002,  in  Pitt  County's  industrial  machine  and  equipment 
sector,  where  WCCI  was  a  major  employer,  average  weekly  pay  was  $812  compared 
with  the  state-wide  average  of  $989  (Pitt  County  Development  Commission  2002).  In 
addition,  the  Pitt  County  WCCI  workforce  was  also  value  for  money: 
In  three  weeks,  the  local  employees  have  learned  what  would  probably 
take  employees  in  Scotland  three  months  to  comprehend.  They  just 
pay  more  attention.  They  are  picking  up  things  faster  and  seeing 
problems  and  connecting  them  (WCCI  Managing  Director  cited  by  the 
Pitt  County  Development  Commission  2002). 
The  company's  decision  in  2001  to  locate  in  China  fuelled  already  existing 
fears  about  job  security  at  WCCI  in  Gourock.  Some  workers  claimed  that  the 
Managing  Director  had,  in  the  past,  referred  to  the  possibility  of  setting  up  in  China 188 
where,  he  apparently  suggested,  "people  would  work  for  a  bowl  of  rice".  Overall,  the 
company's  increasing  ability  to  locate  production  in  other  locations  strengthened  its 
position  and  posed  a  significant  threat  to  a  newly  organising  workforce.  The  resultant 
intensification  of  the  labour  process  under  the  WCCI  regime  acted  as  a  significant 
motivator  for  people  to  join  the  ISTC.  Paradoxically,  increasing  insecurity  and  the 
sacking  of  over  three  hundred  workers  in  April  1998  helped  breed  a  "fear  factor", 
which  left  workers  nervous  of  becoming  involved  with  the  increasingly  evident 
activity  of  the  ISTC.  Yet,  by  the  end  of  1998,  the  union  could  claim  more  than  five 
hundred  members  at  the  Gourock  site.  The  initial  period  of  offensive  of  the  newly 
established  WCCI  management,  intent  on  flexing  its  muscle,  was  met  by  wildcat 
action.  For  example,  many  workers  had  `downed  tools'  three  times  in  a  forty  eight 
hour  period  to  protest  at  new  conditions  which  they  claimed  cut  breaks,  resulted  in  a 
loss  of  earnings,  and  forced  some  of  the  workforce  into  "working  six  nights  in  a  row" 
(Greenock  Telegraph  21S`  February  1998).  Around  seven  hundred  workers  wrote  to 
WCCI  management  refusing  to  accept  the  new  conditions  and  claiming  they  had  been 
"conned"  into  signing  an  agreement  which,  they  believed,  was  only  an  affirmation 
that  they  had  read  the  new  conditions  (Greenock  Telegraph  12`h  February  1998). 
Subsequently,  there  was  an  across  the  board  wage  rise  for  core,  permanent  employees, 
which  meant  an  hourly  rate  of  £5.25  per  hour  up  from  between  £3.20-£4.50.  This 
increase  however  was  linked  to  the  acceptance  of  new  shift  plans  at  Gourock,  like 
those  operating  in  Ayrshire.  It  was  also  linked,  by  the  Managing  Director,  to  the 
apparent  exceptionalism  of  the  electronics  industry,  since  according  to  him  the  shifts 
were  "more  suitable  to  an  electronics  industry  that  requires  a  high  degree  of 
flexibility"  (Greenock  Telegraph  2nd  March  1998).  In  an  attempt  to  marginalise 
dissent  and  promote  division  within  an  increasingly  organised  workforce,  the 
Managing  Director  said  continuing  problems  were  due  to  the  "minority  who  don't 
want  to  work  and  who  fall  asleep  on  the  lines  or  in  the  toilets"  (Greenock  Telegraph 
2  °a  March  1998). 
This  latter  comment  is  indicative  of  the  managerial  attitude  that  had  begun  to 
permeate  rapidly  when  WCCI  took  over  from  Grimtec.  Workers  were  a  "shed-load  of 
shite"  to  the  Managing  Director,  who  apparently  complained  that  he  had  paid  "£21 
million  for  a  shed,  and  a  shower  of  drug  addicts,  alcoholics  and  single  mothers" 
(ISTC  Full-time  officer  and  WCCI  union  activists).  As  for  the  ISTC  they  were  "a 
shower  of  amateurs...  a  soap  opera  union"  (WCCI  Managing  Director  quoted  in  the 189 
Irvine  Herald  30th  January  1998)  and  the  Managing  Director  made  clear  his  view  of 
the  union  by  claiming: 
There  would  be  no  union  in  his  factory  as  long  as  he  had  a  hole  in  his 
arse  (cited  in  Findlay  and  McKinlay,  2000:  15). 
Unsurprisingly,  this  was  not  a  view  shared  by  the  workforce,  many  of  whom  linked 
the  take-over  by  WCCI  and  its  managerial  culture  as  the  catalyst  for  their  seeking  out 
union  representation: 
Most  people  are  joining  [the  union]  because  this  lot  came  in  and 
started  taking  everything  off  us;  taking  breaks  off  us  and  starting  to 
make  a  stand  on  things  affecting  people's  lives  (Vic,  WCCI  worker 
1998). 
To  be  honest  most  of  the  people  I  know  were  happy  before  and  the 
numbers  were  still  going  out  the  door.  It's  only  since  WCCI  that  we 
need  it  (Nicola,  WCCI  worker  1998)1. 
Although  he  believed  the  willingness  to  join  the  union  was  an  indication  of  a  growing 
mood  of  collectivism  at  the  factory,  the  ISTC's  Full-time  officer  felt  that  without 
issues,  without  an  openly  hostile  and  confrontational  attitude  from  the  management, 
its  campaign  would  have  been  a  lot  more  difficult.  The  Managing  Director  was  one  of 
the  best  recruiting  tools  the  union  had,  and  this  acted  as  an  effective  counter-weight  to 
the  difficulties  of  communicating  directly  with  workers,  under  the  conditions  of 
scrutiny  and  security  at  the  factory.  The  `staying  power'  of  the  ISTC  and  the  obvious 
commitment  of  their  Full-time  officer  impressed  workers  and,  crucially,  those 
workers  who  were  prepared  to  take  up  the  reins  of  agitation  and  recruitment  at  shop 
floor  level,  where  there  was  no  access  for  officials: 
The  GMB  and  the  T&G  came.  But  they  never  came  back  again. 
There  was  hostility  to  them  two  cos  of  the  yards  and  the  sugar  houses2. 
They  dished  out  leaflets  I  think  then  fucked  off.  The  ISTC  came  and 
came  back  and  kept  coming  back.  I  was  a  bit  wary  because  of  the 
1  Although  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  nickname  `Grimtec'  suggests  the  previous  regime  was  similarly 
disposed. 
2  One  explanation  for  this  comment  is  that  both  the  GMB  and  the  TGWU  previously  represented 
thousands  in  the  area's  traditional  industries.  `Horse'  was  formerly  a  docker  in  Greenock,  represented 
by  the  Transport  Union  and  worked  in  the  shipyards  where  the  GMB  dominated.  The  GMB  is  also 
associated  locally  with  the  current  MSP  who  is  a  former  official  and  was  the  Shop  Stewards  Convenor 
at  the  time  the  majority  of  the  shipyards  in  the  area  closed. 190 
miners'  strike3.  But  the  full-timer  apologised  for  it.  He  said  all  the  right 
things  -  they  were  grass-roots,  left-wing  fighters  (Horse  2001). 
They  stood  by  and  kept  coming.  Not  like  the  others  who  came  once  or 
twice  and  chucked  it  like  the  GMB  and  the  AEEU.  The  ISTC  stuck  it 
out  (Charlie,  WCCI  activist  2000). 
The  continuing  activity  of  the  ISTC  outside  the  factory  coincided  with  the 
intensification  of  the  harshness  of  WCCI  management  techniques  and  allowed  the 
membership  base  to  grow.  This,  in  turn,  helped  the  new  ISTC  activists  to  harness  the 
mood  of  militant  collectivism  that  was  developing.  In  the  latter  part  of  1998,  three 
main  issues  dominated  discussion  and  served  to  galvanise  workers'  resolve  to  `take  on 
management'.  The  first  was  the  holiday  arrangements  for  the  1998  festive  period.  It  is 
a  striking  feature  of  work  in  this  company  and,  indeed,  elsewhere  in  electronics,  that 
what  are  considered  `traditional'  local  or  national  holidays  are  shifted  to  suit  the 
overall  demands  of  companies.  In  many  local  electronics  factories,  which  are  either 
US  owned  or  particularly  dependent  on  work  from  US  owned  firms,  the  financial 
year-end  coincides  with  the  festive  break  at  the  end  of  the  year  in  the  UK,  and  the 
flexibility  that  is  imposed  on  workers  over  these  holidays  is  extremely  contentious: 
The  seagulls4  want  us  doing  stuff  on  right  up  to  late  on  Hogmany  and 
on  the  second  [of  January].  But  nothing  ever  interferes  with  the  Fourth 
of  July  or  Thanksgiving.  That  really  annoys  me  (Manager  in  another 
electronics  firm,  2  "d  January  2002). 
The  flexibility  of  these  holidays  was  a  feature  of  work  at  WCCI  with  IBM  as  their 
main  customer,  and  in  September  1998  WCCI  management  moved  the  traditional 
Boxing  Day  holiday  (26`h  December)  to  September.  Workers  protested  at  this  and  saw 
it  as  indicative  of  management  attacks  on  their  conditions.  They  threatened  a  protest 
that  involved  turning  up  for  work  en  masse  on  the  day  of  the  September  holiday  and 
3  This  is  a  reference  to  the  fact  that  Scottish  steel  plant,  Ravenscraig,  where  the  ISTC  was  the  main 
union,  remained  open  during  the  1984-85  miners'  strike,  using  imported  coal.  The  ISTC  argued  that 
this  was  necessary  to  secure  the  future  of  the  plant.  Ravenscraig  closed  in  1992.  This  was  referred  to  by 
another  worker  at  the  first  ISTC  meeting  I  attended  in  response  to  the  Full-time  officer's  criticisms  of 
the  tactics  of  the  engineering  union's  rival  attempts  to  recruit  at  the  WCCI  Gourock: 
"See  you're  saying  it's  a  Labour  Movement,  a  trade  union  movement  and  we  should  all  be  singing 
from  the  same  hymn  sheet.  Well  I'm  not  going  to  criticise  the  work  you've  done  so  far.  But  maybe 
these  young  ones  don't  remember,  but  I  do.  I  remember  about  your  union  not  supporting  the  miners  in 
`84  and  if  your  union  hadn't  let  your  members  handle  scabby  coal  then  we'd  have  brought  Thatcher 
and  the  whole  fucking  lot  of  them  to  their  knees"  (Panda,  WCCI  activist  1998).  `Panda'  also  made 
reference  to  this  again  when  interviewed  in  2001. 
4  This  person  uses  this  term  for  senior  American  managers:  "we  call  them  that  because  they  come  over 
here,  eat  all  your  food  and  shit  all  over  you". 191 
bringing  a  `Santa'  with  them,  and  to  take  26th  December  off.  The  ISTC  Full-time 
officer  said  that  he  would  be  supportive  of  any  action,  but  that  he  could  only  represent 
them  individually  since  the  union  was  not  recognised. 
A  second  area  of  contention,  that  helped  galvanise  the  militant  mood  during 
this  period,  was  the  issue  of  the  annual,  `Xmas'  bonus.  Under  the  Grimtec  regime,  and 
in  the  first  year  under  WCCI,  workers  were  given  a  productivity/attendance  bonus  at 
the  end  of  the  year.  Given  the  general  conditions  at  the  factory,  the  workers  were 
convinced  that  they  would  not  get  their  bonus  and  again  the  activists  used  this  to  the 
union's  advantage. 
The  third  motivation  for  militancy  in  late  1998  concerned  the  fact  that  a 
security  worker,  who  was  off  sick  recovering  from  throat  cancer,  was  sacked.  The 
company  stated  that: 
Operational  requirements  and  our  informed  view  of  when  he  would 
return  to  work,  led  to  his  agreement  being  terminated  (WCCI 
spokesman  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  5`h  December  1998). 
Hundreds  of  workers  at  the  factory  signed  a  petition  for  his  reinstatement.  The 
activists  took  the  petition  to  the  streets  of  Inverclyde  and  thousands  signed  it.  They 
also  sought  a  workplace  demonstration  and  hoped  that  ISTC  members  all  over 
Scotland  would  take  part  (Greenock  Telegraph  21St  December  1998).  The  ISTC  Full- 
time  officer's  aim  was  for  "management  to  have  a  rethink"  (quoted  in  ibid).  The 
campaign  over  Duncy,  the  sacked  cancer  victim,  helped  galvanise  support  for  the 
union  and  the  decision  to  involve  the  whole  community  in  condemning:  "a  company 
which  fail  to  recognise  any  sort  of  level  of  common  decency"  (WCCI  activist  quoted 
in  Greenock  Telegraph  21't  December  1998).  It  also  represented  one  of  the  few 
demonstrations  of  the  ISTC's  turn  to  community  unionism  locally  (Willis  2001)5. 
5There  is little  evidence  that  the  ISTC  branch  at  WCCI  fitted  Willis'  model  of  community  unionism. 
She  suggests  that  "community  unionists  are  in  a  position  to  forge  unity  on  the  left,  linking  the  struggle 
for  redistribution  with  that  over  recognition,  the  universal  with  the  particular"  (2001:  469)  citing  how 
the  union  in  Scotland  used  "club  nights  and  parties"  to  help  further  recognition  campaigns  (ibid:  475). 
The  ISTC's  magazine  also  noted  the  union's  attendance  at  the  Irvine  Marymass  festival  in  1999  in  this 
context  (ISTC  1999a).  There  is  no  obvious  connection  with  such  events  and  'making  links  with  the 
left'.  Indeed  one  of  the  problems  with  this  analysis  is  that  there  is little  recognition  of  divisions  within 
the  left.  For  example,  although  the  Full-time  officer  at  WCCI  Gourock  worked  openly  with  the 
Socialist  Workers'  Party  (SWP)  over  the  sacked  cancer  victim,  he  was  extremely  sceptical  and  found 
them  "too  extreme"  (Full-time  officer  1998,2000),  for  example  over  the  calls  to  "occupy  and 
nationalise"  National  Semiconductor  when  it  announced  the  loss  of  six  hundred  jobs  in  October  1998. 
In  the  Inverclyde  area  the  SWP  were  by  far  the  most  active  grouping  on  the  left  and  an  unwillingness  to 
work  with  them  on  the  part  of  the  ISTC  limited  its  ability  to  forge  the  links  that  Willis  discusses. 192 
Activists  continued  to  organise  and  linked  the  three  issues  above  on  one  of 
many  `subversive'  leaflets  that  struck  a  chord  with  a  large  number  of  workers: 
ONE  WORKER'S  OPINION 
We  all  know  that  the  wages  and  conditions  in  this  factory  have  never  been  great  but  at 
least  this  time  last  year  we  had  the  Xmas  bonus  to  look  forward  to.  Well,  it's  nearly 
December  and  we  still  don't  know  if  we're  getting  one  or  not. 
Do  the  management  know  how  much  of  a  bonus  they'll  be  getting  for  all  the  hard 
work  they've  done  over  the  last  year. 
Has  anyone  taken  the  time  to  keep  them  informed  of  such  an  important  decision? 
Now  we  hear  the  management  want  to  start  making  deals  with  the  workforce 
BUT 
Not  on  trade  union  recognition 
Not  on  the  poorer  wages  and  conditions  of  the  Agency  Workers 
Not  on  the  maintenance  of  the  core  workforce 
Not  on  giving  Duncy  his  job  back 
Not  on  the  Xmas  bonus 
Not  on  the  attitudes  of  some  of  the  middle  and  lower  management 
Nothing  about  the  continuing  pressure  on  the  assemblers  and  other  line  workers 
and  its  effects  on  health  and  safety. 
What  do  they  want  to  make  deals  about?  More  bloody  overtime! 
We  gave  up  the  festive  holiday  this  year  at  the  company's  demand.  So  why  haven't  we 
seen  next  year's  holiday  rota  yet?  Think  about  it 
REMEMBER  THE  PROMISES.  START  VOICING  YOUR  OPINION 
START  CASTING  YOUR  VOTE. 
JOIN  THE  UNION. 
JOIN  THE  FIGHT  FOR  RECOGNITION.  UNITYIS  STRENGTH6 
These,  and  the  attention  of  the  local  newspaper  that  was  prepared  to  present 
the  company  in  a  critical  light,  meant  1998  ended  with  the  union  in  an  apparent 
position  of  strength.  However,  as  Willis  (2001)  has  pointed  out,  the  possibility  of 
statutory  recognition  served  to  shift  the  focus  of  the  ISTC  away  from  community 
unionism.  Evidence  from  WCCI  indicates  that  this  was  not  solely  a  result  of  the 
Employment  Relations  Act  in  2000,  as  Willis  suggests  (2001:  476).  However,  the 
Fairness  at  Work  proposals  were  actively  quoted  by  the  Full-time  officer  and  used  to 
add  further  impetus  to  recruitment  and  organisation,  though  the  potential  advantages 
of  new  `rights'  for  workers  were  often  overstated  by  the  ISTC  at  WCCI.  In  particular, 
the  apparent  right  for  a  union  to  be  recognised  by  a  company  under  certain 
circumstances  was  used  by  the  Full-time  officer  to  motivate  people  to  join  the  union. 
6  WCCI  activists  leaflet  October  1998,  original  emphasis. 193 
As  noted  earlier,  Fairness  was  disappointing.  The  automatic  right  to 
recognition  could  only  be  exercised  where  a  union  had  already  achieved  recruitment 
of  more  than  50%  of  the  workforce.  Where  this  was  not  possible,  it  was  necessary  for 
a  majority  of  workers  to  vote  for  recognition,  representing  40%  of  those  eligible  to 
vote.  As  1998  progressed,  it  seemed  that  the  ISTC  at  WCCI  in  Inverclyde  would 
have  little  difficulty  in  passing  the  threshold  of  50%  well  in  advance  proposed 
Employment  Relations  Act  becoming  law.  However,  the  union  continued  to  face  the 
hurdle  of  management  hostility  that  was  clearly  manifest  in  a  company  ballot  to 
ascertain  only  core  workers'  opinion  on  `workplace  representation',  without  naming 
any  union  on  the  ballot  paper.  Eventually  ballots  (carried  out  by  the  Electoral  Reform 
Society)  of  `core'  workers  were  held  in  both  Gourock  and  Ayrshire  on  whether  they 
wanted  union  representation  and  on  which  union  they  preferred  from  four  unions:  the 
ISTC,  the  AEEU  (the  company's  favoured  union),  the  GMB  and  the  TGWU.  The 
ISTC  actively  campaigned  around  the  ballot  and  advertised  in  the  local  press.  This 
paid  off  in  Gourock,  and  when  the  Full-time  officer  announced  the  result  of  the  ballot 
at  a  poorly  attended  meeting  of  workers  in  October  19988  it  was  clear  that,  at  this  site, 
the  ISTC  was  the  union  of  choice.  However,  the  results  of  the  ballot  highlighted  some 
serious  difficulties.  At  Gourock  nine  hundred  and  sixty-five  papers  were  distributed 
but  only  four  hundred  and  fifty-two  were  returned.  Of  four  hundred  and  eight  workers 
who  voted  "yes"  to  union  representation,  three  hundred  and  seventy-two  selected  the 
ISTC  as  their  union  of  choice.  The  union  could  not,  therefore,  claim  a  resounding 
victory  and  the  turnout  of  the  ballot  highlighted  weaknesses  in  that,  according  to  the 
Full-time  officer,  at  least  one  hundred  of  their  members  were  claimed  to  be  temporary 
agency  staff  by  the  Human  Resources  Department?.  The  fact  that  five  hundred  and 
thirteen  workers  did  not  vote  raised  questions  about  the  balloting  process,  and  about 
whether  "young  wans  even  bothered  to  vote"10  . 
At  the  Ayrshire  factories,  where  one 
thousand  six  hundred  and  sixty-eight  ballot  papers  were  sent  out,  a  majority  of 
workers  who  voted  (four  hundred  and  sixty-one  workers)  said  "no"  to  union 
'  The  `40%  rule'  represented  a  key  point  of  departure  for  major  unions  and  the  government,  alongside 
the  proposal  to  exclude  workers  in  small  companies  of  less  than  twenty  employees  (Labour  Research 
Department,  1998:  17).  Subsequent  amendments  contained  in  the  Employment  Relations  Bill  1999 
meant  ballots  would  only  take  place  where  10%  of  workers  were  already  members  and  there  is  a 
likelihood  that  the  union  would  win  the  ballot  (see  Towers  1999). 
8  This  may  have  reflected  to  some  extent  a  central  tactic  in  management's  resistance  to  union 
organisation.  It  was  becoming  increasingly  common  for  overtime  at  premium  rates  to  be  offered  on 
days  when  ISTC  meetings  were  held. 
9  ISTC  members  meeting  23`d  October  1998. 
10  ISTC  member,  speaking  at  the  above  meeting. 194 
representation,  although  the  ISTC  was  the  preference  of  one  hundred  and  seventy- 
eight  of  them. 
The  "fear  factor"  in  each  location  was  also  blamed  for  the  ballot  results. 
Overall,  this  represented  a  setback  for  the  union,  though  not  an  insurmountable  one. 
High-profile  organising  and  recruitment  strategies,  alongside  a  growing  militancy  by 
key  ISTC  activists  inside  the  factory  had  had  a  positive  impact  and  membership 
continued  to  grow.  However,  the  intensification  of  management  hostility,  coupled 
with  the  continuing  shift  towards  replacing  core  workers  with  temporary  workers  that 
served  to  reduce  the  ISTC's  `target  audience'  at  Gourock,  impeded  the  union's  ability 
to  recruit  and  strengthen  its  position. 
The  interplay  of  these  factors  suggested  that  the  50%  threshold  for  automatic 
recognition  was  a  moving  target  for  the  ISTC  at  WCCI.  Moreover,  the  continuation  of 
management's  casualisation  strategy  threatened  the  union's  ability  to  gain  the 
required  40%  of  the  eligible  workforce  in  any  future  ballot,  when  the  proposals 
became  law.  The  40%  threshold  did  not  `fit'  with  "the  current  reality  of  a  flexible 
labour  market"  (Labour  Research  Department  1998:  17),  and  the  ISTC  at  WCCI  was 
aware  of  the  likely  impact  of  this  on  its  aims.  Thus,  though  the  ISTC  continued  to 
look  to  rank  and  file  activity  to  disrupt  production  in  order  to  raise  awareness  of 
conditions  at  the  factory,  the  overall  impetus  was  towards  gaining  recognition  in  order 
to  trigger  further  membership  growth.  Achieving  recognition  could  increase  its 
influence  and  would  allow  a  moderate  union  to  back  off  from  the  militant  activity, 
which  had  thus  far  characterised  experience  at  WCCI  for  the  ISTC.  Normal  industrial 
relations,  therefore,  was  a  key  goal  of  the  union  hierarchy,  though  the  Full-time 
officer  was  fully  aware  of  the  problematic  nature  of  the  management  regime  in  this 
respect.  The  union  was  also  aware  of  the  possible  barrier  to  its  success  presented  by 
the  company's  active  encouragement  of  the  engineering  union,  the  possible 
recognition  and  growth  of  which  could  undermine  the  efforts  of  the  previous  few 
months.  Towers  (1999:  85)  has  noted,  however,  that  though  recognition  and  growth 
are  connected,  the  latter  is  not  contingent  upon  the  former.  Nonetheless,  the  ISTC 
believed  recognition  was  needed  to  promote  its  further  growth  at  WCCI. 
A  crucial  difficulty  emerged  during  this  critical  period,  causing  long-term 
damage  to  the  development  of  the  sort  of  independent,  workplace  organisation  needed 
to  improve  conditions  at  the  factory  (Darlington  1994),  sought  by  the  leading 
activists.  Although  membership  levels  were  around  60-70%  by  the  end  of  1998,  it  was 195 
becoming  increasingly  clear  that  New  Labour's  new  employment  rights  were  going  to 
be  rolled  out  over  a  relatively  lengthy  periods  1.  Clearly,  the  further  intensification  of 
WCCI's  casualisation  strategy  posed  a  significant  threat  to  the  ISTC's  efforts. 
Automatic  recognition  was  no  longer  a  foregone  conclusion.  The  union  would  need  to 
work  hard  to  retain  the  faith  of  workers  in  the  absence  of  recognition  under  extremely 
difficult  conditions,  in  order  to  retain  the  base  it  would  need  to  create  a  40%  majority 
in  a  future  workplace  ballot.  A  key  difficulty  here,  discussed  in  greater  detail  below, 
was  the  division  between  core  and  peripheral  workers.  Clearly,  joining  a  union  whilst  1  11 
employed  by  an  anti-union  employer  represents  a  significant  risk  for  any  employee, 
especially  in  a  period  during  which  employers  in  general  have  been  given  the  upper- 
hand  via  anti-union  legislation,  even  in  the  context  of  the  promise  of  more 
. 
`supportive'  legislation.  For  workers  on  temporary  contacts,  being  the  most 
dispensable  segment  in  the  labour  market  meant  the  added  risk  of  being  sacked.  The 
notable  fear  factor  at  WCCI  was  greatest  for  this  group  overall,  and  thus  the  fear  of 
joining  a  union  was  greatest.  However,  temporary  workers  did  join  the  ISTC,  and  its 
activists  made  clear  from  the  outset  that  they  were  prepared  to  fight  for  `non-core' 
workers.  They  also  wanted  all  WCCI  workers  to  be  in  one  ISTC  branch.  However  the 
primary  focus  of  the  ISTC  at  WCCI,  following  management's  approach,  to  an  extent, 
was  on  the  core  workforce.  The  union  seemingly  judged  that  its  efforts  needed  to  be 
concentrated  on  this  group  as  the  only  it  would  have  voting  rights  in  a  recognition 
ballot.  Moreover,  the  ISTC  policy  nationally  was  apparently  to  recruit  peripheral 
workers  into  a  nationwide  contract  labour  branch.  Thus,  a  division  was  created  that 
had  long-term  ramifications  for  trade  unionism  at  the  factory. 
At  the  same  time,  the  company  also  went  on  the  `sofft'  offensive  and  began  to 
deploy  what  became  a  key  tactic  in  its  fight  to  undermine  union  organisation  and 
worker  militancy:  `talking  up'  its  benevolent  role  in  the  local  community,  and 
underplaying  the  insecurity  created  by  its  employment  practices.  For  example,  the 
company  announced  an  "early  Christmas  present"  for  the  area  in  the  shape  of  four 
hundred  temporary  jobs,  apparently  to  cope  with  seasonal  demand  and  to  alleviate 
pressure  on  the  current  workforce: 
The  contracts  will  last  until  the  end  of  the  year  at  least  and  by  then  we 
will  have  a  clearer  picture  of  how  the  market  is  looking...  [People 
have  been  working]  twelve  hour  shifts,  seven  days  a  week  ... 
I  fully 
11  The  Employment  Relations  Bill  was  published  in  January  1999  but  the  new  `right  to  recognition', 
contained  in  the  Employment  Relations  Act,  did  not  become  law  until  May  2000. 196 
sympathise  with  them  because  at  the  end  of  the  day  they  are  human 
beings  and  not  machines  (WCCI  Managing  Director  quoted  in  the 
Greenock  Telegraph  29th  October  1998). 
The  positive  impact  of  this  `gift'  was  weakened  by  claims  that  the  company  had 
struggled  to  recruit  because  candidates  for  employment  were  failing  a  newly 
introduced  drug  test  (Greenock  Telegraph  2"d  November  1998).  The  precarious  nature 
of  employment  at  the  factory  was  highlighted  in  sharp  relief  early  the  following  year 
when  the  company  laid  off  the  number  they  had  taken  on  (Greenock  Telegraph  71 
January  1999). 
WCCI's  `sot  and  `hard'  offensives,  and  weaknesses  in  New  Labour's 
legislation,  meant  voluntary  recognition,  concluded  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  in 
advance  of  the  new  legal  framework,  became  the  ISTC's  preferred  option.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Full-time  officer,  the  negotiation  of  a  voluntary  agreement,  as 
confirmation  of  the  position  of  strength  that  the  union  had  developed  during  1998, 
would  achieve  a  goal  that  both  New  Labour's  legislation  and  WCCI  strategy  could 
have  permanently  impeded: 
We  got  over  50%  in  a  short  period.  This  put  us  in  a  position  of  power. 
But  the  company  never  really  gave  us  credit  at  this  stage  and  we  built 
from  that  too.  Then  we  got  recognition.  Thank  God  cos  if  they'd 
known  the  legislation  the  way  they  know  it  now  they'd  never  have 
recognised  the  ISTC  (Full-time  officer  2001). 
However,  this  also  involved  a  more  moderate  approach  to  convince  WCCI  that  the 
ISTC  were  worth  doing  business  with  and  that  militant  wildcat  action  could  be 
contained.  Problems  with  the  `rights'  that  eventually  came  out  of  the  Fairness 
proposals,  and  those  associated  with  WCCI's  internal  labour  market,  could  be 
overcome,  in  the  short  term,  but  this  involved  significant  restraint  on  the  part  of 
workers,  especially  the  activists.  It  also  meant  the  development  of  a  more  temperate 
outlook  and  set  of  goals.  Hence  the  period  of: 
Doing  anything  you  think  of...  just  doing  it...  anything.  Showing  this 
guy  [the  Managing  Director]  is  a  nutcase...  putting  your  necks  on  the 
line 
...  to  get  recognition  (Jim,  WCCI  activist  1999,  paraphrasing  the 
Full-time  officer's  advice  in  1998). 
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5.2:  Recognition  in  a  Cold  Climate 
At  the  beginning  of  1999,  some  activists  were  concerned  that  militancy  was 
being  undermined  because  the  activity  of  the  Full-time  officer,  and  some  members  of 
the  newly-formed  union  committee,  was  becoming  too  focused  on  discussions  with 
management.  The  claim  that  recognition  negotiations  were  at  a  `crucial  stage'  had 
begun  to  permeate.  There  was  also  concern  these  were  to  be  conducted  in  secret  at  a 
nearby  hotel.  At  this  stage,  the  biggest  fear  for  militant  activists  was  the  possibility  of 
a  `no  strike  deal'  tied  into  the  reinstatement  of  the  sacked  cancer  victim. 
In  the  middle  of  January  1999,  negotiations  were  concluded.  The  ISTC  and  the 
management  of  WCCI  had  agreed  the  terms  of  union  recognition  at  the  Gourock 
plant.  The  commencement  of  the  agreement  coincided,  and  was  effectively  tied  into, 
new  terms  and  conditions  at  WCCI  that  served  to  formalise  key  strands  of  the 
management's  thrust  since  WCCI  had  taken  over  from  Grimtec.  Two  examples  help 
illustrate  this  point.  Firstly  the  new  contract  of  employment  formalised  the 
organisation  of  holidays  around  production  requirements: 
As  the  Company's  operations  require,  holidays  are  at  specific  times 
which  are  most  suitable  to  customers,  suppliers  and  Company 
production  requirements.  Dates  of  Annual  and  Statutory  Holidays  will 
be  published,  after  discussion,  on  Notice  Boards.  There  may  be 
however  requirements  to  meet  certain  commitments  for  employees  to 
work  during  holiday  periods...  (WCCI  Ltd  ls`  January  1999,  Terms 
and  Conditions  of  Employment,  emphasis  added12). 
Secondly,  although  the  Human  Resources  Manager  had  stated  two  months  earlier  that 
he  felt  random  drugs  testing  at  the  factory  to  be  "inappropriate"  (Greenock  Telegraph 
26`h  October  1998),  their  use  was  now  written  into  the  new  contract: 
Any  employee  who  ... 
is  found  to  have  taken  drugs  following  a  drug 
test  ... 
is  likely  to  be  subject  to  summary  dismissal.. 
.  It  is  a  condition  of 
employment  that  employees  agree  to  submit  to  such  tests  at  such 
reasonable  times  and  places  as  specified  by  the  Company13  (WCCI 
Ltd,  Terms  and  Conditions  of  Employment,  1St  January  199914) 
12  Section  7  paragraph  I  a. 
13  It  is  not  possible  to  fully  explore  the  issue  of  drug  taking  at  this  factory  in  detail.  When  asked  about 
this  in  1998,  one  worker  stated:  "People  take  drugs,  aye.  But  they're  no  junkies.  The  shifts,  the  pressure 
on  you  means  you  sometimes  do  a  bit  a  speed  and  puff  stops  you  from  decking  some  bastard 
supervisor".  Hollywood  (1979:  28)  has  argued  that:  "Drug  taking  []  is  obviously  a  form  of  [] 
resistance  and  refusal  to  relinquish  intrinsic  satisfaction....  drugs  aid  adjustment  to  work.  By  becoming 
absorbed  in  themselves,  turning  inwards,  drug  users  can  ignore  the  objective  reality  of  the  boredom  and 
monotony  at  work".  In  both  cases,  employers  as  well  as  workers  evidently  `need'  drugs  in  this  context. 198 
Further  consideration  of  the  recognition  agreement  offers  insight  into  the  shift 
away  from  militancy  towards  moderation  that  it  helped  bring  about.  Significantly,  the 
first  `casualty'  of  this  agreement  was  the  relationship  with  the  local  press,  the  tool 
activists  had  used  to  highlight  the  worst  excesses  of  the  harsh  regime  WCCI,  helping 
to  build  confidence  inside  the  plant  and  fostering  a  sense  of  outrage  at  it  in  the  wider 
community.  In  the  new  `post-agreement'  climate: 
All  matters  discussed  under  this  agreement  should  remain  private 
between  the  Company  and  the  Union  at  all  times  (WCCI  Ltd/ISTC 
199911) 
Only  when  the  full  grievance  procedure  contained  in  the  agreement  was  exhausted 
could  the  company  and  the  union: 
In  the  first  instance  make  joint  statements  to  interested  parties  on  the 
particular  circumstances  (WCCI  Ltd/ISTC  199916). 
Any  breech  of  this  clause  meant  workers  would  be: 
Subject  to  the  appropriate  disciplinary  rules  of  the  Company  and  the 
Union  (WCCUISTC  199917). 
Importantly,  this  meant  they  could  not  publicise  their  `victory'  in  gaining  recognition 
and  limited  the  possibility  for  a  return  to  a  militant,  aggressive  and  antagonistic 
strategy,  however  necessary  it  became  to  do  so.  It  also  neutralised  any  sense  that 
militant  activity  helped  breed  success  and  reduced  the  impact  that  this  victory  could 
have  had  on  the  confidence  of  other  non-unionised  workers  to  initiate  similar  fights, 
even  those  employed  by  the  same  company.  Effectively,  this  precluded  the  ISTC  from 
forging  greater  links  with  the  local  community  and  making  connections  between 
conditions  in  workplaces  like  WCCI  and  more  general  local  concerns  -  central  aims 
of  community  unionism.  Its  ability  to  make  such  connections  explicitly  and 
Yet,  unlike  the  employer  in  Hollywood's  research,  WCCI  did  not  `turn  a  blind  eye'.  Drug  abuse  is 
particularly  problematic  in  the  Inverclyde  area.  At  WCCI,  the  drug  problem  was  described  as 
"horrendous"  by  one  worker  and  the  company  admitted  that  several  workers  were  found  to  be 
"incapacitated"  (Greenock  Telegraph  26`'  October  1998).  The  local  newspaper  revealed  that  a  bus 
taking  workers  to  the  factory  was  dubbed  "The  Marrakech  Express"  (Greenock  Telegraph  2"a 
November  1998). 
14  Section  13. 
is  Section  6a. 
16  Section  6b. 
17  Section  6c. 199 
consistently  was  severely  curtailed  by  recognition.  This  also  created  problems  for  the 
activists  who  had  played  a  crucial  role  in  building  up  the  support  the  union  needed  to 
force  recognition  negotiations  in  the  first  place: 
Right  after  recognition  was  signed,  we  wanted  to  go  to  the  Tele'8 
because  they'd  followed  our  fight  and  supported  us.  We  imagined 
IBMers  and  that  thinking  these  bastards  can  be  beaten.  But  right  away 
the  management  said  `there's  to  be  no  crowing  about  this,  it's  business 
as  usual'.  Well  it  was  business  as  usual  and  a  very  fucking  ruthless 
business  indeed  (Horse  2001). 
The  decision  to  accept,  what  the  activists  called  a  `gagging  clause',  allowed  the 
company  to  take  the  upper  hand.  It  allowed  WCCI  to  play-down  recognition, 
especially  to  its  main  (anti-union)  customer  and  meant  the  press  would  be  notified 
when  the  company  felt  was  appropriate.  After  weeks  of  adverse  press  coverage  over 
the  campaign  to  have  the  cancer  victim  re-instated,  challenges  over  festive  holidays 
wages  for  agency  workers  at  the  "scrooge  firm"  (Greenock  Telegraph  28`h  December 
1998),  and  the  sacking  of  eight  hundred  temporary  workers,  the  Human  Resources 
Manager  announced  that  the  company  had  agreed  to  recognition  for  the  ISTC  in  an 
`exclusive  interview'  to  the  Greenock  Telegraph  (21St  January  1999).  The  main  thrust 
of  the  interview  was  to  promote  a  Works  Council  that  would  be  set  up  immediately: 
The  fulcrum  of  employee  relations  at  WCCI  will  be  a  works  council 
that  will  be  freely  elected  with  both  union  and  non-union  members 
able  to  stand  for  election  (Human  Resources  Manager  quoted  in  the 
Greenock  Telegraph  21St  January  1999). 
Overall,  the  attitude  of  management  to  recognition  shaped  the  impact  of  the 
agreement  and  this  limited  the  positive  effect  that  it  had  on  working  practices  and 
union  organisation.  The  immediate  benefits  of  recognition  for  the  workers  themselves, 
especially  after  their  sense  of  victory  was  undermined,  were  not  readily  obvious.  The 
terms  of  the  recognition  agreement  had  particular  implications  for  the  key  activists 
most  vociferous  in  their  criticisms  of  the  management  regime,  who  became 
recognised  union  representatives.  It  was  clear  that  `toeing  the  line'  would  be  a  central 
feature  of  workplace  unionism  at  WCCI  since: 
18  The  colloquial  term  for  the  local  newspaper,  the  Greenock  Telegraph. 200 
It  is  incumbent  upon  all  representatives  at  all  times  to  foster  and 
further  good  relations  between  the  Company,  its  employees  and  the 
Union  (WCCI  Ltd/ISTC  199919) 
The  recognition  agreement  also  contained  a  clear  set  of  objectives,  seemingly 
uncharacteristically  in  tune  with  a  `partnership'  approach,  and  that,  if  adhered  to, 
represented  a  major  step  towards  improving  the  general  situation  for  the  union  and  for 
workers: 
The  objectives  of  this  Agreement  are: 
To  develop  and  maintain  the  prosperity  of  the  Company  and  its 
employees. 
To  promote  and  maintain  mutual  trust  and  co-operation  between  the 
Company,  its  employees  and  the  Union. 
To  establish  procedures  by  which  matters  affecting  these  relationships 
can  be  dealt  with  speedily. 
To  recognise  that  all  employees,  at  whatever  level,  have  a  valued  part 
to  play  in  the  success  of  the  company  (WCCI  LtdJISTC  199920)  21 
It  certainly  seemed  to  represent  a  key  shift,  in  a  short  space  of  time,  from  the  WCCI 
managerial  outlook  that  the  workers  and  the  ISTC  had  become  used  to.  Walsh,  for 
example,  notes  how,  previously,  the  WCCI  Human  Resources  Manager  was 
suspicious  and  critical  of  the  ISTC  and  their  methods,  rather  than  unions  per  se,  and 
19  Section  4f. 
20  Section  1  a. 
21  It  is  worth  pausing  here  to  compare  this  statement  with  stated  principles  of  organisations  that  are  key 
proponents  of  the  `partnership'  approach.  For  example,  the  TUC's  first  principle  of  partnership  is  "a 
shared  commitment  to  the  organisation"  (TUC  1999c).  This  seemingly  underlies  the  recognition 
agreement  at  WCCI.  Similarly,  the  promotion  of  trust  and  co-operation  at  WCCI  resonates  with  the 
TUC's  "recognition  by  both  union  and  employer  that  they  each  have  different  and  legitimate  interests" 
(ibid.  )There  is  also  some  `fit'  with  WCCI's  stated  objectives  and  the  partnership  model  outlined  by  the 
Involvement  and  Participation  Association  (IPA)  that  "comprises  three  commitments  to  which  all 
partners  should  subscribe:  *  to  the  success  of  the  enterprise,  *to  building  trust  and  greater  employee 
involvement,  and  *to  recognising  the  legitimate  role  of  each  of  the  partners"  (IPA  2001).  They  can  also 
be  linked  to  an  extent  with  the  partnership  orientation  of  New  Labour  whereby  there  is  a  focus  on 
"procedural  mechanisms  to  facilitate  operation"  (Novitz,  2002:  492)  and  where  the  capital-labour 
relationship  is  characterised,  from  the  New  Labour  perspective  as  potentially  one  of  mutuality  and  trust 
(ibid:  493). 201 
that  the  company  could  not  envisage  the  ISTC  playing  a  positive  role  in  the  future  of 
employee  relations  at  the  plant: 
The  ISTC  has  undoubtedly  excited  the  workforce  with  its  methods. 
But  our  business  dynamics  are  such  that  we  are  very  open  with  the 
workforce.  I  don't  know  what  difference  a  union  could  make. 
Certainly  we  give  advice  to  the  workforce  to  this  effect..  .  This  is 
definitely  new  territory  for  them.  The  ISTC  is  going  into  industries  it 
has  no  history  in,  and  it  seems  to  be  approaching  our  employees  as  if 
they  were  some  sort  of  business  deal  (WCCI  Human  Resources 
Manager  quoted  in  Walsh  1998:  37). 
The  role  that  the  effort  of  the  ISTC  played  in  affecting  the  apparent  shift  from  the 
comments  above  to  the  embryonic  `partnership'  ostensibly  represented  by  the 
agreement  should  not  be  underplayed.  Indeed,  Findlay  and  McKinlay  (2000:  16)  have 
suggested  that  WCCI  could  no  longer  ignore  the  ISTC,  given  their  growing  base 
within  the  factory  and  their  "huge  majority"  in  the  workplace  representation  ballot. 
However,  the  company  could  have  staved  off  recognition  until  legally  compelled  to 
enter  into  negotiations  (more  than  a  year  away  at  this  stage),  and  continued  the 
increasingly  overt  drive  towards  the  casualisation  of  the  workforce.  They  could  have 
also  continued  undermining  the  union  overtly  whilst  overplaying  the  company's 
benevolence  and  the  `special  circumstances'  that  seemingly  typified  the  electronics 
industry.  Yet  the  company  chose  a  route  by  which  it  apparently  ran  the  greatest  risk  of 
legitimising  the  union  at  a  critical  stage.  This  could  have  helped  galvanise  existing 
support  and  aided  membership  growth.  However,  WCCI  both  agreed  to  recognition 
and  maintained  its  pre-agreement  hostility  to  the  union,  thus  suggesting  complexity  in 
the  company's  motivation  to  agree  to  recognition  for  the  ISTC.  Gall  (1999:  25)  has 
argued  that  some  employers  sign  "constrained  recognition  agreements"  whereby  an 
employer  may: 
Establish  means  by  which  to  lessen  the  value  of  the  recognition 
agreement.  This  is  done  with  a-view  to  not  only  lessen  the  concessions 
an  employer  may  have  to  grant  but  also  to  establish  the  limited  nature 
of  the  new  relationship  and  provide  a  basis  for  returning  to  non- 
recognition  by  undermining  the  faith  of  the  members  in  their  union  . 
Other  key  elements  of  the  agreement  itself  offer  insight  into  the  nature  of  the 
complexity  of  the  WCCI  response  to  the  ISTC  and  its  activists.  They  indicate  a 
strategy  of  `containment'  from  the  outset.  There  are  two  key  examples  of  this.  The 
first  is  the  implicit  control  that  the  company  was  able  to  exercise  over  union 202 
organisation  through  the  limitations  it  placed  on  the  selection  of  representatives. 
Certain  categories  of  workers  were  to  be  excluded: 
To  be  eligible  to  stand  for  election  [as  a  union  representative]  an 
employee  must  have  six  months  continuous  service  with  the  Company 
and  have  not  progressed  beyond  the  "recorded  oral  warning"  stage  of 
the  disciplinary  procedure  (WCCI  Ltd/ISTC  199922). 
Given  the  harshness  of  a  regime  that  "would  issue  the  death  penalty  to  a  shop  lifter" 
(WCCI  worker  quoted  in  Findlay  and  McKinlay  2000:  13),  this  clause  served  to  limit 
the  possible  `pool'  that  representatives  could  be  drawn  from.  The  second  part  of  this 
clause  was  even  more  limiting  and  potentially  damaging: 
The  company  may  object  to  any  nomination  if,  in  its  opinion,  the 
election  of  the  candidate  would  prejudice  the  smooth  working  of  the 
Agreement  between  the  Compan  y  and  the  Union  or  the  Company's 
operation  (WCCI  Ltd/ISTC  19992  ). 
This  was  a  clear  indication  of  the  level  of  control  over  the  development  of  workplace 
unionism  that  the  company  was  allowed  to  exercise.  Hyman  (1975)  connects  such 
control  to  the  overall,  and  generalised,  influence  by  capital  on  the  contours  of  the 
processes  of  industrial  relations: 
The  basic  character  of  capitalism  exerts  a  pervasive  influence  on  the 
nature  of  industrial  relations,  most  crucially  through  the  way  in  which 
it  shapes  the  structure,  actions  and  objectives  of  trade  unionism  (1975: 
97). 
The  management  at  WCCI  did  not  confine  the  exercise  of  their  control  over 
the  selection  process  to  the  initial  period  after  recognition  was  agreed,  and  sought  to 
apply  this  clause  as  a  method  of  undermining  the  development  of  union  organisation 
over  time: 
Initially  there  were  only  two  [representatives]  that  the  company  were 
comfortable  with.  One  of  them  very  quickly  went  into  a  supervisor's 
job.. 
. 
There  were  two  others  that  the  company  had  real  difficulty  with 
because,  in  the  company's  words,  they  were  too  militant.  In  the  course 
of  time,  another  one  broke  the  rules  of  the  company  and  we  did  a  deal 
for  him  to  keep  his  job.  But  part  of  that  deal  was  that  he  had  to  stand 
aside  from  union  activity  otherwise  he'd  be  out.  The  company  would 
22  Section  4b.,  emphasis  added. 
13  Section  4b. 203 
always  find  fault  but.  Now  they're  trying  to  manufacture  situations 
against  Fay  but  he  is  very  effective  in  the  union.  Titch  was  a  rough 
diamond  and  he  erred  a  bit  but  the  company  really  attacked  him.  The 
trick  will  be  to  plan  ahead  for  these  attacks  cos  we  know  what  they're 
about  (Full-time  officer  2001). 
The  company  had  ensured,  through  this  agreement,  a  further  way  of  exercising  control 
and  of  undermining  union  strength,  in  the  clause  that  many  of  the  activists  found  most 
difficult  to  accept  and  to  justify  to  themselves: 
Representatives  will  carry  out,  and  will  endeavour  to  ensure  that  the 
employees  they  represent  will  carry  out  all  instructions  of  authorised 
Company  officers  which  do  not  constitute  a  demonstrable  safety 
hazard  (WCCI  Ltd/ISTC  199924). 
This  represented  a  major  blow  to  activists  who  felt  they  were  being  expected  to 
`police'  their  fellow  workers,  and  this  served  to  undermine  their  faith  in  the  ISTC: 
This  agreement  has  thrown  us  back  a  year.  The  pressures  and  the 
threats  are  just  getting  worse.  The  stewards  are  being  told  to  make  the 
line  workers  `up  the  pulse'  [the  productivity  rate].  What's  this  union 
all  about?  (Jim  1999). 
There  were  clauses  in  it  that  meant  if  the  management  came  up  with 
any  proposals  that  didn't  breach  health  and  safety  then  it  was  up  to  the 
union  stewards  to  get  the  workforce  to  do  that.  He  [the  Full-time 
officer]  told  us  `don't  worry  this  is  a  bog  standard  union  agreement' 
but  I  had  arguments  with  that  right  away.  Most  people  I  knew  wanted 
shop  stewards  that  were  fighters  (Horse  2001). 
The  impact  of  such  a  clause  and  of  the  tone  of  the  agreement  overall  needs  to 
be  examined  in  the  context  of  the  fight  that  these  activists  had  put  up  in  the  few  short 
months,  since  the  ISTC  had  begun  to  focus  its  attention  on  WCCI  at  Gourock.  Their 
commitment  to  the  struggle  to  improve  the  conditions  at  the  factory  and  to  `claw 
back'  some  control  from  management,  and,  particularly,  the  supervisors,  remained  but 
their  overall  loyalty  to  the  ISTC  was  threatened,  as  the  comments  above  demonstrate. 
At  the  core  of  the  militant  activity  at  WCCI  was  a  clear  resentment  of  how  workers 
were  publicly  bullied  and  intimidated  by  supervisors.  Goodrich  (1975)  notes  that 
often  it  is  not  simply  control  that  workers  reject,  but  how  that  control  is  exercised.  The 
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way  supervisors  spoke  to  workers  generally  was  a  central  source  of  antagonism  at 
WCCI.  But  there  was  particular  bitterness  directed  at  how  workers  were  `policed': 
`Policing'  is  pretty  generally  resented.  And  sometimes  the  objection  is 
put  rigorously  into  practice.  .  .  All  this  is  not  the  demand  for  control  in 
the  sense  of  an  explicit  theory  of  opposition  to  authority.  .  .  But  this 
resentment  may  easily  be  the  `makings'  of  such  a  demand  (1975:  31). 
The  suggestion  that  newly  elected  representatives  -  many  of  them  known  `fighters'  - 
were  to  assume  a  `policing'  role  over  workers  fostered  resentment  towards  the 
recognition  agreement  and  the  ISTC,  to  the  extent  that  some  activists  challenged 
whether  recognition  was  a  victory  at  all.  Crucially,  those  who  were  `egged  on'  by 
their  fellow  workers  to  become  stewards,  as  they  were  generally  seen  as  being  able 
and  willing  to  take  on  management,  had  most  difficulty  with  the  agreement.  There 
was  some  tacit  understanding  that  `toeing  the  line'  would  be  a  component  of 
recognition  at  WCCI,  and  some  of  the  drawbacks  of  recognition  were  acknowledged 
by  the  Full-time  officer: 
It's  much  more  accountable  in  the  early  stages  and  much  closer  to  real 
action.  You  could  get  people  to  react  quickly  to  put  management  under 
pressure.  Whereas  with  recognition,  the  legislation  can  be  a 
cumbersome  and  laborious  process  and  management  use  this  to 
threaten  and  this  can  soften  attitudes  (Full-time  officer  2001). 
In  this  respect,  there  was  little  difference  between  the  WCCI  stewards  and 
those  in  other  workplaces.  They  needed  to  strike  the  balance  between  resistance  and 
accommodation  that  is  a  central  paradox  that  all  stewards  face.  However,  recognition 
at  WCCI  and  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  also  conveyed  upon  them  a  new  set  of 
responsibilities  and,  at  this  stage,  they  had  little  of  the  organisational  armoury  that 
could  have  helped  them  overcome  their  sense  of  frustration.  They  risked  becoming 
alienated  from  members  if  perceived  as  too  readily  diffusing  conflict  in  ways  that 
appeared  contradictory  to  shop  floor  interests,  but  needed  to  continually  seek 
`peaceful'  solutions  to  ensure  their  own  credibility  with  management  and,  crucially, 
with  the  ISTC.  The  division  that  emerged  between  `accommodators'  and  `resisters' 
within  the  steward  group  created  long-term  difficulties  for  union  organisation  and  the 
development  of  meaningful  trade  union  activity.  The  frustrations  of  many  of  those 
who  campaigned  long  and  hard  for  recognition  became  apparent.  The  company  had 
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for  the  effective  operation  of  its  Gourock  branch,  the  works  council  was  to  be  the 
central  conduit  for  employee  representation  and  WCCI  retained  its  `anti-union' 
outlook.  Crucially,  there  were  few  improvements  that  had  a  long-term  effect  on 
conditions  at  the  factory  and  this,  and  the  `set  back'  that  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
represented  for  some  key  activists,  adversely  influenced  the  development  of  an 
independent  rank  and  file  at  WCCI. 
Notably,  despite  the  reservations  discussed  above,  there  was  support  for  the 
recognition  agreement  and  many  saw  it  as  a  clear  victory  for  the  workers  and  the 
ISTC: 
We  are  all  over  the  moon  about  this  and  people  have  been  lining  up  in 
droves  to  become  members  because  their  fear  of  being  sacked  over 
union  involvement  has  now  gone  (WCCI  worker  quoted  in  the 
Greenock  Telegraph,  21St  January  1999). 
However,  despite  the  apparent  impact  on  membership,  even  the  ISTC  Full-time 
officer  later  noted  some  misgivings,  though  he  felt  that  recognition  afforded  the  union 
some  influence  over  the  autocratic  `hire  and  fire'  regime  at  WCCI: 
This  was  a  success  for  the  ISTC.  It  was  the  first  one  since  the  whole 
organising  thing  was  taken  on  board.  We  were  at  the  forefront  of  that 
whole  TUC  initiative.  But  here  pressure  was  on  us  to  get  that  deal 
done.  This  assisted  other  workplaces  and  along  the  way  we've  finely 
tuned  agreements  -  so  other  workplaces  have  benefited  from 
recognition  at  WCCI.  Some  things  we'd  do  differently  but  the  fact  that 
we  could  construct  cases  meant  benefits  whereas  before  they  could 
dismiss  at  will  (Full-time  officer  2001). 
The  benefits  to  the  company  far  outweighed  those  accruing  to  the  workers.  Before 
discussing  this  is  more  detail,  it  is  useful  to  briefly  examine  the  wider  context  in 
which  this  agreement  was  signed. 
As  noted  above,  to  some  extent  the  terms  of  the  agreement  echo  key  elements 
of  the  New  Labour  partnership  agenda,  and  this  helped  shape  its  content  and  its 
operation.  They  also  served  to  further  limit  the  possibilities  for  militant  action. 
Evidence  from  WCCI  illustrates  the  central  problem  associated  with  such  an 
approach: 
The  difficulty  is  that  if  unions  become  too  wedded  to  a  collaborative 
role,  they  may  find  it  difficult  to  represent  workers  interests  where  they 
diverge  from  those  of  management  (Novitz  and  Skidmore  2001:  176). 206 
This  was  particularly  problematic  at  WCCI,  where  there  was  little  recognition  of 
workers  legitimate,  divergent,  interests  on  the  part  of  management.  Evidently  WCCI 
was  not  the  type  of  employer  conceptualised  within  New  Labour's  partnership  model. 
Yet  the  terms  that  were  agreed  to  by  both  sides  in  the  recognition  negotiations  were 
clearly  not  too  divergent  from  its  Fairness  perspective: 
Trade  unions  are  offered  a  secondary  role  which  is  primarily  co- 
operative.  The  capacity  for  legitimate  conflict  in  industrial  relations  is 
airbrushed  away.  The  new  culture  of  consensual  workplace  relations 
does  not  seem  to  entail  so  much  `partnership'  as  continued  concessions 
to  the  management  agenda  (Novitz  and  Skidmore  2001:  176). 
Arguably,  what  recognition,  agreed  to  in  this  context,  results  in  for  companies  like 
WCCI  is  the  ability  to  manoeuvre  towards  apparently  embracing  trade  unions  and 
overcoming  the  difficulties  that  such  companies  associate  with  unions,  whilst 
containing  their  most  militant  activists.  What  would  have  commonly  been  considered 
failure  in  a  previously  non-union  firm  could  be  used  to  achieve  the  company's  ends 
overall.  For  example,  Findlay's  earlier  analysis  of  union  recognition  in  the  electronics 
industry  has  illustrated  how  non-union  companies  generally  perceived  disquiet  and 
union  activity  negatively: 
There  were  numerous  comments  [from  managers  in  non-union  firms] 
claiming  that  union  presence  was  simply  the  result  of  management 
inefficiency;  that  if  trade  unions  had  gained  members  in  a  company 
then  it  was  because  management  had  failed...  (Findlay  1993:  35). 
However  what  Findlay  also  found  in  such  companies  was: 
an  absence  of  any  conception  of  separate  or  independent  employee 
interests,  linked  to  an  idea  that  the  good  of  the  company  served  the 
good  of  all  its  constituent  elements  (Findlay  1993:  36). 
Thus,  in  the  context  of  partnership,  it  is  possible  that  when  confronted  with  union 
`gains'  and,  with  the  Employment  Relations  Act,  the  threat  of  statutory  recognition,  a 
company  will  use  this  as  a  method  to  openly  institutionalise  (with  the  compliance  of 
the  union,  tacit  or  otherwise)  a  commonality  of  interests  in  the  absence  of  the 
paternalism  of  the  past.  The  contemporary  partnership  approach,  by  design  and  its 
ideological  underpinning  helps  foster  and  ossify: 
A  collectivism  within  the  company  ethos  while  opposing  collectivism 
that  [does]  not  fit  within  their  control  (Findlay  1993:  36). 207 
Though  specifically  concerning  trade  unionism  within  electronics,  the  two  quotations 
from  Findlay  above  sum  up  succinctly  the  approach  to  trade  unionism  that  New 
Labour  has  now  adopted.  Thus  it  becomes  apparent  that,  rather  than  the  creation  and 
facilitation  of  a  new  culture  by  New  Labour,  its  partnership  and  fairness  approach 
involves  the  adaptation  and  adoption  of  an  orientation  already  in  existence  as  an  anti- 
union  strategy. 
5.3:  `Best  Box-Build  in  Europe'25 
It  is  clear  that  WCCI  continued  in  its  opposition  to  a  type  of  collectivism  that 
was  beyond  its  control,  using  and  undermining  union  recognition  in  the  process.  The 
union  continued  to  strive  to  achieve  gains  by  adopting  a  moderate  approach. 
However,  members  had  been  anticipating  a  shift  in  management  attitude  and  some 
improvement  on  wages  and  conditions,  largely  as  a  result  of  months  of  intense 
campaigning  by  the  ISTC,  and  moderation  was  slow  to  deliver  these  improvements. 
This  created  difficulties  for  the  union  and  especially  its  local  representatives: 
It  has  been  difficult  because  people's  expectations  have  went  through 
the  roof  in  terms  of  now  the  union  is  recognised  they  want  to  see 
success  after  success  after  success.  Yes,  we  are  a  go-ahead  union  and 
we  want  to  represent  members,  first  and  foremost.  But  in  the  real 
world  there's  got  to  be  short  term,  mid  term  and  long  term  goals.  It's 
not  all  going  to  happen  tomorrow.  It  was  always  going  to  be  difficult 
for  local  officials  cos  all  eyes  are  on  them  (Full-time  officer  1999). 
The  ISTC  did  achieve  some  successes  especially  in  Employment  Tribunals, 
though  activists  claimed  there  had  been  a  rise  in  the  number  of  `disciplinaries'  issued 
by  managers  since  recognition.  Hence  tribunal  activity  represented  both  evidence  of 
the  questionable  nature  of  management's  objectives  in  the  recognition  agreement  and 
that  the  ISTC  were  still  prepared  to  mount  challenges  to  the  WCCI  regime: 
After  a  sticky  start  and  the  company  trying  constantly  to  belittle  our 
efforts,  we  lost  a  few  cases.  Then  with  successes  at  the  tribunals  the 
company  was  forced  to  re-think  how  they  approached  disciplinary  and 
grievance  procedures.  We  started  to  save  jobs  and  had  some 
tremendous  landmark  victories  (Full-time  officer  2001). 
However,  a  key  difficulty  here  was  that  tribunals  meant  cumulative  individual 
successes  rather  than  collective  `results'  and  little  sense  of  collective  achievement 
developed  as  a  result.  This  is  not  to  deny  the  positive  impact  of  such  successes.  But 
25  Workers  often  commented  that  this  was  how  the  Gourock  plant  was  referred  to  by  management. 208 
they  did  not  inculcate  a  sense  of  collective  strength  overall  and  they  served  to 
demonstrate  the  continuation  of  management's  `hard  edge',  despite  recognition  and 
the  partnership  tone  of  the  agreement  itself.  To  some  extent,  such  individual 
successes  helped  breed  resentment  for  each  individual  failure  within  the  company's 
disciplinary  procedure,  or  within  the  tribunal  system,  adding  to  the  frustration  of  key 
activists.  The  Full-time  officer  was  nevertheless  sceptical  about  over  reliance  on  the 
tribunal  system  and  was  concerned  that  the  union  be  forced  to  represent  any  workers 
who  had  aggressively  "disobey[ed]  a  lawful  instruction  or  a  reasonable  request"  (Full- 
time  officer  April  199926).  He  also  refused  to  sanction  any  return  to  earlier  militancy 
as  a  protest  against  the  apparent  "scape-goating"  of  one  worker  and  sought  a 
conciliatory  approach  to  management  in  dealing  with  the  problems  workers  outlined. 
He  felt  they  could  achieve  more  this  way27: 
Jaw-Jaw  is  working  for  us.  If  there's  going  to  be  on-going  disputes 
then  there'll  be  no  wage  review  -  you  know  that.  There's  more  ways 
of  doing  stuff  than  hitting  the  tarmac.  Come  on  -  I'm  frustrated  as  well 
but  we  can't  act  in  haste  (Full-time  officer  April  1999). 
The  lack  of  a  sense  of  collective  progression  also  frustrated  efforts  to  develop  the 
branch  as  the  vibrant  organised  locus  of  worker  self  activity  that  it  had  shown  the 
potential  to  become  in  the  early  months  of  ISTC  activity.  Overall,  the  sense  of 
collectivism  at  WCCI  Gourock  was  undermined.  There  were  clear  implications  for 
workplace  unionism  and  for  the  activists,  some  of  whom  began  to  synthesise  their 
suspicion  and  criticism  of  management  with  their  opinion  of  the  ISTC,  which  they 
openly  articulated  as  they  struggled  to  retain  credibility  with  members,  who  continued 
to  bear  the  brunt  of  a  harsh  regime: 
Anyway,  see  this  union?  I  look  at  them  now  as  another  management 
team.  They're  the  managers  of  people's  expectations.  We  still  have  at 
least  four  hundred  not  in  the  union.  Why's  that?  Some  are  cynical 
because  of  previous  experience  -  you  know  the  yards  and  that  and  how 
we  were  sold  up  the  river.  Other  people  are  scared  of  that  wee  bastard 
the  Managing  Director]  and  let's  face  it  the  union  don't  really  look  as 
if  they're  up  for  a  fight.  One  guy  actually  said  to  me  `I  know  I'm 
bottom  of  the  heap  and  I  don't  need  a  fucking  union  to  tell  me  that'. 
Z6  Speaking  at  a  members'  meeting  April  1999. 
Zý  When  asked  what  the  union  would  be  doing  for  one  sacked  worker  he  asked  about  the  worker's 
"character"  and  rejected  a  call  to  "hit  the  tarmac"  This  worker  was  sacked  on  suspicion  of  theft  after 
being  filmed  on  the  surveillance  camera's  inside  the  factory  apparently  `putting  something  down  his 
trousers'.  Management  claimed  this  was  a  `processor'.  The  worker  claimed  he  was  concealing  a 
newspaper  as  they  were  banned  on  the  line.  An  Employment  Tribunal  later  upheld  the  company's 
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How  do  we  convince  guys  like  that  with  our  attitude  just  now?  (Horse 
1999). 
People  are  becoming  disillusioned.  You  know  the  way  we  are  being 
treated.  Every  day  it  gets  worse.  People  are  saying  what's  the  union 
doing  for  us  and  I  don't  blame  them.  Things  are  actually  getting  worse 
(Jim  1999). 
Two  key  features  of  experience  at  WCCI  help  demonstrate  the  extent  to  which 
`things  were  actually  getting  worse':  continuing  low  pay  and  insecurity.  Lack  of 
progress  on  the  former  was  brought  fully  to  the  fore  within  weeks  of  recognition,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  annual  pay  negotiations: 
We  are  in  negotiations  with  the  union  and  the  Works  Council  but  it  is 
at  a  very  early  stage.  As  part  of  our  annual  pay  review  we  have  asked 
the  workforce  to  accept  a  pay  freeze.  I  know  they  will  be  disappointed, 
but  I  am  hopeful  they  will  understand  because  you  only  have  to  look 
around  Inverclyde  to  see  that  manufacturing  is  in  recession  (WCCI 
Human  Resources  Manager  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  4`h 
March  1999). 
The  company  hoped  that  wage  negotiations  would  be  resumed  in  June  1999  and 
claimed  that  they  were  being  "prudent"  in  light  of  the  climate  that  prevailed  in 
manufacturing  at  the  time.  However,  given  the  harsh  climate  that  continued  to  prevail 
within  the  factory,  workers  were  understandably  suspicious  of  the  motivation  behind 
the  wage  freeze: 
The  company  claim  that  any  new  offer  in  June  will  be  back-dated  to 
the  28`h  February,  but  that  it  will  be  subject  to  affordability.  In  other 
words  they  will  tell  us  in  June  that  they  can't  afford  it  (WCCI  worker 
quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  22''  March  1999). 
Moreover,  whilst  the  company  looked  for  a  wage  freeze  due  to  apparent  difficulties  in 
the  electronics  industry  generally,  workers  felt  they  had  played  an  important  part  in 
WCCI  being  isolated  from  the  worst  effects  of  the  supposed  down-turn  in  the  sector: 
There  is  no  way  we  are  prepared  to  accept  this  offer  when  shareholders 
are  receiving  a  10.7%  increase  in  dividends.  And  it  is  even  more 
galling  when  this  offer  is  being  made  regardless  of  our  productivity 
levels  (WCCI  worker  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  22"d  March 
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The  ISTC  made  it  clear  to  workers  that,  despite  a  £29  million  fall  in  the  parent 
group's  pre-tax  profit  in  1998  (Laird  Group  1999:  2),  WCCI  was  central  to  the  Laird 
group's  future  success.  Gourock  was  "the  jewel  in  the  crown  of  WCCI"  (Full-time 
officer,  1999).  WCCI's  turnover  had  increased  16%  to  £330  million  in  1998, 
representing  more  than  60%  of  the  overall  turnover  of  Laird's  `service  industries' 
sector.  The  company  had  "consolidated  its  position  as  a  leading  supplier  to  the 
computer  industry  in  Europe  and  the  USA  [in  1998]"  (Laird  Group  1999:  6). 
Furthermore: 
The  main  plant  at  Gourock  which  is  responsible  for  the  assembly, 
testing  and  distribution  of  over  one  million  PCs  per  year,  was 
restructured  improving  throughput  and  capacity  (Laird  Group  1999:  6). 
Thus  the  workers  at  Gourock  seemed  to  be  in  a  strong  bargaining  position. 
They  were  crucial  to  the  success  of  WCCI  and  its  parent  company  and  their  union 
branch  was  instrumental  to  the  success  of  the  ISTC  in  Scotland.  However  the  Full- 
time  officer  made  clear  that  he  was  looking  for  a  compromise.  Under  pressure  from 
the  ISTC  bureaucracy  he  looked  for  a  `sign'  that  the  company  could  be  "trusted"  and 
that  the  workers  would  have  "something  to  show"  for  their  pay  freeze  (Full-time 
officer  1999).  After  some  heated  exchanges  between  members,  activists  and  the  Full- 
time  officer  at  a  meeting  to  discuss  the  issue,  it  was  agreed  to  postpone  the  wage 
review  until  June  1999  on  the  basis  of  certain  `concessions':  the  sacked  cancer  victim 
was  to  be  reinstated,  the  management  agreed  to  the  structure  of  the  Health  and  Safety 
Committee,  and  agreed  to  paid  time  off  to  undertake  health  and  safety  work,  including 
attendance  at  courses,  and  the  union  were  to  be  consulted  on  training  for  the 
workforce.  28  New  pay  negotiations  were  to  begin  on  the  1"  of  June  and  any  award 
would  be  back-dated  to  28`h  February.  The  union  clearly  supported  acceptance  of  the 
`deal',  stating  "if  we  endorse  this  now  we  live  to  fight  another  day.  "  (Full-time  officer 
1999). 
The  second  issue  that  continued  to  dominate  at  WCCI  in  the  post-recognition 
period  was  insecurity.  Clearly,  given  the  number  of  temporary/agency  workers 
28  However,  what  the  management  had  offered  was  not  as  conciliatory  as  first  appeared.  The  local 
paper  reported  that  the  cancer  victim  was  to  be  reinstated  on  the  basis  of  new  medical  evidence 
(Greenock  Telegraph  2°d  April  1999),  paid  time  off  to  attend  meetings  and  courses  connected  to  health 
and  safety  was  a  legal  right  for  safety  representatives  already  (Safety  Representatives  and  Safety 
Committee  Regulations  1977,  Transport  and  General  Workers  Union  1994:  60).  The  provisions  of  the 
Employment  Relations  Act  1999  (though  not  law  until  2000)  meant  a  recognised  trade  union  must  be 
consulted  from  on  training  policy  and  planning  (ERA  Section  5,  DTI  2000). 211 
employed  at  this  and  other  factories  like  it,  insecurity  becomes  part  of  the  generalised 
experience.  This  leads  to  particular  difficulties  in  terms  of  domestic  planning  and 
presents  a  clear  challenge  to  the  New  Labour  claim  that  work  is  the  most  effective 
route  out  of  social  exclusion.  The  agency  workers  at  WCCI  demonstrate  how  it  is 
possible  to  work,  sometimes  for  many  years  in  one  factory,  and  still  to  be  excluded  in 
various  spheres  including  union  representation  and  `rights'  afforded  their  permanent 
colleagues.  The  difficulty  and  strain  of  feeling  insecure  and  dispensable,  whilst  being 
fully  aware  of  the  central  role  that  you  and  your  `temporary'  workmates  play  in  the 
"assembly  of  one  million  PC's  per  year",  is  not  readily  quantifiable.  It  is  also  rarely 
discussed  within  official  discourses  on  `inclusion/exclusion': 
Every  time  we  [agency  workers]  are  laid  off  then  taken  on  again  we 
start  from  scratch  on  our  holiday  entitlement...  obviously  we  all  want 
to  be  working  but  we  also  feel  we  do  enough  to  earn  holidays  (WCCI 
worker  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  7t  January  1999). 
We  [also]  have  agency  workers  who've  been  in  the  company  for  two 
years.  But  it's  not  like  IBM  who  might  have  a  reasonably  good  deal 
and  get  some  of  the  benefits  of  core  workers.  Our  agency  workers 
don't  get  anything.  It's  a  case  of  they  [the  company]  will  do  things  to 
get  round  legislation.  They  will  be  here  for  two  years  but  they  are  laid 
off  at  closures.  Closures  are  really  holidays.  We  don't  have  floating 
days,  we  close.  Well  we  don't  close  but  we  say  we  do.  And  at  that  time 
the  agency  workers  are  paid  off  so  they  don't  have  continuous 
employment  at  any  time  and  then  the  company  brings  them  back  in 
again.  So  when  production  goes  down  then  agency  workers  go  (WCCI 
Human  Resources  Officer  200129). 
These  are  make-believe  jobs.  You  hear  the  word  insecurity  but  do 
people  really  know  what  it  feels  like?  Well,  it's  like  when  Thatcher 
was  in  only  worse.  You  can't  lay  down  any  roots  or  make  any  plans. 
Of  course  you've  got  roots  here  but  I  mean  work  roots.  At  any  time  we 
could  be  finished  up,  any  time...  (Joanna,  WCCI  worker  2001). 
This  was  rendered  more  problematic  by  the  fact  that  insecurity  also  helped 
characterise  the  experience  of  the  `core'  workers.  Indeed,  the  insecurity  of  the  agency 
group  helped  shape  an  overall  feeling  of  insecurity.  The  `core'  group  lacked  any  real 
assurance  that  WCCI  were  committed  to  them  or  to  the  Inverclyde  area.  Short-time 
working,  introduced  at  the  Dundee  plants  at  the  beginning  of  1999  (Dundee  Courier 
&  Advertiser  26th  January  1999),  and  the  opening  of  a  new  production  facility  in 
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Prestwick,  as  part  of  that  area's  regeneration  after  restructuring  at  British  Aerospace 
(Scotland  on  Sunday  20th  December  1998)  reinforced  WCCI  workers'  insecurity. 
Speculation  that  American  firm,  Pentair,  was  interested  in  buying  WCCI  from  the 
Laird  Group  also  fuelled  this  (Greenock  Telegraph  6th  February  1999).  Overall, 
despite  the  productive  success  of  the  Gourock  factory,  there  was  an  overriding  feeling 
that  if  it  could  be  dispensed  with  it  would  be.  In  the  meantime,  core  workers  would 
continue  to  be  replaced  by  agency  workers.  The  company  did  little  to  dispel  this. 
Indeed,  company  employment  practices  reveal  how  grounded  in  reality  workers'  fears 
were: 
If  somebody  leaves  from  a  job,  apart  from  professionals,  then  they  will 
fill  that  with  an  agency  worker.  They  will  not  move  a  core  worker  into 
the  job.  I  had  a  situation  were  I  was  interviewing  for  the  store  and  they 
had  one  core  worker  and  two  agency  workers  who  had  been  with  us 
for  about  a  year.  And  an  agency  worker  said  `it's  a  core  worker  who's 
leaving  so  will  I  become  a  core  worker?  '  But  he  wouldn't.  He  would 
stay  an  agency  worker  in  a  core  workers  job.  So,  he  would  work  with 
three  other  core  workers  doing  exactly  the  same  job  -  only  he  would  be 
paid  less  to  do  this  (Human  Resources  Officer  2001). 
The  ISTC  understood  the  difficulties  of  insecurity  at  this  factory,  to  an  extent. 
The  growth  of  the  peripheral  workforce  was  one  of  the  central  barriers  to  union 
growth.  One  of  the  stated  aims  of  the  Full-time  officer  was  "to  achieve  secure 
employment  for  all  the  workforce"  (1998,2001)  but  both  core  and  agency  workers 
remained  exposed  to  the  company's  abuse  of  this  division.  The  use  of  agency 
workers,  insecurity,  and  the  need  to  retain  the  core  were  the  issues  that  dominated 
union  meetings.  The  responses  to  concerns  raised  demonstrated  an  idealised  notion  on 
the  part  of  the  union  about  what  could  be  done  in  terms  of  job  security  and  the  use  of 
`agencies': 
All  trade  unionists  should  fight  to  increase  the  number  of  full-timers3o. 
I  know  the  company  might  need  agency  workers  but  we  still  need  to 
fight  to  get  some  full-timers.  We  need  to  measure  how  many  and  how 
often,  and  try  to  put  up  a  case  to  increase  the  core.  So  if  its  monitored 
then  we  can  maybe  make  a  case  for  keeping  say  ten  good  ones  and 
building  it  up  from  there.  We  need  to  raise  the  need  to  increase  the 
core  with  management.  You  can  reflect  on  this  -  the  idea  of  monitoring 
and  building  steps  towards  increasing  the  `core'  until  you  get  it  (Full- 
time  officer  August  1999). 
30  `Full-timer'  is  a  term  used  colloquially  to  denote  a  `permanent'  employee.  It  distinguishes  between 
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Yet  despite  the  `quasi  partnership  tone'  of  the  recognition  agreement,  the  ISTC  had 
not  managed  to  obtain  any  commitment  as  far  as  security  was  concerned,  nor  any  on 
the  role  of  the  `peripheral'  workforce.  Indeed,  despite  the  importance  of  the  issue  in 
the  early  part  of  the  struggle  to  unionise,  in  the  effort  to  gain  recognition  the  role  of 
agency  workers  was  side-lined.  Claims  regarding  "seeking  parity  for  agency 
workers",  "trying  to  get  them  a  full-time  job"  (ISTC  branch  secretary  1999)  and  a  new 
system  being  introduced  whereby  "there  would  be  no  [agency  workers]  at  all"  (ISTC 
branch  committee  member  1999),  demonstrated  a  lack  of  understanding  of  the  role  of 
the  non-core  workforce.  Such  claims  were  also  indicative  of  a  misunderstanding  of 
the  power  of  the  ISTC  to  change  the  situation,  not  discouraged  by  the  Full-time 
officer.  The  difficulty  here  was  that  WCCI,  and  electronics  firms  generally,  are  key 
exemplars  of  the  current  configuration  of  capitalist  production,  and  the  creation  of  a 
division  of  the  labour  market  between  core  and  periphery  is  a  crucial  feature  of  this, 
though  as  I  discuss  below,  these  prevalent  understandings  of  these  concepts  can  be 
challenged  with  reference  to  WCCI.  Indeed,  New  Labour's  neo-liberal  flexibility 
demands  that  labour  be  used  this  way:  as  a  reserve  army  of  labour  within  companies. 
This  feature  of  contemporary  flexibility  is  systemic  and  the  lack  of  recognition  of  this 
by  the  ISTC  at  WCCI  can  be  linked  to  key  characteristics  of  trade  unionism  under 
capitalism. 
Hyman  (1975),  for  example,  argues  that  unions'  focus  on  collective  bargaining 
leads  to  reaction  rather  than  initiative,  and  that  the  right  of  capital  to  organise 
production  in  a  particular  way,  creating  particular  labour  market  formations,  is  not 
challenged.  On  one  hand  this  often  confines  demands  to  what  is  "considered  realistic" 
(1975:  98).  However,  on  the  other  hand,  the  case  of  the  ISTC  at  WCCI  demonstrates 
how  a  focus  on  the  day  to  day  issues  of  collective  bargaining  and  on  the  development 
of  bargaining  machinery,  meant  that  `unrealistic'  demands  like  bringing  about  the  end 
of  the  use  of  agency  labour  were  articulated  without  being  acted  upon.  This  is 
connected  to  another  central  feature  of  trade  unionism,  illustrated  in  sharp  relief  at 
WCCI: 
Consciousness  of  capitalism  as  a  system  is  [thus]  remote  from  normal 
trade  union  perspectives;  and  the  influence  of  the  broader  framework, 
because  not  consciously  appreciated,  is  all  the  more  powerful  (Hyman 
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Within  in  the  context  of  this  factory,  the  influence  of  the  `broader  framework' 
was  not  accounted  for  by  the  ISTC,  nor  its  contemporary  embodiment  in  New  Labour 
ideology.  The  focus  on  unrealistic  aims  that  dominated  union  meetings  and, 
paradoxically,  the  retention  of  a  general  orientation  towards  a  `realistic'  set  of 
objectives,  meant  little  was  achieved  overall,  both  in  relation  to  job  security  and  in 
terms  of  other  material  gains. 
Fundamentally,  from  the  ISTC's  perspective,  the  necessity  of  taking  up  the  use 
of  agency  workers  was  an  `economic'  one,  i.  e.  this  issue  needed  to  be  discussed  on 
the  basis  that  the  agency  workers  represented  an  economic  threat,  as  they  filled  the 
role  of  `cheap  labour'.  Political  questions  regarding  who  (or  what)  is  ideologically 
responsible  are  rarely  raised  and  never  effectively  addressed.  This  is  Hyman's 
mechanical  dichotomy  between  the  economic  and  the  political  in  essence  (1989:  133). 
Significantly,  whilst  I  have  noted  in  earlier  chapters  how  this  false  dichotomy 
fundamentally  moulds  the  relationship  between  Labour  and  the  trade  unions,  it  is  clear 
also  that  this  is  crucial  in  shaping  the  activity  of  the  union  bureaucracy  in  relation  to 
its  members  interests,  even  in  the  most  localised  circumstances.  With  the  distinction 
between  core  and  periphery  blurred,  the  ISTC  at  WCCI  could  have  developed  ways  of 
trying  to  unite  workers  on  a  political  basis.  This  did  not  occur  at  a  critical  period  in 
the  development  of  workplace  unionism  at  the  factory.  What  did  emerge  though,  after 
recognition,  was  a  sectionalism  that  was  exploited  to  the  full  by  management.  The 
limiting  and  often  debilitating  effects  of  sectionalism  and  the  problem  of  privileging 
sectional  over  collective  interests,  discussed  by  Darlington  (1994)  for  example, 
became  obvious  at  WCCI,  especially  after  the  formalisation  of  procedure  that 
occurred  as  a  result  of  recognition. 
As  noted,  in  the  early  days  of  the  struggle  to  win  union  representation  for 
workers  and  recognition  for  the  ISTC  there  was  evidence  of  a  clear  attempt  to  include 
the  temporary/agency  workers  by  activists  who  supported  their  becoming  `full' 
members  of  the  union  branch.  But  the  rules  of  the  union  and,  indeed,  the  terms  of  the 
recognition  agreement  prevented  this,  and  bred  the  sectionalism  that  employers'  use 
of  contract  labour  as  a  central  element  of  production  can  help  foster.  This  was  further 
enforced  when  the  proposed  `answer'  to  overcoming  such  division  was  to  look 
upwards  and  "raise  the  need  to  increase  the  core  [workforce]  with  management" 
(Full-time  officer  1999),  whilst  allowing  division  to  persist  at  the  bottom  -  the  very 
place  where  the  workers  had  the  greatest  opportunity  to  transcend  sectionalism.  Post- 215 
recognition  "ambivalence"  to  agency  workers  can  be  linked  to  the  "already  enormous 
vulnerability  of  [core  workers']  employment"  (Findlay  and  McKinlay  2000:  19). 
However  such  ambivalence  needs  to  be  understood  in  the  context  in  which  it 
emerged.  It  was  both  a  product  of  how  the  ISTC  organised  at  the  plant  (and 
nationally)  and  WCCI  management's  strategy  to  recognise  only  core  workers  for  trade 
union  purposes  and,  indeed,  as  the  company's  only  `real'  workforce.  This  resulted  in  a 
shift  in  orientation,  which  intensified  in  the  context  of  both  the  recognition  agreement 
and  company  restructuring  that  involved  job  losses  for  the  core  workforce.  Earlier 
solidarity  between  the  two  groups  was  diminished  rather  than  reinforced  by  the  union 
because  of  bureaucratic  procedure.  This  created  disunity  and  the  persistence  of  mutual 
mistrust  that  produced  `competition'  between  different  groups  of  WCCI  workers 
within  the  factory: 
You  got  different  wages.  See  like  holidays  and  that,  see  when  they 
wanted  us  in  they've  give  us  single  time  but  with  the  full-timers  they 
would  even  pay  double  or  triple.  They  asked  us  to  do  overtime  if  the 
full-timers  said  no.  Full-timers  would  keep  saying  no  so  management 
would  ask  us.  Then  it  got  to  the  stage  that  they  were  ready  to  go  on 
strike  cos  the  company  asked  us  first,  even  though  they  were  either 
working  it  or  didn't  want  to  work  it  (Burrows,  WCCI  worker  2001). 
This,  in  turn,  had  an  impact  on  plant-wide  union  recruitment  and  left  the  whole 
workforce  "highly  vulnerable  to  a  concerted  counter-attack  by  employers"  (Hyman 
1989:  151),  as  the  above  comments  illustrate.  Moreover,  the  privileging  of  sectional 
interest,  and  the  vulnerability  it  served  to  encourage,  reinforced  the  sense  of  insecurity 
embodied  in  the  sentiment:  "there's  always  some  other  poor  bastard  ready  to  take 
your  place".  This  galvanised  the  employer's  already  existing  strength,  diminishing  the 
empathy  for  agency  workers  that  characterised  the  period  of  union  growth  and 
militant  activity.  In  the  post-recognition  period,  as  management  gained  ground  during 
restructuring,  a  more  belligerent  attitude  towards  agency  workers  grew  and  was  often 
evident  at  union  meetings.  This  was  linked  to  the  diminution  of  confidence  in  the 
union. 
Mistrust  and  competition  between  WCCI  workers  was  also  manifest  along 
geographical  lines.  Ayrshire  workers  in  particular  were  demonised  and  parodied. 
Anecdotal  evidence  confirmed  this:  it  was  claimed  at  one  meeting  that  in  Ayrshire 
there  were  "streets  named  after  him  [the  Managing  Director]".  Again,  ISTC  rules,  and 
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of  the  recognition  agreement,  meant  that  it  resisted  pursuing  "an  aggressive 
recruitment  campaign  outside  other  factories  until  the  [Gourock]  agreement  had 
bedded  in"  (Findlay  and  McKinlay  2000:  16).  This  served  to  further  intensify 
sectionalism,  and  the  general  vulnerability  of  all  WCCI  workers  was  not  appreciated: 
A  lot  of  the  work  was  moved  to  Ayrshire.  Management  ask  us  to  train 
them  up  and  the  next  thing  you  know  most  of  the  work  is  heading  for 
Ayrshire.  They  say  it's  not  about  that  but  we  were  the  best  box 
builders  in  Europe  before  they  took  over.  They're  from  his  patch, 
down  the  road  (Panda  1999). 
They  are  the  main  employer  in  Ayrshire.  People  don't  have  anywhere 
else  to  go  and  the  [the  Managing  Director's]  family  are  really  hated 
down  there...  It  is  very  difficult  -  the  family  know  [the  workers]  have 
nowhere  to  go.  If  you're  not  professional  then  you  work  for  this 
company  somewhere  or  you  don't  work.  Up  here  [Gourock]  it's 
different  because  you  can  go  and  sign  on  with  Addeco  or  any  of  these 
agencies  and  end  up  with  IBM  or  Clairemont.  There  are  other  places 
operators  can  work  plus  you  can  commute  more  easily  to  Glasgow.  So 
we  don't  have  the  stranglehold  on  our  employees  that  Ayrshire  has 
(Human  Resources  Officer  2001). 
Clearly,  what  I  would  term  the  `embryonic  generalism'  of  the  earlier  period  was 
negated  by  the  institutionalisation  of  workplace  unionism  at  the  Gourock  plant.  The 
lack  of  growth  for  the  group  of  militant  union  activists  meant  no  fully  effective 
method  of  overcoming  this  sectionalism  was  developed.  As  the  recognition  agreement 
became  bedded  in,  the  union  became  increasingly  ineffective  at  `making  a  difference' 
and  key  activists  lost  heart,  leaving  the  membership  exposed  to  further  offensive  by 
management. 
The  lack  of  engagement  with  official  union  business  on  the  part  of  key 
activists  reinforced  the  division  that  had  emerged  with  recognition.  The  branch's 
dependency  on  the  Full-time  officer  intensified,  rather  than  diminished  with 
experience,  and  his  growing  concern  with  the  institutional  security  of  the  union  at 
WCCI  drew  him  into  conflict  with  activists: 
What  we  need  to  remember  is  that  recruitment  gives  us  clout.  We  need 
to  put  a  positive  spin  on  things.  Realistically,  70%  of  the  workforce  is 
the  safety  net.  Don't  allow  [that]  disillusionment  to  fester  (Full-time 
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Yet  bureaucratic  efforts  to  secure  industrial  peace  at  WCCI  and  a  clear  shift  in 
orientation  away  from  militancy  actually  stunted  organisational  growth.  A  reliance  on 
the  Full-time  officer  and  the  wider  bureaucracy  secured  little  gains  for  the  workforce, 
in  terms  of  health  and  safety  improvements,  for  example,  even  when  breaches  seemed 
clearly  apparent  to  the  workers.  At  meetings  reference  was  made  to  "flooding 
management  with  grievances"  and  the  "need  to  do  a  risk  assessment"  but  little 
progress  was  made.  The  general  feeling  was  that  "you're  only  as  good  as  your  last 
shift  in  there"  (Jim  1999)  and  this  was  later  confirmed  by  the  Human  Resources 
Officer. 
Many  WCCI  workers  also  struggled  to  take  advantage  of  some  of  New 
Labour's  new  `rights'  that  the  ISTC  had  promoted  during  the  recruitment  period.  For 
example,  when  asked  about  the  Working  Time  Directive  and  the  provision  of  longer 
breaks  if  work  is  particularly  mundane  and  repetitive,  the  Full-time  officer  stated31: 
We're  saying  this  to  the  company.  We're  asking  about  a  mandatory 
eleven  hour  break.  Remember  last  year  [the  Human  Resources 
Manager]  wrote  a  lot  of  crap  trying  to  convince  us  that  you  were  not 
night  shift  workers?  Well  you  are  and  you  are  entitled  to  medicals.  I 
suggest  we  raise  Working  Time  Directive  issues.  There's  a  lot  of  stuff 
in  there  about  the  supervision  of  young  workers  that  the  company 
doesn't  stick  to.  We  need  to  educate  about  this  because  it  should  mean 
better  terms  and  conditions.  We  need  to  challenge  this  (Full-time 
officer  August  1999).  32 
However,  when  challenges  were  not  mounted,  this  bred  fatalism  which  manifest  itself 
at  meetings  and  allowed  earlier  confidence  in  the  union  to  wane.  Whilst  the  growing 
lack  of  engagement  with  the  union  (for  example  the  number  of  representatives 
decreased  over  the  years)  was  linked  to  increasing  insecurity  and  fear,  it  was  also 
clearly  linked  to  the  orientation  of  the  union  after  recognition.  Voluntary  recognition 
here  was  achieved  because  of  militancy  from  the  workers'  perspective,  especially  the 
activists.  Whereas,  from  the  ISTC's  point  of  view,  it  seemed  to  have  been  achieved  in 
spite  of  militancy.  Thus  from  the  union's  perspective,  further  gains  could  only  be 
achieved  within  the  framework  of  moderation  that  characterised  the  agreement.  Yet 
this  orientation  depended  on  an  employer  `goodwill'  that  was  never  forth-coming  and 
placed  the  ISTC  locally  in  a  `catch  22'  situation.  They  adopted  a  more  moderate 
outlook  in  the  struggle  for  legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of  a  management,  who  did  not 
31  The  Working  Time  Regulations  1998,  Part  II  section  8  (DTI  1998c). 
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accept  their  interests  as  legitimate,  and,  in  the  process,  they  `lost  face'  with  many 
members  who  became  quickly  disillusioned.  Weaknesses  in  union  outlook  evidently 
had  an  overall  negative  effect  on  trade  unionism  at  WCCI.  Fundamentally  there  was  a 
rejection  of  what  militancy  could  deliver  on  the  part  of  the  union,  once  the  ISTC  had 
gained  formal  access  to  the  negotiating  table  with  management  -  despite  the  limited 
results  that  this  provided: 
The  company  has  been  extremely  lucky  in  their  dealings  with  the 
union  because  I  think  at  times  I  was  surprised  that  the  union  didn't  put 
more  force  into  what  they  were  doing  and  put  more  pressure  on  the 
company...  I  was  impressed  with  how  willing  the  union  was  to 
negotiate.  Not  quite  give  in  but  to  give  some  way  to  management.  That 
stunned  me...  there  have  been  times  when  I've  thought  the  company 
had  quite  an  easy  ride...  I  thought  it 
...  made  them  [the  union  officials] 
look  very  weak.  The  union  believes  what  management  says  about 
change  and  because  of  that  it's  like  `we  will  toe  the  line'.  I  have  never 
known  such  an  easy  ride  for  an  employer.  I  was  surprised  because  I 
thought  I  was  going  into  an  environment  that  I  thought  was  quite 
militant.  I've  never  seen  management  have  to  back  down  -  on  anything 
(Human  Resources  Officer  2001). 
Kelly  (1996)  argues  that  a  militant  outlook,  compared  to  a  moderate  one,  still 
allows  for  the  adoption  of  different  standpoints  on  the  basis  of  circumstances.  It  does 
not  suggest  a  once  and  for  all  refusal  to  enter  into  meaningful  dialogue  with 
employers,  where  this  could  be  beneficial  in  the  long  term.  Militancy  is,  however, 
built  on  members'  willingness  to  act  collectively  and  the  nurturing  of  that  capacity 
within  them.  The  recognition  of  a  fundamental  antagonism  between  the  two  sides  of 
the  employment  relationship,  that  Kelly  argues  exemplifies  militancy,  was  an 
absolutely  central  feature  of  experience  at  WCCI  and  appeals  to  `mutual  gains'  that 
the  ISTC  sought  to  use  to  gain  recognition  cut  across  this,  to  the  detriment  of 
unionisation  overall.  Moreover,  given  the  hostility  of  WCCI  from  the  outset,  over- 
--  reliance  on  employer  `support'  further  compounded  this,  and  there  was  no  obvious 
attempt  to  "normalise  and  stabilise  the  situation"  on  the  part  of  management  (Findlay 
and  McKinlay  2000:  20) 
.  Unsurprisingly,  little  progress  was  made  on  the  two  key 
issues  of  insecurity  and  pay  as  a  result.  With  insecurity  a  continuing  feature  of 
employment  at  WCCI,  even  some  important  successes  at  Employment  Tribunals  did 
33  not  assuage  the  fear  of  job  loss. 
"  In  one  ground-breaking  unfair  dismissal  case  for  the  ISTC  at  WCCI,  an  Employment  Tribunal 
suggested  that  "no  reasonable  employer"  would  have  called  what  the  claimant  did  "gross  industrial 
misconduct"  (Greenock  Telegraph  26  August  1999).  The  company  however  refused  to  comply  with  a 219 
In  relation  to  pay,  as  many  union  members  had  predicted,  negotiations  were 
not  effectively  concluded  in  June  1999.  The  company  offered  a  pay  rise  of  2%  which 
was  rejected.  By  August  1999,  the  company  offered  a  "no  overheads  deal"  (Full-time 
officer  1999)  that  meant  the  percentage  increase  would  remain  the  same  but  the 
company  would  look  at  improvements  like  good  timekeeping  bonuses  or  access  to  a 
company  pension  scheme.  There  was  a  clear  mood  to  take  action  on  pay  at  this  stage, 
and  the  Full-time  officer  was  adamant  that  "any  action  will  not  be  union  dictated". 
WCCI  tried  to  make  further  gains  through  the  wage  negotiations  and  wanted  `extra' 
commitments  on  absence  and  time-keeping.  The  `failure  to  agree'  meant  negotiations 
were  shifted  to  national  level  and  the  activists'  preferred  option  of  a  strike  ballot 
became  a  consultative  (indicative)  ballot.  The  Full-time  officer  was  worried  that  the 
company  was  successfully  deluding  the  ISTC's  national  officials,  allowing  branch 
opinion  to  be  ignored: 
He  [a  national  official]  was  thinking  that  [the  Managing  Director]  was 
alright  because  he  tries  to  put  himself  across  as  a  sort  of  middle  of  the 
road  or  even  left  wing  type  but  we  know  better.  I  think  at  the  top  level 
the  union  are  thinking  in  terms  of  good  industrial  relations  with  this 
guy...  [The  Human  Resources  Manager]  told  them  there  was  only  a 
handful  at  our  meetings  and  we  were  not  representative  (Full-time 
officer  1999). 
In  the  consultative  ballot  95%  of  respondents  voted  `yes'  to  a  full  strike  ballot  and  the 
committee  sought  to  build  for  a  `yes'  vote  from  the  workforce.  As  the  possible  strike 
would  take  place  during  the  crucial  year-end  period,  this  served  add  to  the  pressure 
the  company  was  under  from  IBM  to  complete  orders. 
For  some,  the  strike  was  seen  as  an  important  way  for  the  workers  to  reassert 
themselves  after  a  year  of  management  having  the  upper  hand.  It  also  represented  the 
opportunity  to  gain  more  than  an  increase  in  pay: 
Well  it  isn't  really  just  about  money.  We  need  to  say  to  the  workplace 
that  an  extra  couple  of  bob  is  not  good  enough.  They  chuck  a  couple  of 
coppers  and  people  just  jump  to  it.  We  need  to  show  him  [the 
Managing  Director]  that  we're  willing  to  fight.  They  will  want  to  avoid 
strike  action.  So  we  can  use  this  to  raise  other  issues  as  well.  We're 
only  ten  weeks  away  from  next  year's  negotiations.  We  need  to  take  a 
stand  now.  The  hierarchy  cost  us  a  month  arsing  about.  The 
membership  will  decide  (WCCI  union  committee  member  1999). 
`reinstatement  order'.  The  case  was  eventually  settled  privately  and  the  worker  received  an  undisclosed 
sum  in  lieu  of  reinstatement. 220 
Despite  problems  with  the  ballot  paper34,74%  voted  for  strike  action  on  a  turnout  of 
58%  and  there  was  (for  a  short  time)  a  renewal  of  the  mood  of  militancy  that  had  been 
a  central  feature  of  workers'  experience  a  year  earlier: 
Less  than  a  year  ago  the  workforce  [at  Gourock)  was  second  to  none, 
but  now  we  are  totally  demoralised...  We've  been  treated  like  dirt. 
Every  single  thing  they  have  told  they  are  going  to  do  has  never 
happened  and  now  we  have  had  enough  and  are  fighting  back"  (WCCI 
worker  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  23Td  December  1999). 
With  a  two-day  strike  about  to  begin,  the  company  sent  workers  letters  detailing  the 
impact  of  the  strike  on  wages.  Workers  would  lose  overtime  payments  (for  working 
over  the  festive  period  and  the  millennium  holiday)  if  they  did  not  work  all  working 
days  in  the  week  of  the  strike.  Effectively  this  meant  loss  of  earnings  would  not  be 
confined  to  strike  days.  Anger  at  local  level  was  overshadowed  by  the  effort  to  seek  a 
compromise  on  the  part  of  the  union's  national  officers,  and  the  strike  was  called  off 
at  the  eleventh  hour  on  the  basis  that: 
The  management  are  making  signals  they  are  taking  the  situation 
seriously  and  are  prepared  to  enter  into  a  dialogue  (ISTC  Organiser 
quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  24th  December  1999). 
By  writing  out  to  workers  the  company  had  demonstrated  its  ability  to  undermine  the 
action  by  further  exploiting  organisational  weakness  and  workers'  reliance  on  `extra' 
payments  like  overtime  to  earn  a  `living  wage',  even  at  a  period  when  the  majority  of 
workers  elsewhere  were  having  an  extended  break.  Less  than  a  year  after  recognition 
had  been  achieved  the  numbers  that  attended  meetings  had  dwindled,  and  this, 
coupled  with  the  fact  that  the  most  militant  activists  had  lost  faith,  meant  that 
moderation  and  accommodation  was  allowed  to  prevail  even  in  the  context  of  the 
mood  to  fight.  Pressure  `from  above'  on  the  Full-time  officer  out-weighed  that  `from 
below',  and  the  continued  dependence  on  him  by  the  branch  officers  resulted  in  a  lack 
of  direction  for  the  members.  Claims  that  workers  (even  those  who  had  voted  for 
strike  action)  were  prepared  to  cross  the  picket  line  left  the  committee  feeling  that 
they: 
34  The  ballot  paper  asked  if  the  member  was  prepared  to  take  industrial  action,  but  the  words  yes  and  no 
were  written  inside  the  box.  The  committee  was  worried  that  `yes  voters',  reluctant  to  effectively  cross  out 
the  word  yes,  might  have  instead  crossed  out  the  word  no  -  hence  voting  no  to  action. 221 
Needed  to  get  out  of  jail.  [the  full-timer]  met  with  the  [Managing 
Director]  and  said  `look  I  could  stop  this'.  So  they  gave  us  an 
attendance  allowance  -  50p  for  every  full  day  worked  -  back-dated  to 
1998.  We  stuck  with  the  l  lp  an  hour  rise  that  the  company  had  started 
to  implement  anyway  (Charlie,  ISTC  committee  member  2000). 
For  the  Full-time  officer  the  compromise  represented  a  success: 
The  threat  of  industrial  action  put  the  company  under  pressure.  They 
were  forced  to  put  money  on  the  table  that  they  hadn't  before. 
Although  it  was  disguised,  it  was  real  money.  A  lot  of  that  was  to  hide 
it  so  they  didn't  have  to  pay  it  in  Ayrshire.  This  is  a  real  benefit  that 
we  would  never  have  been  able  to  achieve  in  the  past...  1999  was  a 
success.  Money  was  put  on  the  table  to  avoid  the  action.  It  did  amount 
to  a  1.2%  increase  but  came  in  a  lump  sum  format.  That  was  because 
he  was  pressurised.  That  collective  strength  is  what  [the  Managing 
Director]  fears  most  (Full-time  officer  2001). 
However  the  company  were  not  forced  to  make  commitments  on  any  of  the  other 
issues  that  the  committee  had  hoped  the  threat  of  action  might  bring  about.  Crucially, 
there  was  no  long-term  agreement  on  pay  and  the  negotiations  on  the  2000  settlement 
were  only  weeks  away.  Furthermore  calling  off  the  strike  did  little  to  galvanise  the 
collective  strength  that  the  Full-time  officer  felt  had  had  such  an  impact.  The 
company  had  achieved  what  it  set  out  to  do  at  the  beginning  of  1999:  it  successfully 
put  off  a  wage  increase  for  (almost)  a  year. 
Clearly,  the  successful  strike  ballot  demonstrated  that,  despite  a  year  of 
conciliation  and  accommodation,  when  confronted  with  management  offensive,  the 
possibility  of  collective  resistance  still  existed.  But  the  ISTC's  efforts  to  `police' 
discontent,  and  to  sap  the  collectivist  and  solidaristic  sentiment  that  served  the  union's 
ends  well  in  the  early  days  of  the  battle  to  recruit  and  organise  at  the  plant,  had  taken 
their  toll.  The  outcome  also  served  to  highlight  how  the  relationships  of  workplace 
unionism  developed,  once  those  relationships  were  formalised  after  recognition.  The 
institutionalisation  of  bargaining  certainly  impeded  the  development  of  a  sizeable 
group  of  committed  rank  and  file  activists.  The  relationship  between  members  of  the 
committee  and  the  Full-time  officer  is  of  crucial  importance  here.  As  noted  earlier,  it 
became  clear,  after  the  recognition  agreement  was  signed,  that  the  committee  was 
split  between  the  militants  and  the  moderates.  Whilst  the  latter  group  had  greatest 
`faith'  in  the  ISTC  and  in  the  Full-time  officer: 222 
He's  a  good  guy.  He's  got  a  hard  job  to  do.  We  get  good  support  from 
him  and  the  others.  I  think  they're  a  good  union.  We  get  support 
because  this  is  a  new  branch.  He's  closer  to  being  one  of  us"  (Charlie 
2000) 
both  groups  were  forced  to  depend  on  him.  Recognition  brought  them  very  little  in 
terms  of  time  to  develop  effective  methods  of  articulating  workers'  grievances,  and 
where  they  were  most  successful  (for  example  in  tribunal  cases)  the  Full-time  officer 
was  generally  heavily  involved.  Given  his  concern  with  the  security  of  the  union  and 
the  bureaucratic  role  that  his  position  forced  him  to  play,  this  reinforced  the 
consensual,  non-militant  outlook,  placing  the  overall  orientation  of  the  branch  at  odds 
with  what  the  majority  of  members  wanted.  To  an  extent,  this  helped  shape  the 
relationship  between  committee  members  which  verged  on  bureaucratic  due  to 
dependence  on  the  Full-time  officer,  but  was  not  fully  so,  since  a  lack  of  focus  and 
procedural  development  impeded  this.  Nor  was  it  fully  democratic,  largely  for  the 
same  reasons.  The  "morality  of  `us  and  them"'  (Lane  1974:  199)  was  retained  but 
mostly  at  the  level  of  rhetoric  on  the  part  of  the  union,  and  the  reality  of  `us  and  them' 
was  never  adequately  used  to  allow  the  union  to  grow  and,  crucially,  to  improve 
conditions. 
It  is  also  important  to  explore  the  extent  to  which  `modern'  working  practices 
lend  themselves  to  the  effective  development  of  a  rank  and  file  especially  under 
regimes  like  that  at  WCCI.  The  union  representatives  remained  close  to  their  fellow 
workers  since  they  were  not  relieved  of  their  `productive  responsibilities'  to  carry  out 
union  business.  Union  office,  therefore,  did  not  remove  them  from  the  day  to  day 
`grind'  at  WCCI.  However,  they  had  little  time  to  develop  as  trade  unionists  because 
of  this.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  ISTC  did  not  provide  them  with  opportunities  to 
learn.  It  is  simply  to  note  another  facet  which  I  believe  hampered  development, 
especially  in  the  context  described  above  where  the  harshness  of  the  regime  often 
dictated  a  pace  that  the  `newly  organised'  had  difficulty  matching.  Moreover,  despite 
agreeing  to  recognition,  the  company  did  not  provide  any  facilities  for  the  conduct  of 
union  business,  and  no  official  union  meeting  took  place  on  company  time  or 
property.  In  addition,  the  intensification  of  casualisation  over  the  years  had  a 
significant  impact  on  union  activity,  especially  compared  with  the  most  active  period 
of  recruitment  in  1998.  Casual  workers  are  often  "organisational  inactive"  (Gray 
1995:  16)  and  recognition  did  little  to  improve  this  position.  This  is  clearly  illustrated 
with  regard  to  net  membership  growth  at  this  stage.  As  noted  above,  1999  ended  with 223 
a  strike  ballot  -  of  five  hundred  members  -  approximately  the  same  number  the  union 
had  at  the  beginning  of  the  recognition  negotiations,  despite  the  number  that  joined  as 
a  result  of  recognition 
5.4:  Setbacks,  Successes  and  Disappointments 
Open  struggle  became  more  sporadic  inside  the  factory.  The  next  round  of  pay 
negotiations  had  an  inconclusive  outcome.  The  workers  sought  a  wage  rise  of  around 
8%  and  the  company  sought  another  wage  freeze.  The  union  continued  with  the 
struggle  to  achieve  non-wage  improvements,  largely  in  an  effort  to  save  face  with 
members.  In  the  meantime,  outside  of  the  factory  and  outside  of  Inverclyde,  a 
different  picture  of  working  life  at  WCCI  emerged  as  the  company  maintained  its  dual 
offensive  of  presenting  itself  as  a  key,  benevolent,  employer  whilst  ruthlessly 
restructuring.  The  Managing  Director,  who,  for  the  workers,  was  by  far  the  very 
embodiment  of  the  harsh  autocratic  regime,  was  voted  one  of  the  country's 
entrepreneurs  of  the  year: 
Albert  McDee  firmly  believes  that  a  good  workforce  working  closely 
with  management  is  vital  to  WCCI's  current  and  future  success.  He 
therefore  places  a  strong  emphasis  on  staff  training  and  education  and 
communication  within  the  company  (Ernst  and  Young  2000). 
That  is  shocking.  That  is  really.  .  .1 
have  never  heard  such  downright 
barefaced  rubbish.  I  mean  that  is  just...  it  is  so  not  WCCI.  The  only 
thing  I  can  tell  you  is  that  when  that  company  went  from  Grimtec  - 
there  are  a  lot  of  people  who  are  still  there  who  were  there  at  the  time  - 
who  will  tell  you  that  you  could  physically  see  the  change  happening. 
Everything  was  wiped  in  one  fell  swoop.  They  have  treated  their 
workforce  so  bad.  But  there's  nothing  -  no  civility  -  nothing  (Human 
Resources  Officer  2001,  in  response  to  the  above). 
In  February  2000,  WCCI  again  attracted  the  attention  of  the  national  media 
when  it  announced  a  new  production  facility  in  Irvine,  Ayrshire,  claiming  it  would 
generate  around  seven  hundred  jobs  (BBC  News  Online  14`h  February  2000).  Such  a 
major  investment  by  the  company  brought  public  praise  from  both  the  Scottish 
Enterprise  Minister,  Henry  McLeish,  and  the  First  Minister,  Donald  Dewar: 
The  decision  by  West  Coast  Computer  Industries  to  establish  a  further 
manufacturing  facility  here  at  Riverside  Business  Park  provides  a 
welcome  boost  to  the  Ayrshire  economy.  This  continuing  commitment 
to  Ayrshire  shown  by  WCCI  can  only  further  enhance  the  reputation  of 224 
a  skilled  and  dedicated  local  workforce"  (Dewar  quoted  in  Scottish 
Computer  Headline  March  2000). 
However,  both  politicians  faced  criticism  in  the  Scottish  Parliament"  when  the 
company  announced  a  few  weeks  later  that  it  was  to  cut  one  hundred  and  forty  jobs 
because  of  a  poor  trading  market  that  had  helped  create  a  stockpile  at  its  factories 
(Daily  Record  21St  February  2000). 
The  announcement  of  expansion  at  Irvine,  and  the  subsequent  job  losses, 
further  fuelled  job  insecurity  at  WCCI.  In  the  Gourock  plant,  however,  the  question  of 
security  was  raised  from  different  perspective,  when  the  company  announced  its 
decision  to  outsource  its  security  function  and  force  a  relatively  well-paid  and  highly 
organised  group  of  workers  into  alternative  assembly  work  or  redundancy.  The  thirty- 
five  workers,  90%  of  whom  were  union  members,  were  told  of  the  decision  at  a 
weekend  `offsite'  meeting  and  were  informed  that  their  jobs  had  already  been  filled 
by  national  security  firm,  Securicor.  WCCI  claimed: 
The  decision  has  been  reached  because  of  the  very  serious  concerns 
the  company  has  about  the  credibility  of  the  security  department  at  [the 
Plant]  and...  serious  incidences  of  loss  (spokesperson  quoted  in  the 
Greenock  Telegraph  20th  March  2000). 
However,  for  the  ISTC  and  the  union's  members,  this  was  a  trial  at  `outsourcing'  key 
functions  that  could  have  serious  ramifications  for  the  whole  core  workforce.  Two 
difficulties  emerged  during  the  period  of  uncertainty  for  security  workers.  The  first 
was  that  they  were  in  what  was,  effectively,  a  sub-branch  at  WCCI  since  they  were 
not  part  of  the  hourly  core  paid  group.  In  workplace  terminology,  they  were  "staff', 
employed  on  different  terms  and  conditions  from  production  workers.  Accordingly, 
any  action  or  ballot  for  action  would  have  been  taken  by  this  `sub-branch'  and  not  the 
main  branch.  This  created  the  possibility  of  fellow  union  members  being  prepared  to 
cross  the  security  workers  picket  lines,  particularly  since  support  for  their  case  was 
not  universal.  This  was  linked  to  the  second  difficulty  -  the  function  these  workers 
performed: 
The  main  problem  now  is  whether  we  would  get  branch  backing  -  the 
main  branch.  As  far  as  [the  members]  are  concerned  the  security 
3S  The  jobs  were  "highly  speculative"  according  to  the  South  of  Scotland  MSP,  Mike  Russell.  The  First 
Minister  believed  the  investment  "was  an  important  vote  of  confidence  in  the  future  of  the  Ayrshire 
economy"  (Scottish  Parliament,  2000). 225 
guards  are  a  bunch  of  bastards  and  good  riddance  to  them.  But  this  is 
for  the  whole  branch  and  we  can't  afford  to  be  that  selective.  So  we're 
starting  off  with  a  petition  for  them.  There's  no  way  anybody  should 
be  crossing  a  picket  line  (Full-time  officer  2000). 
The  union  did  manage  to  secure  backing  for  the  workers  and  did  bolster  solidarity 
from  other  workers.  The  union  planned  to  ballot  the  security  workers  over  strike 
action,  though  the  Full-time  officer  was  confident  that  a  favourable  settlement  could 
be  reached,  because  the  company  had  failed  to  consult  the  union  or  the  workers  on  the 
redundancies.  Moreover  the  company  "could  not  afford  a  strike"  especially  if  workers 
refused  to  cross  the  guards'  picket  lines.  It  was  not  clear  whether  the  union  `could 
afford  a  strike'.  Although  production  workers  staged  an  unofficial  walkout  when  the 
guards  were  informed  of  the  company's  decision  to  transfer  their  work,  further 
support  could  not  be  guaranteed.  This  was  compounded  by  the  fact  that  the  most 
militant  union  activists  at  the  factory  had  shifted  into  inactivity,  especially  at  a 
bureaucratic  level.  Some  remained  as  `agitators'  at  shop-floor  level,  but  part  of  that 
`agitation'  reflected  their  frustration  with  their  inability  to  `make  a  difference'  and 
much  of  it  was  directed  at  the  union  itself,  especially  the  Full-time  officer.  One  key 
militant,  who  had  resigned  from  `formal'  union  activity,  claiming  the  union  did  not 
support  a  sacked  colleague  appropriately,  went  onto  long-term  sick.  This  served  to 
limit  the  possibilities  for  action,  beyond  the  solidarity  that  could  be  garnered  from  a 
local  union  campaign  to  initiate  a  "one  out  all  out"  policy  across  the  whole  WCCI 
Gourock  branch  (Greenock  Telegraph  28`h  March  2000).  Within  a  few  weeks  the 
company  and  the  union  had  settled  on  compensation  for  the  guards  through 
Employment  Tribunal  and  alternative  employment  in  the  factory  for  the  majority, 
allowing  the  union  to  retain  some  credibility  and  to  reinforce  its  success  in  terms  of 
legal  representation. 
Away  from  the  Gourock  plant,  the  ISTC  continued  to  recruit  and  organise  in 
the  Ayrshire  plants  and  membership  grew  with  the  announcement  of  potential 
redundancies  in  October  2000.  The  fact  that  the  union  could  apply  to  the  Central 
Arbitration  Committee  (CAC)36  to  be  recognised  for  collective  bargaining  at  WCCI 
Ayrshire  in  December  that  year  represented  a  significant  breakthrough  for  the  union. 
However,  at  the  time  when  the  ISTC  needed  to  focus  its  efforts  on  the  Ayrshire  plants 
to  achieve  recognition  whilst  the  company  remained  hostile,  attention  was  again 
36  Section  1  of  the  Employment  Relations  Act  1999  provides  that  the  Central  Arbitration  Committee 
adjudicates  on  the  statutory  recognition  and  de-recognition  of  trade  unions,  where  this  cannot  be  agreed 
voluntarily  (CAC  2002). 226 
turned  to  Gourock  when  the  company  went  on  the  offensive  and  placed  all  eight 
hundred  workers  on  ninety  days  redundancy  notice.  Although  the  company  predicted 
that  three  hundred  and  fifty  workers  would  go  in  February  2001  (Greenock  Telegraph 
25`h  November  2000),  many  workers  felt  it  was  the  beginning  of  the  end  for  the 
Gourock  site,  particularly  for  core  workers.  They  blamed  a  greater  reliance  on  agency 
workers  at  other  WCCI  plants  which  meant  the  company  could  move  work  there  from 
Gourock  in  order  to  save  money.  Moreover,  they  believed  that  if  business  improved  in 
the  New  Year,  as  it  often  did  in  the  industry,  with  a  sizeable  number  of  the  core 
workforce  removed,  this  would  allow  the  company  to  increase  the  number  of  agency 
workers  -  fulfilling  a  long-term  management  aim.  The  workers  showed  their  reaction 
with  a  return,  albeit  it  brief,  to  the  militant,  spontaneous  action  of  the  period  before 
recognition.  They  downed  tools,  refused  to  work  for  three  days  and  began  to  build 
support  for  their  cause  locally  petitioning  in  the  main  town  centre.  Two,  formerly  key, 
activists  collected  "more  than  three  hundred  signatures  in  an  hour"  (Greenock 
Telegraph  29th  November  2000)  and  there  was  a  mass  leafleting  campaign  at  the 
factory  gates  by  them,  other  activists,  and  members  of  the  Socialist  Workers  Party. 
The  spontaneous  activity  that  workers  engaged  in  when  the  announcement  was 
made  brought  criticism  some  members  of  the  branch  committee,  and  from  the  Full- 
time  officer,  who  was  `shouted  down'  when  he  came  to  the  factory  during  the  `sit-in' 
--  to  tell  workers  to  get  back  to  work: 
You  shit  in  the  nest  last  Friday.  You  need  to  decide  what  you  are  going 
to  do.  We  need  to  send  a  warning  sign  but  nobody  wants  to  see  a 
padlock.  It's  not  for  me  to  say  -  strike  (Full-time  officer  2000). 
I  have  it  on  good  authority  that  a  guy  was  sent  out  over  the  weekend  to 
look  for  any  empty  factories  in  the  West  of  Scotland  where  this  work 
could  be  done.  We  need  to  box  clever  here.  Everything  needs  to  be 
official  or  they've  got  us  (ISTC  Branch  Secretary  2000). 
Workers  were  worried  about  the  number  of  redundancies  and  about  the  long-term 
security  of  the  plant,  as  were  union  officials,  as  the  comments  above  suggest. 
However,  there  was  little  evidence  of  a  strategy  being  developed  that  could  secure  the 
future  of  the  plant  or  that  could  resist  the  redundancies  effectively,  despite  the  fact 
that  the  Full-time  officer  believed  these  redundancies  to  be  "false",  because  of  the 
apparent  need  to  rehire  in  the  next  financial  quarter.  He  sought  assurances  from  the 227 
company  that  redundant  workers  would  be  taken  back  on  with  `core'  status  if  the 
business  outlook  improved,  though  he  was  unable  to  secure  this.  It  was  made  clear  at 
a  mass  meeting  of  over  three  hundred  workers  that  external  pressure  could  be  applied 
to  the  company  through  "lobbying"  and  the  involvement  of  outside  agencies  like  the 
STUC  and  local  politicians.  The  role  of  militancy  was  also  made  clear: 
The  company  are  holding  a  gun  to  our  heads  about  any  wildcat  action. 
Basically,  its  get  back  to  normal  working  or  no  talks.  They'll  stop 
negotiating  with  us  and  they're  contacting  the  ISTC  headquarters 
complaining  about  us.  We  need  to  save  as  many  jobs  as  possible  and 
get  an  enhanced  package  for  those  we  can't.  I  need  to  go  through  the 
motions  and  get  the  negotiations  running  (Full-time  officer,  2000). 
There  was  a  definite  mood  of  militancy  at  the  meeting  with  calls  to  "save  all 
jobs  and  never  mind  redundancies"  but  this  was  not  harnessed.  Also,  as  had 
increasingly  become  the  norm  at  meetings,  militancy  was  manifest  as  a  criticism  of 
the  Full-time  officer  rather  than  as  developing  tactics  to  initiate  an  effective  fight- 
back.  There  were  no  concrete  suggestions  or  plans  worked  out  to  `test'  union  officials 
when  the  workers  were  seemingly  most  united,  for  example.  Company  representatives 
had  also  gone  on  the  offensive  over  spontaneous  action: 
J  [a  manager]  said  if  there's  any  action  you'll  all  be  sacked".  We've 
been  told  that  the  place  will  shut  if  there  are  any  wise-cracks,  is  this 
right?  IBM  will  send  nothing  unless  we  are  quiet.  Any  action  and  the 
place  will  shut  (WCCI  worker  2000). 
Whilst  the  Full-time  officer  and  local  officials  sought  opinion  on  the  sort  of  action 
that  workers  would  be  prepared  to  take  against  the  redundancies  there  was  little 
effective  leadership: 
You  know  how  to  hurt  him  but  without  it  looking  like  action.  He  [the 
Managing  Director]  has  threatened  to  get  the  police  involved,  but  we 
have  strength  -  that's  the  thing  we  need  to  remember  -  that's  the  last 
thing  (Full-time  officer  2000). 
Strength?  We  need  to  do  something  with  that  strength.  People  sitting  in 
that  factory  doing  fuck-all  work  that's  strength  -  but  then  what? 
What's  going  to  be  done  with  it?  (WCCI  activist,  replying  to  above 
2000). 
There  was  also  little  evidence  to  support  union  suggestions  that  politicians  would  be 
fighting  casualisation  and  workers  were  sceptical  of  their  potential  role: 228 
Parliament  must  know  about  causalisation.  It's  a  UK  wide  thing.  You 
can't  say  they  don't  know  about  it  and  that  you're  telling  them 
anything  new.  If  I  get  kicked  out  I'll  go  temping  but  I'm  scared.  And  it 
doesn't  matter  because  New  Labour  turns  a  blind  eye.  It's  a  Labour 
council  in  Ayrshire  and  they  advertise  it  to  employers  as  a  low  pay 
region  (WCCI  worker  2000). 
The  Full-time  officer  suggested  a  march  and  rally  ("which  would  be  difficult  to 
organise")  and  Gourock  workers  lobbying  at  the  Ayrshire  plants  ("to  brow-beat  the 
Ayrshire  people").  Despite  the  context  of  this  meeting,  the  poor  level  of  organisation, 
the  lack  of  concrete  decisions  and  the  `unrealistic'  orientation  that  had  come  to 
characterise  union  meetings  were  all  apparent: 
IBM  has  a  big  responsibility  to  each  and  every  individual  in  WCCI. 
They  are  being  approached  at  a  political  level.  They  owe  us  jobs 
(Branch  Secretary  2000). 
The  meeting  and,  indeed,  the  redundancy  situation,  also  further  illustrated  the 
debilitating  effect  of  the  sectionalism  that  had  divided  the  Gourock  workers  from  their 
counterparts  in  Ayrshire.  If  the  workers  were  to  build  the  widest  possible  support  for 
their  cause  then  they  would  have  needed  the  full  support  of  the  Ayrshire  workers,  but 
given  that  division  had  been  allowed  to  persist  with  little  effective  engagement  to 
challenge  it  by  the  union,  the  possibility  of  achieving  unity  at  this  critical  stage  was 
limited.  The  union  officials  were  not  able  to  demonstrate  that  they  had  developed 
plans  to  try  to  build  solidarity  between  the  two  areas.  Whilst  the  Full-time  officer 
stressed  this  was  needed,  he  still  seemed  prepared  to  countenance  calls  from  some 
workers  for  the  closure  of  part  of  the  Ayrshire  facilities,  to  ensure  work  could  not  be 
moved  there.  The  impact  of  the  lack  of  concerted  effort  previously  in  trying  to 
overcome  this  division  was  fully  realised  during  the  redundancy  period,  though  some 
activists  eventually  realised  that  the  links  with  Ayrshire  could  have  been  developed 
through  a  recognition  of  shared  interests: 
They  never  really  got  anything  else  out  of  management.  I  now 
wouldn't  say  they  were  on  his  [the  Managing  Director's]  side.  They're 
there  for  the  money  the  same  as  us.  They  are  feart  to  stand  up  to  him. 
They  probably  had  their  militants  as  well  (Panda  2001). 
"Ayrshire's  no  the  problem.  They've  been  working  for  that  bastard  for 
a  lot  longer  than  us.  It's  nonsense  that  they  fucking  love  him.  They 
don't  and  there's  always  been  ISTC  members  there  as  well  (Horse 
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The  Full-time  officer  stated  explicitly  that  he  could  only  openly  sanction 
particular  types  of  collective  action:  the  application  of  pressure,  raising  grievances, 
pursuing  a  legal  case,  "bombarding  the  Ma1137,  sending  letters  to  the  Labour  party", 
but  he  "would  be  winking"  whatever  action  the  workers  decided  to  take.  But  because 
of  the  level  of  dependency  on  this  officer  by  branch  officials  and  the  wider 
membership,  and  the  effective  `withdrawal'  of  the  militants  from  formal  activity  over 
the  previous  months,  the  only  decision  taken  was  one  to  maintain  the  status  quo  to 
allow  the  Full-time  officer  to  begin  talks.  The  union  were  given  "a  week  and  a  day"  to 
negotiate  with  WCCI  management.  The  frustration  that  this  lead  to  for  many  members 
was  later  summed  up  by  a  former  activist: 
People  were  ready  for  it  but  it  needed  him.  People  needed  the  union 
guy  to  turn  round  and  say..  . 
People  do  need  that  because  a  lot  of  people 
were  feart.  That's  all  it  was  -  fear.  The  committee  didn't  have  much  to 
say  about  it.  Everybody  was  just  mad.  Then  they  should  have  stuck  to 
their  guns.  We  could  have  taken  them  on  and  taken  over  and  we  would 
have  got  everything  because  it  was  the  busy  time  of  the  year.  They 
would  have  won  everything  over.  I  really  felt  it  was  a  possibility  right 
up  to  the  Wednesday.  That's  why  I  lost  the  nut  at  that  meeting  because 
it's  like  talking  to  a  brick  wall.  And  I  realised  that  for  about  three  or 
four  years  I'd  been  talking  to  a  brick  wall  (Panda  2001). 
What  was  also  demonstrated  was  that  the  dependency  on  the  Full-time  officer 
was  mirrored  in  his  own  dependency  on  the  union  hierarchy,  on  the  Labour 
Movement  bureaucracy  and,  indeed,  on  the  Labour  Party  to  deliver  on  the  workers' 
behalf,  though  there  had  been  little  attempt  previously  to  build  any  effective  links.  38 
Dependence  on  the  ISTC's  bureaucracy  had  been  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  past,  as 
had  its  apparent  inability  or  unwillingness  to  offer  an  appropriately  active  level  of 
support39  but  it  is  in  the  context  of  these  redundancies  that  the  dependence  on  outside 
pressure  was  fully  illustrated.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  union  members  under  threat 
should  not  seek  to  use  the  resources  of  the  wider  Labour  Movement.  However,  what 
was  suggested  at  this  meeting  was  not  that  workers  appeal  for  the  solidarity  of  other 
union  members,  but  that  they  try  to  apply  pressure  to  the  bureaucracy  of  the  union 
37  The  town  centre  of  Greenock,  Inverclyde's  largest  town. 
38  The  branch  did  affiliate  to  the  Labour  Party  (in  the  constituency  of  the  ISTC's  Scottish  HQ,  some 
thirty  miles  away)  in  1999.  It  was  my  impression  that  what  was  being  agreed  to  was  not  made  clear  to 
members  at  the  meeting  who  voted  for  it.  Moreover,  I  found  no  evidence  that  affiliation  had  brought 
the  "extra  clout"  which  the  Full-time  officer  suggested  would  be  the  main  benefit  of  it. 
39  As  noted  earlier,  the  workers  often  complained  at  meetings  about  what  they  felt  were  clear  breaches 
of  health  and  safety  at  the  factory.  The  elected  committee  seemed  ill  equipped  to  deal  with  these.  Yet 
despite  promises  to  the  contrary,  there  were  no  effective  interventions  from  national  officers. 230 
movement  to  apply  political  pressure  to  WCCI  management  and  to  IBM  as  its  main 
customer.  However,  as  I  argued  earlier,  over-reliance  on  electronics  in  Inverclyde 
meant  that  to  argue  this  sort  of  case  was  not  viewed  as  politically  expedient.  Given 
that  politicians  clearly  accepted  the  `upturn  -  downturn'  logic  (and  continue  to  do  so) 
that  companies  represent  as  the  `blight'  of  the  electronics  industry  globally,  there  was 
limited  purchase  in  the  union  making  such  appeals.  The  Full-time  officer  either  did 
not  realise  this  or  was  unwilling  to  openly  recognise  it  in  the  absence  of  a  more 
effective  and  more  militant  strategy.  For  example,  the  local  MSP  was  apparently 
concerned  to  "minimise  the  impact  of  the  redundancies"  (McNeil  2000)  and  tabled  a 
parliamentary  motion.  However  his  `intervention'  did  not  necessarily  signal  a  fight  for 
WCCI  jobs: 
Myself  and  [the  Westminster  MP]  are  meeting  today  with  trade  unions 
and  management...  to  see  what  the  issues  are,  to  see  what  can  be 
salvaged.  It  may  not  necessarily  mean  the  jobs.  I  mean  we've  got  a 
whole  generation  of  people  who  don't  expect  long  term  jobs 
now.  .  . 
There  are  people  there  who  you  know  are  more  ready  to  accept, 
if  the  deal's  right  to  leave  and  move  on  -  see  what  they  think  of  their 
chances.  Or  we  have  people  -  they're  permanent  starts  that  think  - 
`well  is  it  worth  it?  '  The  company  have  decided  to  cut  their  core  and 
have  an  increased  reliance  on  temporary  workers...  from  that  point  of 
view  I'm  disappointed.  There  are  a  lot  of  issues...  what  would  my  role 
be  in  this,  how  do  I  support  the  trade  unions...  what  are  the 
management  issues  -  can  I  be  of  any  assistance  there?  (McNeil 
20004  ). 
These  comments  demonstrate  how  the  MSP  saw  his  role.  He  was  prepared  to  play  the 
facilitator,  the  mediator,  and  will  only  express  `disappointment'.  His  approach  is 
clearly  underpinned  by  New  Labour's  ideology,  and  there  is  explicit  support  in  these 
comments  for  flexibility  and  competitiveness.  There  is  also  support  for  the  New 
Labour  shift  from  full  employment  to  `full  employability'. 
No  further  collective  action  was  taken  against  the  redundancies  and  the 
company  were  inundated  with  volunteers  for  redundancy,  hundreds  more  than  they 
expected,  and  many  more  than  the  numbers  of  workers  they  needed  to  shed  (Human 
Resources  Officer  2001).  Having,  again,  lost  the  opportunity  to  disrupt  production  at  a 
crucial  time  in  the  year  for  the  company,  the  union  moved  towards  the  negotiation  of 
an  enhanced  package  which  they  failed  to  achieve  (Human  Resources  Officer  2001). 
The  decision  to  "exhaust  the  machinery"  meant  no  gains  were  made  on  behalf  of  the 
40  Based  on  interview,  27`h  November  2001. 231 
workers,  with  the  exception  of  an  apparent  promise  to  bring  core  workers  back  as  core 
workers  if  business  picked  up.  What  can  be  garnered  from  the  following  comments  by 
the  Human  Resources  Officer  is  that  the  scepticism  of  many  workers,  in  this  respect, 
was  well-founded: 
They  know  that  come  the  end  of  March  we'll  need  to  bring  it  back  up 
again  because  that's  when  the  figures  come  in  [the  numbers  of  units 
that  the  customer  requires].  So  we'll  bring  everybody  back  in  as 
agency  workers.  The  same  people  that  we  made  redundant.  One  of  the 
things  the  union  fought  for  was  that,  should  we  be  vamping  up  very 
soon  after  the  redundancies,  then  we  should  bring  back  the  core 
workers  as  core.  I  would  be  very  surprised  if  managers  don't  find  a 
way  round  that.  They're  never  going  to  bring  them  back  as  core 
workers.  The  company  would  be  on  dodgy  ground  to  bring  them  back 
that  soon.  So  the  union  think  they've  negotiated  something  that  they 
didn't  actually  get  (Human  Resources  Officer  2001). 
The  company  also  took  the  decision  to  `release'  hundreds  of  workers 
immediately,  in  advance  of  retraining  and  advisory  support  being  put  in  place  at  the 
plant,  and  were  criticised  for  thwarting  the  efforts  of  politicians  and  support  agencies 
(Greenock  Telegraph  27th  January  2001).  The  redundancies  "went  smoothly"  (Human 
Resources  Officer  2001)  at  the  Gourock  plant  and  the  company  assured  local 
politicians  that  it  was  committed  to  keeping  Gourock  open.  The  workers  made 
redundant  included  the  majority  of  the  remaining  ISTC  activists,  who  had  been  central 
to  the  recruitment  campaign  in  1998  and  to  building  the  branch  in  the  early  post 
recognition  period.  This  had  a  significant  impact  on  union  activity.  The  apparent 
success  of  the  modern,  consumer-service  based  trade  unionism  pursued  by  the  ISTC 
came  at  a  cost.  For  example,  as  the  Full-time  officer  later  admitted,  the  strategy  of 
vigorously  pursuing  `check-off  for  union  members  at  WCCI  also  had  serious 
implications  in  the  context  of  mass  redundancy: 
We  need  to  be  careful.  We  went  to  check-off  from  a  direct  debit 
situation  after  recognition.  With  hindsight  I'm  not  sure  that  was  the 
best  option.  In  a  massive  redundancy  situation  it's  unhealthy  that  a 
seriously  anti-union  employer  knows  who's  all  in  the  union.  I  don't 
know  if  we  will  repeat  this  again.  We've  been  hit  hard  with  two 
hundred  members  at  least  gone"  (Full-time  officer  2001)  al 
"Check-off  is  the  deduction  of  union  subscriptions  directly  from  pay.  The  bureaucratic  functioning  of 
the  union  meant  that,  despite  what  is  being  said  here,  there  was  little  option  for  the  branch  locally,  as 
check-off  is  a  clear  element  of  ISTC  culture.  For  example  at  introduction  of  the  Trade  Union  Reform 
and  Employment  Rights  Act  1993  already  "some  90%  of  the  [ISTC]  membership  made  its 
contributions  directly  at  source"  (Upham  1997:  255).  Check-off  was  an  issue  that  was  discussed 232 
5.5:  The  Beginning  of  the  End 
By  the  year-end  in  2000,  WCCI  had  lost  14.9%  of  their  workforce  nationally 
and  had  seen  profits  fall  by  43.02%  to  £3.47million  (Scottish  Business  Insider  2002). 
The  impact  of  this  on  the  Gourock  site  was  as  predicted:  a  serious  reduction  at  in  the 
number  of  core  workers.  Across  the  Ayrshire  plants  more  than  two  hundred  workers 
lost  their  jobs.  As  noted  above,  this  had  helped  bolster  support  for  the  ISTC  there  and 
this,  in  turn,  helped  strengthen  the  case  that  the  ISTC  put  forward  for  recognition  to 
the  CAC.  However,  the  fact  that  membership  had  grown  during  a  period  of 
redundancy,  also  formed  a  central  plank  of  WCCI's  challenge  to  the  recognition 
claim.  Although  the  union  were  assessed  to  have  a  majority  (5  1.3%)  of  workers  in  the 
bargaining  unit  as  members42,  the  company  argued  that  joining  a  union  during  a 
redundancy  situation  meant  members  did  not  fully  consider  the  implications  of  union 
membership.  Membership  under  these  circumstances,  according  to  the  company, 
could  not  be  taken  as  support  for  collective  bargaining  (Central  Arbitration 
Committee  2001).  The  ISTC's  case  both  highlighted  and  helped  resolve  some  of  the 
legal  ambiguity  in  the  statutory  recognition  procedure,  in  particular  whether  an  "only 
just"  majority  constitutes  the  need  for  a  ballot,  and  regarding  the  most  appropriate 
date  when  the  level  of  membership  should  be  assessed  (European  Law  Review  2001). 
The  CAC  declared  in  the  union's  favour  in  March  2001.  WCCI  sought  legal 
redress  through  a  judicial  review  at  the  Scottish  Court  of  Session  in  order  to  overturn 
the  CAC's  decision  not  to  hold  a  ballot  of  the  workforce.  The  company  made 
particular  issue  of  the  date  that  the  membership  level  was  assessed,  the  narrowness  of 
the  majority,  and  argued  that  a  ballot  would  be  in  the  interests  of  good  industrial 
relations.  The  Court  of  Session  judged  in  June  2001  that  the  WCCI's  case  was 
dismissed.  The  ISTC  had  won  a  significant  victory  over  WCCI.  During  the  CAC 
hearing  the  company  argued  that  the  union  had  played  a  role  in  "diminish[ing]  the 
reputation  of  the  company  in  the  eyes  of  its  clients"  during  the  "disruption"  (CAC 
. 
2001)  at  the  time  of  the  redundancies.  The  ISTC  versus  West  Coast  Computer 
Industries  was  also  one  of  the  first  cases  in  which  the  CAC  was  forced  to  defend  a 
regularly  at  early  post-recognition  meetings.  The  direct  debit  arrangements  put  in  place  for  the  intense 
period  of  organising  and  recruiting  at  WCCI  meant  special  concessionary  membership  rates.  The  shift 
to  check-off  meant  an  end  to  these  rates  at  a  time  when  faith  in  the  union  was  waning. 
42  The  CAC  can  only  declare  that  a  union  is  recognised  for  collective  bargaining  purposes  without  a 
ballot  if  none  of  three  qualifying  conditions  are  met.  These  exceptions  are:  the  CAC  believes  a  ballot 
would  be  in  the  interests  of  good  industrial  relations,  the  CAC  is  informed  that  a  majority  in  a 
bargaining  unit  does  not  want  the  union  to  conduct  collective  bargaining  for  them,  and  that  evidence  is 
presented  that  casts  doubt  on  whether  collective  bargaining  could  be  conducted  effectively. 233 
decision  under  the  new  statutory  recognition  procedure  and  its  interpretation  of  it 
(European  Law  Review  2001). 
Despite  this  victory,  thousands  of  job  losses  in  the  electronics  industry 
nationally  continued  to  breed  insecurity  at  WCCI  and  elsewhere.  Motorola  in  West 
Lothian  shed  three  thousand  jobs  in  April  2001.  Compaq  also  lost  seven  hundred 
workers  at  its  Erskine  factory,  many  of  whom  came  from  the  Inverclyde  area,  when  it 
decided  to  "contract  out"  the  manufacture  of  personal  computers  (BBC  News  Online 
2  °d  April  2001).  The  WCCI  redundancies  of  2000/2001  had  taken  their  toll  within  in 
the  Gourock  factory.  The  loss  of  many  members  and  of  the  militant  activists  allowed 
the  spirit  of  resistance  that  had  characterised  WCCI  to  dissipate.  For  activists  looking 
back,  unsurprisingly,  there  were  mixed  feelings  about  what  was  achieved  by 
unionisation,  about  what  went  wrong  and  about  what  could  have  been  done 
differently,  especially  in  terms  of  building  on  an  embryonic  collectivism  at  WCCI  that 
actually  pre-dated  the  influence  of  the  ISTC.  The  militants  felt  that  dependence  on  the 
Full-time  officer,  and  the  approach  that  characterised  the  period  after  recognition, 
were  at  the  root  of  what  they  saw  as  failure.  There  was  also  a  sense  that  the  ISTC  had 
promised  much  and  delivered  little: 
They  were  full  of  fighting  talk.  The  full-timer  said  the  ISTC  was  a  left- 
wing,  grassroots  union.  They  said  all  the  right  things.  After  recognition 
they  started  to  bend  over  backwards  to  do  everything  management 
said.  They  were  full  of  promises  saying  the  only  way  to  get  it  was 
through  recognition.  They  lied  to  us.  They  were  not  democratic,  not 
grassroots,  not  membership  led.  They  promote  people  who  dance  to 
the  right  tune.  We  [the  militants]  were  too  small  and  too  isolated.  They 
[the  moderates]  had  the  strength  of  the  full-timer  behind  them  (Horse 
2001). 
We  impressed  them  as  fighters,  aye  -  [the  moderates]  loved  that  but 
right  from  the  start  they  started  shouting  `where's  the  full  timer?  T 
'What's  meant  to  be  happening  here?  '  A  couple  of  us  tried  to  make  the 
point  that  we  had  to  keep  everything  in  the  factory  on  the  shop-floor. 
You  know  like  kinda  up  to  us  -  we  push  for  stuff.  But  he  [the  Full-time 
officer]  advised  against  everything.  He  didn't  want  a  strong  shop-floor. 
He  wanted  the  weak  end  of  the  committee  to  run  everything  but 
eventually  the  shop  stewards  that  were  left  ended  up  with  no  respect. 
Then  people  just  stop  caring  about  the  union  (Jim  2001). 
His  [the  Full-time  officer's]  idea  was  direct  debits  all  the  time.  They 
took  ten  minutes  off  us  and  we  weren't  happy.  We  could  have  stuck 
together  over  that  but  he  never  really  tried  to  unite  us.  Away  at  the 234 
beginning  I  said  we  could  draw  up  a  list  of  things  we  wanted  and  he 
said  that  would  come  later  but  it  never  did.  When  we  lost  stuff  it  was 
always  -  `we  can  get  stuff  back  once  the  union  is  in'.  After  a  year  in 
we  never  got  the  stuff  back.  The  ISTC's  only  achievement  has  been 
recognition,  but  for  the  union,  and  it  hasn't  made  any  real  difference 
(Panda  2001). 
When  I  see  what's  happened,  I'm  no  even  sure  now  that  they  were 
hated  by  management.  I  think  it  was  a  bluff.  Why  be  so  against  the 
ISTC  when  they  made  it  easy  for  management?  It's  a  pure  con  (Doc, 
WCCI  activist  2000). 
5.6:  Take-over  and  Restructuring 
By  2002,  five  years  after  the  WCCI  takeover  from  Grimtec  and  almost  four 
years  after  the  ISTC  set  its  sights  on  recognition  at  the  plant,  the  workforce  at 
Gourock  numbered  around  five  hundred  representing  both  core  and  agency  workers  - 
approximately  a  third  of  the  number  employed  when  this  study  began.  Although  the 
company  had  won  a  £40  million-assembly  contract  from  Tiny  Computers  for  their 
Prestwick  plant  in  late  2001  this  did  not  create  any  new  jobs  (BBC  News  Online  14th 
'August  2001)  and  their  main  customer  remained  IBM.  Before  outlining  further  key 
developments  in  the  WCCI  relationship  with  IBM,  it  is  worth  re-affirming  the  nature 
and  contours  of  that  relationship.  The  comments  below  serve  to  illustrate  its  central 
characteristics: 
We  are  very  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  nothing  there  happens  unless 
IBM  has  said  do  it.  Basically  that's  what  it  comes  down  to.  And  we 
will  do  things  like  -  IBM  wants  three  thousand  boxes  built  by 
Saturday.  Right,  so  we  pull  the  workforce  and  organise  it.  Then  they 
phone  at  four  o'clock  on  Friday  afternoon  and  say  `cancel  that  we 
don't  want  it'.  So  we  have  to  apologise  to  the  workforce,  bearing  in 
mind  they're  relying  on  that  money.  It's  very  much  a  puppet  and  the 
strings  are  being  pulled  by  IBM.  But  like  a  lot  of  these  big  companies 
they  keep  their  nice  image  and  they  use  companies  like  ours  to  do  the 
dirty  work.  All  IBM  care  about  is  getting  boxes  built  and  they  don't 
care  how  he  [the  Managing  Director]  runs  it.  He  could  chain  the 
workers  to  the  benches  as  far  as  IBM  is  concerned.  They  don't  care 
how  we  do  it.  It's  `just  do  it  and  get  it  at  that  price'.  So  they  keep  their 
lovely  image  as  great  employers.  It's  like  Marks  and  Spencer  who 
have  kids  of  twelve  knitting  jumpers  in  some  back-water.  It  is  very, 
very  much  like  that  (Human  Resources  Officer  2001). 
However,  even  with  this  level  of  flexibility,  IBM  still  sought  to  further  develop  what  I 
would  term  its  `tight  grip,  loose  accountability'  strategy.  In  January  2002,  IBM 
announced  that  the  contract  WCCI  had  with  them  was  to  be  outsourced  to  US  based 235 
Sanmina-SCI.  WCCI  would  still  undertake  the  work  (alongside  eighty  former  IBM 
core  workers  who  were  transferred  to  Sanmina)  on  IBM  servers,  but  for  Sanmina 
rather  than  IBM. 
The  first  reverberations  of  this  were  felt  by  WCCI  workers  when  they  were 
forced  to  take  two  days  designated  holidays  from  their  annual  entitlement  in  February 
2002  in  order  to  facilitate  an  audit  for  the  Sanmina-SCI  transfer.  Whilst  workers 
threatened  a  `lock  out'  where  they  would  turn  up  and  not  be  allowed  into  the  plant,  the 
ISTC's  divisional  organiser  made  clear  that  the  preferred  option  would  be  to  "get 
some  compromise"  (Greenock  Telegraph  12th  February  2002).  The  company  "didn't 
think  people  should  be  paid  for  sitting  at  home.  Holidays  are  available  and  we  want 
them  to  use  them"  (General  Manager  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  12th  February 
2002).  Moreover,  under  recognition,  the  company  had  the  `right'  to  force  workers  to 
do  this.  The  full  implications  of  the  introduction  of  Sanmina  into  IBM's  supply  chain 
were  not  to  be  realised  until  months  later  however.  In  the  meantime  the  "job  swap" 
was  given  the  full  backing  of  local  politicians  who  saw  this  as  a  way  of  safeguarding 
work  for  Inverclyde  (Greenock  Telegraph  15th  January  2002). 
In  August  2002,  the  Laird  Group  announced  the  sale  of  West  Coast  Computer 
Industries  to  its  smaller  Scottish  rival,  Simlcar  International  for  £30  million.  For  the 
WCCI  Managing  Director,  who  was  to  continue  as  the  Chief  Executive,  the  decision 
was  needed  to  ensure  "survival  and  getting  the  business  positioned  to  move  forward" 
(quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  9t'  August  2002)  although  Simclar's  Managing 
Director  could  not  rule  out  job  cuts  in  the  WCCI  Scottish  workforce,  which  now 
numbered  only  thirteen  hundred  overall  (The  Herald  9th  August  2002).  As  with  earlier 
corporate  restructuring,  this  added  to  the  generalised  feeling  of  insecurity  that  had 
become  the  norm  at  Gourock  and  this  was  exacerbated  by  rumours  that  IBM  were  to 
switch  production  from  Greenock  to  non-UK  'locations  (Greenock  Telegraph  9th 
August  2002). 
At  the  same  time,  politicians  were  apparently  concerned  about  Inverclyde's 
dependence  on  electronics,  serving  to  create  the  situation  of  "a  large  number  of  people 
employed  under  temporary  and  short-term  contracts"  (Cairns  quoted  in  the  Greenock 
Telegraph  28th  October  2002).  However,  as  had  become  the  norm,  such  concerns 
were  framed  with  reference  to  the  problematic  nature  of  companies'  operation  in  the 
global  market  place: 236 
Unfortunately,  the  global  economy  moves  at  such  a  pace  that  it  is  often 
difficult  for  companies  to  offer  permanent  jobs  to  their  employees. 
This  obviously  causes  insecurity  for  people  and  while  these  days 
nobody  can  guarantee  a  job  for  life,  it  is  important  that  workers  get 
help  so  that  they  are  able  to  minimise  any  damaing  gaps  in  their 
career  (Cairns  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  28'  October  2002). 
This  is  clearly  in  line  with  the  New  Labour  position  that  I  outlined  earlier. 
Unemployment  is  reconceptualised  as  "career  gaps",  "help"  is  premised  on  New 
Labour's  ideological  commitment  to  the  development  of  human  capital.  In  addition, 
the  form  this  help  takes  is  characteristically  vague,  more  so  in  this  case,  as  the 
Minister  for  Work  at  the  time,  Nick  Brown,  felt  the  sort  of  assistance  generally 
provided  would  be  seriously  limited  because  the  local  labour  market  was: 
Slightly  anomalous  because  of  the  impact  and  prevalence  of  short-term 
contracts.  I  am  not  sure  how  much  the  employment  service  and 
Jobcentre  plus  can  do  to  deal  with  the  core  problem  -  the  short-term 
nature  of  the  contracts  themselves  (quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph 
28th  October  2002). 
Recognising  these  difficulties  is  important  since,  in  the  context  of  wider  problems  in 
the  area,  it  presents  clear  and  significant  challenges  to  the  social  exclusion/economic 
efficiency  model  that  New  Labour  has  sought  to  develop. 
There  are  three  key  problems  the  government's  conceptualisation  and  analysis 
of  exclusion  in  relation  to  efficiency,  that  will  be  discussed  more  fully  later.  The  first 
is  that  evidence  from  WCCI  suggests  work  is  not  the  panacea  for  the  ills  that  blight 
many  working  class  communities,  despite  the  unwavering  faith  that  New  Labour  has 
in  this  premise.  It  is  worth  re-iterating  that  the  conviction  that  work,  any  work,  is 
central  to  Third  Way  `renewal'  of  the  UK.  It  has  been  the  cornerstone  of  the  political 
development  of  New  Labour  and  is  embodied  policy  terms: 
There  is  a  clear  road  map  to  our  destination...  The  reason  for  the 
changes  we  are  making  is  not  for  their  own  sake  but  because  they  are 
the  means  to  the  fairer  society  where  aspirations  and  opportunity  are 
open  to  all,  which  we  believe  in...  It  means  an  economy  with  a  new 
job  if  your  old  one  goes  ...  It  means  that  decent  hard  working  people 
who  play  by  the  rules,  don't  see  others  who  refuse  to,  gain  by  it  (Blair 
quoted  in  The  Guardian  12th  March  2002). 
What  New  Labour  has  tried  to  overcome  in  such  rhetoric  is  the  persistence  of  `old' 
divisions  that,  I  would  argue,  its  attempts  at  synthesis  actually  exacerbate.  The 
evidence  from  WCCI  demonstrates  how  in  many  cases  the  opportunity  to  labour 237 
means  just  that  and  little  else.  New  Labour's  characteristic  attempts  to  exaggerate 
what  are  represented  as  novel  and  transformative  trends,  and  to  underplay  key 
continuities,  are  put  in  sharp  relief  by  the  WCCI  evidence.  Insecurity,  low  pay  and 
harsh  management  regimes  are  a  continuing  feature  of  the  New  Labour/'new' 
Scotland  milieu.  Moreover,  these  combine  in  workers'  experience  to  inculcate  a  sense 
that  they  are  only  `one  wage  packet  away'  from  the  exclusion  faced  by  their 
unemployed,  excluded  neighbours.  The  development  of  aspirations  is  stunted  rather 
than  encouraged  through  work,  and  their  treatment  at  the  hands  of  management  mean 
they  can  experience  the  difficulties  normally  associated  with  exclusion.  Hence 
increasingly,  in-work  exclusion  is  a  feature  of  contemporary  experience  unrecognised 
by  New  Labour.  Nor  does  employment  legislation  overcome  this.  Indeed,  the  overall 
ideological  premises  of  New  Labour,  which  I  have  outlined  throughout,  facilitate  the 
development  of  the  kind  of  workplace  culture  described  above.  This  is  far  removed 
from  the  Fairness  rhetoric  or  that  of  growing  the  Scottish  economy  for  the  `common 
good'.  Yet  it  is  not,  however,  an  aberration  to  New  Labour,  for  example,  in  the 
context  of  appeals  to  the  entrepreneurial  discourse  that  emerged  in  its  representation 
of  the  central  features  of  the  `new'  Scotland.  In  this  sense,  the  Managing  Director  of  a 
company  like  WCCI  is  the  very  epitome  of  those  the  government  sought  to  engage 
and  enable. 
The  second  problem,  intrinsically  linked  to  the  first,  is  that  if  work  takes  on 
the  role  of  universal  cure  then  those  that  `provide'  work  must  be  granted  the  full 
flexibility  and  freedom  to  operate,  and  politicians,  in  order  to  retain  their  `favour', 
must  remain  silent  on  all  but  the  very  worst  excesses  of  abuse.  Often,  particularly  in 
places  like  Inverclyde,  in  which  there  is  an  over-reliance  on  one  industry  where 
responses  to  global  restructuring  have  been  matched  by  the  hardening  of  its  `flexible 
edge',  this  is  manifest  in  unquestioning  loyalty  to  companies.  Moreover,  and  equally 
as  damaging  to  workers,  the  gratitude  for  the  existence  of  work  shown  to  companies 
by  local  politicians  forms  a  crucial  element  of  the  myriad  of  forces  that  act  against 
both  the  subjective  and  objective  interests  of  workers. 
The  third  difficulty  is  again  linked  to  those  above,  and  is  clearly  not  unique  to 
circumstances  in  Inverclyde  or  to  electronics,  though  in  the  current  circumstances 
both  are  key  exemplars  of  it.  It  is  also  demonstrated  in  the  comments  of  the  Minister 
of  Work  highlighted  above.  Plainly,  if  difficulties  are  recognised  then  the  next  stage  is 
finding  a  solution  to  them.  This  means  ascertaining  both  who  is  responsible  for  them 238 
and  reasonably  what  can  be  done  to  resolve  them.  But  New  Labour's  ideological 
commitment  to  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership,  that  underpins  its  overall 
Third  Way  goal  of  synthesising  `old'  antagonisms,  does  not  effectively  allow  for  this. 
The  case  of  WCCI  demonstrates  what  such  commitments  mean  in  reality.  The 
message  to  employers  is  thus:  do  what  you  have  to,  to  remain  competitive,  be  as 
flexible  as  you  have  to  and  get  workers  `on  side'  in  relation  to  company  goals  by  any 
means  necessary  under  the  auspices  of  an  ever-vague  partnership  culture  that  can,  and 
does,  as  WCCI  demonstrates,  result  not  in  a  softening  of  an  antagonistic  edge,  as  New 
Labour  would  have  it,  but  in  a  hardening  of  it.  Furthermore  unions  that  offer  tactic 
support  for  this  position,  like  the  ISTC,  find  themselves  powerless  at  one  level  to 
resist  it  effectively  in  order  to  secure  real  gains  for  their  members,  as  the  `penultimate' 
juncture  in  the  story  of  West  Coast  Computer  Industries  serves  to  illustrate. 
Towards  the  end  of  2002,  the  workers  at  WCCI  faced  a  situation  that 
demonstrated  the  extent  to  which  problems  continued  at  the  factory,  and  sought 
redress  over  low  pay  that  had  remained  a  feature  despite  the  `deal'  of  December  1999. 
In  the  intervening  years  no  further  pay  rise  had  been  awarded,  the  around  twenty 
pence  an  hour  extra  that  they  had  been  granted  then  represented  their  last  rise.  With 
core  workers  on  £5.48  an  hour  and  agency  workers  on  £4.50  per  hour,  the  company 
went  on  the  offensive  and  sought  to  introduce  a  system  of  `annualised'  hours  whereby 
crucial  overtime  payments  were  to  be  cut.  In  production  `down-time'  workers  would 
be  on  short  time  and  in  busy  periods  they  could  work  up  to  seven  days  a  week  for 
normal  pay.  In  the  busiest  periods  around  the  year  end  (December  -  January)  normal 
working  could  be  "up  to  sixty  or  seventy  hours  a  week"  (WCCI  worker  2002).  The 
rejection  of  the  union's  claim  for  a  pay  rise  of  6%  and  the  subsequent  rejection  of  the 
company's  offer  of  2%  precipitated  the  first  `official'  strike  at  WCCI  since 
recognition.  The  mood  of  the  workers  was  summed  up  simply:  "enough  is  enough" 
(Greenock  Telegraph  5th  November  2002).  The  four  day  strike  planned  over  two 
shifts  was  to  hit  the  company  hard  over  their  busiest  time  and  the  pickets  stood  firm. 
Three  hundred  workers  in  total  were  involved,  but  this  highlighted  the  problematic  of 
a  dual  workforce  that  had  not  been  fully,  nor  openly  tested.  The  obvious  risks  of 
taking  strike  action  were  not  uniformly  borne  across  the  workforce,  nor  was 
protection  over  strike  action  universally  available.  This  was  manifest  in  the  fact  that 
many  agency  workers  crossed  picket  lines,  though  some  looked  despondent  on  the 
buses  that  took  workers  past  the  pickets,  despite  the  presence  of  striking  fire-fighters 
who  attempted  to  persuade  them  otherwise.  These  workers  risked  not  just  four  days 239 
pay  but  their  livelihoods.  Flexible  employment,  however  long  term,  left  them  little 
choice  in  the  absence  of  union  membership  or  backing.  Here  the  full  effect  of  WCCI 
management's  development  of  a  segregated  workforce  over  many  years,  and  the 
damage  of  the  ISTC  following  their  lead  in  organisational  practice  to  a  great  extent, 
was  illustrated  in  sharp  relief.  Moreover,  the  ratio  of  core  to  agency  workers  had  been 
drastically  reduced  through  continuous  `replacement'  policies  and  restructuring,  and 
the  number  of  strikers  and  the  number  of  those  continuing  to  work  was  almost 
equivalent.  The  circumstances  of  the  strike,  the  problematic  intensification  of 
causalisation,  and  the  overall  reduction  in  the  number  employed  at  WCCI  over  the 
five  year  period,  represent  the  sharpest  indication  of  the  limited  impact  that  the  ISTC 
and  recognition  had  made. 
As  in  1999,  the  outcome  of  this  strike,  which  was  halted  in  December  2002, 
was  more  favourable  to  the  company  than  the  workers.  Indeed,  what  workers  gained 
was  similar  to  what  was  gained  in  1999:  a  2%  increase,  an  `agreement'  on  sickness 
and  holiday  pay43  and  a  lump  sum  (for  core  workers  only)  of  £200  (Greenock 
Telegraph  21s`  December  2002).  Four  years  after  the  "£5.25  strike"  that  heralded  the 
beginning  of  the  openly  militant  period  that  ended  in  recognition  at  the  plant,  workers 
were  forced  to  settle  a  key  dispute  against  the  injustice  of  low  pay,  on  the  basis  of 
earning  around  thirty  pence  an  hour  more  after  years  of  struggle.  The  decision  to  call 
off  the  strike  had  not  been  an  easy  one,  but  other  factors  had  begun  to  mitigate  against 
its  continuation:  work  was  being  outsourced  by  Sanmina  to  Eastern  Europe  and  it  was 
being  done  cheaper  than  at  WCCI  (Greenock  Telegraph  21St  December  2002). 
Moreover  agency  workers  in  the  factory  during  the  strike  and  subsequently  over  an 
extended  `holiday'  period  due  to  end  of  the  8th  of  January  2003  reported  that  there  had 
been  something  close  to  "stockpiling  and  the  packaging  of  important  equipment" 
(WCCI  agency  worker  February  2003). 
5.7:  Closure  and  the  Saviour  of  Spango44 
What  happened  next  is  both  the  final  element  of  the  story  of  WCCI  and  the 
emergence  of  the  realisation  of  a  new  one.  It  represents  how  workers  at  WCCI  were 
failed  by  management,  by  the  ISTC,  and  by  local  politicians  all  too  comfortable  in 
their  impotence  in  the  face  of  `sacred'  employers,  as  they  try  to  negotiate  the  vagaries 
43  It  has  always  been  difficult  to  judge  gains  made  at  WCCI  since  such  gains  were  often  connected  to 
rights  that  were  already  legally  enshrined.  It  is  not  know  what  was  achieved  here  regarding  holiday  pay 
but  the  right  to  four  weeks  paid  leave  is  contained  in  the  Working  Time  Regulations  1998  (DTI  1998c). 
Nothing  was  gained  in  this  area  for  the  agency  workers. 
44  Spango  Valley  is  the  location  of  the  IBM  plant. 240 
of  the  market.  However  it  also  signifies  the  development  of  a  new  configuration  of 
capitalist  production,  as  the  low-value  end  of  electronics  and  responsibility  for  the 
workers  unfortunate  enough  to  make  their  living  there,  are  hived  off  from  the  core 
employer  at  the  hub  of  the  entire  operation  of  electronics  production.  Before  outlining 
events  and  examining  this  in  more  detail,  it  is  worth  illustrating  WCCI  workers 
understanding  of  this: 
One  multinational  makes  a  decision  and  conspires  with  a  contractor 
who  whispers  in  the  ear  of  another  contractor  and  we  lose  our  jobs. 
Electronics  companies  are  getting  rid  of  their  core  workforce  and 
handing  out  jobs  to  contractors.  The  contractors  use  casual  labour  on  a 
minimum  wage  -  who  get  called  in  for  a  few  hours  and  then  send  them 
home  as  soon  as  the  pace  slackens.  You  read  about  the  docks  in  the 
past,  with  people  scrabbling  for  a  job  for  a  day.  I  sometimes  wonder 
how  far  we've  come. 
(Linzi  and  Davey,  WCCI  workers  quoted  in  Socialist  Worker  18th 
January  2003). 
On  Monday  6`h  of  January  2003,  two  days  before  its  workers'  return  after  the 
festive  break,  West  Coast  Computer  Industries  sent  couriers  to  their  homes  delivering 
letters  telling  them  that  the  factory  would  not  re-open.  Five  hundred  workers  were 
sacked.  For  many  of  them,  the  first  they  knew  about  the  factory's  closure  was  when 
asked  about  it  by  news  crews  that  had  descended  on  Inverclyde.  The  company  met 
with  the  union  at  10am,  made  the  closure  announcement  at  lunchtime  and  threw  a 
security  fence  around  the  factory  preventing  workers  from  either  collecting  their 
belongings  or  bidding  farewell  to  colleagues  of  longstanding.  Crucially,  this  also 
served  to  circumvent  the  possibility  of  workers  initiating  a  fight-back  from  within  the 
plant  and  thwarted  the  development  of  a  collective  response. 
The  reasons  for  the  closure  that  had  been  revealed  to  the  union  seemed  straight 
forward.  According  to  the  ISTC  regional  organiser  at  the  mass  meeting  convened  after 
the  closure  announcement,  Sanmina-SCI  had  reduced  its  production  requirements  by 
80%  because  WCCI  could  not  meet  a  new  set  of  conditions  that  its  customer 
demanded.  Under  the  new  arrangements  WCCI  were  no  longer  to  be  paid  a  separate 
contractor  fee  and  none  of  the  cost  of  overtime  payments  were  to  be  borne  by  the 
customer.  All  fixed  costs  (building  and  equipment  maintenance,  for  example)  became 241 
the  full  responsibility  of  the  supplier,  WCCI.  45  The  General  Manager  apparently  told 
the  union: 
The  company  could  no  longer  continue  production  at  Gourock  under 
these  conditions  and  pay  the  legal  minimum  wage"  (ISTC  organiser 
2003). 
Yet  the  company  placed  a  different  `spin'  on  their  decision  to  close  the  factory  to  the 
media: 
The  electronics  industry  in  Scotland  continues  to  face  serious  global 
competition  and  our  Gourock  facility  has  become  un-competitive  in 
the  face  of  lower  cost  economies  in  Eastern  Europe  and  elsewhere 
(The  Scotsman  7`h  January  2003). 
The  remaining  20%  of  the  Sanmina  work  was  moved  to  WCCI's  Prestwick  facility 
which  operated  with  almost  exclusively  agency  labour  and  where  "some"  Gourock 
workers  "might"  be  given  jobs.  There,  the  company  had  developed  a  "more 
competitive  business  model"  which  would  allow  `box  build'  to  continue  in  Scotland 
(WCCI  spokesman  quoted  in  Greenock  Telegraph,  7`h  January  2003).  In  the 
meantime,  the  Gourock  core  workers  were  given  ninety  days  notice  and  told  they 
would  either  receive  wages  until  April  2003  or  they  could  apply  for  a  lump-sum  in 
lieu  and  statutory  redundancy  pay.  Agency  workers  were  simply  sacked.  There  was 
no  consultation  or  negotiation,  though  the  union  indicated  that  they  "would  be 
prepared  to  talk  about  wage  scales  if  costs  were  too  high"  (ISTC  regional  organiser 
quoted  in  Greenock  Telegraph  8th  January  2003). 
Within  twenty-four  hours  local  and  national  attention  quickly  shifted  as  IBM 
were  about  to  make  a  major  announcement  about  the  future  of  production  at  their 
Spango  Valley  plant  in  nearby  Greenock.  In  an  `added  twist'  to  the  WCCI  story,  on 
Tuesday  the  7`h  of  January  2003,  IBM  announced  that  Sanmina-SCI  were  to  take-over 
their  manufacturing  operation  as  part  of  a  wide  reaching  `outsourcing'  deal  worth  $3.6 
billion  over  three  years  (Sanmina-SCI  2003).  Six  hundred  and  sixty  `core'  IBM 
Greenock  workers  were  transferred  to  Sanmina  and  a  further  seven  hundred  `agency' 
and  temporary  workers  were  under  threat.  The  restructuring  meant  jobs  were  only 
`guaranteed'  for  a  maximum  of  three  years46.  It  also  brought  an  end  to  the  days  where: 
"to  get  a  job  in  IBM  in  the  1970's  was  to  be  sure  of  three  things,  a  higher  salary  than 
as  Under  the  IBM  contract  the  customer  helped  finance  the  running  of  WCCI  plants.  46  The  strength  of  this  apparent  guarantee  is  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 242 
anyone  else's,  the  best  pension  around  and  a  job  for  life"  ("longstanding"  IBM  worker 
quoted  in  The  Observer  12th  January  2003).  There  was,  reportedly,  widespread  relief 
that  the  work  was  to  remain  at  Spango,  not  least  from  local  politicians  who  praised  the 
`historic'  and  "potentially  very  exciting"  deal  (Cairns  quoted  in  Greenock  Telegraph 
8th  January  2003).  "The  three  year  deal"  Cairns  claimed  "is  an  eternity  in  the 
electronics  industry".  However,  the  decision  fuelled  resentment  among  the  WCCI 
workers  who  believed  that  both  IBM  and  Sanmina  had  `colluded'  to  orchestrate  their 
own  demise. 
The  manner  of  the  `saving'  of  the  jobs  at  Spango  Valley,  and  the  praise  of 
both  Sanmina  and  IBM  by  the  local  MP  and  MSP,  in  particular,  drew  vociferous 
criticism  at  a  mass  meeting  of  hundreds  of  WCCI  workers,  four  days  after  the  closure 
announcement.  As  one  worker  put  it: 
How  can  Sanmina  get  away  with  taking  on  six  hundred  and  fifty 
people  and  bagging  us  in  the  same  week  and  how  come  McNeil  and 
Cairns  [the  MSP  and  MP]  are  congratulating  them?  (WCCI  worker 
2003). 
With  the  workers  demanding  `answers'  to  their  questions,  the  mood  at  the  meeting 
was  angry.  Not  all  of  that  anger  was  directed  at  the  companies  involved  and  people 
took  the  opportunity  to  criticise  the  ISTC.  This  became  more  explicit  when  it  became 
obvious  that  there  would  be  little  opportunity  to  discuss  the  possibility  of  collective 
action  against  the  closure.  Indeed,  this  meeting  was  not  about: 
The  past  but  about  the  future.  What  happens  now  is  why  we're  here. 
We  need  to  focus.  We  can't  be  sidetracked  by  what's  been  said  in  the 
press  etc.  You  need  to  be  thinking  about  what  the  ISTC  can  do  for  us. 
Shouting  won't  change  anything  (ISTC  regional  organiser  2003). 
Thus,  there  was  no  strategy  for  resistance  put  forward  by  the  ISTC.  The  purpose  of 
the  meeting  was  to  introduce  workers  to  representatives  from  internal  and  external 
agencies  that  could  advise  on  retraining  and  to  outline  some  of  the  mechanisms  to  be 
put  in  place  to  assist  with  job  seeking.  The  "plain  fact"  was  that  the  plant  had  closed 
and  there  would  be  "no  reversal"  on  this  by  the  company,  what  was  needed  now  was 
to  "move  on"  (ibid). 
The  difference  between  this  meeting  and  those  of  1998  when  the  ISTC  first 
openly  set  its  recognition  sights  on  WCCI  Gourock,  was  stark.  The  `grassroots, 
membership  based,  community'  union  did  not  offer  any  effective  leadership  over  the 243 
closure.  Nor  had  their  willingness  to  `play  the  game'  had  any  positive  effects  on  the 
workers  long-term  security.  No  effective  strategy  for  survival,  either  of  the  plant  itself 
or  of  the  union  locally,  had  ever  been  developed.  Workplace  organisation  had  been  at 
its  strongest  during  the  most  militant  months  and  in  the  early  post-recognition  period. 
With  the  departure  of  the  militants,  no  effective  counter  strategy  had  been  put  in 
place.  The  union's  refusal  to  countenance  any  fight-back  by  the  workers,  even  in  the 
shape  of  a  demonstration  or  a  lobby,  demonstrated  how  readily  officials  `gave  up' 
when  faced  with  what  they  saw  as  an  insurmountable  hurdle.  That  this  hurdle  is 
linked,  particularly,  to  the  relationship  between  unions  and  Labour  in  power,  is  not 
recognised  openly.  However,  that  they  were  able  to  do  this  also  demonstrates  how, 
without  the  development  of  shop-floor  organisation  and  rank  and  file  leaders,  the 
`will'  of  the  bureaucracy  can  thwart  the  impulses  of  resistance  and  the  members' 
ability  to  mount  a  collective  challenge. 
Darlington's  conclusions  (2002)  regarding  the  centrality  of  a  layer  of 
workplace  militants,  who  are  willing  and  able  to  provide  leadership  in  the  face  of 
management  attacks,  are  clearly  relevant  in  this  context.  Evidently,  as  Darlington 
suggests,  workers  are  not  passive  recipients  of  management  dogma  nor  of  union 
conciliatory  approach  in  the  face  of  it.  The  processes  at  WCCI,  narrated  above,  have 
demonstrated  the  role  of  human  agency,  especially  in  the  early  period  of  activity.  At 
the  plant,  initially  at  least,  there  was  a  group  politically-minded  activists  well- 
prepared  to  argue  with  other  workers  about  wider  questions  regarding  the  general 
organisation  of  production  and  of  society.  However,  they  were  relatively  few  in 
number  and  their  level  of  political  `immersion'  was  not  deep  enough  to  consolidate 
the  general  militant  `sentiment'  of  a  large  number  of  workers.  Though  these  activists 
were  significant  recruiters  for  the  ISTC,  especially  in  1998,  and  the  workers  did  look 
to  them  for  leadership,  the  group  never  reached  the  level  of  `critical  mass'  (Kelly 
1998)  that  would  have  been  required  to  both  help  develop  an  effective  rank-and-file, 
and  to  counter  the  ISTC's  recognition-and-respectability-at-all-costs  approach.  Nor 
could  the  militants  hold  onto  a  further,  less  politically  astute  group  around  them,  lured 
by  the  union's  accommodative  approach  after  recognition  was  won.  Weaknesses  were 
not  simply  political  but  organisational,  and,  it  must  be  said,  linked  to  the 
intensification  of  the  labour  process  ('upping  the  pulse'). 
The  open  struggles  with  management  which,  as  Darlington  notes  (2002:  101), 
help  such  activists  learn  "distinct  lessons"  and  allow  them  to  develop  "a  more 244 
consistent,  penetrating  and  critical  analysis  of  class  relations  than  existed  generally  in 
the  factory",  were  heavily  mediated  by  the  ISTC's  Full-time  officer.  This  again 
impeded  progress  and  helped  sap  self-activity.  Frustration  at  this,  and  management's 
seemingly  largely  unchecked  offensives,  meant  the  all-too-soon,  withdrawal  from 
meaningful  activism  by  the  core  militants.  This  left  the  whole  workforce  vulnerable, 
as  the  plant's  closure  demonstrates.  One  crucial  question  posed  by  the  lack  of  militant 
development  at  WCCI  concerns  how  to  nurture  it  in  the  context  of  a  workforce  who 
experience  exploitation  daily,  yet  lack  a  clear  conceptualisation  of  it.  Moreover, 
unsurprisingly,  given  the  lack  of  militant  tradition  in  the  electronics  industry,  there 
was  a  distinct  lack  of  active  political  affiliation  although  some  of  the  activists  were 
clearly  influenced  by  the  Socialist  Workers  Party,  either  through  membership  or 
through  experience  of  working  alongside  local  SWP  members  in  relations  to  the 
factory's  key  issues. 
In  the  absence  of  strong  political  roots  within  WCCI,  the  structural  constraints 
of  management  offensive,  the  pace  of  work  and  long-hours  culture,  and  the  ISTC's 
approach  were  felt  all-the-more  keenly,  despite  the  seeds  of  militancy  sown  in  early 
1998  and  its  continuing  impulses  until  closure.  It  is  important  to  recognise  that  a 
group  of  militant  left-wing  activists  seeking  to  build  an  oppositional  and  effective 
workplace  unionism,  however  committed,  may  be  operating  in  a  context  removed 
from  a  `history'  of  successful  resistance  and  organisational  resilience.  Some 
consideration  of  effectively  `organising  the  un-organised'  is  needed.  Moreover,  more 
than  two  decades  of  the  balance  of  class  forces  being  tipped  in  favour  of  capital  not 
only  creates  the  need  to  re-build  and  re-invigorate,  it  also  means  `starting  from 
scratch'  in  many  workplaces  and  industries.  In  the  latter  context,  the  issue  of  not 
becoming  an  adjunct  of  a  well-organised  union  bureaucracy  is  paramount,  as  the 
impulse  to  do  so  can  be  greater  due  to  a  lack  of  experience  and,  it  should  be  noted, 
due  to  the  spirit  of  partnership  being  encouraged. 245 
CHAPTER  SIX:  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  `NEW'  WORLD  OF 
WORK 
6.1:  New  Labour  in  Inverclyde 
This  set  of  chapters  began  with  a  discussion  of  the  Inverclyde  context  in  which 
workers  at  WCCI  and  their  employers  operate.  It  is  important  to  return  to  this  context 
in  2003,  and  note  briefly  some  local  developments  that  have  continuing  relevance  for 
the  `story'  of  WCCI,  before  summing  up  the  key  features  I  want  to  draw  out  from  the 
WCCI  study. 
As  the  WCCI  workers  were  coming  to  term  with  their  fate,  and  the  six 
hundred  and  fifty  IBM  workers  were  transferring  to  Sanmina-SCI,  the  knock  on 
effects  of  the  closure,  and  of  the  transfer,  were  beginning  to  reverberate  around 
Inverclyde.  Finns  that  were  part  of  IBM's  local  supply  chain,  and  out-with  it,  suffered 
job  losses.  In  total,  in  January  and  February  2003  Inverclyde  lost  more  than  two 
thousand  jobs  in  electronics  related  companies.  This  has  clear  implications  for  both 
WCCI  workers,  in  terms  of  gaining  work  in  a  drastically  contracted  labour  market, 
and  other  workers  in  the  sector.  There  are  also  implications  for  the  ISTC,  who  had 
been  gaining  a  foothold  in  some  of  these  companies  during  their  period  of  recruitment 
and  organisation  at  WCCI.  Forced  retreat  from  the  area  is  likely  to  result  in  a  revision 
of  Division  One  strategy,  as  it  will  be  difficult  for  the  ISTC  to  make  up  the  ground 
(and  membership)  lost  as  a  result  of  the  WCCI  closure. 
Given  the  evidence  above  regarding  the  accommodating  attitude  of  local 
politicians  towards  employers  in  the  area,  the  necessity  of  bringing  jobs  to  Inverclyde 
means  an  intensification  of  their  gratitude  to  them.  The  praise  heaped  on  Sanmina  and 
on  IBM  for  not  sacking  all  of  its  three  thousand  workers,  only  one  day  after  the 
company  was  implicated  so  explicitly  in  the  closure  of  WCCI,  were  early  examples  of 
this.  There  is  little  evidence  of  the  development  of  a  strategy  to  encourage  large-scale 
investment  to  Inverclyde  to  re-invigorate  the  local  economy.  `The  export  capital  of 
Scotland',  so  heavily  dependent  on  electronics,  is  a  title  that  the  area  cannot  now 
sustain.  Wider  developments  have  compounded  local  difficulties  as  between 
December  2000  and  March  2002,10%  of  Scotland's  manufacturing  jobs  were  lost 246 
(TUC  2002d).  A  more  recent  shift  towards  call  centre  employment,  some  of  which  is 
based  at  IBM,  now  faces  competition  from  cheaper  workers  in  the  developing  world 
and  Eastern  Europe,  suggesting  that  earlier  suggestions  of  Inverclyde  becoming  a 
`call-centre  economy'  in  the  long-term  may  be  premature  and  ignorant  of  the  vagaries 
of  that  particular  labour  market. 
Inverclyde's  experience  of  New  Labour's  `modernisation'  and  `reform'  of  the 
public  sector  are  also  beginning  to  have  an  effect  on  the  local  labour  market. 
Restructuring,  and  the  downgrading  of  health  services,  in  particular  at  the  large 
general  hospital,  Inverclyde  Royal,  will  impact  on  the  numbers  employed  there  in  the 
long-term.  A  programme  of  school  closure  and  the  introduction  of  a  PPP  for  the  entire 
education  system,  as  well  as  Inverclyde  Council's  plans  to  impose  millions  of  pounds 
worth  of  cuts  announced  in  early  2004,  will  affect  both  public  sector  workers  and  the 
local  labour  market  generally. 
Overall,  therefore,  workers  in  Inverclyde  have  borne  the  brunt  of  the 
contemporary  restructuring  of  the  area's  dominant  industry  and  face  uncertainty  due 
to  changes  that  will  affect  other  sectors  employing  there.  This  is  compounded  by  the 
continuance  of  low  pay  in  the  area,  where  workers  are  now  the  lowest  paid  in  the 
country  at  more  than  £100  per  week  less  than  the  national  average  (Greenock 
Telegraph  17`h  February  2003).  These  figures  suggest  that  average  wages  in 
Inverclyde  have  increased  by  only  £30  per  week  since  1997,  from  £323.40  in  1997  to 
£352.75  in  2001/2  (Inverclyde  Economic  Development  Department  1998:  6; 
Greenock  Telegraph  19th  September). 
The  effects  of  these  problems  have  been  illustrated  in  sharp  relief  through  the 
evidence  garnered  from  experience  at  WCCI  as  outlined  by  some  of  the  workers,  and 
by  an  analysis  of  developments  at  the  plant,  and  within  the  company.  Moreover,  since 
its  closure  in  2003,  further  developments  indicate  the  extent  to  which  the  situation  is 
worsening,  in  electronics,  in  particular.  In  July  and  August  2003  "hundreds  of 
workers,  many  of  whom  had  worked  for  IBM  contractors  for  six  or  seven  years,  had 
their  jobs  axed"  (Greenock  Telegraph  14th  October  2003).  According  to  the  ISTC, 
these  job  losses  brought  the  total  in  seven  months  to  "almost  one  thousand"  (ISTC 
divisional  organiser  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  29th  August  2003).  Hewlett 
Packard  (formerly  Compaq)  in  Erskine  also  announced  the  transfer  of  two  hundred 
and  sixty  `core'  workers  to  an  employment  agency.  In  addition,  less  than  one  year 
after  the  `historic  deal'  that  outsourced  IBM  production  to  Sanmina-SCI,  the  latter 247 
announced  that  it  sought  volunteers  for  redundancy  numbering  around  half  of  the 
workforce  that  it  had  taken  over  as  part  of  the  transfer  deal  (Greenock  Telegraph  12th 
January  2004).  Given  such  trends,  WCCI  has  helped  demonstrate  the  limited  impact 
of  New  Labour's  agenda  in  the  area  of  employment  `rights'  and  the  limitations  that 
are  experienced  as  a  result  New  Labour's  overall  orientation. 
One  important  observation  is  just  how  little  devolution  has  had  a  positive 
impact.  As  noted  previously,  a  combination  of  the  sort  of  vision  outlined  for  the 
Scottish  Parliament  by  New  Labour,  and  the  reservation  of  key  powers  to 
Westminster,  serves  to  compound  Inverclyde's  difficulties.  Neither  the  Westminster 
nor  the  Holyrood  Parliaments  have  developed  effective  strategies  to  combat  the 
problems  experienced  in  places  like  Inverclyde.  The  characteristically  New  Labour 
responses  to  them  below  help  demonstrate  this: 
The  electronics  industry  has  been  a  great  success  story.  It  is  a  very 
competitive,  global  economy  in  which  change  is  happening  all  the 
time.  The  best  things  that  governments  can  do  is  to  ensure  overall 
economic  stability  and  to  equip  people  with  the  skills  so  that  they  are 
well-positioned  to  get  another  job  if  they  lose  one...  An  important 
aspect  of  flexibility  here  in  the  UK]  is  that  it  is  easier  for  employers  to 
take  people  on-Whatever  challenge  is  facing  individual  communities, 
you  have  to  invest  in  skills  for  the  future. 
.  .1  am  absolutely  confident 
that  Inverclyde  faces  a  bright  future  economically..  . 
There  isn't  a 
magic  wand  but  you  have  the  strengths  to  build  on  for  the  future 
(Smith  quoted  in  the  Greenock  Telegraph  27`h  November  20031). 
This  is  deeply  disappointing  news  ... 
I  will  be  asking  questions  in 
Parliament,  not  only  about  the  support  which  will  be  given  to  the 
workers  affected  by  this  announcement,  but  about  how  we  are  going  to 
reform  our  economy  and  break  the  cycle  of  constantly  lifting  and 
laying  workers.  I  will  make  representations  to  Enterprise  Minister,  Jim 
Wallace,  renewing  my  calls  for  the  necessary  steps  -  from  better 
transport  links  to  real  partnership  working  -  to  be  taken  in  areas  like 
Greenock  (McNeil  quoted  the  Greenock  Telegraph  11`''  December 
2003,  emphasis  added2). 
Harrison  (1997:  222)  has  argued  that  what  he  usefully  terms  "the  dark  side  of 
flexibility"  necessitates  public  policy  aimed  at  containing  "the  tendency  toward 
greater  polarisation  of  income  and  power  based  on  whether  one  is  inside  or  outside 
the  core  jobs  in  the  hub  firms".  There  is  little  evidence  in  New  Labour's  ideology  that 
'  Andrew  Smith  is  the  Work  and  Pensions  Minister.  He  visited  Inverclyde  in  November  2003. 
2  McNeil  was  speaking  in  response  to  the  redundancy  announcement  by  Sanmina-SCI. 248 
demonstrates  any  recognition  of  this  crucial  point,  despite  the  rhetoric  of  politicians 
like  McNeil.  Moreover,  as  a  member  of  the  devolved  parliament,  he  is  not  ultimately 
accountable  for  employment.  Although  his  colleagues  at  Westminster  are  at  face 
value  at  least,  they,  in  turn,  do  not  have  responsibilities  for  the  worst  effects  of  this 
`dark  side'  of  flexibility.  The  overall  result,  in  relation  to  Inverclyde's  employment 
problems,  has  been  multi-layered,  New  Labour  rhetoric  that  amounts  to  twice  the 
amount  of  hand-wringing  and  head-shaking,  and  very  little  else.  That  New  Labour  is 
in  power  in  both  parliaments  results  in  non-antagonistic  relations  between  two 
separate,  though  indistinct,  layers  of  governance.  This  not  only  reinforces  the  grip  of 
New  Labour  `solutions'  and  its  `there  is  no  alternative'  premise,  it  also  exposes 
devolution  as  both  a  `toothless  tiger'  and  as  a  centralising  strategy.  Thus,  the 
`knowledge'  rhetoric,  so  readily  drawn  on  in  relation  to  the  `new'  Scotland,  New 
Labour's  largely  amorphous  commitments  to  `skill  development'  and  `full 
employability',  contain  little  to  effectively  counter  key  elements  of  the  reality  of  work 
in  the  era  of  New  Labour. 
Importantly,  the  story  of  WCCI  outlined  above,  acts  as  a  prism  through  which 
the  success  or  otherwise  of  other  central  tenets  of  New  Labour  ideology,  for  example, 
flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership  and  the  role  of  work,  can  be  examined  and 
assessed.  It  is  clear  from  this  evidence  that  New  Labour's  apparent  long-term  aims  are 
far  from  being  met: 
In  the  new  world  our  aspiration  must  be  full  and  fulfilling  employment 
through  work  and  training  opportunities  for  all.  And  it  must  therefore 
be  our  objective  to  abolish  not  only  our  youth  unemployment,  but 
long-term  unemployment,  with  our  eventual  aim  to  replace  redundancy 
with  the  prospect  of  new  work  through  retraining  (Brown  1993). 
Though  the  reaction  of  New  Labour  to  the  type  of  job  losses  and  transfers,  outlined 
above,  do  indicate  a  continuing  willingness  to  draw  on  this  type  of  rhetoric. 
Lastly,  the  study  of  WCCI  allows  for  a  consideration  of  some  elements  of 
contemporary  trade  unionism,  as  experienced  in  the  context  this  ideology  helps  create. 
Support  for  New  Labour  overall  demonstrably  cannot  be  separated  from  day  to  day 
union  activity,  despite  efforts  to  do  so.  Thus,  in  this  case,  the  ISTC's  overall  impact  at 
the  factory  was  severely  limited.  It's  whole  approach  was  based  on  its  ability  to  take 
advantage  of  new  legislation  and  the  possibility  of  a  new  culture  of  `mutual  gains'  and 
conciliation  at  work  emerging,  to  which  the  ISTC  were  seemingly  well-placed  to 
relate.  Yet,  at  WCCI,  the  thrust  of  New  Labour's  ideology  of  flexibility, 249 
competitiveness  and  partnership  helped  create  conditions  that  the  union  struggled  to 
counter  successfully  by  applying  this  approach. 
6.2:  Flexibility,  Inclusion  and  the  Rhetoric  of  Human  Capital 
One  of  the  key  questions  needing  to  be  effectively  addressed,  is  what  does 
flexibility  actually  mean?  Earlier  chapters  outlined  how  New  Labour  conceptualises 
flexibility  in  the  labour  market.  It  means  no  jobs  for  life,  allowing  workers  to  `up- 
skill'  as  they  try  to  negotiate  looser,  more  liberating  (from  a  New  Labour  perspective) 
employment  ties,  and  relative  freedom  from  regulation  for  employers,  ensuring 
companies  remain  competitive.  Evidence  from  WCCI  clearly  suggests  that  a 
distinction  needs  to  be  drawn  between  what  flexibility  is  represented  as  and  what  it 
actually  means  in  terms  of  experience.  Much  of  what  New  Labour  say  about 
flexibility  can  be  dispensed  with  as  rhetoric  especially  in  terms  of  its  apparently 
inherent  empowerment  of  workers.  Taylor  (2002)  for  example  argues  that  preliminary 
findings  from  the  Economic  and  Social  Research  Council's  "Working  in  Britain  in 
2000"  survey  illustrate  that  the  view  of  a  new  world  of  work  characterised  by  more 
flexible  employment  relations  is  overstated.  Indeed: 
The  most  startling  overall  conclusion  to  draw  from  the  material  is  that 
many  of  the  commonly  held  assumptions  about  today's  world  of  work 
need  to  be  seriously  questioned.  In  fact,  a  disturbingly  wide  gulf  exists 
between  the  over-familiar  rhetoric  and  hyperbole  we  hear  daily  about 
our  flexible  and  dynamic  labour  market  and  the  realities  of  workplace 
life  (Taylor  2002:  7). 
Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  from  the  WCCI  evidence  that  flexibility  and  job  insecurity 
was  a  feature  of  employment  there.  This  does  not  necessary  challenge  of  all  of 
Taylor's  premises,  but  he  does  conflate  length  of  job  tenure  and  employment  stability, 
thus  disputing  the  existence  of  the  type  of  flexibility  that  the  Government  both 
promotes  and  seemingly  maps  in  its  rhetoric.  What  the  WCCI  evidence  illustrates  is 
that  experience  there  contradicts  both  Government  versions  of  flexibility  and 
challenges,  like  Taylor's,  to  it.  I  would  suggest  that,  perhaps,  length  of  tenure  is 
indicative  of  wider  insecurity  and  instability,  hence  something  that  could  be  termed 
`negative  flexibility'  (Harrison's  `dark-side').  Moreover,  the  proliferation  of  the  use 
of  agency  labour  at  WCCI  plants  and  in  other  factories,  especially  IBM,  meant  an 
insecurity  that  workers  increasingly  associated  with  something  called  flexibility, 
however  amorphous  and  ideological  that  concept  turns  out  to  be.  That  it  has  seeped 
into  management  rhetoric,  whereby  at  places  like  WCCI  it  is  used  to  both  justify  the 250 
use  of  agency  labour  and  abdicate  responsibility  for  that  labour,  means  workers  are 
affected  by  flexibility.  Politicians,  too,  as  demonstrated  above,  seek  to  place  a  positive 
`spin'  on  flexibility  and  their  understanding  of  it  as  a  `carrot'  for  workers,  is  clearly 
far  removed  from  the  experience  of  many.  Crucially,  flexibility  is  also  used  as  a 
`stick'  to  force  workers  to  adapt  to  otherwise  disagreeable  working  conditions. 
At  WCCI  this  worked  at  multiple  levels.  For  example,  as  noted  above,  the 
existence  of  agency  labour  on  worse  terms  and  conditions  served  as  a  constant 
reminder  to  `core'  workers  of  their  own  vulnerability.  The  drive  towards  decreasing 
this  `core',  in  the  name  of  the  necessity  of  operating  flexibly  due  to  the  apparent 
pressures  that  the  electronics  faced,  kept  workers  in  fear  for  their  jobs.  Moreover,  the 
longevity  of  the  tenure  of  `temporary'  agency  workers,  despite  what  appeared  to  be 
the  charade  of  sporadic  lay-offs,  not  only  exposed  how  little  protection  these  workers 
had  from  abuse,  it  also  challenged  any  notion  that  `core'  production  workers  were  a 
necessary  cog  in  the  WCCI  wheel.  This  compounded  the  insecurity  workers  felt  as  a 
more  generalised  reaction  to  a  harsh  management  regime,  whose  operation  of 
disciplinary  and  even  sickness  procedure3  also  created  a  climate  of  fear.  Of  course,  as 
was  demonstrated  in  sharp  relief  in  early  2003,  the  dependence  of  WCCI  on  IBM 
meant  workers  in  the  former  negatively  experienced  the  drive  towards  flexibility  in 
the  latter.  Sennett  (1998:  56)  describes  the  impact  of  multi-nationals  seeking 
flexibility  in  production  across  the  globe  thus: 
... 
The  large  corporation  holds  the  shifting  corps  de  ballet  of  dependent 
firms  in  its  grip,  passing  on  dips  in  the  business  cycle  or  product  flops 
to  its  weaker  partners,  which  are  squeezed  harder.  The  islands  of  work 
lie  offshore  of  a  mainland  of  power. 
Flexibility  as  a  concept,  therefore,  can  only  be  effectively  described  and  analysed,  and 
its  effects  appropriately  measured,  once  the  necessity  of  including  both  the  objective 
and  subjective  impact  on  workers  is  realised. 
As  noted  earlier,  Harrison's  (1997)  description  of  contemporary  production  as 
"lean  and  mean"  is  clearly  relevant  in  the  context  of  flexibility  as  the  network 
clustered  around  the  core  company,  in  this  case  IBM,  represent  peripheral  smaller 
firms  that  provide  core  functions  and  key  stock  on  a  largely  just-in-time  basis.  Yet, 
3  Anecdotal  evidence  from  meetings  suggested  that  workers  needed  to  get  a  medical  certificate  from  a 
doctor  from  the  first  day  of  illness  in  order  for  their  absence  to  be  viewed  as  legitimate.  However, 
generally  speaking,  the  norm  would  be  for  the  first  seven  days  of  absence  to  be  `self-certificated'. 
Workers  reported  that  doctors  charged  a  fee  for  supplying  a  certificate  earlier. 251 
what  they  also  provide,  for  IBM,  is  just-in-time  labour.  Peripheral  companies  like 
WCCI  are  also  `lean  and  mean'  and  maintaining  their  competitive  edge  was 
fundamentally  based  on  its  operation  of  a  further  layer  of  contingent,  just-in-time, 
workers.  As  demonstrated  above,  such  companies  are  also  increasingly  dispensable  as 
the  networks  of  core  companies  expand  into  developing  economies  where  labour  is 
cheaper  and  ties  to  local  communities  looser.  Overall,  this  current  production 
configuration,  embodied  within  electronics  in  Inverclyde,  adds  a  complexity  to  the 
web  of  flexibility  that  New  Labour  rhetoric  does  not  take  account  of.  Moreover,  the 
flexibility  and  competitiveness  ideology  increasingly  necessitates,  at  the  very  least,  a 
re-conceptualisation  of  dominant  notions  of  core/periphery  and  temporary/permanent 
in  the  light  of  evidence  presented  here.  As  Harrison  (1997:  199)  has  argued,  the 
notion  of  an  internal  labour  market  based  on  valuable  `core'  employees  is  being 
eroded,  with  training  and  re-skilling  often  taking  place  as  an  external  function,  thus 
undermining  the  benefits  of  training  for  promotion  to  the  `better'  jobs  within  and 
organisation. 
Gray  (1995)  clearly  roots  her  exploration  of  flexibility  in  exploitation 
relations.  The  "flexibilisation"  of  labour  cannot  be  separated  from  what  she  argues  are 
the  corollary  attacks  on  working  conditions  and  living  standards.  She  has  illustrated 
how  workers  experience  of  flexibility  means  lower  pay  and  fewer  rights  and  how  this: 
...  sets  up  a  vicious  circle  whereby  new  forms  of  work  weaken 
workers'  capacity  to  organise,  which  in  turn  facilitate  further 
`flexibilisation'  and  the  intensification  of  exploitation  (1995:  12). 
Gray's  term,  "flexploitation"  (1995:  12),  clearly  has  resonance  with  the  experience  of 
workers  at  WCCI  and  is  closer  to  the  impact  on  workers  of  `actually  existing' 
flexibility  than  that  promoted  by  New  Labour.  Further,  I  would  argue  that  evidence 
from  WCCI,  in  particular,  and  Inverclyde  generally,  exposes  the  contradictions 
inherent  in  the  flexibility-competitiveness-partnership  ideology.  WCCI's  `dark-side 
flexibility'  was  central  to  its  competitiveness  and  it,  in  turn,  fell  `victim'  to  IBM's 
`dark-side  flexibility'  as  it  sought  to  remain  competitive. 
Two  further  elements  of  New  Labour's  version  of  flexibility  can  also  be 
challenged  through  the  WCCI  evidence,  and,  indeed,  wider  experience  in  Inverclyde. 
The  first  is  the  extent  to  which  flexibility  helps  to  achieve  a  key  element  in  New 
Labour's  apparent  aims  to  advance  a  social  justice  agenda  by  facilitating  the 
expansion  of  human  capital.  For  core  workers  this  is  linked,  often  through  partnership 252 
and  Human  Resources  rhetoric,  to  a  commitment  to  the  company  and  the  harnessing 
of  workers'  skills  to  the  good  of  the  enterprise.  It  also  often  includes  an  apparent 
commitment  that  the  company  will  help  ensure  workers  have  the  appropriate  skills 
both  to  do  their  work  and  to  improve  future  employability.  Unsurprisingly,  these 
values  also  form  the  core  of  New  Labour's  improving  human  capital  rhetoric.  As 
noted  previously,  enhancing  human  capital  is  also  central  to  New  Labour's  life-long 
learning  agenda.  Put  simply,  from  the  New  Labour  perspective,  work  is  about  much 
more  than  teaching  people: 
... 
how  to  get  up  in  the  morning...  getting  into  work  patterns  and 
earning  money  and  taking  on  this  greater  responsibility.  .  . 
but  how  do 
we  generally  make  that  an  opportunity...  how  could  we  link  it  with 
education.  What  education  and  training  is  being  provided,  what  could 
we  provide  if  it  wasn't  there...  maintaining  not  only  the  economic 
activities  of  the  people  but  general  opportunities  through  study 
(McNeil  20004). 
For  the  government,  enhancing  human  capital  means  the  process  of  `up-skilling',  in 
work  and  out  of  work.  As  highlighted  earlier  in  my  argument,  this  is  a  central  element 
of  New  Labour's  embrace  of  the  `knowledge  economy'.  Indeed,  skills  acquisition  and 
the  enhancement  of  human  capital  rhetoric,  have  been  highly  significant  in  the 
creation  of  New  Labour  and  a  key  component  of  its  world-view: 
[These]  new  economic  requirements  coincide  with  the  Labour 
Movement's  historic  mission  to  enhance  the  value  of  labour.  Two 
hundred  years  ago,  capital  was  the  scarce  resource  and  labour  was  seen 
as  simply  a  commodity  -  each  employee  virtually  interchangeable  with 
the  other.  Now  everything  has  changed.  Capital  is  more  than  ever  a 
global  commodity,  highly  skilled  labour  now  acknowledged  to  be  the 
critical  resource.  In  this  way,  the  successful  countries  of  the  future  will 
be  those  that  employ  their  citizens  in  the  most  productive  and 
imaginative  way  (Brown  1993,  emphasis  added). 
The  WCCI  case,  and  the  experience  of  other  workers  in  the  IBM  network,  renders 
New  Labour  analyses  problematic.  For  workers  at  WCCI  there  were  clear  difficulties 
regarding  the  acquisition  of  new  skills,  not  least  in  terms  of  their  employer's  lack  of 
commitment.  Now,  the  skills  that  they  acquired  during  the  time  they  worked  for 
WCCI  are  those  acquired  by  many  other  local  workers  made  redundant  early  in  2003, 
and  since.  Moreover,  working  long-hours  in  the  conditions  that  characterised 
experience  at  WCCI  represented  a  clear  impediment  to  `up-skilling'  outside  of  work. 
4  Based  on  interview,  27`h  November  2000. 253 
Company  imposed  restraint  on  trade  union  and  health  and  safety  activity  meant  that 
there  was  little  chance  of  personal  skills'  development  through,  what  might  be  termed, 
a  more  `traditional'  route.  Despite  the  rhetoric,  the  Government  places  no  real 
demands  on  companies  to  assist  in  the  achievement  of  its  stated  aim  of  creating  a 
flexible,  multi-skilled,  workforce.  Most  Government-sponsored  activity  related  to 
skills  acquisition  continues  to  be  directed  to  the  unemployed.  This  poses  particular 
difficulties  for  temporary  workers  who,  overall,  gain  least  in  terms  of  in-work  human 
capital  enhancement  (Booth  et  al.  2000).  In  places  like  WCCI,  up  until  recently  at 
least,  such  workers  were  not  technically  unemployed  for  long  enough  to  take 
advantage  of  the  limited  opportunities  provided  by  state  agencies. 
Another  element  of  New  Labour's  flexibility  that  can  be  challenged  is  how  far 
it  leads  to  work  being  available  that  protects  workers  from  exclusion.  As  noted 
throughout,  for  New  Labour,  work  is  the  panacea  against  the  "scourge  and  waste"  of 
exclusion.  The  WCCI  evidence  throws  this  premise  into  question.  The  organisation  of 
production  at  WCCI,  the  segmentation  of  the  labour  force,  the  structure  of  the  local 
labour  market  and  the  levels  of  pay  inside  the  factory,  and  in  Inverclyde  generally, 
have  a  specific  impact  that  serves  to  dispute  the  Government's  simplistic 
conceptualisation  of  exclusion  and  inclusion.  All  WCCI  production  workers  to  an 
extent  were  representative  of  a  working  excluded,  with  the  temporary/agency  workers 
being  the  most  excluded  within  the  group.  This  exclusion  is  both  objective  and 
subjective.  Moreover,  once  flexibility  is  conceptualised  in  relation  to  its  `dark  side', 
then  it  becomes  clear  that  not  only  will  the  number  of  working  excluded  grow,  but 
also  that  key  elements  of  New  Labour  ideology  counteract  each  other.  Hence 
flexibility  and  competitiveness  can,  and  do,  preclude  `inclusion'. 
Overall,  despite  the  evidence  that  Taylor  describes  as  challenging  much  of 
New  Labour's  claims  about  flexibility,  it  would  be  wrong  to  dismiss  flexibility  as 
meaningless  in  terms  of  workers'  current  experience.  Evidence  certainly  challenges 
the  New  Labour  rhetoric  about  the  positive  aspects  of  flexibility.  However  the 
negative  aspects  of  actually  existing  flexibility  in  the  current  world  of  work  have 
serious  consequences,  and  these  are  likely  to  intensify.  One  of  the  key  indicators  of 
this  is  the  `axis  of  flexibility'  that  Blair  and  his  counterparts  in  Italy  (Berlusconi)  and 
Spain  (Aznar)  have  sought  to  build  as  a  counterweight  to  the  most  progressive 
European  legislation  in  the  arena  of  employment  rights.  For  most  people  employed  at 
WCCI,  flexibility  has  turned  out  to  mean  rather  more  than  `playing  around  with  your 254 
holidays'.  For  these  workers  and  many  others  and,  indeed,  their  employers,  flexibility 
clearly  translates  into  state-sanctioned  dispensability. 
6.3:  `Actually  Existing'  Partnership 
As  noted  earlier,  like  flexibility,  partnership  is  a  slippery  concept  at  the  hands 
of  New  Labour.  It  is  also  a  concept  at  the  heart  of  the  New  Labour  project  and 
especially  the  vision  of  relations  at  work,  where  partnership  remains  the  central 
theme.  At  face  value,  partnership,  from  the  New  Labour  perspective,  means  a  concern 
for  and  commitment  to  the  success  of  the  enterprise  -  shared  by  employers  and 
workers,  the  promotion  of  a  culture  of  mutual  gains,  dialogue  between  employers  and 
worker  representatives  (though  not  necessarily  unions)  and  the  recognition  of  the 
legitimate  interests  of  both.  The  promotion  of  such  a  culture  is  fundamentally 
underpinned  by  the  central  New  Labour  premise  that,  in  employment  relations,  there 
would  be  no  going  back  a  more  militant  era  of  the  past.  Since,  at  the  beginning  of  this 
research,  workers  at  WCCI  seemed  to  be  well  advanced  in  their  return  to  militancy  in 
the  face  of  increasingly  harsh  management,  I  judged,  primarily,  that  the  concept  of 
partnership  was  not  readily  applicable  to  the  situation  at  WCCI.  In  government 
rhetoric,  partnership  is  characterised  in  its  broadest,  most  benevolent  sense,  and 
couched  in  terms  of  mutual  respect,  understanding  and  progressive  employee 
relations.  On  that  basis,  it  seemed  unlikely  that  this  culture  would  penetrate  too  deeply 
at  WCCI.  At  that  stage,  I  expected  WCCI  to  demonstrate  how  the  notion  that 
employers  would  be  readily  persuaded  by  the  partnership  philosophy  could  be 
challenged.  At  the  very  least,  WCCI  seemed  to  be  one  of  the  exceptions  to  partnership 
proponents,  an  anathema  in  the  New  Labour  version  of  employment  in  the  twenty- 
first  century  economy,  and  not  the  type  of  employer  envisioned  in  its  promotion  of 
partnership.  Much  of  the  evidence  I  have  presented  supports  this  conclusion,  and 
WCCI  does  demonstrate  how  New  Labour's  ideology  of  partnership  is  based  on  the 
flawed  premise  that  the  fundamental  antagonism  between  employers  and  workers  can 
be  overcome  simply  via  promoting  a  culture  that  just  ignores  this  division. 
However,  further  analysis  of  partnership  in  the  WCCI  context  reveals  that  it  is 
not  simply  the  case  that  WCCI  and  partnership  `just  don't  go'.  In  the  simplest  of 
terms  the  government  envisages  partnerships  for  all  employers  especially  since,  from 
the  New  Labour  perspective,  it  is  the  route  to  success  and  competitiveness  for  the 
enterprise.  To  dismiss  partnership  as  having  had  little  or  no  role  to  play  at  WCCI 
would  be  a  mistake  therefore.  What  WCCI  shows  is  that  general  employer  hostility 255 
does  not  preclude  such  an  employer  from  making  partnership-style  gains.  This  was 
demonstrated  first  and  foremost,  as  noted  above,  in  both  the  tone  and  content  of  the 
recognition  agreement  itself.  Moreover,  what  was  ostensibly  a  pay  freeze  over  many 
years  presented  as  crucial  for  the  survival  of  the  enterprise,  and  even  the  control  and 
surveillance  roles  that  were  suggested  for  the  union  representatives,  are  not  too  far 
removed  from  the  partnership  orientation  that  New  Labour  promotes.  This  helps 
illustrate  underlying  elements  of  partnership,  the  impact  of  which  are  crucial,  though 
they  are  rarely  focused  on  in  government  rhetoric  directed  at  workers  and  their 
unions.  The  partnership  agenda  seeks  to  create  a  once-and-for-all  acceptance  of  the 
ideology  of  competition,  framed  within  the  apparent  demands  of  globalisation. 
Partnership,  whether  open  or  implicit  (in  the  case  of  WCCI)  becomes  a  matter  of 
survival. 
As  noted  throughout,  competitiveness  is  key  in  Third  Way  analyses  of  the 
global  economy.  This  is  also  linked  to  the  sort  of  flexibility,  discussed,  above  since: 
A  key  ingredient  of  competitiveness  is  to  use  the  workforce  efficiently 
and  effectively.  For  this  purpose  the  workforce  has  to  be  properly 
trained,  to  be  prepared  to  work  flexibly,  and  to  co-operate  with  all 
innovations  (Collins  2001:  302). 
The  link  between  partnership  and  competitiveness  is  representative  of  another  New 
Labour  synthesis  whereby  one  element  -  in  this  case  competitiveness  -  is  privileged 
over  the  other.  Moreover,  competition  or  competitiveness  in  industry  is  one  of  the 
standards  the  government  has  set  to  measure  its  own  success.  If  industry  is  successful 
outside  of  a  culture  of  participation  in  the  workplace  through  partnership,  then  this 
objective  is  still  satisfactorily  achieved.  Therefore,  partnership,  in  reality,  often  bears 
little  relation  to  the  dialogic,  `fair'  workplace  of  mutual  gains  and  respect.  There  is  no 
impunity  for  the  competitive,  non-partnership,  employer.  From  this  perspective, 
WCCI  was  not  the  antithesis  of  the  type  of  company  that  would  fit  the  New  Labour 
mould.  During  its  six  years  in  Inverclyde,  WCCI  maintained  a  clear  focus  on 
remaining  competitive,  manoeuvring  in  an  industry  that  had  faced  the  impact  of  an 
apparent  world-wide  recession  in  electronics.  Yet,  arguably,  in  order  to  do  so, 
management  remained  unitarist  in  the  extreme,  despite  the  implicit  concession  in 
agreeing  to  union  recognition.  Dominant  notions  of  partnership  can  be  challenged  on 
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As  Collins  has  noted  (2001:  306),  a  `traditional'  employment  contract 
relationship  with  the  employer  directing  labour  to  its  most  profitable  use,  is  weakened 
by  its  lack  of  provision  of  "incentive  for  workers  to  use  human  capital  to  improve  the 
employers  business"  (Collins  2001:  307).  Hence,  the  notion  of  partnership  is  linked  to 
efficiency  and  business  improvement.  As  noted  earlier,  a  central  element  of  the 
dominant  notions  of  partnership  held  by  the  government,  the  TUC  and  the  IPA,  is  that 
it  can  be  worker-centred  offering  clear  benefits  outside  the  salvation  of  the  enterprise. 
But  this  erroneously  shifts  partnership  away  from  its  connection  to  competitiveness, 
which  will  continue  to  be  sought  by  any  means  necessary.  Evidence  from  WCCI 
demonstrates  how  it  is  possible  to  re-conceptualise  partnership.  There,  in  the  absence 
of  a  partnership  agreement,  the  competitive  resilience  of  the  company  between  1999 
and  2002  was  largely  based  on  a  mixture  of  the  company's  ability  to  reap  partnership 
style  benefits  from  their  agreement  with  the  ISTC,  without  similar  gains  for  the  union. 
This,  alongside  the  less  subtle  hire-and-fire  policies,  had  profound  implications  for  the 
WCCI  workforce.  At  the  very  least,  this  opens  up  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of 
partnership  `from  above'  which  is  not  necessarily  contradictory  to  the  `spirit'  of 
partnership  that  New  Labour  seeks  to  promote.  There  is  an  assumption  that  "fairness" 
breeds  success,  but  at  WCCI  reality  suggested  otherwise.  Thus  `traditional'  contract 
relations  were  maintained  from  the  employer's  perspective  yet  WCCI,  whilst  not 
explicitly  utilising  a  human  capital  model  as  such,  did  ensure  that  the  good  of  the 
enterprise  was  paramount. 
This  alludes  to  one  of  the  central  problems  with  the  partnership  model.  This  is 
that  it  is  based,  in  ideological  terms,  on  the  illusion  of  a  level  playing-field  -  at  the 
negotiating  table,  and,  crucially,  in  employment  relations  generally.  Hendy  suggests 
that  there  needs  to  be  clear  recognition  that: 
Partnership  at  work  is  a  concept  which  is  only  achievable  where  power 
is  distributed  in  some  sort  of  equilibrium.  Respect  for  trade  union 
rights  and  in  particular  the  right  of  workers  to  exert  power  collectively 
would  appear  to  be  essential  pre-requisites  to  bring  partnership  within 
reach.  Britain's  trade  union  laws  do  not  permit  a  level  playing  field 
(Hendy  2001:  17). 
The  retention  of  the  anti-trade  union  laws  of  the  previous  Conservative  government, 
therefore,  actually  precludes  the  development  of  meaningful  partnership  and  is  the 
clearest  challenge  to  the  clarity  of  the  concept.  Partnership  therefore  requires  a 257 
balance  that  is  not  readily  struck.  In  the  hands  of  New  Labour,  whose  avowal  of  the 
commitments  of  one  side  of  the  partnership  (business)  is  apparent,  the  concept  is 
meaningless  in  terms  of  the  improvement  of  working  lives.  That  partnership  is  at  its 
most  salient  at  the  level  of  rhetoric,  is  demonstrated  in  the  way  that  trends  are 
interpreted  to  imply  that  it  is  in  the  ascendancy.  Undy's  argument  (1999:  321)  that  the 
economic  and  political  context  in  1998,  when  the  publication  of  Fairness  at  Work 
forced  employment  relations  to  the  forefront,  was  such  that  industrial  relations 
practice  followed  the  pattern  of  the  1980s  is  persuasive.  There  little  real  evidence  of 
that  the  new  culture  New  Labour  proposed  has  emerged.  The  situation  at  WCCI  also 
supported  the  salience  of  this  claim.  Yet  its  proponents  deploy  partnership  as  a  filter 
through  which  each  trend,  each  development  in  employment  relations  should  be 
understood.  For  example,  when  commenting  on  strike  figures  in  1999,  a  time  when 
partnership  was  a  relatively  emergent  concept,  TUC  General  Secretary  suggested 
these  indicated  a  growing  interest  in  partnership: 
Industrial  action  is  at  an  all-time  low  and  the  partnership  approach  to 
industrial  relations  is  now  the  dominant  mode.  These  figures  should 
nail  the  myth  that  unions  are  adversaries  and  show  good  employers 
have  nothing  to  fear  from  a  proper  partnership  relationship  with  unions 
(Monks  quoted  TUC  1999b). 
Such  comments  demonstrate  how  partnership  is  talked  into  being  and  talked  up,  to 
make  reality  fit  with  the  concept  rather  than  the  other  way  round.  It  also  illustrates 
how  the  rhetoric  of  the  leadership  of  the  union  movement  mirrors  that  of  New  Labour 
and  the  Third  Way. 
There  are  clear  difficulties  with  partnership  in  terms  of  what  it  means,  in  terms 
of  its  benefits  to  workers,  and  in  terms  of  commitments  on  the  part  of  government  and 
employers  to  some  of  apparently  central  aims.  Furthermore,  as  Hendy  (2001)  makes 
clear,  full  reform  of  trade  union  law  is  the  best  guarantor  of  making  partnership  a 
reality.  Yet  this  is  not  part  of  the  government's  agenda  for  industrial  relations  since: 
The  existing  balance  of  power,  which  favoured  the  employer,  was  seen 
as  appropriate,  otherwise  the  Conservatives  anti-trade  union  legislation 
would  have  been  subject  to  more  radical  changes  (Undy  1999:  330). 
Partnership  also  assigns  labour  a  particular  role.  It  formally  reduces  the 
activity  of  rank  and  file  trade  unionists  and  seeks  to  circumscribe  a  more  formal 
understanding  of  `reasonableness'.  At  WCCI  and  elsewhere,  this  was  linked  to  the 258 
fusion  of  management  and  worker  goals  and,  especially,  appeals  to  "foster  and  further 
good  relations"  that  were  privileged  over  attempts  to  counteract  the  harshness  of  the 
WCCI  regime.  Partnership  imposes  an  institutional  regularity  on  the  contradiction 
between  union  accommodation  and  resistance  that  has  serious  implications  for  the 
nature  of  workplace  unionism.  At  WCCI,  the  union's  struggle  for  formal  involvement 
with  the  company  took  place  in  a  context  framed  by  the  partnership  agenda,  and  this 
forced  them  to  accept  the  notion  of  a  commonality  of  interests  between  workers,  the 
union  and  the  employer.  This  shaped  the  recognition  agreement  and,  demonstrably,  a 
version  of  workplace  unionism  that  worked  against  the  interests  of  workers.  The 
fusion  of  goals  was  highly  significant  since  it  represented  a  step  far  removed  from  the 
goals  that  helped  fuel  the  militancy  of  the  earlier  period  before  recognition.  Clearly 
partnership  represents  a  challenge  to  the  autonomy  of  trade  unions  as  it  helps  to 
institutionalise  the  trend  towards  acquiescence,  outlined  by  Darlington  (1994),  which 
characterised  the  New  Realist  trade  unionism  of  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s. 
Underlying  both  is  the  claim  that  unions  can  achieve  growth  and  success  if  they  "can 
convince  employers  of  their  value"  (DTI  1998a:  23).  WCCI  clearly  demonstrates  the 
inherent  failure  of  such  an  orientation,  as  value  to  employers  is  distinct  from  value  to 
members.  When  the  former  is  privileged  this  is  damaging,  especially  where 
organisation  is  at  an  embryonic  stage  and  a  former  antagonistic  outlook  on  the  part  of 
workers  was  viewed,  by  workers  themselves,  as  having  achieved  real  gains.  Thus, 
although  ordinary  shop  floor  workers  experienced  none  of  the  new  culture  of 
participation  in  the  workplace  defined  by  New  Labour's  partnership  goals,  they  were 
still  affected  by  how  their  influence  on  the  ISTC  bureaucracy  precluded  certain  forms 
of  activity  and  agitation.  It  certainly  did  not  encourage  the  sort  of  trade  unionism  that 
appeared  to  be  wholly  necessary  to  struggles  in  factories  like  WCCI  and  which  would 
have  helped  workers  develop  as  trade  unionists  and  as  political  individuals. 
Kelly  (1996)  has  argued  forcefully  against  partnership,  as  it  represents  a  long 
term  strategy  of  moderating  goals  and  approach  that  threatens  the  ability  of  unions  to 
act  as  a  countervailing  force.  At  WCCI  this  helped  fuel  antipathy  towards  the  union, 
made  manifest  in  open  criticism  towards  the  Full-time  officer.  The  over-reliance  on 
employer  goodwill  fundamental  to  partnership,  and  the  blurring  of  the  distinction 
between  worker  and  employer  interests  inherent  therein,  was  evident  in  the  ISTC's 
overall  approach  at  WCCI.  It  is  unlikely  that,  had  a  more  formal  partnership 
agreement  existed,  an  outcome  more  favourable  to  the  workers  could  have  been 
achieved.  Given  the  general  shift  away  from  union  involvement  on  the  part  of  workers 259 
and  their  increasing  lack  of  faith  in  the  union's  ability  to  `make  a  difference', 
partnership,  wholly  embraced,  would  not  have  drawn  workers  into  activity.  Even  in  its 
most  embryonic  form,  partnership  still  helped  weaken  union  development  since: 
The  capacity  for  legitimate  conflict  is  airbrushed  away.  The  new 
culture  of  consensual  workplace  relations  does  not  seem  to  entail  so 
much  `partnership'  as  continued  concessions  to  a  management  agenda 
(Novitz  and  Skidmore  2001:  176). 
Final  developments  in  the  situation  at  WCCI  help  elucidate  the  problematic  nature  of 
partnership.  The  factory's  eventual  closure  indicates  how  even  a  full  and  flourishing 
partnership  agreement  would  not  have  saved  a  single  job  at  WCCI  as,  even  in  the 
government's  and  the  TUC's  approach,  commitment  to  security  is  weak  and 
ultimately  subordinated  to  flexibility  and  competitiveness  goals.  Nor  could  it,  given 
New  Labour's  overall  orientation  towards  business  interests  and  efficiency.  What 
WCCI  demonstrated  in  sharp  relief  was  the  continuing  limitations  for  workers,  in  an 
apparently  new  context,  as  they  tried  to  assert  power.  It  also  demonstrated  how,  in  the 
-  long  term,  participation  through  partnership  is  not  a  workable  alternative  to  struggle 
from  below  that  clearly  recognises,  as  the  WCCI  workers  did,  a  fundamental 
difference  between  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour. 
6.4:  The  Real  Impact  of  New  Labour's  Legislation 
When  this  research  began,  the  most  obvious  legislative  change  that  was 
expected  to  have  a  clear  impact  at  WCCI  was  that  introducing  statutory  recognition. 
As  noted  earlier,  alongside  the  issues  that  emerged  at  the  Gourock  plant  from  mid  - 
1997,  the  ISTC  focused  its  campaign  to  recruit  at  WCCI  on  the  possibility  of  taking 
advantage  of  statutory  recognition  when  it  became  law.  However,  what  emerged 
during  this  research  was  the  necessity  of  shifting  the  focus  away  from  individual 
pieces  of  legislation  towards  a  wider  goal  of  understanding  the  context  created  by  the 
New  Labour  values  that  underpin  them.  Thus  the  impact  of  New  Labour's  reforms  in 
the  workplace  can  only  be  assessed  when  the  government's  orientation  is 
conceptualised  and  its  influence  accounted  for.  I  have  sought  to  do  this  above  and  in 
earlier  chapters.  That  "the  devil  is  not  only  in  the  detail  of  Labour's  policies  but  in  the 
values  and  policy  too"  (Smith  and  Morton  2001:  120)  was  clearly  borne  out  by  the 
evidence  from  WCCI. 
At  this  point,  it  is  worth  re-iterating  the  underpinning  motivations  of  New 
Labour's  employment  relations  reforms.  Firstly,  there  was  the  clear  acceptance  that 260 
any  resurgence  of  militant  trade  unionism,  assumed  to  characterise  industrial  relations 
under  previous  (Old)  Labour  governments,  would  be  a  barrier  to  New  Labour 
achieving  the  dual  aims  of  economic  prosperity  and  political  success.  Secondly,  it  was 
recognised  that  what  needed  to  be  developed  and  promoted  was  a  particular  type  of 
trade  unionism  that  was  subordinate  to  business  or  (even  better)  that  could  be 
harnessed  by  business  to  the  extent  that  it  posed  little  or  no  threat  to  the  corporation  or 
employers  generally.  It  is  a  re-moulded  trade  unionism,  with  unions  as  acceptable 
partners  to  do  business  with  business  -  in  no  sense  a  working  class  movement.  In  turn, 
this  could  facilitate  the  creation  of  a  new  culture  of  partnership  at  work  between 
employers  and  employees,  supportive  of,  though  subordinate  to,  the  partnership  that 
developed  between  business  and  the  government.  Trade  unions  that  conform  to  the 
partnership  model,  following  the  government's  line  of  `on  your  side  -  not  in  your 
way',  can  be  included.  In  the  process,  and  in  the  longer  term,  non-conforming  unions 
can  be  de-legitimised  and  de-stabilised.  Central  to  all  of  this  is  a  relatively 
parsimonious  raft  of  employment  legislation,  including  the  National  Minimum  Wage 
and  the  Employment  Relations  Act,  created  to  take  appropriate  account  of  the 
concerns  of  business. 
In  relation  to  New  Labour's  claims  regarding  social  justice,  the  idea  that 
justice  at  work  would  result  from  its  legislation  has  been  challenged  with  reference  to 
WCCI.  Indeed,  what  WCCI  clearly  demonstrates  is  New  Labour's  overall  lack  of 
commitment  to  social  justice  and  a  weak  attachment,  within  Third  Way  ideology,  to 
collective  advancement  through  collective  solutions.  The  fragmentation  of  collective 
power  is  assumed  and  collective  action  is  undermined  by  the  New  Labour.  This  has  a 
critical  impact  on  working  lives  that  places  serious  limitations  on  the  `positive'  impact 
of  the  legislation  overall.  That  the  balance  of  power  between  employers  and  workers, 
which  emerged  from  the  mid-1970s  under  Labour  and  ossified  in  the  years  of 
Conservative  rule,  and  its  resultant  weakening  of  trade  unions  in  terms  of  both  power 
and  numerical  strength,  is  maintained  was  clearly  demonstrated  in  New  Labour's 
retention  of  the  previous  government's  employment  laws.  Hence  employers  and 
business'  position  of  strength  would  be  maintained  and  increased  under  the 
stewardship  of  New  Labour.  In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  assess  employment 
legislation  as  a  central  element  of  this  -  as  fundamental  to  bringing  about  this 
situation  -  rather  than  as  a  positive  element  of  New  Labour  that  is  simply  undermined 
by  its  wider  orientation.  Although  New  Labour's  industrial  relations  settlement  is 
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Department  1999;  Towers  1999;  Hendy  2001,  Smith  and  Morton  2001;  TUC/Ewing 
2001;  Novitz  and  Skidmore  2001),  it  did  receive  a  cautious  welcome  within  the  labour 
movement  especially  from  the  TUC.  The  trade  union  bureaucracy  continue  to  imply 
compliant  unions  like  the  ISTC,  had  little  to  fear  from  the  advent  of  partnership. 
In  relation  to  WCCI,  there  are  three  key  elements  within  New  Labour's 
legislation  seemingly  with  the  potential  to  impact  upon  the  lives  of  workers  there, 
given  the  particular  type  of  management  regime  that  has  been  outlined  above:  the 
introduction  of  the  National  Minimum  Wage,  the  implementation  of  the  European 
Working  Time  Directive,  and  the  statutory  recognition  procedure  contained  in  the 
Employment  Relations  Act.  At  face  value,  the  impact  of  the  minimum  wage  was 
clear.  Employers  would  apparently  no  longer  be  able  to  achieve  competitive 
advantage  through  cutting  wages.  Its  impact  was  also  characterised  by  New  Labour  in 
opposition,  and  in  government,  as  both  fully  in  keeping  with  its  social  justice  agenda 
and,  crucially,  as  demonstrating  an  ability  to  chart  a  Third  Way  course  between 
employers  and  employees: 
We  want  a  national  minimum  wage  to  tackle  exploitation  and  because 
we  believe  that  by  ending  exploitation  we  will  make  the  economy 
stronger  not  weaker  (Cook  1996). 
Yes  we  work  with  business,  but  we  also  introduced  the  minimum  wage 
(Blair  quoted  The  Guardian  12th  March  2002). 
Yet  one  of  the  key  problems  with  the  minimum  wage,  illustrated  with  reference  to 
WCCI,  was  that  set  at  such  a  low  level  (£3.60  in  1998  with  gradual  increases  up  to 
£4.20  in  2002)  it  had  a  serious  impact  on  workers  who  earned  just  above  or  around 
this  level.  Once  the  minimum  wage  was  introduced,  employers  like  WCCI  had  little 
incentive  to  improve  wage  levels  much  above  the  minimum.  Hence,  in  a  period  of 
over  four  years,  workers  there  received  wage  rises  of  little  more  than  a  few  pence  per 
hour,  despite  some  very  successful  financial  years  for  the  company.  To  the  extent  that 
workers  received  any  reward  in  recognition  of  this,  this  was  paid  as  a  one-off  bonus 
that  had  no  effect  on  overall  wage  rates  that  stayed  relatively  close  to  the  national 
minimum.  The  impact  of  this  was  keenly  felt  by  the  temporary  agency  workers  and 
the  level  of  the  minimum  wage,  alongside  other  problems  outlined  above,  impeded 
their  ability  to  fight  for  higher  wages.  However,  Gray's  point  that  a  high  level  of 
minimum  wage  "is  crucial  for  the  employed  as  well  as  the  unemployed"  (1995:  29)  is 262 
particularly  salient  in  the  context  of  WCCI,  given  the  extent  to  which  core  workers 
were  replaced  by  temporary  workers  on  a  wage  of  more  than  £1  an  hour  less.  Whilst  it 
may  be  important  to  view  such  measures  as  a  step  forward: 
Minimum  wage  legislation  should  not  be  decried,  it  can  do  (and  it  has 
done)  a  great  deal  here  and  abroad  to  help  those  on  the  bottom  rungs  of 
the  social  ladder.  Nor  should  legislative  provisions  for  guarantee 
payments  protecting  workers  against  a  sudden  fall  in  income  due  to 
market  fluctuations  or  unforeseen  abnormal  circumstances  (Kahn- 
Freud  1977:  2). 
It  is  important  not  to  overstate  their  positive  impact.  The  government  continues  to 
bolster  low  pay  with  in-work  benefits  and  this  illustrates  the  limited  success  of  the 
minimum  wage.  Moreover,  in  its  submission  to  the  Low  Pay  Commission  in  January 
2001,  the  TUC  suggested  that  an  estimated  one  hundred  and  seventy  thousand 
workers  were  not  getting  the  minimum  wage  (TUC  2001).  These  weaknesses  also 
make  clear  how  social  justice  `at  work'  would  not  simply  emerge  as  a  result  of  New 
Labour's  minimum  standards  in  the  workplace.  The  closure  of  the  WCCI  Gourock 
plant  in  2003  meant  remaining  work  was  taken  over  by  the  Irvine  Riverside  plant, 
where  the  workforce  is  predominantly  lower  paid  agency  workers.  This  suggests  that, 
whilst  the  minimum  wage  apparently  sought  to  end  competition  between  employers 
through  lower  wage  costs  (Gennard  1997:  13),  competition  between  workers  in  the 
same  companies  is  allowed  to  thrive.  At  WCCI,  though  inadvertently  perhaps,  the 
minimum  wage,  set  at  the  level  it  was,  acted  as  a  further  method  through  which  the 
management  could  discipline  workers  -  `lose  your  job  here  and  earn  over  £1  an  hour 
less  elsewhere'-  or  worse  still  -  `lose  your  job  here  and  come  back  on  £1  and  hour 
less'.  Set  initially  to  fit  with  the  CBI's  "comfort  zone"  of  £3.50  (Gennard  1997:  22) 
at  "just  twenty  pence  more  than  Labour's  1992  election  promise,  and  nowhere  near 
the  `50  per  cent  of  men's  median  earnings'  -  the  Party's  original  position"  (Coates 
2000:  130),  the  impact  at  WCCI  was  clear.  This  suggests  that  it  could  drive  wages 
down  generally  in  the  long  term.  Whilst  New  Labour  argues  that  its  aim  to  remove  the 
worst  type  of  exploitation  has  been  successful  (DTI  1998a:  15),  this  is  questionable. 
The  outcome  for  the  workers  at  WCCI  suggests  that  firms  still  compete  on  labour 
costs  and  price  rather  than  on  quality. 
One  of  the  main  problems  with  the  Working  Time  Regulations  experienced  at 
WCCI  was  in  some  workers  exercising  their  `right'  to  paid  annual  leave.  Under  these 
regulations,  employees  with  a  contract  of  thirteen  weeks  or  more  are  entitled  to  four 
weeks  holiday.  However,  as  alluded  to  above,  WCCI  seemingly  used  fluctuations  in 263 
the  electronics  market,  and  its  general  reliance  on  contract  labour,  to  evade  paid  leave 
obligations.  Indeed,  the  testimony  of  a  Human  Resources  Officer  suggested  a  strategy 
of  non-compliance  in  this  area,  whereby  WCCI  used  to  notion  of  seasonal  `shut 
downs',  common  in  electronics  locally,  specifically  to  minimise  the  cost  of  both 
contract  workers  holidays  and  perceived  impact  of  core  workers  `inappropriate'  time- 
off.  Workers  ability  to  expose  this  practice,  especially  agency  workers,  was  greatly 
impeded  by  the  fact  that: 
Currently  the  onus  is  on  the  employee  (with  the  notable  exception  of 
the  National  Minimum  Wage)  to  instigate  legal  proceedings  against 
employers  who  break  the  law  (Citizens  Advice  Scotland  2001:  13). 
Outside  WCCI,  evidence  suggests  that  non-compliance  with  the  Working  Time 
Regulations  is  relatively  common  and  entitlement  to  annual  leave  is  the  most 
significant  area  where  non-compliance  is  a  feature  of  experience  (ibid:  9).  This 
implies  that  experience  at  WCCI  was  not  unique  and  that,  in  the  absence  of  a 
commitment  on  the  part  of  the  government  to  ensure  that  new  rights  are  universally 
available,  their  positive  impact  was,  and  remains,  considerably  weakened.  It  also 
confirms  a  freedom  and  flexibility  afforded  employers  in  terms  of  their 
responsibilities  not  granted  to  workers.  What  is  perhaps  surprising  in  the  context  of 
WCCI  was  the  apparent  inability  to  take  advantage  of  new  rights  under  the  Working 
Time  Regulations  on  the  part  of  the  unionised  workforce5.  Despite  the  Full-time 
officer  mentioning  these  in  a  positive  light,  there  was  no  evidence  that  the  union 
would  have  been  prepared  to  fight  a  case  in  order  to  win  these  rights.  As  soon  as  the 
regulations  came  into  force,  the  company  outlined  what  it  believed  to  be  the  position 
of  its  `night  workers',  who  had  particular  rights  under  the  regulations.  6  Some  months 
later,  the  Full-time  officer  stated  the  advice  he  had  been  given  confirmed  that  the 
company  were  not  applying  the  law  correctly.  However,  this  was  not  pursued.  New 
regulations,  regarding  breaks  for  monotonous  work  and  for  young  workers,  were 
highlighted  at  meetings  by  the  activists,  but,  again,  these  do  not  seem  to  have  been 
invoked.  This,  coupled  with  what  appeared  to  be  a  very  weak  application  of  already 
5  Goss  and  Adam-Smith's  comprehensive  study  of  employer  compliance  to  the  regulations  concerning 
holiday  entitlement,  in  particular,  suggest  the  presence  of  a  union  had  a  significant  impact  on  employer 
compliance  (2001:  204).  Of  course  at  WCCI,  there  was  a  union  but  whether  the  company  was  fully 
compliant  with  the  Working  Time  Regulations  across  the  board  remained  questionable.  6  Under  the  Working  Time  Regulations  night  workers  are  not  expected  to  work  on  average  more  than 
eight  hours  per  night,  though  this  is  specific  to  regular  night  working.  WCCI  interpreted  their  rotational 
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existing  health  and  safety  law  on  the  part  of  the  union,  suggested  that  laws  could  only 
be  taken  full  advantage  of  with  the  backing  of  a  strong  union  at  local  level: 
The  law  does,  of  course,  provide  its  own  sanctions,  administrative, 
penal,  and  civil,  and  their  impact  should  not  be  underestimated,  but  in 
labour  relations  legal  norms  cannot  often  be  effective  unless  they  are 
backed  by  social  sanctions  as  well,  that  is  by  the  countervailing  power 
of  trade  unions  and  of  the  organisation  of  workers  asserted  through 
consultation  and  negotiation  with  employers  and  ultimately,  if  this  fails 
through  withholding  their  labour  (Kahn-Freud  1977:  8). 
In  this  context,  the  partnership,  flexibility  and  insecurity  that  I  have  outlined 
above  interlink,  and  act  as  a  countervailing  force  against  the  take-up  of  rights. 
However  at  WCCI,  the  union  could  have  used  the  availability  of  these  rights  to 
construct  a  realistic  set  of  demands  around  which  to  galvanise  members'  support.  To 
an  extent,  one  would  expect  these  to  be  the  `bread  and  butter'  issues  that  help  sustain 
a  union  like  the  ISTC,  and  gains  made  to  strengthen  the  union's  position  locally, 
without,  it  should  be  noted,  recourse  to  militant  or  wildcat  action.  The  reason  why 
health  and  safety  improvements,  including  those  created  by  the  Working  Time 
Regulations,  were  not  more  vigorously  pursued  by  the  union  locally  or  nationally  was 
never  fully  apparent.  However  a  key  element  of  this  weakness  can  be  linked  to  the 
orientation  of  New  Labour.  The  new  legislation  was  not  designed  to  re-create  unions 
as  a  countervailing  force.  Moreover,  this  orientation,  and  `light  touch'  enforcement 
procedures,  limits  the  social  sanction  element  of  legal  rights.  In  the  struggle  to  prove 
their  worth  to  employers,  evidence  from  WCCI  suggests  that  taking  advantage  of  the 
most  basic  rights  can  be  impeded  by  unions  struggling  to  avoid  the  `troublesome' 
label.  This  is  exactly  how  partnership  under  New  Labour  works  and  why  I  have 
conceptualised  union-management  relations  at  WCCI  as  partnership-esque. 
At  face  value,  the  introduction  of  a  statutory  recognition  procedure  under  the 
Employment  Relations  Act  1999,  presented  unions  with  their  best  chance  of  renewal 
and  revitalisation  for  decades,  and  created  an  opportunity  to  reverse  the  decline  in 
both  membership  and  influence  that  had  characterised  the  years  since  1979.  For 
unions  like  the  ISTC,  it  meant  the  possibility  of  overcoming  the  negative  impact  of 
de-industrialisation,  and  added  value  and  legitimacy  to  their  recruitment  in  sectors 
like  electronics,  where  previously  they  had  no  influence.  For  workers,  potential 
recognition  apparently  opened  up  the  possibility  of  meaningful  union  membership 
free  from  intimidation  and,  crucially,  empowerment  and  increased  influence  through 265 
negotiation,  where  this  was  not  previously  available.  Both  these  outcomes,  again  at 
face  value,  represented  a  challenge  to  entrenched  employer  attitudes  regarding  their 
ability  to  run  efficient  enterprises  without  impediment  from  `outside'  or  worker 
interests.  However  from  the  outset,  unions  were  told  that  they  would  need  to  convince 
employers  that  they  could  play  a  valuable  role  in  employment  relations  for  the  good 
of  the  enterprise.  At  WCCI,  it  became  clear  from  the  resultant  recognition  agreement 
between  the  company  and  the  union  that  the  ISTC  were  well  prepared  to  operate  in 
this  way,  even  if  it  acted  to  the  detriment  of  the  membership  in  the  long  term.  Findlay 
and  McKinlay's  claim  (2000:  25)  that  the  union  agreed  not  to  pursue  recruitment  and 
recognition  at  the  Ayrshire  plants  aggressively  also  confirms,  this  and  the  negative 
outcome  of  such  a  strategy  in  terms  of  its  divisiveness  is  well  documented  above.  In 
striving  to  "replace  the  notion  of  conflict  between  employers  and  employees  with  the 
promotion  of  partnership"  (DTI  1998a:  3),  New  Labour  created  legislation  that 
assumed  something  of  an  `ideal  type'  of  employer.  Mutual  gains  and  a  commonality 
of  interests  in  industry  and  employment  are  problematic.  New  Labour's  approach  to 
the  employment  relationship,  that  underplays  a  fundamental  division  between  the 
exploited  and  their  exploiters,  shares  the  weaknesses  of  other  syntheses  of  `opposites' 
that  characterise  New  Labour's  political  economy.  Post-recognition  experience  at 
WCCI  illustrated  this,  and  supports  Kelly's  argument  that: 
Actions  pursued  by  employers  under  conditions  of  freedom  offer  a  far 
more  reliable  guide  to  their  interests  than  actions  pursued  under  the 
constraints  of  union  power  and  pro-union  legislation  (1996:  99). 
Clearly  the  possibility  of  statutory  recognition  placed  unions  in  a  stronger 
position  to  bargain  in  advance  of  the  law  actually  coming  into  force.  It  also  had  the 
effect  of  legitimising  aggressive  recruitment  and  organisation  campaigns.  However, 
from  there,  the  focus,  at  this  factory  at  least,  shifted  very  quickly  towards  achieving 
recognition.  As  detailed  above  there  were  sound  reasons  for  this  in  the  sense  that 
WCCI  were  continually  reducing  their  core  workforce  -  the  ISTC's  target  group. 
What  occurred  then  was  the  negotiation  of  a  submissive  agreement  that  undermined 
the  opportunity  of  using  recognition  to  strengthen  the  union.  The  delay  in  bringing  the 
law  into  force  -  arguably  to  fine  tune  it  to  suit  business  needs  -  contributed  to  the 
ISTC's  apparent  haste.  Its  endeavour  to  gain  recognition  from  WCCI  resulted  in  them 
gaining  little  overall  in  terms  of  "voluntary  understanding  and  co-operation"  (DTI 
1998a:  3).  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  voluntary  recognition  in  advance  of  the 266 
legislation  was  an  overwhelmingly  problematic  course  to  chart.  Given  the  nature  of 
the  differences  between  the  Fairness  White  paper  in  1998  and  the  subsequent 
Employment  Relations  Act  of  1999,  this  may  have  represented  the  most  `union 
friendly'  route  to  recognition: 
Its  [the  Employment  Relations  Act]  language  bears  the  imprint  of  legal 
advice  tendered  by  employers  representatives.  The  circle  is  squared:  a 
statutory  union  recognition  procedure  has  been  imposed  on  employers 
despite  their  opposition;  its  procedures  embody  employers'  wishes  at 
almost  every  turn  despite  unions'  concerns.  Examination  of  the 
schedule  reveals  a  series  of  rigorous  tests  that  establish  a  highly 
circumscribed  right  to  trade  union  recognition  (Smith  and  Morton 
2001:  124). 
Yet,  it  was  significant  that  WCCI  chose  not  to  wait  for  the  legislation.  Realistically, 
the  company  could  have  held  the  union  at  `arms  length'  until  legally  forced  to  do 
otherwise.  Findlay  and  McKinlay  (2000:  16)  have  argued  that  WCCI  could  no  longer 
resist  recognition  at  Gourock.  A  subsequent  `Trade  Union  Trends'  survey  seemingly 
confirmed  that  the  possibility  of  legislation  helped  change  employer  attitudes  to  union 
recognition  (TUC  1999c:  3).  Yet  it  is  important  not  to  overstate  the  positive  impact  of 
this  apparent  reconciliation  with  the  legislation  by  some  employers.  Moreover,  Gall 
(1999)  has  outlined  a  variety  of  employer  strategies  to  keep  union  influence  in 
abeyance,  even  within  the  context  of  statutory  recognition. 
What  I  believe  voluntary  recognition  at  WCCI  indicated,  achieved  a  full  year 
before  the  law  came  into  effect,  was  a  deliberate  policy  of  containment  on  the  part  of 
the  company.  On  the  one  hand,  the  company  could  have  continued  successfully 
without  a  recognised  union.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  militancy  and  wildcat  action 
needed  to  be  contained.  The  recognition  agreement  gave  the  employer  some 
credibility  and  allowed  WCCI  room  to  manoeuvre  on  new  terms  and  conditions  that 
militancy  was  serving  to  block  effectively.  The  ISTC  had  proved  their  worth,  not 
necessarily  through  negotiation  per  se,  but  through  their  ability  to  encourage  workers 
to  draw  back  from  militancy  when  recognition  negotiations  were  at  a  `crucial  stage'. 
The  strategy  of  containment  through  recognition  was  also  demonstrated  in  the  lack  of 
overall  legitimacy  that  the  company  granted  to  the  union.  The  persistence  of  its  anti- 
union  orientation,  the  continuing  harshness  of  the  WCCI  regime,  undermining  the 
union's  officers  on  the  shop-floor,  and  at  regional  level,  and  the  company's  renewed 
promotion  of  a  defunct  Work's  Council  are  all  indicative  of  a  deliberate  policy.  This 
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ironically,  the  ISTC's  implicit  engagement  with  it,  contributed  overall  to  the 
diminution  of  the  strength  of  the  local  branch.  WCCI  therefore  exemplified  how  union 
power  decreased  through  statutory  recognition,  and  how  New  Labour's  plans  to 
circumvent  the  ability  of  unions  to  act  autonomously  could  work.  Employer  concerns 
that  New  Labour  might  be  `pro-union'  and  unions'  hopes  of  benefiting  in  the  long- 
term,  in  terms  of  growth  in  number  and  in  influence,  are  contradicted  to  an  extent. 
New  Labour's  employment  relations  settlement,  including  apparently  positive 
legislation  like  the  Employment  Relations  Act  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  Working 
Time  Regulations,  in  the  context  of  WCCI,  suggest  the  development  of  a  dichotomy 
between  `having  a  union'  and  `being  unionised'.  The  former  involves  union  presence, 
significant  levels  of  membership  and  even  recognition.  The  latter  is  linked  to  actual 
strength  and  ability  to  act  in  members'  interests  through  exercising  power  and 
influence  over  managerial  decisions.  New  Labour's  overall  ideological  position,  its 
orientation  towards  business  and  hostility  to  oppositional  trade  unionism,  weakens 
both.  However  it  may  well  be  the  case  that  the  less  effective  former  position  will  be 
characteristic  of  workplace  trade  unionism  that  develops  out  of  the  new  legislation. 
The  case  of  WCCI  helps  elucidate  how  `having  a  union'  of  the  type  that  developed 
there  may  present  employers  generally  with  an  overall,  very  effective,  `union  busting' 
strategy. 
6.5:  Conclusion 
Clearly  this  case  study  of  West  Coast  Computer  Industries  demonstrates  how 
New  Labour's  ideology  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership  does  not  serve 
workers  well.  The  thrust  of  my  argument  throughout  has  sought  to  show  how  New 
Labour's  ideological  underpinning  works  against  the  interests  of  workers.  Indeed,  the 
`picture'  from  Inverclyde  generally  suggests  that  this  ideology  serves,  in  the  long 
term,  to  act  against  New  Labour's  apparent  aims  for  social  justice.  This,  alongside 
New  Labour's  continuing  commitment  to  neo-liberal,  market  solutions  generally,  and 
to  the  anti-trade  union  laws  of  the  Conservatives  specifically,  act  as  a  highly  effective 
counterweight  to  the  very  type  of  `mutual  gains'  culture  that  it  purports  to  promote. 
WCCI  illustrates,  in  sharp  relief,  the  contours  of  the  `new'  world  of  work  that  New 
Labour  both  seeks  to  mould  and  to  relate  to.  It  is  also  indicative  of  the  sort  of  trade 
unionism  that  can  emerge  within  the  New  Labour  context,  especially  where  workers 
are  encouraged  to  look  `upwards'  to  effect  meaningful  change,  and  union  officials  are 
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trade  unionism  `from  below'.  It  is  important  therefore  to  analyse  the  impact  of  New 
Labour  on  work  at  macro-level  by  exploring  examples  of  lived  experience  at  micro- 
level  to  fully  demonstrate  the  `hollowness'  of  a  supposed  `fairness  not  favours' 
agenda  in  the  light  of  the  totality  of  New  Labour,  and  what  it  actually  means. 
Lastly,  the  WCCI  evidence  also  makes  clear  how  little  impact  devolution  has 
had,  in  terms  of  social  justice  `at  work'  and  in  relation  to  `Scottish  solutions  to 
Scottish  problems'.  What  has  seemingly  been  de-centralised  is  responsibility  for  the 
effects  of  the  worst  excesses  of  a  low-waged,  low-skilled  economy,  whilst  the 
framework  through  which  to  address  structural  inequality  is  not.  The  overarching 
ideological  framework  of  the  centre  (i.  e.  the  Project)  remains  intact.  Moreover,  if,  as 
New  Labour  would  have  it,  the  existence  of  a  Scottish  Parliament  addresses  a 
fundamental  democratic  deficit  then  the  supposed  benefits  of  this  are  far  removed 
from  experience  in  WCCI  and  in  Inverclyde,  and  I  would  argue,  from  the  experience 
of  the  majority  workers  in  Scotland  and  the  rest  of  the  UK. 269 
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HALTED? 
There's  power  in  the  factory,  power  in  the  land,  power  in  the  hands  of 
the  worker.  But  it  all  amounts  to  nothing  if  together  we  don't  stand. 
There  is  power  in  a  union.  Now,  the  lessons  of  the  past  we've  all 
learned  with  workers'  blood  -  mistakes  of  the  bosses  we  must  pay  for. 
In  the  cities  and  the  farmlands,  to  trenches  full  of  mud,  war's  always 
been  the  bosses'  way,  sir. 
The  union  forever,  defending  our  rights.  Down  with  the  blackleg  -  all 
workers  unite  with  our  brothers  and  sisters  in  many  far-off  lands. 
There  is  power  in  a  union. 
Now  I  long  for  the  morning  that  they  realise  brutality  and  unjust  laws 
cannot  defeat  us.  But  who'll  defend  the  workers  who  cannot  organise 
when  the  bosses  send  there  lackeys  out  to  cheat  us?  Money  speaks  for 
money  -  the  devil  for  his  own.  Who  comes  to  speak  for  the  skin  and 
the  bone?  What  a  comfort  to  the  widow,  a  light  to  the  child.  There  is 
power  in  a  union. 
The  union  forever,  defending  our  rights.  Down  the  black-leg,  all 
workers  unite.  With  our  brothers  and  our  sisters  together  we  will  stand. 
There  is  power  in  a  union.  ' 
Introduction 
Clearly  the  purpose  of  this  concluding  chapter  is  to  draw  together  some  of  the 
central  themes  of  my  argument  overall  and  to  highlight  the  most  significant 
developments  that  I  have  outlined  and  analysed  in  the  thesis.  However,  it  is  also  worth 
bearing  in  mind  that  the  work  for  this  thesis  was  begun  at  the  end  of  the  last  century 
and  as  such  there  have  been  further  important  developments  in  relation  to  this  work 
that  are  as  yet  un-discussed  or  have  been  discussed  briefly  thus  far.  It  is  intended 
therefore  to  try  to  develop  some  points  in  this  regard,  and  to  briefly  explore  how  more 
contemporary  changes  and  continuities  impact  on  what  has  been  said  so  far. 
1  There  is  Power  in  a  Union,  Billy  Bragg  1986. 270 
Focusing  on  political  trajectories,  as  this  thesis  does,  brings  with  it  added 
complexities.  On  the  one  hand,  research  into  and  analysis  of  events  as  they  unfold 
means  that  `calling  a  halt'  limits  the  scope  for  discussion  of  further,  connected,  events 
as  they,  in  turn,  unfold.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  undertaking  research  of  this 
nature  creates  the  opportunity  to  utilise  its  concluding  element  to  speculate  in  terms  of 
what  may  occur  in  the  political  sphere  and  to  explore  how  my  arguments  can  be 
linked  to  possible  developments.  I  have  tried  to  challenge  the  dominant  ideas 
regarding  the  development  of  New  Labour  in  terms  of  its  assumed  `beginnings'  and 
those  regarding  the  `beginnings'  of  emergence  of  other  important  features  of  the 
contemporary  period.  Just  as  questions  over  `beginnings'  add  complexity,  therefore, 
what  I  am  trying  to  suggest  is  that  notions  of  `endings'  are  as  equally  complex.  Thus 
political  horizons  are  continually  evolving.  In  this  sense,  speculation,  rooted  in  the 
detailed  analysis  of  what  are  now  `past'  developments  that  has  been  presented  in  this 
thesis,  is  both  possible  and  necessary. 
Also  important  is  the  need  to  discuss  the  areas  where  I  believe  more  research 
is  necessary  in  order  to  elucidate  further  key  features  considered  here.  In  this  context, 
I  have  also  tried  to  briefly  outline  possibilities  for  research  that  would  take  the  themes 
and  arguments  of  this  thesis  further,  selecting  some  areas  for  development  in  order  to 
explore  some  of  what  is  covered  in  my  research  in  greater  depth  than  I  have  had  scope 
for. 
As  I  outlined  in  the  introduction,  and  as  I  have  tried  to  make  clear  throughout, 
this  piece  of  research  is  fundamentally  shaped  by  personal,  political,  concerns.  In  the 
process,  I  have  been  forced  to  confront  personal  assumptions,  particularly  in  relation 
to  my  own  understanding  of  trade  unionism  and  the  possibilities  for  militancy.  I 
quoted  the  Billy  Bragg  song  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  because  it  is 
representative  of  a  personal  understanding  of  trade  unionism,  though  it  is  rooted  in  a 
collective  working  class  identity.  All  through  this  research,  especially  as  it  has  drawn 
to  close  in  the  last  few  months,  I  have  been  forced  to  confront  some  of  the  ideas 
represented  in  this  song.  Essentially,  this  had  not  involved  my  rejection  of  them. 
However,  what  I  have  learned  is  that  there  is  a  serious,  arguably  urgent,  task  ahead  of 
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retained  in  any  meaningful  sense  in  the  twenty-first  century.  I  try  to  explore  this 
below  and  utilise  my  own  findings  to  discuss  how  this  can  be  done. 
In  the  final  section  of  this  conclusion,  I  also  adopt  a  very  personal  perspective 
in  relation  to  the  outcomes  of  the  WCCI  `story'.  Here  I  simply  represent  actual 
extracts  from  the  final  pages  of  my  research  diary,  written  in  the  week  of  the  factory's 
closure,  after  the  final  union  meeting.  In  doing  so,  I  seek  to  illustrate  the  `meaning'  of 
research  for  researchers  and  to  demonstrate  to  full  effect  how  claims  to  objectivity 
and  academic  rigour  should  never  be  allowed  to  detract  from  how  events  in  the  social 
world  impact  on  those  who  seek  to  analyse  it. 
The  Dawning  of  the  New,  New  Labour  Era? 
One  of  the  key  features  of  New  Labour  that  has  been  discussed  is  how 
oppositional  interests  are  fused  in  its  underpinning  ideology.  Central  to  my  argument 
has  been  the  endeavour  to  bring  together  dual  aims  like  social  justice  and  economic 
efficiency,  and  to  synthesise  the  interests  of  capital  and  labour.  Both  are  intrinsically 
linked  to  the  pursuit  of  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership.  The  evidence 
presented  in  relation  to  both  WCCI  and  the  public  sector  has  helped  elucidate 
significant  weaknesses  in  this  New  Labour  ideological  position.  In  both  cases,  it  has 
been  made  clear  how,  within  each  fusion  of  antagonistic  categories,  New  Labour 
clearly  prioritises,  increasingly  in  favour  of  capital  and  against  what  were  perceived  in 
the  past  as  Labour's  traditional  interests.  Exploring  both  the  public  and  private 
sectors,  as  I  have  done,  makes  this  all  the  more  obvious.  Hence,  in  the  case  of  WCCI 
there  is  nothing  in  the  New  Labour  settlement  that  was  able  to  protect  these  workers. 
In  fact,  as  I  have  emphasised,  this  case  study  has  demonstrated  how  it  actually 
represents  a  countervailing  force  in  relation  to  workers'  interests  overall.  This  not 
only  throws  into  question  the  very  meaning  of  `fairness'  at  the  hands  of  New  Labour, 
it  represents  an  irrefutable  challenge  to  its  apparent  social  justice  aims. 
Increasingly,  though,  this  presents  New  Labour  with  problems.  The  first 
among  these  is  connected  to  a  further  central  element  of  the  New  Labour  ideology:  its 
ability  to  relate  to  and  to  mould  our  experience  of  'globalisation'.  As  outlined  in  The 
Political  Economy  of  New  Labour,  key  to  the  development  of  New  Labour,  and  its 
political  success,  is  the  `success'  of  a  Third  Way  orientation  towards  global 
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the  challenges  of  globalisation  and  its  effects.  Yet,  for  the  workers  at  WCCI,  New 
Labour's  route  through  global  challenges  have  similar  outcomes  to  those  of  the 
previous  Conservative  governments:  redundancy,  poverty,  and  marginalisation. 
Devoid  of  its  connection  to  the  workers'  perspective,  to  a  concern  for  outcomes  that 
were  at  least  perceived  as  at  the  core  of  Old  Labour's  political  programme,  New 
Labour  has  little  to  offer.  It  is  difficult  to  measure  how  this  will  impact  on  New 
Labour  in  the  future.  However,  what  may  become  increasingly  clear,  is  the  limited 
purchase  of  the  `at  least  they're  not  the  Tories'  perspective  that  played  an  important 
role  in  the  return  of  Labour  in  1997  and  2001.  This  serves  to  weaken  New  Labour, 
particularly  in  relation  to  the  wider  political  developments  that  are  discussed  below. 
This  weakness  is  further  compounded  in  relation  to  New  Labour's  recent  responses  to 
the  `dark  side'  of  globalisation  as  it  impacts  on  working  lives.  A  clear  example  of  this 
is  to  be  found  in  Blair's  recent  analysis  of  the  growing  trend  in  off-shore  outsourcing, 
not  simply  in  relation  to  production  but  also  in  the  service  sector.  In  March  2004, 
Blair  sought  to  highlight  what  he  saw  as  the  clear  benefits  of  jobs  moving  to  less 
developed  countries.  Put  simply,  this  is  good  for  business: 
...  contrary  to  every  instinctive  reaction,  such  methods  are  not  merely 
necessary  for  business  to  survive,  but  can  increase  the  provision  of 
jobs  if  the  extra  competitive  advantage  is  properly  used  (Blair  quoted 
in  The  Guardian  23rd  March  2004). 
Clearly  this  presents  difficulties  in  convincing  many  that  this  particular 
version  of  competitiveness  is  good  for  workers.  Though,  as  has  been  outlined 
throughout,  New  Labour  rhetoric  is  characteristically  vague,  this  speech  from  Blair 
contains  something  which  may  help  frame  the  New  Labour  future: 
We  have  to  take  on  and  defeat  the  resurgent  voices  of  protectionism 
(ibid). 
Although  this  is  rooted  in  Blair's  original  Third  Way  analysis  (1998a),  there  are  clear 
echoes  here  of  `taking  on  the  forces  of  conservatism'  in  relation  to  the  public  sector. 
This  may  represent  a  more  explicit  re-emergence  of  a  New  Labour  battle  on  two 
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In  relation  to  `taking  on  the  forces  of  conservatism  in  the  public  sector',  and  as 
a  result,  from  New  Labour's  perspective,  improving  service  delivery  therein,  there  has 
been  limited  success.  The  public  sector  remains  a  key  battleground  and  New  Labour 
`modernisation'  and  `reform'  have  done  little  to  assuage  this.  Recent  strikes  by 
members  of  the  CWU,  the  PCS  and  UNISON  confirm  that  New  Labour  has  been 
unable  to  talk  militancy  out  of  existence,  nor  is  there  much  evidence  to  suggest  that 
the  public  are  prepared  to  embrace  the  `solidarity  of  the  private'  that  I  noted  it  was 
seeking  to  develop.  One  important  problem  for  New  Labour  in  the  future  is  that  the 
cost  of  Public  Private  Partnerships  will  continue  to  `bite',  leaving  actual  service 
delivery  vulnerable  to  the  costs  of  servicing  debts  to  the  private  sector.  Moreover 
experience  of  `flagship'  PPPs,  like  that  to  build  the  new  Edinburgh  Royal  Infirmary, 
have  been  problematic,  and  the  apparent  `trade  off'  etween  the  private  sector 
profiting  from  public  services  and  improvements  in  services  has  been  increasingly 
questioned.  The  privatised  railways  are  a  key  exemplar.  Importantly,  evidence 
suggests  New  Labour's  perspective  is  clearly  at  odds  with  public  opinion  and  the 
government  face  its  fiercest,  well  organised  critics  in  the  rail  unions. 
Thus  far,  the  focus  of  `reform'  and  `modernisation'  in  the  public  sector  has 
been  on  local  government  and  the  NHS.  In  both  cases,  it  has  been  met  with  resistance. 
Most  recently,  in  terms  of  the  latter,  New  Labour's  introduction  of  foundation 
hospitals,  which  are  seen  as  divisive  and  as  a  clear  indication  of  support  for 
`marketisation',  drew  criticisms  from  outside  and  within  the  Labour  Party.  Whilst  the 
impact  of  this  is  yet  to  unfold,  given  the  extent  to  which  New  Labour  stakes  its  claims 
regarding  its  closeness  to  the  needs  of  consumers  and  its  endeavour  to  bring  about 
effective  improvements,  especially  in  the  NHS,  failure  here  could  do  New  Labour 
serious  damage.  The  difficulties  of  distinguishing  itself  from  the  Conservatives, 
outside  of  political  rhetoric,  may  become  increasingly  apparent.  Moreover,  the  costly 
`consultation'  and  review  culture,  that  has  become  a  central  element  of  the  New 
Labour  era  in  the  public  sector,  has  actually  intensified  people's  experience  of  `down 
grading'  and  closure  rather  than  bringing  about  improvements  in  popular 
understanding.  The  impact  of  this,  too,  continues  to  unfold,  though  faith  in  the 
listening  element  of  consultation  initiatives,  the  most  recent  example  of  which  being 
New  Labour's  `The  Big  Conversation'  with  the  public  on  services,  is  limited.  This 
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government  may  help  raise  expectations  that  cannot  be  fulfilled.  This  leaves  New 
Labour  vulnerable  to  attack,  not  simply  from  opposition  parties  seeking  to  capitalise 
on  a  lack  of  improved  services,  but  also  from  voter  complaints  regarding  New  Labour 
promising  much  and  delivering  little.  This  introduces  a  further,  key  issue  concerning 
New  Labour's  vulnerability  that  I  shall  return  to  below:  trust.  The  relationship 
between  New  Labour  rhetoric  and  the  reality  of  the  experience  of  New  Labour  has 
been  a  key  element  of  this  thesis.  But  the  persistence  and  pervasion  of  New  Labour's 
consultation  culture  alongside  reduced  services  brings  an  added  twist,  that  is  worthy 
of  further  study. 
As  noted  above,  thus  far  New  Labour's  rhetoric  of  `reform'  and 
`modernisation'  has  been  applied  most  in  practice  to  local  government  and  the  NHS. 
Towards  the  end  of  this  second  term  of  office  for  New  Labour,  the  focus  has  shifted 
to  the  reform  of  the  machinery  of  central  government,  the  civil  service.  The 
Chancellor's  2004  Budget  Statement  gives  us  a  clear  indication  of  both  a  key  election 
issue  for  the  2005  and  a  definitive  aspect  of  `third  term  New  Labour':  a  cull  in  the 
civil  service  that  represents  the  "largest  attack  on  the  civil  service  ever  mounted"  (The 
Observer  21St  March  2004).  `Efficiency'  savings  to  fund  a  £20  billion  switch  to 
frontline  services  will  involve,  according  to  Brown,  the  loss  of  forty  thousand  civil 
service  jobs,  though  other  estimates  suggest  the  number  could  be  as  high  as  eighty  to 
one  hundred  thousand  (The  Guardian  19th  March  2004).  This  development  has  further 
significance  in  relation  to  the  themes  explored  in  this  thesis. 
Firstly,  the  announcement  that  effectively  gives  tens  of  thousands  of  public 
sector  workers  their  `notice'  was  made  by  the  Chancellor  in  the  Budget  with  similar 
verve  to  that  of  a  positive  development,  a  `pleasant'  policy  for  the  common  good. 
Civil  servants'  modern  `partner'  in  government  chose  not  to  consult  on  or  discuss  the 
biggest  mass  redundancy  ever  faced  in  the  history  of  the  civil  service.  There  was  no 
evidence  of  partnership  principle  in  this  respect,  no  mutual  gains,  no  recognition  of 
distinct  yet  legitimate  interests.  Secondly,  there  is  more  evidence  in  this  issue  about 
New  Labour's  relationship  with  business  that  I  have  sought  to  highlight  throughout 
the  thesis.  The  merger  of  the  Customs  and  Excise  and  the  Inland  Revenue 
departments,  central  to  the  Chancellor's  proposal,  involves  the  creation  of  a  high- 
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department  (Brown  quoted  in  The  Guardian  19th  March  2004).  Thirdly,  the  main  civil 
service  union,  the  PCS,  has  indicated  that  it  is  prepared  to  take  a  "firm  line" 
(Serwotka  March  2004).  This  is  significant  in  that  PCS  General  Secretary,  Mark 
Serwotka,  is  a  popular  and  vociferous,  `awkward  squad',  New  Labour  critic,  and  the 
PCS  has  no  Labour  affiliation  to  hinder  its  struggle  in  opposition  to  New  Labour 
government  policy.  His  election,  and  that  of  Scottish  Socialist  Party  member  Janice 
Goodrich  as  President,  represented  the  culmination  of  a  struggle  against  the  union's 
rule  by  New  Labour  modernisers  that  actually  predates  the  election  of  the  New 
Labour  government.  Thus  New  Labour  is  setting  its  face  against  a  very  different  civil 
service  union  leadership  than  that  faced  by  the  Conservatives  in  the  1980s  and  1990s. 
As  a  result  of  this,  and  cuts  in  relative  terms  and  conditions,  it  faces  a  very  different 
civil  service.  Indeed,  PCS  members  in  the  Department  of  Work  and  Pensions  were 
already  taking  selective  industrial  action  on  low  pay  when  the  Chancellors 
announcement  was  made.  The  civil  service  and  the  outcomes  of  the  `firm  line'  of  the 
PCS  are  likely  to  develop  as  key  sites  for  the  further  analysis  of  a  new,  New  Labour 
era.  One  possible  point  of  departure  in  this  respect  could  be  to  explore  the  "protecting 
society"  role  that  the  previous  Conservative  administration  saw  as  central  to  the 
portrayal  of  the  function  of  Customs  and  Excise,  and  how  this  is  forcibly  re- 
conceptualised  by  the  New  Labour  shift  towards  fiscal  responsibility  that  the  merger 
signifies. 
Thus,  the  public  sector,  in  terms  of  limited  improvements  in  services, 
increasing  costs,  pressure  to  convince  the  public  on  its  real  aims  in  relation  to 
modernisation,  and  a  growing  resistance  to  its  objectives  by  workers,  remains  a  key 
`Achilles  heel'  for  New  Labour.  Whilst  the  idea  of  a  Summer  or  Winter  of  Discontent 
may  be  a  distant  dream  for  some  (nightmare  for  others),  the  public  sector  represents, 
paradoxically,  both  the  possible  embodiment  of  New  Labour  success  and  its 
weakness.  To  an  extent,  as  I  noted  earlier,  in  this  respect  there  are  clear  continuities 
with  Old  Labour.  However,  it  is  the  New  Labour  focus  on  opportunity  over  outcome 
that  not  only  distinguishes  it  from  Old  Labour,  but  that  also  leaves  it  more  vulnerable 
than  its  Old  Labour  predecessors.  Moreover,  New  Labour's  approach  to  public 
services  has  been  one  of  the  key  themes  of  attempts  within  the  Labour  Party  to 
`reclaim'  it  from  what  is  both  perceived  and  portrayed  as  its  Blairite  `virus'  and,  as 
such,  is  intrinsically  linked  to  key  political  developments  that  threaten  the  Project. 276 
A  key  claim  made  in  the  thesis  is  regards  the  ability  of  reformism  to  reinvent 
itself.  Whilst  New  Labour  demonstrates  in  sharp  relief  the  difficulties  of  reformism 
without  positive,  lasting  reforms,  its  limitations  are  also  helping  to  give  life  to 
initiatives  to  reclaim  Labour.  One  such  development  emerged  at  the  end  of  2003  with 
the  foundation  of  the  `New  Wave  Labour'  group  of  MP's  whose  aim  is  to  influence 
the  party's  goals  for  the  2005  elections  and  steer  it  towards  a: 
Deeper  democracy:  challenging  market  fundamentalism.. 
. 
New  Wave 
Labour  is  grounded  in  Labour's  core  values  of  equality,  fairness  and 
social  justice  as  well  as  recognising  the  importance  of  responsibility 
and  economic  opportunity  (New  Wave  Labour  2004). 
It  is  worth  noting,  firstly,  that  at  first  sight,  such  statements  from  `New  Wave  Labour' 
seemingly  bear  the  clear  imprint  of  New  Labour.  Secondly,  however,  what  is  clear 
from  `New  Wave  Labour'  material  is  an  implicit  concern  for  the  `social'  that,  despite 
its  rhetoric,  New  Labour  has  struggled  to  convince  its  support  for.  Hence  its  manifesto 
is  peppered  with  claims  suggesting  a  definite  turn  away  from  New  Labour:  support 
for  notions  like  "collective  provision",  measures  "against  inequality",  "democratic 
socialism",  "markets  have  limits"  etc.  There  are  two  main  issues  worthy  of  our 
attention  here,  however  brief.  The  first  is  that  New  Wave  Labour,  thus  far  at  least,  in 
its  tone  and  its  apparent  concerns  is,  to  an  extent,  New  Labouresque.  Just  as  the  Third 
Way  seemingly  represented  a  move  `beyond  left  and  right',  this  is  a  move  `beyond 
New  Labour'.  Hence  the  second  point.  What  `New  Wave  Labour'  could  represent  is 
the  emergence  of  a  strategy  for  a  post  Blair  horizon  that  takes  the  `best'  of  New 
Labour  and,  `in  its  own  image',  recognises  those  `mistakes'  of  the  past. 
A  clear  difficulty,  in  respect  of  new  initiatives  within  the  party,  is  related  to 
the  transformation  of  how  it  operates,  post-modernisation.  A  key  element  of  New 
Labour  is  its  leadership-driven,  party  professionals-led,  character.  This  limits  the 
scope  of  grassroots,  membership-based,  success  in  initiating  further  transformation  of 
the  machinery  of  the  party.  Whilst  this  favoured  a  popular  `Blairism',  this  approach  is 
representative  of  a  further  problem  for  `future  Labour'.  It  has  helped  to  create  and,  in 
recent  times,  calibrate  concerted  and  well-organised  challenges  outside  the  Labour 
Party  in  the  shape,  firstly,  of  the  Socialist  Alliance  and,  secondly,  of  the  Respect 
Unity  Coalition  Party,  in  England  and  Wales.  Launched  late  in  2003,  the  latter 
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political  party  that  is  considered  a  highly  significant  development.  Respect  "stands  for 
peace,  social  justice  and  public  provision  from  the  cradle  to  the  grave..  .  and  the  return 
to  public  ownership  of  our  essential  services"  (Respect  2004).  The  focal  point  of  its 
challenge  to  New  Labour  is  the  elections  for  the  Greater  London  Assembly  and  the 
European  Parliament  in  June  2004.  Certainly,  both  the  lack  of  dissent  allowed  within 
New  Labour  and  its  lack  of  concern  for  more  `traditional  interests',  have  helped  to 
increase  membership  and  support  for  the  SSP  in  Scotland.  The  influence  of  the  Anti- 
War  Movement  has  been  obvious  in  both  developments.  Thus,  it  should  be  noted  that 
the  continuing  occupation  of  Iraq,  with  all  its  inherent,  financial  and  otherwise, 
problems  for  Blair  and  New  Labour  generally,  and  public  opposition  to  it,  presents 
Blair  with  his  strongest  leadership  challenge  at  this  juncture.  Despite  a  contemporary 
move  by  some  MPs,  like  Peter  Hain,  to  try  to  reinvigorate  grass  roots  activism 
through  internal  reforms  (Catalyst  2004),  and  the  apparent  turn  away  from  `actually 
existing'  New  Labour  by  the  `New  Wave'  group,  the  war  in  Iraq  and  Blair's 
continuing  support  for  George  Bush  is  shaping  up  as  Blair's  `poll  tax'.  It  certainly 
raises  questions  over  `listening'  New  Labour,  given  the  scale  and  size  of  an 
opposition  that  numbers  many  millions  if  demonstrations  against  it  are  taken  as  an 
indicator. 
As  noted  earlier,  the  issue  of  trust  is  becoming  increasingly  thorny  for  the 
Blair  government.  This  has  concerned  the  ability,  even  willingness,  of  New  Labour  to 
deliver  what  its  rhetoric  says  it  will.  It  has  also  been  related  to  the  public's  suspicion 
of  spin  and  what  I  would  term  `rule  by  red  top',  where,  despite  what  is  proposed  by 
Blair  and  his  ministers,  and,  despite  claims  regarding  New  Labour's  connection  to 
`true'  Labour  values,  the  development  of  policy  is  often  related  to  relentless  tabloid 
headlines.  Immigration  and  Europe  are  key  examples  of  this  occurring  in  practice. 
Hence,  a  question  of  trust  regarding  how  firmly  the  government  would  be  prepared  to 
set  its  face  against  a  critical  media  is  raised.  However,  where  the  issue  of  trust  has 
been  most  problematic  for  Blair  has  been  over  the  war,  the  existence  of  `weapons  of 
mass  destruction',  and  the  reasons  presented  to  justify  war  and  occupation.  It  is  not 
possible  to  fully  explore  the  issue  of  the  war  here.  What  I  am  suggesting  is  that  the 
war  is  doubly  threatening  for  Blair.  Firstly,  in  the  sense  noted  previously  whereby 
tragic  developments  in  terms  of  casualties  etc.  can  and  will  impact  on  the  government. 
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regarding  the  run-up  to  war  will  apply  further  pressure  that  could  do  serious  damage. 
Overall,  just  as  a  central  element  in  the  demise  of  the  previous  Conservative 
government  was  sleaze,  the  weak-spot  akin  to  this  for  New  Labour  could  be  trust. 
One  further  possible  problem  that  New  Labour  could  face  is  a  revitalised 
Conservative  Party  under  the  leadership  of  Michael  Howard.  For  the  whole  of  Blair's 
term  in  office  thus  far,  the  Conservatives  have  never  posed  a  clear  political  threat. 
Arguably,  since  1997,  elections  have  been  exercises  in  damage  limitation  for  them  as 
they  sought  to  confront  a  strong,  `relevant',  and  popular  New  Labour  in  the  face  of 
the  Conservative  Party's  own  division,  dissent,  and  leadership  weaknesses.  Currently, 
there  are  sighs  that  this  is  changing.  In  this  respect,  I  would  like  to  posit  two 
interconnected  ways  in  which  developments  in  relation  to  the  Conservatives  could 
impact  negatively  on  `future  Labour'.  The  first  concerns  the  possibility  of  a  quasi- 
Third  Way  Conservative  Party  -a  'new'  move  for  them  beyond  `right  and  right'. 
Whilst,  thus  far,  there  is  limited  evidence  for  this,  the  success  of  New  Labour  in  key 
`Tory  domain'  areas,  like  public  sector  privatisations,  could  offer  the  Conservatives 
direction  in  their  own  policy  developments.  Moreover,  Conservative  developments 
need  to  be  understood  in  relation  to  what  the  Party  will  inherit  if  elected  to  govern. 
For  example,  there  is  little  in  the  flexibility,  competitiveness  and  partnership  ideology, 
as  outlined  in  this  thesis,  which  the  Conservatives  would  find  too  problematic. 
Arguably,  in  addition,  even  the  type  of  Labour  Movement  that  New  Labour  has 
sought  to  construct,  and  the  outlook  of  the  modern(ised)  trade  union  bureaucracy,  may 
offer  the  Conservative  Party  a  key  site  in  which  it  could  seek  to  construct  new 
alliances.  At  this  juncture,  what  is  clear  is  that  it  will  be  unable  to  convincingly 
construct  the  unions  as  demonic,  undemocratic,  Labour  puppet-masters,  leaving  a  gap 
in  the  Party's  political  posture  of  the  last  thirty  years.  A  shift  towards  a  more- 
consensual  approach  to  unions  is,  therefore,  not  quite  as  `far  fetched'  as  it  sounds. 
Hence  it  is  possible  to  envisage  the  `transformation'  and  `reform'  of  the  Conservative 
Party  whereby  old  alliances  are  reconfigured  (since  it  will  need  to  re-engage  business 
in  the  light  of  New  Labour  success)  and  new  ones  are  formed. 
The  second  issue  is  grounded  more  in  contemporary  reality.  A  central 
supportive  factor  for  New  Labour,  despite  the  weaknesses,  the  contradictions,  and  the 
damage  that  it  is  able  to  inflict,  is  what  I  would  term  the  `lest  we  forget  mentality'.  As 279 
I  noted  in  New  Labour  and  the  Unions,  Blair  himself  has  used  the  spectre  of  the  return 
of  the  Conservatives  as  motivator  to  ensure  some  bitter  pills  were  smartly  swallowed, 
especially  by  the  unions.  But  a  key  difficulty  is,  as  New  Labour  has  progressed,  it  has 
become  problematic  to  counter-pose  the  two  as  diametric  opposites.  Ironically,  this 
may  be  representative  of  an  inadvertent  New  Labour  synthesis  too  far,  and  the  extent 
to  which  New  Labour  can  now  use  the  Conservative  Party,  and,  especially,  previous 
Conservative  governments,  as  something  to  define  itself  against  is  waning.  Moreover 
both  parties  face,  not  only  an  electorate  increasingly  disengaged  from  `mainstream' 
political  activity,  but  one  that  increasingly  has  little  experience  of  the  Conservative 
New  Right  in  power,  and  no  experience  of  apparently  more  worker-centred, 
redistribution-focused,  Labour  governments.  It  is  the  understanding  of  these  distinct 
positions  that  kept  many  ordinary  people  loyal  to  Labour  during  the  1980s  and  1990s. 
This  change,  I  would  argue,  is  more  damaging  to  Labour  than  to  the  Conservatives.  I 
also  believe  that  useful  research  could  be  carried  out  in  relation  to  these  political 
developments  in  terms  of  engagement  with  the  `mainstream'  democratic  process,  and, 
importantly,  a  possible  rejection  of  it,  whereby  the  lack  of  distinction  between  the  two 
main  parties  at  Westminster  encourage  people  to  turn  away  from  elections  as  a  key 
method  of  political  expression.  Signs  are  already  emerging  that  they  are  but  research 
could  focused  on  the  `why'  in  relation  to  the  political  programmes  of  each  party. 
A  Weakening  Link? 
A  central  element  in  the  shifting  electorate,  and  which  party  such  changes 
might  favour,  is  connected  to  the  unions'  fortunes,  and  the  relationship  between  them 
and  Labour.  This  is  linked  to  continuing  questions  over  the  contemporary  relevance  of 
unions  in  a  context  where  "only  18%  of  under  twenty-nine  year  olds  belong  to  a 
union"  (Toynbee  2004).  However,  it  also  needs  to  be  explored  in  relation  to  my 
earlier  arguments  about  the  maintenance  of  the  `false  dichotomy'  between  politics  and 
economics  that  underpins  the  Labour-union  relationship.  There  are  important  issues 
that  require  further  analysis,  as  events  unfold.  The  first  is  relatively  simple.  Given  the 
features  of  the  New  Labour  era  that  I  have  outlined  throughout,  an  acceptance  of 
`looking  to  Labour'  politically,  tacit  or  otherwise,  can  no  longer  be  assumed. 
Increasingly,  the  bureaucracy  of  the  union  movement,  if  it  is  successful  in  its 
apparently  distinct  `economic'  aim  of  growing  the  movement  (numerically  at  least), 
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historical  endeavour  and  assumed,  large-scale,  gains  made  on  workers'  behalf  through 
the  operation  of  the  Labour-union  link.  This  is  an  important  development,  and  a  key 
reason  for  viewing  experience  of  New  Labour  as  having  inflicted  damage  upon  this 
dichotomy.  In  turn,  this,  I  believe,  has  forced  unions  to  work  harder  in  justifying  the 
movement's  support  for  Labour,  and,  so  far,  New  Labour  has  left  this  job  largely  to 
the  unions.  However,  perhaps  a  defining  feature  of  the  coming  period  will  see  New 
Labour  having  to  work  harder  in  this  area. 
This  is  linked  to  a  second  point,  regarding  the  difficulties  both  face  in  doing 
so.  One  central  reason  for  reproducing  the  words  of  the  Billy  Bragg  song  at  the 
beginning  of  this  chapter,  was  that  it  represents  the  embodiment  of  a  "them  and  us" 
perspective  that  has  helped  sustain  Labour  and  the  unions  for  over  a  century.  Hence, 
the  sentiment  of  this  song  helps  sum  up  exactly  what  New  Labour  sets  itself  against 
ideologically.  This  ultimately  raises  this  question  of  whether  `modern'  trade  union 
members  across  different  industries  and  occupation  would  recognise  the  trade 
unionism  of  New  Labour  and  the  union  bureaucracy  as  the  movement  that  Bragg  is 
describing.  On  one  hand,  perhaps  New  Labour  would  argue  that,  if  it  is  the  case  that 
they  do  not  recognise  Bragg's  `power  in  the  union',  then  this  is  a  clear  indication  of 
the  success  of  New  Labour,  although  there  is  some  hint  in  it  of  membership 
`servicing'.  On  the  other  hand,  without  such  underpinning  values,  I  would  argue  that 
there  may  seem  very  little  point  in  actively  engaging  with  even  the  bureaucratic 
machinery  of  the  union.  Membership  -  yes,  activity  -  no.  Yet  both  unions  and  New 
Labour  need  such  a  movement,  for  without  it  faith  in  the  joint  historical  project  of 
reformism  can  wane.  The  idea  of  unions  representing  an  alternative  ideological 
programme,  as  the  Bragg  song  alludes  to,  is  at  their  very  core.  This  is  problematic  for 
unions  and  for  Labour.  It  is  also  related  to  a  distinction  that  I  noted  in  Reflections  on 
the  `New'  World  of  Work  between  `having  a  union'  and  `being  unionised'.  The  former 
is  a  starting  point  and  is  certainly  the  epitome  of  the  union  bureaucracy's  approach 
currently.  Yet,  as  we  found  with  WCCI,  `having  a  union'  is  no  discriminator  in 
relation  to  cuts  and  job  losses.  Nor  is  `being  unionised'.  However  I  would  distinguish 
it  from  `having  a  union'  since  I  judge  it  to  be  representative  of  having  consolidated, 
with  meaningful  activity  that  is  necessary  oppositional  in  character,  the  `having  a 
union'  position  to  move  towards  vibrant  organisation  at  grassroots  level  and 
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context,  it  appears  that  the  `having  a  union'  position  is  the  sole  aim  for  the  union 
movement,  the  `best'  that  can  be  hoped  for.  Yet  there  are  problems  inherent  in  this  for 
both  Labour  and  the  unions.  If,  as  Blair  and  New  Labour,  and  some  union  leaders 
would  have  it,  unions  are  `on  the  side  of  business  not  in  their  way'  and,  crucially,  that 
they  are  servicing  organisation  like,  perhaps,  insurance  companies,  then  what  is  there 
to  engage  with  in  terms  of  political  challenges?  Insurance  companies  do  not  look  to 
their  customers  to  take  militant  action  to  defend  them  against  attacks  from  rivals.  To 
take  this  analogy  a  little  further  in  relation  to  other  servicing  functions,  the  `logical' 
outcome  of  the  position  that  New  Labour  claims  it  places  trade  unions  in  is  that  they 
would  face  competition  from  other  `providers'. 
Of  course  this  is  unlikely  to  be  the  case.  What  I  am  trying  to  address  here  is 
that  unions  continue  to  be  central  to  Labour  and  to  working  life.  The  issue  here,  that  is 
perhaps  another  key  site  for  further  exploration,  is  that  what  is  marginalised  by  New 
Labour  and  the  union  bureaucracy,  is  any  sense  of  trade  unionism  being  a  key  feature 
of  a  `class  for  itself'.  It  is  a  sense  of  a  collective  historical  endeavour  that  holds  the 
key  to  the  development  of  trade  unionism  and  its  continuing  relevance  in  the  twenty- 
first  century.  It  is  the  fusion,  not  the  separation  of  `political',  `economic'  and,  indeed, 
class  consciousness  that  breeds  a  vibrant,  and,  to  adopt  New  Labouresque 
terminology,  relevant,  Labour  Movement. 
There  are  many  important  developments  in  relation  to  unions  that  I  would  like 
to  examine.  However,  mindful  of  constraints  of  space,  I  would  like  to  conclude  this 
brief  discussion  with  one  further  area  where  problems  for  both  New  Labour  and 
unions  may  emerge.  Before  doing  so,  it  is  worth  re-iterating  that  militancy,  especially 
in  the  public  sector,  and  hence  against  the  New  Labour  grain,  has  continued  apace.  In 
some  areas,  like  the  Post  Office  for  example,  the  last  year  or  so  has  seen  the  `return  of 
the  wildcats'  (Socialist  Review  December  2003).  As  I  write  (April  2004),  in  Scotland, 
the  national  strike  against  low  pay  by  Nursery  Nurses,  employed  by  Scotland's  local 
authorities,  continues  and  this  is  the  longest  running,  all-out-indefinite,  national, 
dispute  there  since  the  Miners  in  1984-5.  Whilst  there  is  not  time  to  explore  these  in 
detail  here,  it  is  worth  noting  in  relation  to  the  latter,  an  important  point  that  links  to 
the  final  issue  I  want  to  discuss  in  relation  to  the  Labour-union  link.  At  this  juncture, 
the  strike  is  in  the  process  of  breaking  down.  Put  simply,  a  central  element  of  the 282 
Nursery  Nurses  (and  UNISON's)  claim  was  for  a  Scotland-wide  pay  settlement  and 
now  the  union  is  agreeing  local  deals  with  employers.  The  point  that  I  want  to  make 
here  is  that,  especially  in  the  public  sector  and  especially  in  relation  to  UNISON,  New 
Labour's  term  in  office  would  have  been  made  much  more  difficult  without  the 
capitulation  of  trade  union  leaders  and  the  marginalisation  of  members'  interests  for 
reasons  of  political  expediency.  In  a  sense,  as  I  have  noted  in  New  Labour  and  the 
Unions,  there  is  little  to  distinguish  New  Labour  from  its  Old  Labour  predecessors. 
However,  and  this  leads  onto  my  concluding  point  regarding  unions;  Labour  and  the 
trade  union  bureaucracy  can  no  longer  rely  on  the  assumption  that  the  link  will  be 
maintained  and  hence  deliver  for  Labour.  Thus  far,  only  the  RMT  have  officially 
`broken'  and  been  subsequently  expelled  from  the  Labour  Party,  though  other  unions 
(the  FBU  and  the  CWU  for  example)  have  amended  their  individual  operation  of  the 
link  due  to  membership  pressure.  These,  and  the  other  unions  maintaining  the  link,  are 
however  becoming  increasingly  critical  of  New  Labour.  This  is  clearly  challenging,  as 
is  the  continuing  problematic  relations  with  key  trade  union  figures  and  the  growing 
awkward  squad.  However,  whilst  New  Labour  faces  problems  with  its  affiliated 
unions,  I  would  like  to  posit  a  further  key  problem  for  `future  Labour'  away  from 
those  most  obviously  connected  with  the  `what  do  we  get  for  our  money  arguments'. 
A  key  element  of  the  movement  for  `democratic  unionism'  and  `democratise 
funding',  discussed  briefly  in  New  Labour  and  the  Unions,  has  of  course  been  to  try 
to  force  the  whole  question  of  the  continuing  link  onto  the  union  agenda,  and  to 
challenge  the  trade  union  bureaucracy  to  offer  members  a  choice  in  relation  to  which 
political  party  their  union  helps  fund.  Most  union  rulebooks  only  cover  affiliation 
with  Labour,  thus  precluding  funding  for  other  parties,  even  where  there  is  a 
democratic  mandate  to  do  sot.  However,  a  further,  significant,  feature  of  this 
movement  is  to  encourage  unions  without  a  political  fund  to  set  one  up.  Importantly, 
these  are  unions  that  are  not  already  affiliated  to  the  Labour  Party.  There  are  three 
points  worthy  of  note  here.  Firstly,  for  the  first  time  since  the  Conservatives 
2  In  the  case  of  UNISON's  'fudge'  of  having  two  separate  political  funds,  the  Affiliated  Political  Fund 
(APF)  and  the  General  Political  Fund  (GPF)  what  appears,  at  face  value,  the  epitome  of  democratic 
trade  unionism  and  a  compromise  relevant  to  the  traditions  of  local  government  and  health  service 
unions  that  merged,  creating  UNISON,  appears  otherwise,  on  further  exploration.  The  APF  pays 
money  directed  to  the  Labour  Party  and  the  GPF  is  used  to  further  UNISON's  aims  politically  through 
campaigning  and  the  like.  Yet  the  rules  of  the  union  state  that  the  GPF  cannot  operate  contra  to  APF 
interests.  Hence  an  openly  political  campaign  against  New  Labour  policy  could  not  be  funded  from  the 
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introduced  the  legal  requirement  for  unions  to  ballot  their  membership  on  political 
affiliation,  those  voting  will  not  readily  assume  a  `yes'  vote  in  such  a  ballot  as  a  pro- 
Labour  vote.  Secondly,  the  growth  in  alternatives  to  Labour  in  this  respect,  especially, 
though  by  no  means  exclusively,  the  Scottish  Socialist  Party,  presents  progressive 
choices  in  such  a  ballot  that  have  been  hitherto  unavailable.  Hence  New  Labour  could 
face  much  more  concerted  political  challenges  that  are  both  well-funded  and  well- 
organised.  Of  course,  Labour  would  likely  remain  one  of  the  choices  members  would 
be  faced  with.  However,  and  this  is  the  third  and  final  point,  problems  for  Labour  lie 
in  which  unions  are  likely  to  consider  balloting  their  members.  First  amongst  these 
could  be  the  PCS,  where  as  noted  above,  confidence  in  New  Labour  is  diminishing 
and  militancy  against  it  is  likely  to  increase.  Then,  until  now,  the  AUT  has  had  no 
political  affiliation,  and  it  has  recently  been  involved  in  action  against  cuts  in  terms 
and  conditions.  Crucially,  as  the  AUT's  recent  action  demonstrated,  key  features  of 
many  disputes  are  now  becoming  focused  on  linking  what  appear  as  `employment 
specific  grievances'  to  a  critique  of  the  general  political  climate.  Hence,  the  AUT 
action  was  intrinsically  linked  to  the  National  Union  of  Students  campaign  against 
top-up  tuition  fees,  student  poverty  and  debt.  In  any  event,  these  have  all  the 
difficulties  for  New  Labour  of  public  sector  militancy  that  I  have  already  outlined. 
The  possibility  of  unions  and  their  members  linking  their  `fights'  with  employers  with 
New  Labour  political  policies  adds  to  the  potential  risk  for  New  Labour.  Nonetheless, 
it  is  the  possibility  of  a  persistent  and  increasingly  pervasive  militancy  (in  relation  to 
the  public  sector  at  least),  not  bound  by  any  sense  of  delivering  for  Labour  by  having 
to  `toe  the  line'  without  experience  of  Minkin's  "transactional  consciousness"  (1991: 
654),  that  presents  New  Labour  with  its  greatest  trade  union  threat.  Thus,  as  events 
transpire,  there  is  some  likelihood  that  `future  Labour'  will  have  to  spend  as  much 
energy  on  re-stating  the  centrality  of  its  relationship  with  the  trade  unions  as  the 
modernisation  project  did  trying  to  underplay  it. 
Settling  Down  to  the  Scottish  Settlement 
By  necessity,  I  will  keep  this  discussion  brief,  not  least  because  what  I  have 
already  discussed  above  is  clearly  relevant  in  Scotland  and,  as  such,  will  impact  on 
developments  in  the  Scottish  polity.  However,  as  I  outlined  in  A  Tartan  Third  Way, 
Scotland  remains  an  interesting  site  for  analysis  in  the  light  of  the  specific  way  the 
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persistence  of  the  `is  Scotland  different,  more  radical  etc?  '  discourse.  Given  recent, 
`Scottish  specific'  developments  like  the  Nursery  Nurses  dispute  and  that  the  RMT's 
historic  decision  was  taken,  firstly,  by  its  Scottish  membership,  there  is  still  much 
scope  for  further  research  in  this  respect.  Here,  though,  I  would  like  to  briefly  allude 
to  what  I  currently  perceive  as  issues  related  to  Scotland,  in  particular,  relevant  to  the 
key  arguments  of  this  thesis. 
Firstly,  as  noted  in  Reflections  on  the  'New'  World  of  Work,  thus  far 
experience  of  New  Labour's  search  for  `Scottish  solutions  for  Scottish  problems' 
actually  demonstrates  a  paucity  of  solutions,  as  the  final  pages  of  the  WCCI  story  and 
the  discussion  of  developments  in  Inverclyde  illustrated  in  sharp  relief.  The  creation 
of  `knowledge  jobs',  Blair's  Third  Way  `a  new  job  if  you  old  one  goes'  mantra, 
economic  success  (profit)  delivering  social  justice,  have  been  exposed  as  hollow  in 
relation  to  the  evidence  I  have  presented.  One  important  facet  of  this  is  continuing  to 
develop  is  the  abdication  of  `meaningful'  responsibility  that  the  devolution  settlement 
has  facilitated.  New  Labour  in  power,  in  both  the  Westminster  and  Holyrood 
parliaments,  has,  I  believe,  helped  reinforce  and  reconfigure  the  very  democratic 
deficit  devolution  was  expected  to  address. 
I  noted  earlier  how  new  layers  of  governance  had  not  only  not  created  greater 
democracy  but  are  actually  acting  a  barrier  to  the  development  of  effective  solutions, 
and  were  helping  to  `shore  up'  New  Labour's  ideological  perspective  with  little 
practical  improvement.  I  would  like  to  briefly  explore  this  process  occurring  in 
practice  by  looking  at  two  important  examples.  For  the  first,  I  return  to  the  Nursery 
Nurses  strike.  The  Nursery  Nurses  seek  a  national  agreement  on  pay  and  conditions. 
They  are  employed  by  local  authorities,  the  majority  of  which  are  Labour  controlled 
and  grouped  in  the  Convention  of  Scottish  Local  Authorities  (COSLA).  The  workers' 
fight  is  in  one  sense  with  each  local  authority,  the  first  layer  of  power,  but  they  are 
governed  by  Labour  dominated  COSLA,  the  second  layer.  An  agreement  cannot  be 
reached  so  the  workers  have  attempted  to  take  their  fight  to  the  Labour-dominated 
Scottish  Parliament,  layer  three,  who  claim  they  are  powerless  to  intervene  to  impose 
a  national  settlement.  The  point  here  is  not  simply  that  New  Labour  dominates  at  each 
level,  though  this  is  significant,  but  that  having  it  dominate  at  each  level  impacts  to 
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is  their  powerlessness.  It  is  difficult  to  perceive  how  a  democratic  deficit  is  being 
addressed  in  the  `goverment  without  power/power  without  governing'  complex  that 
has  developed  to  characterise  the  devolution  settlement  in  Scotland. 
This  is  further  demonstrated  by  what  I  argue  is  the  creation  of  new  facet  to  the 
democratic  deficit,  regarding  policy  decisions  that  do  not  affect  Scotland  being  taken 
by  Scottish  Westminster  MPs.  This  is  particularly  relevant  in  controversial  decisions 
like  those  to  introduce  foundation  hospitals  and  university  top-up  tuitions  fees  that 
only  passed  in  the  House  of  Commons  with  the  support  of  Scottish  Labour  MPs.  At 
this  current  juncture,  this  is  certainly  presenting  New  Labour  with  a  clear  win-win 
situation.  Unpopular  policy  is  shored  up  by  people  whose  constituents  will  not  be 
affected  by  it,  hence  Scottish  MPs  do  not  need  to  justify  their  actions  to  them  to  any 
extent.  In  this  sense,  Scottish  MPs  run  the  least  risk  of  being  called  to  account  by  their 
voters  and  can  therefore  provide  New  Labour  with  an  unquestioning  reservoir  of 
support.  Labour's  continuing  domination  in  Scotland  ensures  there  are  enough  of 
them  to  change  the  course  of  events  in  key  areas  where  the  government  face 
opposition  from  its  own  (English  and  Welsh)  MPs.  Interestingly,  this  means  that  even 
a  Scottish  MP  who  is  against  a  specific  policy,  has  little  to  gain  and  very  much  more 
to  lose  by  setting  his  or  her  face  against  the  leadership.  Again,  there  is  little  here  to 
support  any  New  Labour  claims  regarding  democratic  renewal  and  addressing 
democratic  deficit  in  this  situation.  At  face  value  at  least,  this  creates  something  of  a 
protective  layer  around  the  individual  MPs  and,  importantly,  around  unpopular  New 
Labour  policy.  However,  it  is  worth  recognising  the  damage  that  a  democratic  deficit, 
differently  configured,  was  able  to  inflict  on  previous  Conservative  governments. 
Whilst  New  Labour  is  strengthened  by  its  domination  of  Scottish  politics 
overall,  it  is  important  to  point  out  a  key  area  where  this  domination  may  help  create 
weakness  in  the  longer  term.  As  noted  above,  Labour  continues  to  dominate  local 
government  in  Scotland.  Indeed,  the  retention  of  local  strength  helped  Labour  to 
maintain  a  powerful  political  position  in  Scotland  whilst  `frozen  out'  of  government 
office.  However,  a  central  element  of  this,  and  Labour-dominated  regional 
government,  was  the  existence  of  a  `fall  back'  position  whereby  ultimately  the  blame 
for  cuts  in  services,  rising  local  taxation,  the  depletion  of  resources  to  manage  etc., 
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Unpalatable  policy  could  be  reinforced  with  a  `heavy  heart'  or  even  resisted,  as  part 
of  concerted  campaigns  against  a  government  `that  we  did  not  even  vote  for'.  This, 
again,  helped  bolster  support  for  Labour  nationally,  as  the  promise  of  badly  needed, 
local,  improvements  were  perceived  as  not  only  contingent  upon  the  election  of  a 
Labour  government  but  that  these,  in  a  sense,  would  then  be  a  mere  formality.  Now, 
as  I  have  suggested  throughout  the  thesis,  this  has  not  turned  out  to  be  the  case.  This 
leaves  Labour  councillors  with  two  clear  and  interconnected  problems.  Firstly,  there 
is  little  scope  to  openly  criticise  the  New  Labour  vision  that  they  are  charged  with 
delivering,  and  this  renders  them  largely  unable  to  engage  with  wider  political 
opposition  and  campaigns  against  the  leadership  of  their  own  party.  This  is  not  to 
suggest  that  all  Labour  councillors  are  unprepared  to  criticise  New  Labour  policy. 
Many  were  vociferous  in  the  condemnation  of  the  war  in  Iraq,  for  example.  But  there 
is  a  distinct  lack  of  this,  particularly  where  policy  is  directly  connected  to  the  delivery 
of  local  government  services.  Apparent  Labour  council  support  for  Public  Private 
Partnerships  in  schools  and  the  sale  of  social  housing  to  private  housing  associations, 
are  key  exemplars  of  this  point.  As  with  other  possible  problems  for  `future  Labour', 
the  impact  of  this  is  yet  to  unfold.  However,  exploring  this  as  it  emerges  or  the  routes 
through  this  taken  by  Labour  councillors  that  face  `credibility'  challenges,  could  form 
the  basis  of  further  research.  Interestingly,  a  similar  problem  faces  Liberal  Democrat 
councillor  whose  party  are  also  in  Government  in  Holyrood,  though  their  `third  party 
status'  at  Westminster  clearly  lessens  the  impact  of  this. 
The  final  issue  that  I  want  to  briefly  consider  is  one  that  in  no  small  has 
dominated  the  `business'  of  Scottish  politics  almost  since  the  first  day  of  devolution 
in  practice,  the  cost  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  building.  Up  from  a  price  tag  of  around 
£40  million,  the  as  yet  uncompleted  Parliament  building  will  cost  more  than  ten  times 
that.  It  is  not  possible  to  explore  this  is  any  detail,  and  it  has  already  had  more 
coverage  than  any  other  issue  thus  far  in  Scottish  politics  since  1999.  But  I  refer  to  it 
here  because  of  its  possible  wider  implications.  Importantly,  in  one  sense,  the  story  of 
the  Parliament  building  has  come  to  represent  a  dominant  perception  of  the  devolution 
settlement:  was  it  worth  it?  There  is  a  sense  of  frustration  at  the  overall  lacklustre 
Scottish  politics  that  have  helped  to  define  devolution  so  far.  This  has  lead  to 
questions  over  the  calibre  of  politicians,  the  conduct  of  parliamentary  business  where 
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opaque  committee  system,  and,  importantly,  where  all  key  decisions  are  taken  four 
hundred  miles  away  in  London.  There  is  little  sign  or  sense  of  a  reinvigorated 
democracy  and,  I  argue,  the  political  battle  over  the  cost  of  the  building  and  the 
method  of  its  commissioning,  embody  this.  This  creates  two  specific  problems  that  I 
feel  will  not  simply  disappear  once  the  shinny  new  building  is  opened  to  the  MSPs 
and  the  camera-clad  tourists  who  might  flock  to  it.  The  first  is  already  in  evidence. 
Each  time  a  public  service  or  facility  is  under  threat  the  question  of  the  cost  of  the 
Parliament  is  raised.  And  this  is  done  so  from  the  increasingly  dominant  perspective 
that  sees  our  elected  representatives  as  feathering  their  own  nests  out  of  the  public 
purse,  whilst  services  are  cut  and  key  social  justice  promises  are  left  unfulfilled.  The 
first  generation  of  Scottish  New  Labour  MSPs  will  long  be  associated  with  this 
sentiment.  This  leads  to  the  second  problem.  Being  openly  confronted  with  such  an 
explicit  cost  of  New  Labour's  `new'  Scotland,  the  question  of  benefit  is  never  far 
away. 
A  Reflexive  `Moment'  in  a  Long  Struggle 
I  have  chosen  this,  the  final  section  of  the  thesis,  as  the  most  fitting  point  to 
return  to  the  WCCI  story.  All  too  often  what  the  reader  is  presented  with  in  academic 
work  is  a  somewhat  `sanitised'  version  of  a  very  real  and  emotional  process  that 
impacts  on  the  researcher  as  well  as  the  `researched'.  Structure  is  often  something  that 
we  impose  after  the  event  in  terms  of  research  activity  and  analysis  takes  place  `at  a 
distance'  from  actual  events.  Bourdieu  (1999:  608)  has  argued  that: 
...  a  reflex  reflexivity  based  on  a  craft,  a  sociological  "feel"  or  "eye", 
allows  one  to  perceive  and  to  monitor,  on  the  spot  ...  the  effects  of  the 
social  structure  [within  which  the  interview  is]  occurring. 
When  such  an  understanding  occurs  on  the  spot,  it  is  important  to  highlight 
and  utilise  it,  though  when  caught  up  in  concerns  for  rigour,  objectivity,  and  academic 
`form'  this  is  not  always  possible.  Yet  it  is  in  such  moments  that  the  impact  of  the 
research  process  on  the  researcher  is  most  keenly  felt. 
I  would  like  to  conclude  my  thesis  by  trying  to  demonstrate  what  I  have 
described  above  in  relation  to  the  case  study  of  this  research,  by  presenting  extracts 
from  notes  taken  at  the  final  union  meeting  that  I  attended  at  the  time  of  the  closure  of 288 
WCCI,  Gourock.  It  is,  in  a  sense,  the  final  piece  of  the  empirical  jigsaw  of  WCCI.  I 
believe  it  demonstrates  an  `on  the  spot'  understanding  of  social  structure  as  the 
research  is  taking  place  in  relation  to  the  key  themes  of  the  research,  and  the 
sociological  value  of,  just  sometimes,  simply  `telling  it  like  it  is': 
What  was  happening  here  in  1998  was  anomalous.  Workers  had  moved  from 
traditional  industries  to  `new'  industries  before  but  we  were  told  that  in  this  transition 
the  collective  aspects  of  their  work  were  lost.  The  fight  for  jobs,  decent  jobs,  had  been 
replaced  with  a  scramble  for  any  job  and  a  spirit  of  resistance  consigned  to  the 
dustbin  of  history.  Over  the  years,  this  was  portrayed  as  the  end  of  the  organised 
working  class,  the  end  of  trade  unionism  and  the  end  of  militancy,  which  was  no 
longer  to  be  a  feature  of  local  experience.  In  the  years  of  Conservative  rule,  unions 
were  beaten  back  by  years  of  legislation  -  not  just  anti-union  legislation  but  anti- 
working  class  legislation  in  the  shape  of  the  so-called  rolling  back  of  the  state.  Heads 
went  down  -  perhaps  there  really  was  no  alternative.  The  forces  of  the  right  at  home 
and  the  irresistible  forces  of  something  called  globalisation  conspired  to  create  a  new 
configuration  of  the  relationship  between  capital  and  labour,  the  latter  irreversibly 
weakened  in  the  process. 
The  batten  down  the  hatches  and  wait  for  a  Labour  government  approach  of  the 
1980s  was  exposed  in  all  its  weakness  in  the  election  of  1992.  Even  on  a  programme 
barely  recognisable  to  traditional  Labour  voters  in  terms  of  both  redistribution  and  in 
terms  of  Labour's  relationship  with  capital,  Labour  seemed  unelectable.  A  radical 
'modernisation'  and  reinvention  of  Labour  that  took  full  account  of  the  purchase  of 
the  right  and  that  could  make  meaningful  the  reach  of  globalisation  into  every  aspect 
of  working  class  lives  was  the  only  way  Labour  could  now  be  elected.  Only  this  would 
`save'  what  used  to  be  the  working  class.  For  the  many,  not  the  few!  A  return  to  a 
`socialism'  that  'worked'.  One  that  was  as  relevant  to  a  production  line  worker  as  it 
was  to  a  company  executive  in  the  same  factory.  Flexibility  was  the  key  -  no  jobs  for 
life.  These  ideas  don't  need  to  be  explained  to  the  people  who  worked  at  the  'leading 
edge'  companies  of  the  new  economy  in  Silicon  Glen.  With  flexibility,  little  regulation 
and  a  very  supportive  government  in  the  UK,  there  would  be  little  need  to  seek  out 
foreign'  cheap  labour.  After  all,  it  was  readily  available  at  home  in  the  shape  of  an 
extremely  expendable  workforce  beaten  down  by  years  of  long-term  unemployment  or 
churning  from  shit  job  to  shit  job,  always  losing  something  of  yourself  in  the  process. 
Yet  this  was  the  context  in  which  the  WCCI  workers  began  to  flex  what  muscle  they 
had  to  seek  out  a  voice.  Things  were  bad  enough  but  that  their  boss  and  his  pumped 
up'  underlings  did  not  attempt  to  conceal  their  overall  power  over  the  workers  - 
swearing  at  them,  intimidating  them  -  meant  something.  It  was  a  shift  too  far. 
Recognition  of  this  did  coincide  with  the  possibility  that  a  Labour  government  might 
be  prepared  to  reign  in  companies  like  this.  But  something  would  have  happened  here 
anyway.  `Success'  or  otherwise  might  have  been  contingent  on  Labour's  legal 
changes  -  but  they  would  have  gone  for  it  anyway.  Legislation  did  not  provoke  the 
early  militancy.  The  regime  and  the  workers'  recognition  of  their  position  in  the 
organisation  of  very  profitable  production  did. 
The  promise  of  legislation,  alongside  the  development  of  a  new  strategy  motivated  the 
ISTC  to  organise  in  this  `virgin'  territory.  And  then  what?  Four  years  of  jaw  jaw  not 
war-war'  that  sapped  militancy  almost  as  quickly  as  it  had  sprung  up.  Who  was  really 
prepared  for  the  influx  of  the  raw,  the  unorganised?  These  were  not  well  organised 
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background.  What  might  have  seemed  like  indiscipline  (the  shouting,  being  drunk  at 
meetings,  ignoring  `the  rules  of  the  game)  can't  be  separated  from  the  frustration  of 
working  at  WCCI.  This  wasn't  really  accounted  for  properly.  This  was  a  fledgling 
organisation  from  workers  whose  only  real  weapon  was  militancy.  Once  that  weapon 
was  taken  away  -  before  independent  organisation  could  develop  -  they  had  nothing. 
When  you  actually  exist  in  the  world  where  production  is  organised  around  a 
dichotomy  of  core  and  periphery  that  in  your  experience  is  clearly  a  false  one,  there  is 
an  immediacy  that  means  'gains'  and  `reforms'  need  to  be  got  quickly.  A  slow 
methodical  approach  undermined  this  and  needs  to  be  seen  as  inappropriate  in  this 
context.  Insecurity  has  become  an  emotional  state  as  well  as  a  material  state.  Where 
is  the  understanding  of  this  completeness?  When  large  numbers  of  workers  -  indeed  a 
majority  in  one  area  -  are  concentrated  into  these  circumstances,  this  helps  breed  a 
geographical  insecurity  that  reinforces  the  interaction  of  the  personal  and  the  social. 
Four  years  later  and  now  with  the  closure  of  the  factory  it  is  hard  to  see  what  real 
gains  were  made  by  the  workers  at  WCCI.  In  fact  closure  has  even  been  blamed  on 
the  uncompetitiveness  of  Gourock.  How  much  more  competitive  can  you  get  as  a 
worker.  You're  paid  buttons,  you  work  long  hours  and  crazy  shifts.  There  has  even 
been  some  debate  over  whether  problematic  worker-management  relations  have 
brought  about  closure  -  the  old  `if  they'd  kept  their  heads  down  and  their  mouths  shut 
then  they'd  have  a  job'  argument  i.  e.  union  recognition,  and  the  fight  for  it  quickened 
their  demise.  The  evidence  for  this  is  non-existent  and  other  developments  suggest 
otherwise.  There's  no  union  in  Compaq  whose  merger  with  Hewlett  Packard  brought 
hundreds  ofjob  losses  and  transfers  here,  in  Ayrshire  and  elsewhere  in  the  world.  The 
job  losses  connected  with  IBM  transfers  to  Solectron  then  Sanmina  happened  in  the 
absence  of  unionisation.  How  production  is  organised  and  the  so-called 
competitiveness  that  is  just  the  latest  justification  for  the  route  out  of  capitalist  crisis 
create  the  conditions  for  this  devastation. 
Were  the  workers  right  to  fight?  Of  course.  For  a  brief  period  there  was  a  sense  of 
dignity,  a  real  alternative  to  frustration  and  a  sense  of  clawing  something  back. 
WCCI  were  forced  in  some  sense,  however  briefly  as  it  turned  out,  to  factor  in  the 
notion  of  workers  having  something  resembling  `rights  :A  mood  of  collectivism, 
however  ineffectively  harnessed,  is  still  a  mood  of  collectivism.  The  union's  inability 
(unwillingness?  )  to  calibrate  this  did  damage  overall.  You  see  in  the  brave  new  world 
of  New  Labour,  collectivism  for  unions  like  the  ISTC  is  a  'value',  an  ethos'.  It  is 
stripped  of  any  dialectical  sense  of  collectivism  as  both  an  underpinning  value  and  as 
a  tool,  a  method.  What  use  is  it,  divorced  of  its  practical  application? 
I  chose  to  do  this  research  because  I  thought  I  was  confronting  clear  evidence  that  the 
working  class  wasn't  dead.  People  spoke  in  class  terms  and  their  commentary  on 
daily  life  at  the  factory  challenged  the  right  to  profit  at  this  level  while  they,  and 
others  like  them,  suffered.  I  remember  a  quote  from  somebody,  roughly:  'you  don't 
need  to  be  able  to  spell  gemeinschaft  and  gesellschaft  to  understand  the  trajectory  of 
modern  capitalism  :  Plenty  of  "them  and  us"  here  to  make  Blair  and  Monks 
uncomfortable  if  they  bothered  to  talk  to  the  right  people.  But  it  needed  organisation. 
Where  is  the  campaign  to  defend  these  jobs?  We've  lost  the  `right  to  work'  and  those 
who  claim  to  give  political  leadership  don't  seem  to  have  noticed.  Politicians' 
platitudes  are  left  unchecked. 
WCCI  was  important  for  the  insight  it  provides  into  twenty-first  century  production 
and  its  real  effects  -  effects  that  politicians  and  (some)  union  leaders  gloss  over. 
This  has  been  a  very  strange  week.  Briefly,  I  thought  it  was  a  joke  when  I  was  told  a 
security  fence  had  been  built  around  the  factory.  The  phone  call  to  say  the  factory  had 290 
been  closed  was  one  I'd  often  imagined  -  the  workers  often  joked  that  the  place  would 
be  shut  before  I'd  finished  the  research.  I  had  been  tipped  off  by  someone  high-up  in 
another  company  that  the  2000/01  redundancies  would  mean  the  factory's  closure.  I 
planned  that  this  would  be  the  end  of  my  `story'.  That  it  wasn't  was  a  bonus  and  the 
workers  lived  to  fight  another  day.  There  was  even  another  strike. 
Seeing  the  fence  and  the  security  guards  around  the  factory,  and  listening  to  news 
report  after  news  report  made  the  analysis  of  the  closure  surreal.  I  was  unconnected 
to  WCCI,  yet  it  has  been  a  central  part  of  my  life  for  more  than  four  years.  I  can  only 
describe  how  I  feel  as  being  like  a  ghost  in  a  building  that  burnt  down.  As  an 
observer,  known  only  to  a  small  core  of  workers  by  2003,  I  had  no  legitimate 
comment  to  make.  I  really  had  to  work  hard  to  use  the  last  meeting  as  an  evidence 
gathering  experience  because  I  was  deeply  affected.  Did  researcher's  distance  really 
matter  now?  Maybe  I  could  have  broken  the  researcher's  code  of  silence  at  earlier 
meetings  and  have  made  better  use  of  all  the  information  I  was  gathering.  I  might 
even  have  made  a  difference!  The  notion  that  these  workers  might  eventually  benefit 
from  this  research,  as  long  as  it  was  completed,  seems  so  hollow  now.  Do  we  use 
people? 
The  final  meeting  was  a  bit  of  a  shambles  -  one  of  the  busiest  I'd  ever  attended.  It  was 
also  an  example  of  a  continuing  resilience.  The  ISTC  seemed  a  bit  disorganised  in 
terms  of  the  conduct  of  the  meeting  -  as  ever  -  but  they  had  brought  along  a 
collection  of  `work'  counsellors  and  advisers  to  discuss  retraining  and  prospects  - 
very  New  Labour  but  still,  it  was  something.  But  this  was  a  crucial  meeting  and  this 
represented  a  squandered  opportunity  like  many  that  had  characterised  the  period 
since  recognition.  Yet  the  humour,  the  concern  for  the  jobs  of  the  `young  wans  ,  the 
open  criticism  of  the  ISTC,  of  the  company  and  other  companies  in  its  production 
network,  suggested  to  me  that  somewhere  in  the  room  the  seeds  that  had  borne  fruit 
for  the  ISTC  in  1998  remained.  This  was  the  first  meeting  I'd  been  at  without  my 
activist  buddies  and  I  was  known  only  to  one  man  sitting  at  our  table.  I  was  the  object 
of  curiosity  and  humour  but  I  played  up  the  just  ignore  me  -  I'm  doing  a  project  for 
college'  routine. 
The  noise  of  the  cross-fire  of  anger  and  frustration  at  the  company  and  my  own 
exasperation  at  the  union's  refusal  to  talk  about  what  went  wrong  or  to  fight  the 
closure  made  my  head  spin.  A  representative  from  Scottish  Enterprise  informed  the 
workers  that:  "  if  they  wanted  to  work,  they  would  work"  -  very  Third  Way  -a  new 
job  if  your  old  one  goes.  But  isn't  this  a  Tebbitesque  insult  -  the  kind  that  made  us  so 
determined  to  get  rid  of  the  Tories?  I  let  my  guard  slip  a  couple  of  times  and  this  was 
one  of  them.  I  said  "shite"  at  this  comment,  loud  enough  for  the  men  sitting  at  my 
table  to  hear.  By  far  the  best  response  to  this  insult  was  when  one  man  shouted:  "I 
want  to  retrain  as  a  scuba  diver  because  I'm  drowning  in  my  own  debt".  Another 
non-researcher  moment  came  when  the  workers  were  filling  out  forms  about 
retraining  needs.  They  were  eager  for  me  to  help  -I  was  eager  to  take  it  all  in.  I  was 
asked:  "what  do  I  put  for  occupation?  "  and  I  said  absently  "unemployed?  ",  not 
realising  that  I  was  being  asked  whether  this  worker  should  make  reference  to  his 
almost  ten  years  in  the  brave  new  world  of  electronics  or  whether  he  should  revert 
back  to  his  'trade'  And  therein  lies  a  story.  There  seemed  to  be  a  sense  in  which  the 
years  at  WCCI  and  elsewhere  in  this  new  world  represented  a  foray  into  something 
that  turned  out  to  be  as  temporary  as  they  always  thought  it  would  be.  I  then 
remembered  my  Dad's  `excuse'  for  not  having  gone  into  electronics  in  the  1960s  and 
1970s  when  'Big  Blue'  was  seen  as  the  model  employer.  He  said  it  was  a  seven  day 
wonder.  He  was  right  in  one  sense.  The  model  employer  myth  lasted  longer  than 291 
seven  days  but,  just  at  a  time  when  people  like  my  Dad  are  getting  grips  with  the  idea 
the  computers  are  now  the  commodity,  employment  in  electronics  locally  is 
contracting.  In  a  different  sense,  no  seven  day  wonder  could  ever  have  truly  shaped  a 
local  economy,  a  local  labour  market  -  real  lives  -  in  the  way  that  this  one  did.  The 
cost  of  electronics  in  Inverclyde  will  surely  one  day  be  measured  in  terms  of  its  real 
overall  effects  rather  than  in  terms  of  the  big  houses  that  employment  there  once 
bought  or,  more  recently,  the  status  for  credit  (some)  employment  there  affords. 
I  was  embarrassed  leaving  the  final  meeting  because  I  thought  I  looked  more  shell- 
shocked  than  everybody  else  -  the  real  workers.  I  was  worried  that  the  waiting 
photographers  would  think  my  ashen  face  would  make  a  good  'human  interest' 
picture  for  the  papers  next  day.  I  couldn't  go  for  a  drink  with  the  workers  though  they 
invited  me,  even  offering  to  pay  "cos  students  are  always  skint".  I  didn't  really  share 
their  experience  and  yet  somehow  I  did.  Somebody  joked  that  they  wanted  to  get  to  the 
job  centre  before  me  because  I'd  be  the  "cleverest  cunt  on  the  buroo  ". 
The  factory  might  be  closed  but  there  are  people  everywhere  who  could  teach  the 
'teachers'  about  struggle,  about  fight,  about  a  spirit  that  politicians  can  never  wish 
away.  WCCI  has  taught  me  more  about  'two  warring  camps  in  a  continuous  struggle' 
than  books.  It  has  also  taught  me  that  you  don't  need  to  make  a  choice  between 
sociology  and  struggle.  Properly  conducted  -  they're  the  same. 292 
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